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SUMMARY 
 
In this thesis, the common law crime of obstructing or defeating the course of justice as 
currently applied in South African law, is considered critically. The purpose of the study 
is to determine whether the ambit of the crime should be extended to target all conduct 
which undermines the proper administration of justice in South Africa.  The interests 
protected by the crime are investigated, and those important constitutional values which 
underpin the crime, are identified.  These values are: (i) constitutional supremacy (ii) the 
rule of law (iii) the doctrine of separation of powers, and (iv) the independence of the 
courts.  In a post-constitutional era, the question raised is whether the crime as developed 
in the common law adequately protects these important democratic values. The historical 
background and development of the offence are discussed.  This is followed by a 
comparative legal study which considers the existence and ambit of the offence in certain 
foreign jurisdictions.  The foreign legal systems considered are England, Australia, 
Canada and the United States of America.  The study reveals that the crime has been 
codified in most of these jurisdictions.  Codification was driven by the need for legal 
certainty and compliance with constitutional imperatives. The study concludes that 
similar reform is necessary in South African criminal law.  It is recommended that the 
common law offence of obstructing or defeating the course of justice be repealed and 
replaced with a comprehensive statutory offence which criminalises all manifestations of 
conduct which are intended to defeat or obstruct the proper administration of justice. The 
proposals are based upon the identified constitutional imperatives which underpin the 
crime.  It is argued that the legislature is the proper institution to initiate reform in this 
regard.  Detailed recommendations are made, which include draft legislation.   
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Key words:  lex Cornelia de falsis; lex Remmia; lex Julia de vi Publica; calumnia; 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 GENERAL 
The crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice serves to protect the integrity 
of the administration of justice.  The purpose of the crime is to intervene to prevent the 
malfunction of the administration of justice, rather than to punish those who have caused 
an injustice to be done.1 In the broader context this crime serves to uphold the democratic 
values recognized as core values in the Constitution of South Africa.2
 
 These values are: 
 (1) constitutional supremacy, 
 (2) the rule of law, 
 (3) the doctrine of separation of powers, and 
 (4) the independence of the courts.   
 
Despite the importance our constitutional state attaches to these values, the obstruction of 
the due administration of justice is a social phenomenon prevalent in South African 
society.  Alleged interference in the exercise of the functions of the judiciary by various 
organs of state is reported on a regular basis in the newspapers.  Manifestations of this 
crime are rife in various other contexts and both threaten and damage the democratic 
functioning of our society. 
 
                                                 
1J Burchell and J Milton Principles of Criminal Law 3ed by J Burchell (2005) 939.  
 
2The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.  
 
 2 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the common law offence of defeating or 
obstructing the course of justice as applied in South African law.  The main focus is 
whether the current definition of the crime targets all the conduct which undermines the 
proper administration of justice in the South African society.  The question raised is 
whether the values which underpin the offence, for example, the rule of law and the 
independence of the courts, are adequately protected in terms of the current application of 
the offence. 
   
The hypotheses are the following:  
 
(1) The current definition of the crime is inadequate to protect the important 
constitutional values which it is intended to serve, and 
(2) In a post-constitutional era, the crime should be extended to target all conduct 
which undermines these values. 
 
In order to critically evaluate the crime as applied in South African law, a comparative 
legal study was undertaken.  The law of selected foreign jurisdictions relating to the 
obstruction of the administration of justice is considered and compared with the South 
African position.  More particularly, the law of England, Canada, Australia and American 
federal law are considered.  It is significant that in all these jurisdictions (with the 
exception of the United Kingdom) the crime of obstruction of the administration of 
justice has been codified in comprehensive legislation.  Therefore, we have much to learn 
from how these jurisdictions have chosen to counter the phenomenon of obstruction of 
 3 
justice.  The application of the crime of obstruction of justice in the jurisdictions chosen 
for this study is compared with the South African approach for a number of reasons. 
 
Firstly, South African common law is a hybrid system3 based on English law and 
Roman-Dutch law.  The writer is mindful of the sentiments of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Park-Ross v Director: Office for Serious Economic Offences,4
 
 where it 
cautioned that reference to foreign jurisprudence should be exercised with circumspection 
because of the different contexts within which the law in these countries developed.  The 
court further warned of the danger of needlessly importing into the South African legal 
system doctrines associated with constitutions in foreign jurisdictions.  However, 
constitutional jurisprudence since 1994 reveals that reference to the law of comparable 
foreign jurisdictions has been of significant value in developing South African law to 
meet the constitutional demands of a changing society. 
Obstructing the course of justice is still a common law crime in English law.  As in South 
African law, case law is the source of law in England through which the crime of 
obstruction of justice developed, and the courts in England play an important role in the 
protection of individual liberties as much as they do in South Africa.5
                                                 
3See PHJ Thomas, CG van Der Merwe and BC Stoop Historical Foundations of South African Private Law 
2ed (2000) 7. 
 
  
41995 (2) SA 148 (SCA) at 160G-H. 
  
5RD and JEC Brierley Major Legal Systems in the World Today 2ed (1978) 346.  English law is now also 
subject to the European Community law as a result of the Human Rights Act of 1998.  For instance, section 
6 of the Human Rights Act requires judges to interpret statutory provisions in such a way as is compatible 
with Convention rights.  Section 2 obliges the judges to take account of the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights.  In the United Kingdom the judiciary is authorized to scrutinize the conformity of 
the legislation with the Human Rights Act of 1998.  However, it is not empowered to strike down 
 4 
Australia, too, belongs to the common law family.  Initially, the crime of perverting the 
course of justice was recognised only in Australia’s common law.  Currently, Australia 
has comprehensive federal legislation which deals with the crime of perverting the course 
of justice.  Therefore, South Africa can learn a lot from examining how the crime of 
obstructing the course of justice developed in Australian criminal law from a common 
law crime to a comprehensive statutory crime. 
 
The criminal justice systems of Canada and the United States of America are subject to 
written Constitutions with Bills of Rights that limit state powers.  Similarly to the South 
African position, the courts are the protectors of the civil rights and liberties of citizens.  
Both Canada and the United States of America have comprehensive legislation to deal 
with the crime of obstruction of justice.  Courts in these jurisdictions have developed 
jurisprudence on the obstruction of justice which is of significant value to any critical 
analysis of the crime as applied in South African law. 
 
The study indicates how the development of the crime of obstructing the proper 
administration of justice in these foreign legal systems is valuable to extending the scope 
of the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice in South African law.  The 
findings of this study follow. 
 
A consideration of foreign law reveals that while certain conduct that potentially 
undermines the due administration of justice is punishable as the criminal offence of 
                                                                                                                                                 
legislative enactments.   See A Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law 5ed (2006) 7 and P Lenta “ 
Democracy, rights and judicial review” (2004) SAJHR Vol 20 1 2.  
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obstruction of justice in other jurisdictions, it is not punishable in South African law.  The 
conclusion reached is that, as currently applied, the common law crime of obstructing the 
proper administration of justice does not sufficiently protect the proper administration of 
justice in all spheres of society.  It is recommended that the common law crime be 
repealed and replaced by legislation which criminalises all conduct intended to obstruct 
the due administration of justice.  A broad offence of obstructing or defeating the course 
of justice (as currently defined) should continue to be included in the legislation, but 
specific conduct should also be criminalized as separate offences.  It is recommended that 
the ambit of the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice be extended in 
legislation to include, inter alia, the following unlawful conduct intended to obstruct the 
due administration of justice:6
 
 
a. Picketing and parading with intent to threaten or intimidate a member of the 
judiciary. 
b. Interfering with judicial officers, assessors, witnesses and legal practitioners. 
c. Concealing offences.  
d. Attempting to obstruct or to defeat the course of justice or the due administration 
 of the law. 
e. Fabricating evidence or making use of fabricated evidence. 
f. Interfering with evidence. 
g. Deceiving witnesses. 
 
 
                                                 
6See the discussion of this conduct infra Chapter Nine under 9.4.  
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h. Obstructing justice administered in quasi-judicial proceedings such as 
commissions of inquiry, boards of inquiry, an inquiry by the National Assembly, 
the National Council of Provinces or a Municipal Council. 
i. Conspiring to bring a false accusation. 
j. Conspiring to defeat justice. 
k. A general offence of defeating or obstructing the due administration of justice.  
l. Refusing to give or allow the taking of a blood sample required in terms of 
section 37(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and section 65(9) of 
the National Road Traffic Act 93 of 1996 in order to determine drunken driving. 
m. Persuading another person to plead guilty to a crime. 
n. Obtaining bail by improper means. 
o. Persuading a victim not to report a criminal incident to the relevant authorities or 
not to prosecute his assailant. 
p. Pleading guilty to a crime committed by another person.  
 
Recommendations are accordingly made for law reform which will include draft 
legislation.7
  
 It is also suggested that to waste police time and resources by making a false 
report that a crime has been committed should be punishable as a separate offence. 
 
 
                                                 
7See infra Chapter Nine under 9.4. 
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1.2 FIELD AND GENERAL SCHEME OF STUDY  
This thesis is divided into nine chapters.  Chapter 1 is the introduction.  Chapter 2 deals 
with the historical background of the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of 
justice, and it exhaustively analyses the Roman, Roman-Dutch, early English and South 
African law.  Chapter 3 deals with the application of the crime of perverting or 
preventing or attempting to pervert or prevent the course of justice in the English criminal 
justice system.  Chapter 4 considers how the Australian criminal justice system deals with 
the crime of perverting the due administration of justice, and Chapter 5 deals with the 
treatment of the crime of obstruction of justice in Canadian law.  Chapter 6 deals with the 
federal law of the United States of America, and South African law is dealt with in 
Chapter 7.  In Chapter 8, the impact of the South African Constitution8
                                                 
8The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.  
 on the common 
law crime of defeating the course of justice is considered.  The core values of our 
Constitution which the crime of obstruction of justice strives to protect are identified.  
Other aspects that are considered in this chapter are the interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights; whether certain rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited for the purposes of 
protecting the due administration of justice and whether the current definition of the 
crime infringes the constitutional principle of legality.  Chapter 9 sets out the conclusions 
of this study.  It considers whether the crime should be extended, and if so, whether that 
reform should be undertaken by the legislature or by the courts.  Law reform is suggested 
and comprehensive proposals are made for codification of the crime. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1    ROMAN LAW 
2.1.1    General 
The crime of obstructing the course of justice, as it is known today in South African law, 
originates from the provisions of the Roman lex Cornelia de falsis (the Cornelian Laws of 
Falsity).1 The penalty of the lex Cornelia was imposed on somebody who altered, 
suppressed or counterfeited the truth committed with wrongful intent to harm and prejudice 
another.2 There is authority to assert that the Romans did not pass any law for the crime of 
falsity before the Cornelian laws were enacted.3 This may be inferred from words of 
Cicero.4
 
  
It appears from Cicero’s text that the two Cornelian Laws on falsity were enacted after 80 
BC.5 The first law related to falsity committed in testaments and the second pertained to 
false coinage.  Subsequently, other senatusconsulti6
                                                 
1A Berger Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (1953) 341.103. 
 were added to the law on testaments  
 
2The Digest of Justinian Vol IV 48.10.1 (hereinafter referred to as D.  Latin edited by T Mommsen and P 
Krueger and translated by A Watson). 
 
3D48.10.1.  
 
4In Verrem, II.i.42:  “[A]nd in no (that is, law) is the deed of the past made subject to censure, except a deed 
of a kind which in its own nature is criminal and nefarious, so that it ought to have been totally avoided, even 
if no law existed.  And in these very matters we notice much that was prohibited by law in such a way that 
deeds committed previously were not brought to prosecution.  Take the Cornelian Law on testaments, and the 
Law on coinage, and a number of others; in these there is not some new legal precept which is laid down for 
the people, but it is enacted that what has always been an evil deed should as from a certain date be subject to 
trial before the people.  Except that false witnesses were dealt with in the XII Tables, tab. 7, law 12 (see 
Funccius, ad leges XII Tabularum):  Let him who has spoken false witness be thrown from the Tarpeian 
rock.”  Citation from DG Van der Keessel Praelectiones ad Jus Criminale Vol III (Bk 48.10.1) translated by 
B Beinart and P van Warmelo (1973) 1299. 
 
5Ibid. 
 
6A senatusconsultum is that which the Senate commands and ordains; the Roman  population eventually 
increased to such an extent that it was difficult to assemble them all for the purpose of enacting laws, so it 
seemed more practical to consult the Senate on behalf of the people.  Cf RB Howes and RPB Davis The 
Elements of Roman Law: Being Selections from the Institutes of Justinian, with explanatory notes, for the use 
of students (1923) 17. 
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where the penalty of the Cornelian Law was extended to other types of falsity committed in 
respect of documents.  For the purposes of this thesis, the relevant senatusconsulti are those 
which prohibited people from accepting money for arranging legal assistance and those 
which dealt with witnesses who accepted money to give, or not to give, evidence.  The acts 
that constituted crimes under the lex Cornelia de falsis will now be discussed. 
 
2.1.2    Punishable acts in terms of the lex Cornelia de falsis 
Under Roman law the following acts fell foul of the lex Cornelia:7
 
 
a. To knowingly, and with malicious intent, conspire to give false witness or to furnish, 
one after another, false evidence.8
 
  
b. Where a person accepted money in order to furnish evidence.9 In this instance, the 
person would have contravened the lex Cornelia de falsis if he or she received money 
in order to renounce or withdraw evidence, or to give or to withhold evidence.10
 
 
c. Where a person accepted money to provide advocacy or evidence, or made an 
agreement to, or conspired to, ensnare an innocent person.11
 
   
d. To corrupt, or to provide for the corruption of a judge.12
                                                 
7D 48.10.1-2; A Berger Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (2002) 467 and PMA Hunt South African 
Criminal Law and Procedure: Common Law Crimes Vol II 2ed by JRL Milton (1982) 137.   
 Fraudulently preventing a 
judge from freely deciding, as he should, was also a contravention of the lex Julia de 
 
8D 48.10.1. 
 
9D 48.10.1.2. 
10Ibid. 
  
11D 48.10.1.1. 
12D 48.10.1.2. 
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vi publica.13 This lex is discussed in detail in the ensuing pages.14
  
 
e. Where a judge neglected the imperial constitutions, or pronounced a sentence that 
was contrary to the law which was cited to him.15
 
 
f. Where a person made a false entry or removed an item from accounts, registers, wax 
tables, or any other such record, without affixing a seal.16 An Egyptian prefect, for 
example, was condemned for forgery under the lex Cornelia, because he made a false 
entry in his records while he was in charge of the province.17
 
 
g. Where a person opened someone else’s will while the latter was still alive18 and stole, 
hid, removed, destroyed, partially erased, substituted or unsealed a will, or, with 
malicious intent, wrote, sealed or recited a false will.19
 
   
2.1.3    Requirements for liability in terms of the lex Cornelia 
To fall foul of the Cornelian law of falsity, the following requirements had to be met:20
 
 
a. The accused must have acted positively; he must have done something which 
distorted the truth.  Examples included when someone forged accounts, testaments or 
                                                 
13See Hunt op cit (n 7) 137. 
14For a discussion of the crime, see text at 2.1.6 infra at note 33.  
15D 48.10.1.3. 
16D 48.10.1.4.  This is a crime of forgery, as opposed to defeating or obstructing the course of justice. 
17Ibid. 
18D 48.10.1.5. 
19D 48.10.2.  
20D 48.10.1; D48.10.1.1 and D48.10.9.  
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any other matter,21 or added some impurity to gold.22
 
 
b. The act must probably have caused harm and prejudice to another person, for 
example, when the accused entered into an agreement with another person in order to 
falsely accuse an innocent person.23
 
 
c. The accused must have acted wrongfully.24
  
 
d. He or she must have acted intentionally.25
 
   
2.1.4    The lex Remmia  
There is authority to assert that a person who entered into an agreement, or who conspired 
with another person to ensnare an innocent person, was punished in terms of the lex 
Cornelia de falsis.26 False accusations against another person (calumnia) were also 
punished in terms of the lex Remmia.27 However, there was no rush to regard someone who 
failed to prove his case as a calumniator, because the investigation of that matter was 
entrusted to the discretion of the judge.28
                                                 
21D 48.10.1.4. 
 It is said that, after the acquittal of the accused, 
the judge would begin to look into the intention and state of mind of the accuser and that 
which led him or her to bring the accusation.  If it was found that there was a reasonable 
22D 48.10.9.  
23D 48.10.1.1. 
24D 48.10.1. 
25Ibid. 
26Ibid. 
27D 48.16.1.2; Hunt op cit (n 7) 137.  Calumnia is defined as a false charge, malicious accusation or 
prosecution (civil claim).  For this definition, see HL Gonin and WJG Lubbe Lexicon Institutionum Gai et 
Institutionum Justiniani: Latin – English (1987) 41. 
 
28D 48.16.1.3. 
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mistake on the part of the accuser, he or she was cleared, but if the judge caught the accuser 
in a manifest act of calumny, the accuser was punished for calumnia in terms of the lex 
Remmia.29 It is said that in private indictments, as in accusations extra ordinem, all persons 
guilty of calumny were punished extra ordinem according to the degree of their offences.30
 
  
2.1.5 Requirements for liability in terms of the lex Remmia 
For X to be convicted of calumnia in terms of the lex Remmia he or she should have acted 
dolo malo.31
 
 
2.1.6 The lex Julia de vi Publica  
It has been said that to fraudulently prevent a judge from freely deciding as he should was a 
contravention of the lex Cornelia de falsis,32 but there is further authority to the effect that 
such an act was also punished under the lex Julia de vi publica.33 The lex Julia on extortion 
applied to anyone holding positions of magistracy, power, administration, legateship, 
office, duty, public employment or while on the staff of any of these positions and who 
took monies.  Anyone who, while holding any position of power, accepted money in return 
for giving or not giving a judgment or passing sentence was liable under this lex.34
 
 
It is said that the lex Julia on extortion provided that no one should take anything for the 
                                                 
29D 48.16.1.3.  Whichever of the two verdicts the judge reached was made clear by the very words of his 
pronouncement.  If he pronounced: “you have not proved [your case,]” he had acquitted the accuser of 
calumny; but if, on the other hand, he pronounced that “you have committed calumny,” he had condemned 
him.  See D 48.16.1.4. 
 
30D 48.16.3. 
 
31Hunt op cit (n 7) 137.  
 
32D 48.10.1.2 and Hunt op cit (n 7) 137.  See text under 2.1.2 supra, at note 13. 
 
33Hunt op cit (n 7) 137.  ‘Anyone who does something with malicious intent to hinder the safe exercise of 
justice or to hinder judges in the proper giving of judgment, or [to hinder] anyone holding office or power 
from giving decrees or orders or from acting as he has the right to do, contravened the lex Julia de vi public.’ 
 
34D 48.11.3. 
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purpose of providing it to a judge or arbiter in order to change him or compel him to give a 
certain judgment; nor for not providing, not changing, or not ordering him to give 
judgment; nor for throwing a man into a public prison, binding him, ordering him to be 
bound, or releasing him from his chains; nor for condemning or acquitting any man; nor for 
assessing damages, giving or not giving judgment involving status or money.35 This lex 
also punished those people who accepted money to give or withhold evidence.36 It is also 
said that a person condemned under this law was prohibited from ever giving evidence 
publicly, from being a judge, or from bringing an accusation.37
 
   
2.1.7 Summary of Roman law 
In Roman law the crime of obstructing the course of justice came into being after the 
enactment of the lex Cornelia de falsis in 80 BC.  In terms of this law a person could be 
punished for various acts, for example: 
 
a.  procuring false witnesses; 
b.  furnishing false evidence; 
c.  suppressing witnesses; 
d.  conspiring to lay false charges against an innocent person;  
e.  using false or forged documents in court; 
f.  corrupting or attempting to corrupt a judge; 
g.  being a judge, neglecting the imperial constitutions; and 
h.  accepting money in order to give evidence.  
 
                                                 
35D 48.11.7. 
36D 48.11.6. 
37D 48.11.6.1. 
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Except for the acts listed above, which also fall under the ambit of the lex Cornelia de 
falsis, were perjury, fraud, counterfeiting and other similar conduct. Dolo malo was a 
requirement before a person could be convicted for contravening the lex Cornelia de falsis.   
Other important pieces of legislation concerning the crime of obstructing the course of 
justice were the lex Julia de vi publica and the lex Remmia.  The former forbade anyone to 
fraudulently prevent a judge from deciding as he should.  The latter law was infringed when 
someone accused an innocent person of a crime knowing very well that he or she was 
innocent. 
 
2.2 ROMAN-DUTCH LAW  
2.2.1 General 
In Roman-Dutch law, the crime of falsity developed from the Roman law in general, and 
the Roman lex Cornelia in particular.  This is confirmed in the writings of some old 
Roman-Dutch writers38 whose approach to the study of the law was always by way of the 
Roman law set out by Justinian.39
 
 Similarly to the Roman law, certain acts which defeated 
or obstructed the course of justice were also punished under the Roman-Dutch law.  Under 
Roman-Dutch law the crime of falsity was categorised in terms of: 
a. Documents,40
b. Proceedings and evidence,
 
41
c. Testimony.
 and 
42
 
  
                                                 
38A Matthaeus (1601-1654); J Voet (1647-1713) and DG Van der Keessel (1738-1816).  See also AB 
Edwards The History of South African Law: an outline (1996) 53-63. 
 
39Edwards op cit (n 38) 53. 
40Van der Keessel op cit (n 4) 48.10.6.  
 
41Van der Keessel op cit (n 4) 48.10.8.  
42Ibid.  
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All the categories of falsity will now be discussed in detail hereunder. 
 
2.2.2    Categories of falsity 
2.2.2.1    Falsity with regard to documents 
This type of falsity was committed, inter alia, in the following ways:  
 
a. When a person concealed something in order to hide the truth, and thus suppressed a 
genuine document which he or she was compelled to produce, or those who had unsealed 
such a document or who had substituted a document, that is to say, a false one;43 to conceal 
the truth and to keep others ignorant of a fact which one knows and which it is in their 
interest to know, for one’s own gain;44 to keep silent about the truth or a fraudulently 
concealed truth which might lead others into mistake is referred to as the fraud of being 
silent.45
 
 
b. When someone wrote false statements in his or her document to the prejudice of 
another person.  When, for example, debtor X antedated the date of a pledge given for a 
debt by Y, a creditor.  This act causes prejudice to creditor Y.46 Van der Keessel provides 
the following fitting example: on a certain day, someone wrote in a chirograph a date 
anterior to that on which the pledge had, in actual fact, been effected.47
                                                 
43Van der Keessel op cit (n 4) 48.10.6.  
 Similarly, this type 
of falsity is committed by X, who, though he had been away, wrote in a chirograph or in a 
 
44A Matthaeus De Criminibus Vol III (48.7.1.12), edited and translated by MC Hewett and BC Stoop at 418. 
 
45J Voet Commentarius ad Pandectus (48.10.4), translated by P Gane The Selective Voet: Being the 
Commentary on the Pandects Vol 7 (1957) 458. 
 
46Van der Keessel op cit (n 4) 48.10.6.  These are not acts which obstruct or defeat the course of justice, but 
examples of fraud.  They are only discussed here for the sake of completeness in order to show that under the 
lex Cornelia de falsis the crime of obstructing the course of justice sometimes overlapped with crimes like 
fraud and forgery.  See Hunt op cit (n 7) 137.  
  
47Van der Keessel op cit (n 4) 48.10.6. 
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receipt that he had received his property in person, his purpose being to cause prejudice to 
another.48Although these acts were punishable as species of crimen falsi, they are rather 
examples of fraud and are not acts which infringe the free administration of justice.49
 
  
2.2.2.2    Falsity with regard to judicial proceedings and evidence 
The following acts with regard to judicial proceedings and evidence were punishable in 
terms of the lex Cornelia de falsis  in Roman-Dutch law:   
 
a. Bribing a prosecutor, and if the prosecutor accepted money for refraining to 
prosecute, that is, to settle a criminal case, or for summoning or for not summoning a 
witness.50 Thus, a prosecutor who had previously summoned witnesses to give evidence on 
behalf of the state then exempted such witnesses from continuing to give evidence in order 
to protect the accused from conviction would have violated the law.  It was also a violation 
of the lex Cornelia for the prosecutor who had already started with prosecution, to accept 
money for summoning witnesses so that the accused might more readily be incriminated.51 
Van der Keessel52
 
 was of the opinion that it was immaterial whether the evidence led was 
true or false.  Both the person who bribed the prosecutor for not summoning witnesses (the 
corruptor) and the prosecutor who connived with the accused, and his or her friends, 
committed this type of falsity. 
b. Bribing or causing bribery of a judge in order for him to pass or not to pass a certain 
                                                 
48Ibid. 
49Hunt op cit (n 7) 137.  
50Van der Keessel op cit (n 4) 48.10.8. 
51Ibid. 
52Ibid. 
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verdict.53 This crime carried a very serious punishment, especially if the judge was bribed 
in order to give an unfair judgment.54
 
   
c. A judge accepting a bribe.55
 
 Judges and their deputies were punished in various ways 
when bribed, but a heavy punishment was not always passed, except on the judge who was 
bribed to give an unfair judgment.  
d. If a judge disregarded imperial constitutions or pronounced a sentence contrary to the 
law which was cited to him.56 It is said that a judge who gave a judgment contrary to the 
imperial constitutions or contrary to the public law which was read out to him infringed the 
lex Cornelia de falsis and was deported to an island.  This crime was not committed 
through negligence or lack of legal knowledge, because the law was read out to the judge; 
and it further appears that wrongful intent was a further requirement.57
 
   
e. Selling the outcome of the court’s judgment.58
friendship or intimacy with a judge and sold the outcome of his judgments committed the 
crime.  These people presented themselves as though they would easily obtain from a judge 
a judgment in favour of the person from whom they accepted money to that end.  They sold 
the promise of victory in an action, and entered into such agreements on the understanding 
that they would give the money to the relevant judge.  Such actions were probably 
punishable, because they tarnished the integrity of the judge and perverted the proper 
 Persons who falsely claimed 
                                                 
53Matthaeus op cit (n 44) 48.7.1.9.  See also Van der Keessel op cit (n 4) 48.10.8. 
54Van der Keessel op cit (n 4) 48.10.8. 
55Ibid. 
56Ibid; Voet op cit (n 45) 48.10.3 and Matthaeus op cit (n 44) 48.7.1.9. 
57Van der Keessel op cit (n 4) 48.10.8.   
58Ibid. 
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administration of justice. 
 
2.2.2.3    Falsity with regard to testimony  
The following acts with regard to testimony were punishable in terms of the lex Cornelia de 
falsis and also in Roman-Dutch law: 
 
a. Where a person accepted money or agreed that money be paid to him or her for 
arranging legal assistance or testimony.59 Also, where a person accepted money for 
promoting a lawsuit by arranging legal assistance, or witnesses, for reward, to the detriment 
of an innocent person, he committed the crime of falsity.  It was considered to be wrong 
and, therefore, a crime, to persuade an advocate or a witness to take up the case of a friend 
and to accept money for performing that service.60
 
  
b. Where a person accepted money for giving, or for not giving evidence.61 
According to Matthaeus,62 if someone accepted money in order to suppress evidence, he or 
she infringed the lex Cornelia de falsis.  However, if he or she received no money, but 
refrained from attending judicial proceedings as a witness he or she was not liable.  His 
reason was that a person could not be deemed to commit a falsity by altogether refraining 
from giving evidence, but those who presented themselves as witnesses and suppressed the 
truth were naturally liable for falsity.63 Roman-Dutch authors64
                                                 
59Van der Keessel op cit (n 4) 48.10.8 and Matthaeus op cit (n 44) 48.7.1.14.  
 did not agree on the issue 
that people who did not receive money, but who still refrained from presenting themselves 
60Since advocates were allowed to accept a fee, this should not be understood to refer to one who instructed an 
advocate in a normal way, but to he or she who accepted money to instruct an advocate to the detriment of an 
innocent person.  See Matthaeus op cit (n 44) 48.7.14. 
 
61Van der Keessel op cit (n 4) 48.10.8. 
62Matthaeus op cit (n 44) 48.7.1.12. 
63Ibid. 
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as witnesses did not fall foul of the lex Cornelia.    
 
Another controversial issue was whether someone who accepts money to give evidence 
falls foul of the lex Cornelia when their evidence unexpectedly serves to assist, not the 
person who called the witness but his or her adversary.65 Matthaeus66
 
 said that some 
commentators took the view that such a person did not fall foul of the lex Cornelia, but 
Matthaeus held the contrary view.  He said the law was framed without distinction and that 
a person should be punished with the penalty for falsity if he or she received money in 
return for giving evidence.  He wrote that if a person received money either to tell or not to 
tell the truth he was necessarily liable, because the legislature intended to prevent witnesses 
from receiving money as this prospect of a reward would encourage certain people to give 
false testimony. 
c. Giving false testimony.67 It is said that one who gave false testimony was liable in 
terms of the lex Cornelia.  Voet68 said that falsity took place when anyone with evil intent 
made statements which were false, or which varied and were mutually inconsistent, or gave 
differing evidence on behalf of two persons.  Some commentators raised the question as to 
whether a person was liable in terms of the lex Cornelia if that person, in fact, did not give 
false testimony, but, however, suppressed the truth.  It is said that some commentators 
made a distinction between whether he or she did or did not accept money for doing so.  
Matthaeus69
                                                                                                                                                     
64Van der Keessel op cit (n 4) 48.10.8 and Matthaeus op cit (n 44) 48.7.1.12. 
 was of the opinion that the distinction was not important.  Giving false 
65Matthaeus op cit (n 44) 48.7.1.13. 
66Ibid. 
67Van der Keessel op cit (n 4) 48.10.8. 
68Voet op cit (n 45) 48.10.3.  
69Matthaeus op cit (n 44) 48.10.12.  
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testimony was treated so seriously that those who gave false testimony that resulted in an 
innocent person being condemned in a capital offence received the maximum penalty.70
 
 
d. Where a witness disclosed his or her evidence to both parties in the matter 
before the court.71
 
 This happened when Y had called X as a witness in his case against Z, 
and X disclosed the evidence he or she would give on behalf of Y to Z so that Z could come 
prepared against the evidence.  
e. Where persons conspired to render innocent persons liable.72
 
 Persons who, with 
wrongful intent, entered into an agreement or conspired to burden an innocent person with 
some false prosecution were liable for falsity, or if they did so in order that the person who 
had been unjustly prosecuted should be unable to save himself or herself. 
2.2.3   Ways of committing falsity 
Having discussed the categories of falsity, this thesis will now look at the ways of 
committing the crime of falsity.  In Roman-Dutch law the crime of falsity was committed in 
the following four ways: 
 
a. By speaking.73
 
 This included reading out a false last will and maliciously making 
false statements; and when a judge, in passing judgement, maliciously disregarded the 
ordinances of the Emperors. 
                                                 
70Matthaeus op cit (n 44) 48.7.2.1. 
71Van der Keessel op cit (n 4) 48.10.8 and Voet op cit (n 45) 48.10.6. 
72Van der Keessel op cit (n 4) 48.10.8.  
73Voet op cit (n 45) 48.10.3.  
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b. By silence.74
 
 There were seven instances, including suppression of evidence.  Among 
other things, this offence was committed when one remained silent about and concealed the 
truth so that others were led into mistakes.  
c. By writing.75 There were eleven instances, including forgery.  Voet76
 
 noted that one 
became guilty of falsity by putting together fraudulently false written statements of 
evidence to be submitted, or false records of evidence to be inspected, that is to say, had 
reduced them to writing so that they might be used in a judicial proceeding. 
d. By act.77 This included corruption of judges, counterfeiting and adulteration and 
using of false weights and measures or false trademarks.  It is also said that this way also 
applied to the person who opened the last will of a living person; or betrayed documents 
deposited with him or her to the opponents of the depositor; or had sold the same property 
in whole to two different persons by different contracts.78
 
    
2.2.4    Requirements for liability in terms of Roman-Dutch law 
Under Roman-Dutch law, for an accused’s conduct to fall foul of the Cornelian law of 
falsity, the following requirements had to be met: 
 
a. There should have been an alteration of the truth.79
                                                 
74Voet op cit (n 45) 48.10.4. 
 This happened, inter alia, when a 
person had given false testimony.  When, for example, someone had committed forgery in 
75Voet op cit (n 45) 48.10.5.  
76Ibid.  
 
77Voet op cit (n 45) 48.10.6.  
78Voet op cit (n 45) 48.10.6.1-3. 
  
79Van der Keessel op cit (n 4) 48.10.1.  
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accounts, testaments or any other matter or had added some impurity to gold.  Secondly, 
suppression of the truth; for example, if someone had destroyed or stolen another person’s 
testament; or had made away with accounts; or with wrongful intent ruined the edicts.  
Lastly, counterfeiting the truth constituted falsity, for example, if someone had forged 
another person’s chirograph; or had given false testimony; or delivered false letters in the 
name of the praetor or used a false name.  It is said that those who, with wrongful intent, 
opened letters addressed to others also committed falsity.80
 
 
b. The act should have caused harm and prejudice to another person.81 Van der 
Keessel82 said that this requirement must be understood in the sense that harm is probably 
threatened by the act of falsity, even though possibly it had not been caused.  He gives the 
example of a witness who had given false testimony.  According to him, such witness was 
liable for falsity even if the court gave no credence to his or her testimony.83
 
 So, according 
to Van der Keessel, only potential prejudice was required. 
c. The accused must have acted dolo malo.84  The third requirement was that it should 
have been committed with wrongful intent.  Although Van der Keessel acknowledged the 
fact that in some situations falsity could be committed through gross negligence, for 
example, where the law stipulated that falsity could be committed through negligence and 
had specifically provided for exceptions, he preferred to say that falsity was committed by 
wrongful intent only.85
                                                 
80Ibid. 
 The exception mentioned in the Roman-Dutch law where 
81Ibid.  
82Ibid .  
83Ibid. 
84Ibid.  
85Ibid. 
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negligence was said to constitute falsity was where persons failed to prevent falsity when 
they were able to do so.86 It is said that this was a special law applicable solely to the crime 
of false coinage.87 It is submitted that punishing people with falsity for failing to prevent 
falsity when they were able to do so, should be taken as authority that even an omission 
was punished as falsity under the lex Cornelia de falsis when the was a legal duty to act 
positively or when the legal conviction of the society demanded X to act positively.88
 
   
2.2.5    Summary of Roman-Dutch law 
The Roman-Dutch law developed from the Roman Cornelian law.  Following Roman law 
and treating the various ways of defeating or obstructing the course of justice as punishable, 
as well as a variety of other fraudulent conduct that infringed upon the interests of the due 
administration of justice, the Roman-Dutch law widened the scope of the Cornelian law of 
falsity.  
 
The following acts relating to the obstruction of the proper administration of justice were 
punishable in terms of the Roman-Dutch law:  
 
a. Bribing a prosecutor and if a prosecutor accepted a bribe in order to refrain from 
prosecuting. 
b. Bribing or causing bribery of a judge in order for him or her to pass or not to pass a 
verdict. 
c. A judge accepting a bribe. 
                                                 
86Ibid. 
87Ibid. 
88See comment on the legal convictions of the society infra Chapter Seven under 7.1, text at note 18.  
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d. If a judge disregarded imperial constitutions or pronounced a sentence contrary to the 
law which was cited to him. 
e. Selling the outcome of the court’s judgment.   
f. Accepting money for arranging legal assistance or testimony. 
g. Accepting money for giving or not giving evidence. 
h. Giving false testimony. 
i. Where a witness disclosed his evidence to both parties to the matter before the court. 
j. The bringing of false accusations against another person (calumnia) was also an 
offence in Roman-Dutch law.  
k. There is Roman-Dutch authority which indicates that persons who through wrongful 
intent failed to prevent falsity when they were able to do so (omission) were punished 
with the penalty of falsity.  It is said that this was a special law applicable solely to 
the crime of false coinage. Therefore, this shows that not only positive acts were 
punished in terms of the lex Cornelia, but failure to act positively was also punished. 
 
In Roman-Dutch law the following fraudulent conduct which infringed upon interests other 
than the free administration of justice were also punishable as species of crimen falsi: 
 
a. Writing a false statement in a document to the prejudice of another person.  For 
example: 
 
i. when a debtor antedated the date of a pledge given for a debt by Y, a creditor, 
and 
ii. X, who, though he had been away, wrote in a chirograph or in a receipt that he 
had received his property in person, its purpose being to cause prejudice to 
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another. 
 
This leads us next to an historical overview of this crime in English law.     
 
2.3    ENGLISH LAW  
2.3.1 General 
In English law a miscellany of specific offences was treated traditionally under the rubric of 
perverting the course of justice.89 It is said that the offences of interfering with the course of 
justice were somewhat numerous.90 In English law obstructing the course of justice was a 
common law crime that could be tried only on indictment and punishable at the discretion 
of the court.91 The crime had a more general application and it punished any conduct which 
had a tendency to wrongfully interfere with the initiation, progress or outcome of any court 
proceedings, including arbitration proceedings.92 There is English authority for asserting 
that attempts to commit this crime were also punishable.93 It is said that the charge took the 
form of inchoate offences of incitement, conspiracy or attempt even though justice had 
been manifestly perverted.94 Card95 and Smith and Hogan96
                                                 
89Hunt op cit (n 7) 138.  
 submit that the use of the word 
‘attempt’ in the name of this offence is misleading because the attempt is per se the 
substantive offence.  In the next paragraph we will look at types of conduct that constituted 
the crime of perverting the course of justice. 
90GL Williams Criminal Law: The general part 2ed (1961) 416. 
91R Card Cross, Jones and Card Criminal Law 11ed (1988) 427. 
92Card op cit (n 91) 428.   
93The Queen v Vreones [1891] 1 QB 360 at 367; JC Smith and B Hogan Criminal Law 6ed (1988) 751 and 
Williams op cit (n 90) 416.  
 
94Smith and Hogan op cit (n 93) 751. 
95Card op cit (n 91) 427.  
  
96Smith and Hogan op cit (n 93) 751.    
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2.3.2    Actus reus of the crime of attempt to pervert the course of justice  
Card97 observes that the use of the word ‘attempt’ when referring to this offence is 
misleading because the attempt itself is the substantive offence.  Williams98
 
 observes that 
there is authority for asserting the existence of a general common law misdemeanour to 
pervert, delay or defeat the course of justice.  The following types of conduct constituted 
the offence of perverting the course of justice: 
a. Interfering with witnesses.99 It was a common law misdemeanour to attempt to 
dissuade or prevent a witness from appearing or giving evidence.  In R v Johnson100 it was 
held that agreeing to give another person a sum of money in order to testify and prove that a 
deed was forged for purposes of obtaining a verdict, was a criminal offence. The facts of 
this case were as follows:  The case emanated from a civil trial where, among other things, 
the truthfulness of the deed which the plaintiff produced against the defendant was at issue.  
During the trial the plaintiff produced a deed against the defendant, Johnson, and her 
tenants.  Allegedly, Johnson denied that the deed was true.  It was further alleged that 
Johnson agreed to give Y a sum of money in order for him (Y) to prove that the deed was 
forged.101 She was convicted for subornation of perjury.102 She appealed.  It was submitted 
on Johnson’s behalf that she was found guilty of no crime because the charge did not 
surmise or allege that the deed was true.103
 
  
                                                 
97Card op cit (n 91) 427 and R Card Cross and Jones Introduction to Criminal Law 9ed (1980) 284.  
 
98Williams op cit (n 90) 416.  
99Williams op cit (n 90) 416. 
100(1678) 2 Shaw 1 753.  
101At 754.  
102At 753-54.  
 
103At 754.  
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The court, per Justice Jones, held:104 ‘I judge it an offence, for witnesses ought to come 
unbiased and not affected with money.’  The court found that an agreement to prove that a 
deed was forged was an indictable offence if done with a wrongful intent.105 The court, in a 
majority judgement, confirmed the conviction.106
 
 
The importance of this case is twofold.  Firstly, the conviction was in line with the Roman 
lex Cornelia de falsis, namely, it punished witnesses for receiving money for, inter alia, 
giving or not giving evidence.107
 
 Johnson attempted to obstruct the course of justice by 
inducing someone to make a false report in return for money.  This was a common law 
misdemeanour in English law.  Secondly, the case shows that there was some overlapping 
between the crime of perverting the course of justice and the crime of perjury or 
subornation of perjury.   
b. Intimidation of witnesses.108 In the Nineteenth Century, threatening and intimidating 
witnesses with the intention of preventing them from giving evidence was punished as 
contempt of court and not as a misdemeanour to pervert the course of justice.  Conspiracy 
to commit this offence was also punishable.109 One of the earliest cases that dealt with the 
intimidation of witnesses was Shaw v Shaw.110
 
 
The facts of this case were as follows:  The respondent (Mr Shaw) was petitioned by his 
                                                 
104At 756.   
105At 753.  
106At 756.  
107Matthaeus op cit (n 44) 48.10.12 and Van der Keessel op cit (n 4) 48.10.8.  See text under 2.1.2 supra at 
note 11. 
 
108Shaw v Shaw (1861) 6 LT 1096.  
  
109JWC Turner Russell on Crimes 12ed Vol 1 (1964) 313. 
110Shaw v Shaw supra (n 108) at 1096.  
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wife to show cause why he should not be imprisoned or dealt with according to law for 
contempt of court for threatening and intimidating witnesses in a hearing against him.  The 
witnesses referred to here were Mrs Downan and Mrs Stewart.  The former had been 
working for the Shaws for three months in 1860.  She alleged in her affidavit that she had 
witnessed the physical abuse of Mrs Shaw by the respondent on many occasions.  It was 
alleged that he threatened and intimidated the witnesses for the purpose of preventing them 
from giving evidence against him. 
 
The Judge observed that the respondent’s actions were intended to intimidate the two 
witnesses so that they would not give evidence at the hearing and that, therefore, he was 
guilty of contempt of court.111
 
 In this case, intimidating and threatening witnesses in order 
to prevent them from giving evidence was punished as contempt of court as opposed to 
perverting the course of justice as the offence is known nowadays.  
I concur with the learned writers, Smith and Hogan,112
 
 when they say the relationship 
between perverting the course of justice and other common law misdemeanours is obscure. 
There is, for instance, a very thin line between this offence, perjury and contempt of court.  
c. Making false allegations against another and making false statements to the 
police.113
 
 In English law, making false statements to the police or other officers of the 
peace with the view to pervert the course of justice was punishable as a misdemeanour.   
d. Fabrication of false evidence.114
                                                 
111At 1098. 
 Like interference with witnesses, fabrication of 
 
112Smith and Hogan op cit (n 93) 755.  
113Smith and Hogan op cit (n 93) 752-53 and Card op cit (n 91) 428.  
114Smith and Hogan op cit (n 93) 752. 
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evidence was a misdemeanour under English law.  The Criminal Code Commission115 gave 
an illustration of the latter.  In The Queen v Vreones116
 
 it was held that fabrication of false 
evidence for the purpose of misleading a judicial tribunal was a misdemeanour under 
English law. 
The facts of this case were as follows:  The defendant (Vreones) was charged and convicted 
for attempting to pervert the course of justice by preparing false evidence to be used in an 
imminent arbitration.  This matter arose from the terms of a contract for the purchase of a 
cargo of wheat where the sellers were to ship it to the buyer.  One of the terms of the 
contract was that any dispute should be referred to two arbitrators, whose award would be 
final and conclusive and upon the application of either party, be made a rule of the court in 
England.  Vreones was appointed by the sellers and charged with taking samples of the 
cargo upon the arrival of the ship at its destination.  It was alleged that he, with intent to 
deceive the arbitrators (to be appointed in terms of the contract), with regard to the quality 
of the wheat in the cargo, so as to prevent the due course of justice, unlawfully tampered 
with the quality of wheat in the cargo.  He put top quality wheat at the top and sub-quality 
wheat at the bottom.  It was said that his actions had the potential to injure and prejudice the 
buyer and to prevent the due course of justice.117
 
 The court found him guilty for attempting 
to pervert the course of justice.  
In a persuasive judgement that was delivered by Lord Coleridge, CJ, the court observed:118
 
 
                                                 
115Criminal Code Commission Report (1879) 21 as cited by Williams op cit (n 90) 416. 
116The Queen v Vreones supra (n 93). 
117At 360. 
118At 366-67. 
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[I] cannot doubt that to manufacture false evidence for the purpose of misleading a judicial 
tribunal is a misdemeanour … I think that, an attempt to pervert the course of justice is in 
itself a punishable misdemeanour.  
 
The majority of the Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed the conviction.119 This decision 
confirmed that judicial proceedings did not necessarily need to be in process to successfully 
convict those guilty of the misdemeanour of fabricating evidence in order to pervert the 
course of justice.  It was enough for such proceedings to be imminent.120
 
 
e. Aiding someone to evade lawful arrest.121
 
 Committing an act that will tend to 
assist, and with the intent to assist, another person to evade lawful arrest knowing that the 
police wanted that person constituted an attempt to pervert the course of justice.  
f. Disposal of a corpse with intent to prevent an inquest.122 X was guilty of a 
common law misdemeanour if he or she destroyed or otherwise disposed of a dead body 
with intent to prevent a lawful inquest being held. In The Queen v Stephenson,123
                                                 
119At 369. 
 the 
accused were found guilty of a misdemeanour of obstruction of justice for burning a corpse 
in order to prevent an inquest. The facts of this case were as follows:  The defendants were 
indicted for having burnt the corpse of an infant child with the intent of preventing the 
holding of an inquest upon it.  It was alleged that one of the defendants (the mother of the 
child) left the child at the house of another woman.  The child died.  It was alleged that the 
defendants secretly took the corpse away and burnt it with the intent of preventing an 
inquest.  It is said that when the coroner was appointed to hold an inquest the defendants 
knew about it.  The inquest could not be held because the body was not forthcoming.  The 
120Smith and Hogan op cit (n 93) 753 and Williams op cit (n 90) 416. 
121Card op cit (n 91) 429.  
122Smith and Hogan op cit (n 93) 756. 
123(1884) QBD 331. 
  
31 
 
two defendants had taken it away from one of the defendants’ houses and burnt it.   
 
The defendants were indicted for burning the dead body with intent to prevent the holding 
of an inquest.  During the trial, the indictment of the defendants was objected to on the 
following grounds:124
 
   
(1) that it did not sufficiently aver that the case was a proper one for an inquest; or  
(2) that the proposed inquest was one which ought to be held; or  
(3) that the information on which the Coroner acted should have been sent out and 
that it ought to have been shown that the case was of such a nature that the Coroner 
was bound to hold an inquest.  
 
The court a quo convicted both defendants of the misdemeanour of perverting the course of 
justice.  The Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed the convictions.125
 
  
Although it was never pronounced in so many words that burning a corpse in order to 
prevent an inquest perverts the course of justice, this case shows how the common law 
misdemeanour of perverting the course of justice developed in English law to what it is 
today. 
 
2.3.3 Offences akin to perversion of justice 
The following offences, which are related to perversion of justice, were once treated as 
offences that interfered with the course of justice:126
                                                 
124At 332.  
 
125At 339. 
126Williams op cit (n 90) 416; JC Smith and B Hogan Criminal Law (ed) (1965) 536-37; Card op cit (n 91) 
429-30 and Card op cit  (n 97) 285. 
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a. Embracery. This was a common law misdemeanour which consisted in any attempt 
to influence a juror in the giving of a verdict otherwise than by evidence and arguments in 
open court.  In R v Owen127 it was noted that the bribery of the juror or other attempts to 
influence him out of court may be charged as conspiracy to pervert the course of justice, or 
dealt with as contempt.  The Court of Appeal observed that this offence is now obsolete.128
The facts of this case were as follows:  In 1974, D was tried for murdering his wife, the 
appellant’s sister.  The appellant and other members of his family were present during the 
trial.  At the commencement of the trial the judge warned the jury against speaking to 
anyone, or allowing anyone to speak to them, about any matter related to the trial.
   
129
 
 It is 
said that one day, when the case was still sub judice, one member of the jury (Mrs Owen) 
saw some of the deceased wife’s family walking along the road ahead of her during the 
midday adjournment.  She slowed down to avoid them, but the appellant, who was walking 
behind her, passed her.  She then said ‘Guilty.  He’s guilty, you know.  He’s already 
stabbed somebody before.’   
Mrs Owen said at the trial that the appellant uttered these words to her in such a way that 
she doubted whether the family members walking ahead could have overheard them.  As a 
result of what happened, Mrs Owen, it is said, was somewhat disturbed.  She drew away 
from the appellant and went to the cafeteria.  
 
The juror reported the incident to the police, who informed the judge.  The judge 
discharged the jury and another one had to be empanelled and the trial had to start all over 
again.130
                                                 
127[1976] 3 All ER 239 CA. 
 The appellant was charged with embracery and was convicted.  He appealed 
128At 239.  
129At 241e. 
130At 242a. 
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against both the conviction and the sentence.131 The court allowed the appeal on sentence, 
but did not interfere with the conviction.132
 
 
The court, per Lawton, LJ, noted that the reason why the offence of embracery was 
becoming obsolescent was that in modern times the kind of conduct envisaged by the 
offence of embracery had been dealt with in one of two ways.  The court noted that if more 
than one person had been involved, the charge was likely to have been conspiracy to 
pervert the course of justice.  If only one person was involved, the court said the charge was 
likely to have been contempt of court.133
 
  
This case highlights the interrelationship between the crime of perverting the course of 
justice and contempt of court.  The court confirmed this proposition when it made the 
observation that, if more than one person had been involved, the charge was likely to have 
been conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.  If only one person was involved, the court 
said that the charge was likely to have been contempt of court. 
 
b. Prison-breaking, escape and rescue.  In Williams,134
 
 escape and assisting escape, 
breach of prison and rescue and the escape of juveniles and mentally disordered patients 
were all considered as common law misdemeanours which interfered with the course of 
justice.  
c. Maintenance, champerty and barratry.  Maintenance was committed when 
someone, without lawful excuse, gave assistance to a party to a civil action when he did not 
                                                 
131At 242e. 
132At 243c-d. 
133At 240g-h. 
134Williams op cit (n 90) 416.  
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have a legal standing in the matter.135 Champerty was a species of maintenance where it 
was agreed that X was to receive part of the fruits of the action if it succeeded.136 Barratry 
was the offence of one who habitually maintained suits in which he or she had no legal 
standing.137
 
  
According to Smith and Hogan,138
 
 in some circumstances there might be lawful 
justification for conduct which was otherwise within the definition of maintenance as, for 
example, where a person assisted a poor man purely out of charitable motives or assisted a 
close relative or his or her house helper.  Likewise a lawyer who provided his or her 
professional assistance for free was not guilty of any these offences.  However, if it had 
been agreed that the lawyer would receive a proportion of the fruits of the action in the 
latter case, he or she was guilty of champerty and maintenance.  These offences are now 
obsolete. 
d. Wasteful employment of police.  It was a misdemeanour to mail statements to the 
police falsely averring that a crime had been committed, for example, if X mails a statement 
to the police or telephones the police to claim falsely that she has been hijacked.  Following 
these claims the police waste their time searching for her and her hijackers.  It is said that 
the misdemeanour did not cover acts done by the accused person himself to evade 
punishment, such as trying to evade arrest or destroying the evidence against him or herself.  
Neither was an accused person guilty of an offence for refusing to admit to the police 
whether he or she is guilty of any suspected crime.139
                                                 
135Smith and Hogan op cit (n 126) 536. 
 This fell under the protection against 
136Ibid. 
137Ibid.  
138Smith and Hogan op cit (n 126) 536-37.  
139Williams op cit  (n 90) 417. 
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self-incrimination. For example, X has shot and killed Y.  During police investigation, the 
police questioned X about the murder. X denied any involvement with the murder.  
Subsequently, X was charged with Y’s murder.  It was not an offence for X to tell the 
police that he or she did not commit the crime.   
 
2.3.4   Legislation  
The crimes of perverting the course of justice were mostly common law misdemeanours.  
The legislation that governed the crime of perverting the course of justice will now be dealt 
with.  In the Nineteenth Century the English legislature passed laws which recognised the 
existence of an offence of conspiracy to obstruct, prevent, pervert, or defeat the course of 
the due administration of justice140 and which protected witnesses.141
 
  
a. The Criminal Procedure Act of 1851 
This legislation142 punished certain conduct that had a tendency to obstruct the course of 
justice.  Section 29 of this Act provided:143
 
  
Whenever any person shall be convicted of any one of the offences following, as an indictable 
misdemeanour; that is to say, any cheat or fraud punishable at common law; any conspiracy to cheat 
or defraud, or to extort money or goods, or falsely accuse of any crime, or to obstruct, prevent, 
pervert, or defeat the course of public justice; any escape or rescue from lawful custody on a criminal 
charge; … it shall be lawful for the court to sentence the offender to be imprisoned for any term now 
warranted by law, and also to be kept to hard labour during the whole or any part of such term of 
imprisonment. 
 
 
A close scrutiny of this legislation reveals that the English legislature intended to punish 
various types of conduct including the false laying of a charge against an innocent person 
                                                 
140Section 29 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1851.  See Halsbury’s Statutes of England 2ed Vol 5 by R 
Burrows (1948) 717. 
 
141Section 2 of the Witnesses Protection Act of 1892.  See Halsbury’s Statutes of Wales 4ed Vol 12 Criminal 
Law (1985) 177 and Turner op cit (n 109) 313. 
 
142Section 29 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1851. 
143Halsbury op cit (n 140) 717. 
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and any conduct, which obstructed, prevented, perverted or defeated the course of justice.   
In this Act the legislature did not list any acts, which obstructed, prevented, perverted or 
defeated the course of justice.  It was left for interpretation by the courts.   
 
b. Section 2 of the Witnesses (Public Inquiries) Protection Act of 1892  
In 1892 the English legislature promulgated the Witnesses (Public Inquiries) Protection Act 
which was intended to protect witnesses who had testified in an inquiry against retaliation.  
The words “for having given evidence” are used in section 2 of the Act.  It is clear that 
section 2 of the Act was not intended to protect witnesses or potential witnesses who had 
not testified. Section 2 of the Act provided:144
 
 
Every person who commits any of the following acts, that is to say, who threatens, or in any way 
punishes, damnifies, or injures, or attempts to punish, damnify, or injure, any person for having 
given evidence upon any inquiry, or on account of evidence which he has given upon any of such 
inquiry, shall unless such evidence was given in bad faith, be guilty of a misdemeanour, …  
 
 
It is clear that the statutory offence of perverting the course of justice did not only coexist 
with the common law offence, but was similar to the Roman and Roman-Dutch crimes 
punishable in terms of the lex Cornelia de falsis.145
 
 
2.3.5    Summary   
Under English law the crime of attempting to pervert the course of justice was a common 
law crime triable only on indictment.  The crime’s designation as “attempting” to pervert 
the course of justice is said to be misleading because the crime is not an inchoate offence, 
but a substantive offence.  Under this crime a number of acts were punishable, e.g., 
interference with witnesses, fabrication of evidence, interfering with a juror and laying of a 
                                                 
144The Witnesses (Public Inquiries) Protection Act 1892, Criminal Law Vol 39 (55 and 56 Vict C 64 (Revised 
on 1st June 1978)) 1.  
 
 145See text under 2.1.2 supra, at note 11 and text under 2.1.4 supra, at note 27.  
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false charge, etc.  It is said that the offence was not limited to matters directly concerned 
with proceedings already in being, but it was sufficient if the proceedings were imminent or 
the investigations that could or might lead to proceedings were in process.   
 
Along with the common law crime of attempting to pervert the course of justice further 
pieces of legislation to protect witnesses existed.  Section 29 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
of 1851 made it a statutory offence to obstruct, prevent, pervert or defeat the course of 
public justice.  Section 2 of the Witness Protection Act of 1892 created a statutory offence 
of, inter alia, threatening witnesses who had testified in an inquiry.  It is clear that section 2 
of the Act was not intended to protect witnesses who had not testified or potential 
witnesses.  
 
This leads us to the discussion of the evolution of this crime in South African law. 
 
2.4    SOUTH AFRICAN LAW  
2.4.1    General 
The lex Cornelia de falsis accepted in Roman-Dutch law had a strong influence on the 
evolution of the crime of obstruction of justice in South Africa.  Undoubtedly our courts 
derived their inspiration from Roman and Roman-Dutch authorities.  English law played a 
lesser role in the development of this part of our law.146 Similarly to Roman and Roman-
Dutch law, this offence was committed only where judicial proceedings relating to the 
administration of justice were defeated or obstructed.  Our courts restricted this offence to 
proceedings of a judicial nature and expressly held that proceedings of an administrative 
nature or quasi-judicial nature could not amount to the crime of defeating or obstructing the 
due administration of justice.147
                                                 
146Hunt op cit (n 7) 140. 
  
147Hunt op cit (n 7) 141. 
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As opposed to the position in Roman and Roman-Dutch law where there were no organised 
police forces and where modern methods of investigation and prosecution of crime were 
unknown, the scope of the crime had been extended in our law to cover the pre-trial aspects 
of the administration of justice, which include police investigations of crimes or, indeed, 
police efforts to prevent the commission of crimes.148 It has been reasoned that to hold that 
interference in these aspects of the administration of justice come within the ambit of the 
crime is within the spirit of the Roman and Roman-Dutch law and amounts to no more than 
an adaptation of the crime to modern circumstances.149 This represents the extension of the 
crime beyond its Roman and Roman-Dutch origins, where its various manifestations related 
almost exclusively to the trial stage.150 Therefore, the crime today covers a wider field than 
the original lex.151 Although Hunt152 supports the view which says that while it seems 
correct and necessary to regard police investigations as falling within the scope of the 
concept of the administration of justice, he submits that it is only those activities which 
relate to the investigation of crimes and the collection of evidence relating to such crimes 
that should come within the ambit of the concept.  He further submits that routine police 
activities which are not connected with the investigation of crimes are of an essential 
administrative nature and do not fall within the ambit of the crime of defeating or 
obstructing the administration of justice.153
 
 This thesis shall now discuss the reception of 
this crime in our law.  
 
                                                 
148Ibid.  See also J Burchell and J Milton Principles of Criminal Law 3ed by J Burchell (2005) 940. 
 
149Hunt op cit (n 7) 141. 
 
150Hunt op cit (n 7) 149. 
 
151CR Snyman Criminal Law 4ed (2002) 337. 
  
152Hunt op cit (n 7) 142). 
 
153Ibid.  
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2.4.2    The development of the crime in the Cape Colony 
The question of whether or not the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice 
was part of our law presented itself, for the first time, in the Cape Colony.  The first 
reported case dealing with the offence of conspiring to prevent and obstruct the due course 
of justice was R v Braham.154
 
 In this case the court set aside a conviction for conspiring to 
prevent and obstruct the due course of justice. 
The facts of this case were as follows:  The accused was charged with the offence of 
“conspiring to prevent and obstruct the due course of justice.”155 It was alleged that he 
agreed with a material state witness, Hopper, in the case against a certain Osborne, that she 
would be removed in order not to have to give evidence in the case against the accused.156
court’s jurisdiction. 
 
It was alleged that the accused promised to pay Hopper a sum of money if she left the  
 
It was objected on behalf of the accused that, inter alia, the indictment did not charge a 
crime known in our law.  The jury nevertheless convicted the accused of conspiring to 
prevent and obstruct the due course of justice.157 The court allowed him to appeal to the 
Court of Appeal in Criminal Cases.  It was contended on behalf of the appellant that “… 
[Th]is was no offence known to the law.”158 The court avoided this issue by holding that 
the indictment did not in any event sufficiently allege conspiracy.159
                                                 
154(1882) 1 Buch AC 147.  It may be noted that between 1814 and 1825 a number of convictions were 
recorded in the Cape for ‘false accusations of crime’ and ‘laying false complaints.’  See Hunt op cit (n 7) 139. 
 The court said that it 
was difficult to understand from the wording of the indictment whether the state intended to 
 
155R v Braham supra (n 154) at 147.  
 
156Hunt op cit (n 7) 139. 
 
157R v Braham supra (n 154) at 147.  
 
158At 151. 
 
159At 153. 
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charge the accused with conspiracy to commit the crime or with conspiring to induce the 
commission of the crime.  The court further observed that if the state intended to charge the 
accused with conspiracy with a certain Hopper to commit a crime, then, there was no 
evidence of consent on her part.  If the charge was that of conspiring to induce Hopper to 
commit a crime, then there was no person indicated with whom that conspiracy was 
made.160 The conviction was set aside.161
 
 
A landmark decision in the evolution of the common law offence of obstructing the course 
of justice was delivered in 1886 in Queen v Foye and Carlin.162
 
 In this case the court was 
faced with the question of whether or not to defeat or obstruct the course of justice was an 
offence known in our law.   
The facts of the case were as follows:  The accused were charged with murder and the 
crime of defeating and obstructing the due course of justice.163
Mr Jonas, a detective who was a material Crown witness in the case against the said 
Eatwell, in order not to testify against Eatwell.  The Crown also alleged that Foye and 
Carlin murdered Jonas so that he could not testify in the case against Mrs Eatwell. The trial 
proceeded upon a not guilty plea.  The jury found the accused not guilty on the charge of 
murder, but guilty of defeating and obstructing the due course of justice.  The court 
reserved for the consideration of the Court of Criminal Appeal, inter alia, “[w]hether the 
 It was alleged that the 
accused enticed away and removed a material Crown witness in order to prevent and hinder 
him from appearing to give evidence in court against a certain Ann Eatwell who was an 
accused in another case.  It was alleged that Foye and Carlin enticed away and removed  
                                                 
160At 152.  
 
161At 153. 
 
162(1886) 2 Buch AC 121. 
 
163At 122. 
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prisoner Foye was rightly convicted inasmuch as there was not sufficient evidence against 
him that he, in the Territory of Griqualand West, acted in concert with Carlin or the boy 
Jonas, so as to defeat the ends of justice.”164
 
  
On appeal, counsel for the accused admitted that defeating and obstructing justice was an 
indictable offence but denied that it had been proved that any crime had been committed.165 
The court unanimously sustained the conviction of the accused of the crime of defeating 
and obstructing the due course of justice.166
 
  
The Queen v Foye and Carlin case is an important decision in our law regarding the 
reception of the crime of obstruction of justice.  Now the crime of obstructing the course of 
justice was recognised in common law.167
 
 This decision laid a strong legal foundation in 
our legal system insofar as the reception of the Roman and Roman-Dutch law relating to 
the obstruction of the administration of justice.   
In 1893, barely seven years after the Queen v Foye and Carlin168
Court, in Queen v Kaplan,
 case, the Cape Supreme  
169 was faced with another matter related to obstructing or 
defeating the course of justice. In this instance the accused were facing the charge of 
“conspiracy to defeat the course of justice” as in the R v Braham170
 
 case.  
                                                 
164At 124. 
 
165Ibid. 
 
166At 125-26. 
 
167FG Gardiner and CWH Lansdown South African Criminal Law and Procedure: a Treatise upon the Law 
and Practice in Criminal Matters in the Union of South Africa 2ed Vol II (1924) 818. 
 
168Queen v Foye and Carlin supra (n 162). 
 
169(1893) 10 SC 259. 
 
170R v Braham supra (n 154). 
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The facts of this case were as follows:  The accused, A and M Kaplan, were indicted with 
two others on a charge of “conspiracy to defeat the course of justice.”  Mr A Kaplan was 
first arrested on the charge of receiving stolen goods knowing them to be stolen.  While he 
was out on bail, it was alleged that he and the other three persons had attempted to persuade 
two material witnesses, on the charge of receiving stolen goods knowing them to be stolen, 
to leave the country so that they could not testify at the trial.  It was alleged that the two 
Kaplans set up a plan to try to get the two chief witnesses against A Kaplan to leave the 
country.  It was said that money, a cart and a pair of horses were provided.  It appeared 
under cross-examination that the two witnesses did not have any intention of going away. 
The arrangement was a plot to catch the two Kaplan brothers.  It is not clear from the case 
whether it was a police trap or if the two gentlemen acted on their own accord.171
 
 
It was submitted on behalf of the accused that the crime of conspiracy was unknown in our 
legal system.  The court nevertheless convicted both the accused of conspiring to defeat the 
course of justice.  The court reserved to the Cape Supreme Court the question of “whether 
the charge as laid in the indictment disclosed any crime known to law.”172 Therefore, the 
Cape Supreme Court had to decide as to whether conspiracy to defeat the course of justice 
was a crime in our law.  The court per De Villiers CJ held:173
  
  
[I] have not been able to find any authority on Roman or Dutch or South African law which treats 
such a conspiracy as a substantive crime, or which treats every conspiracy to commit any crime, 
whatever its nature may be, as being itself an indictable offence. 
 
The exception taken in the court a quo that the charge laid in the indictment was not an 
indictable offence was sustained and the conviction and sentence were set aside.  Kaplan’s 
                                                 
171Queen v Kaplan supra (n 169) at 260.  
 
172Ibid. 
 
173At 265. 
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case accepted that obstruction of justice was an offence in our law; it held only that 
conspiracy was not a crime.174
 
  
Subsequent to the Queen v Kaplan175 decision, in 1902, in R v Moss,176 the accused were 
charged and convicted with the offence of attempting to defeat the course of justice.  The 
facts of the case were the following:  It was alleged that the accused, X, a general dealer, 
and Y, a seaman, both of Cape Town, by the offer of bribes and other corrupt means, 
induced and persuaded a certain Greenhill to write and sign a document declaring that a 
charge he laid against (Z) was laid while he was under the influence of liquor and that he 
gave evidence before the Magistrate under the influence of a false impression and that the 
evidence was not true.177 Maarsdorp J observed:178
 
 
If a person attempts fraudulently to lead another person to make a statement which he knows to be 
untrue in order to prevent justice being done, that is an attempt to defeat the ends of justice. 
 
2.4.3  The development of the crime in the Transvaal  
The first important decision in the Transvaal was in 1897 in S v Friedman and Sonn.179 The 
facts of this case were as follows:  The accused were charged with attempting to bribe 
witnesses in order to induce them not to give true evidence.  The accused were convicted 
and they appealed against their conviction, inter alia, upon the ground that attempting to 
bribe witnesses was not a crime according to our law.  The conviction was confirmed and 
the appeal was dismissed.180
                                                 
174Hunt op cit (n 7) 139. 
 The court did not advance any reasons for its decision. 
 
175Queen v Kaplan supra (n 169). 
 
1761902 12 CTR 810. 
 
177At 810. 
 
178At 811. 
 
179(1897) 4 Off Rep 183. 
 
180At 184. 
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The significance of this case is that, although the accused were not charged with defeating 
or obstructing the course of justice, the court decision laid a strong foundation for the 
development of this crime.  Bribing witnesses so that they could not testify is indeed 
interfering with witnesses and such action obstructs the course of justice.181
 
  
Subsequently, in 1903, the Transvaal Supreme Court considered a case relating to attempt 
to defeat the ends of justice.  In R v Cowan and Davies182 the court received the law as set 
out in the lex Cornelia.  The court was largely inspired by the Queen v Foye and Carlin183
 
 
decision in finding that the crime of “attempting to bribe a witness” was punishable. 
The facts of this case were as follows:  Cowan and Davies were employees of the Criminal 
Investigation Department.  They had trapped and arrested a certain Solomon for illicit 
liquor dealing.  They promised Mr Solomon, the accused in an illegal liquor dealing case, 
that they would leave the country so that they could not give evidence against him in the 
court of law if he would pay them a sum of money.  Solomon informed the police who then 
laid a trap for them.  The police made arrangements with Solomon for him to meet Cowan 
and Davies and pay them a portion of the money under the observation of the police.  They 
were convicted for attempting to defeat the ends of justice.  The court reserved for the 
consideration of the Supreme Court of ‘whether upon the finding of the jury the prisoners 
could be legally convicted of the crime in the indictment.’184
 
  
The court referred to both Roman and Roman-Dutch law, especially Voet, where it was 
said that if a person corruptly removed himself so that he could not be compelled to give 
                                                 
181Emphasis added. 
 
182(1903) TS 798. 
 
183Queen v Foye and Carlin supra (n 162). 
  
184The crime referred to here was the crime of attempting to defeat the ends of justice, following accepting 
money for the giving or withholding of testimony. 
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evidence he contravened the lex Cornelia de falsis.185 The question reserved was answered 
in favour of the state186
 
 and the conviction was upheld. 
The Supreme Court made the following statement:187
 
 
To my mind this branch of the crime, of attempting to defeat the ends of justice, coincides exactly 
with the branch of the lex Cornelia de falsis.  In so far as the lex Cornelia de falsis deals with the 
corruption of testimony, and in so far as defeating the ends of justice is carried out by corrupting 
testimony, to that extent the two laws overlap; and it does not matter whether one calls the offence 
which the accused committed a breach of the lex Cornelia or an attempt to defeat the ends of justice: 
in substance the two crimes are the same.  Just as forgery is the branch of the crimen falsis, so 
attempting to defeat the ends of justice by corrupting testimony is, in my opinion, a branch of the lex 
Cornelia. 
 
 
The Roman and Roman-Dutch law prohibited procuring money for, inter alia, renouncing 
or withdrawing evidence or for giving or withholding evidence; anyone doing that was 
liable in terms of the Cornelian law.188
 
 It is clear in this case that Cowan and Davies 
procured money so that they could leave the country and by doing so they would renounce 
the giving of evidence as witnesses in a case against Solomon.  Renouncing the giving of 
evidence in court obstructs the course of justice and it is a criminal offence in our law. 
Almost six years after the Transvaal Supreme Court had observed in the Cowan and 
Davies189case that ‘attempting to defeat the ends of justice coincides exactly with the 
branch of the lex Cornelia de falsis,’190 the same court was faced with a similar matter in 
1909.  In Duuring v R,191
                                                 
185R v Cowan and Davies supra (n 182) at 801. 
 it was held that to constitute the crime of defeating or attempting 
 
186At 802. 
 
187At 801-02. 
 
188D 48.10.2.  See text under 2.1.4, supra at note 11. 
 
189R v Cowan and Davies supra (n 182). 
 
190At 801-02. 
 
191[1909] TS 933 at 935. 
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to defeat the ends of justice, it must be shown that the accused knowingly and wilfully 
committed or attempted to commit the acts, the necessary consequence of which would 
have been to defeat the ends of justice. 
 
The facts of the Duuring case were as follows:  The accused, a law agent, was charged with 
attempting to defeat the ends of justice, in that a warrant had been issued to search a bottle 
store belonging to one Salmenson and to seize the business books therein.  It was alleged 
that the accused, knowing of the warrant, removed the books. 
 
There were criminal proceedings contemplated against one Measroch following 
contravention of the Liquor Ordinance and those books were of vital importance to support 
the court proceedings.  It was alleged that the accused went inside the bottle store and came 
out with the parcel, but it was not clear whether the parcel contained the said books or not.  
Nevertheless, he was charged with attempting to defeat the ends of justice.192
 
 He was 
convicted and he appealed.  
On appeal, the court found that there was great uncertainty regarding the contents of the 
parcel and that no proof was produced that any of the business books were actually missing. 
Therefore, the court set aside the conviction and allowed the appeal.193
 
 
The importance of this case lies in the following observation made by the court:194
 
 
Now it is a criminal offence to defeat, or attempt to defeat, the ends of justice.  But, as was laid down 
in Queen v Foye and Carlin (2 Buch. App. Cas. 121), in order to establish such a crime it must be 
                                                 
192At 934. 
193At 935. 
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shown that the accused knowingly and wilfully committed or attempted to commit acts the necessary 
consequence of which would have been to defeat the ends of justice.     
 
In making such observation, the court further entrenched the crime of defeating or 
obstructing, or attempting to defeat or obstruct the course of justice in our law.  This leads 
us to the evolution of this crime in Natal.    
 
2.4.4 The Natal courts’ approach to this crime 
Following the developments in other jurisdictions, notably in the Cape and Transvaal, the  
Natal Supreme Court in 1908 in R v Gabriel,195 followed the decision in R v Cowan and 
Davies196
 
 and rejected the contention by the appellant that there was no such a crime as 
“attempting to defeat the ends of justice.”  
The facts of this case were as follows:  The appellant, Gabriel, acted as counsel for the 
defence in a criminal case against Mr Solomon and Mr Roots. He was charged for 
wrongfully and unlawfully attempting to, inter alia, defeat the ends of justice.  The state 
alleged that he attempted to:197
 
 
a. dissuade Mr Joseph a material state witness in the case against his clients, 
Solomon and Roots, from testifying; 
b. remove, or induce to remove, Joseph from the court’s jurisdiction so that he should 
not be compelled to give evidence for the state in the case against the aforesaid; and 
c. approach the investigating officer in the case against the aforesaid, to work with him. 
 
                                                 
195(1908) 29 NLR 750. 
196R v Cowan and Davies supra (n 182). 
197R v Gabriel supra (n 195) at 752. 
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The court convicted Gabriel, and he appealed on the ground, inter alia, that the summons 
did not disclose a crime known under the South African law. 
 
In passing judgment, the court per Bale, CJ, relied heavily on R v Cowan and Davies.198 
The court found no reason to interrupt the verdict of the Magistrates’ Court and the appeal 
was dismissed.  This decision further entrenched the development of the crime of 
obstruction of the course of justice in our law.  However, what was needed was the 
confirmation of the Appellate Division as to whether the crime of obstructing the course of 
justice was recognised in South African law. It is said that the practice of charging a 
specific offence of obstructing or defeating the course of justice became established in our 
law and soon received the Appellate Division’s approval.199
 
 
2.4.5 The Appellate Division decision 
Following the developments in the Cape, Transvaal and Natal Supreme Courts, the 
Appellate Division ended the legal uncertainty in 1919 in R v Zackon.200
 
  
The facts of this case were as follows:  X, the owner of a licensed bar, was charged with 
attempting to defeat the ends of justice.  It was alleged that he allowed a child who was then 
under the age of sixteen years to be in the bar, in contravention of legislation governing the 
sale of liquor.  After being charged for the contravention of the legislation governing the 
sale of liquor it was alleged that he attempted to induce the mother of the girl to state in 
evidence that the girl was indeed sixteen years of age.  The court a quo found him guilty of 
attempting to defeat the ends of justice.  He appealed to the Cape Provincial Division and 
his appeal was dismissed.  He then applied for leave to appeal against the decision of the 
                                                 
198R v Cowan and Davies supra (n 182). 
199Hunt op cit (n 7) 140. 
200(1919) AD 175. 
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Cape Provincial Division on the following grounds:201
 
    
a. that there was no evidence that he, at the time of the offence, knew that the girl was 
under sixteen years of age; 
b. that at the time of the alleged offence no summons had been issued to the mother of 
the child; 
c. that the mother was not a material witness; and 
d. that there was no proof that the ends of justice would have been defeated. 
 
The Cape Provincial Division decided that there was no probability of the applicant 
succeeding in the Appellate Division either upon the question of law or fact.  The 
application was refused.202 He then applied to the Appellate Division for leave to appeal 
and, in dismissing that application, De Villiers, AJA, held:203
 
 
I agree that the application should be refused, for it is clear the appeal cannot succeed.  There is no 
dispute about the law. … Although differently stated it all comes to this that any tampering with 
evidence which is to be used before a court of law is an interference with the course of justice, and 
therefore an attempt to pervert or obstruct or to defeat the ends of justice and as such punishable 
under the lex Cornelia de falsis. 
 
 
The R v Zackon decision created legal certainty as to whether obstruction or defeating the 
end of justice was an offence recognized in our law.  But what various acts constituted the 
crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice?   
 
2.4.6 Categories of acts which constituted the offence  
In this paragraph the conduct which was regarded to constitute the crime will be discussed.  
                                                 
201At 176. 
 
202At 181-183. 
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It is said that the course of justice was obstructed or defeated in many ways and some of the 
acts were usually prosecuted under the name of some specific crime, which the crime of 
obstruction of justice might to a greater or lesser extent overlap.  The offence overlapped 
with offences like contempt of court; perjury or subornation of perjury; bribery of public 
officers; fraud or forgery; extortion; assisting a prisoner to escape or obstructing the police 
in performing their official duties.204
 
  
After the ruling by the Appellate Division in R v Zackon205 the following acts, as in Roman, 
Roman-Dutch and English law, were punishable as obstruction of the course of justice:206
 
 
a. Interference with witnesses.207 It is said that this offence was committed when the 
accused approached a potential witness, even if he or she had not yet been subpoenaed, to 
give false evidence.208 It was not necessary that the accused approach the witness directly; 
persuading a third party to do so was sufficient.  Another way of interfering with a witness 
was the removal of a witness or potential witness from the court’s jurisdiction so that the 
witness could not be compelled to give evidence.209
 
     
b. Tampering with documentary and other evidence.210
                                                 
204Hunt op cit (n 7) 155. 
 Any tampering with 
evidence which was to be used before a court of law was and is still punished as obstructing 
205R v Zackon supra (n 200). 
206Hunt op cit (n 7) 155-161. 
207Hunt op cit (n 7) 155. 
208R v Zackon supra (n 200).  The accused was charged and convicted with attempting to defeat the ends of 
justice after he attempted to persuade a witness to give false evidence. 
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the course of justice.  This offence was committed when the accused destroyed documents 
that might be of help to the court or when the accused altered or concealed evidence.211
 
   
c. Attempt to bribe or improperly influence the judge or investigating officer or 
prosecutor.212
 
 As with Roman and Roman-Dutch law, any attempt to influence a judge or 
prosecutor by means of a bribe or by any improper means was charged as an attempt to 
obstruct or defeat the course of justice or contempt of court.   
d. Procuring an escape of an awaiting trial prisoner.213 Procuring an escape of a 
prisoner was punished as obstructing or defeating the course of justice.  This is not the 
situation anymore, as escaping from custody is now a separate offence regulated by 
common law and by statute.214
 
   
e. Obstructing the police.215 It has been mentioned216
 
 that our courts extended the 
ambit of the crime of obstructing or defeating the course of justice to include police 
investigations of crimes.  The acts which impede or frustrate police activities and which 
constituted obstructing or defeating the course of justice are the following: 
i. Laying false charges (calumnia).  As indicated, under Roman and Roman-
Dutch law, the bringing of false accusations against another person was 
                                                 
211Duuring v R supra (n 191).  
212Hunt op cit (n 7) 161-62.  
213Hunt op cit (n 7) 162.  
214See Snyman op cit (n 151) 348. 
215Hunt op cit (n 7) 157.  
216Burchell and Milton op cit (n 148) 940.  
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punished in terms of both the lex Cornelia217 and the lex Remmia.218
 
   
According to the common law, conspiracy to obstruct the course of justice was not 
punishable. 
 
2.4.7    Statutory provisions 
In our law, the crime of obstructing the course of justice was and still is a common law 
offence.  In South Africa, statutory intervention regarding the offence of defeating or 
obstructing the course of justice can be traced back to the Transkeian Penal Code.219
The following acts were punishable in terms of the Act: 
  
 
a. to mislead any court of justice or any person holding any such judicial 
proceedings, to fabricate or to contrive evidence by any means220
 
  
b. to conspire to prosecute an innocent person for an offence knowing very well that 
he or she is innocent221
 
 
c. to conspire with another person to obstruct, prevent or defeat the course of justice 
or to wilfully attempt in any way, not otherwise criminal, to obstruct, prevent, 
                                                 
217D 48.10.1.  See text under 2.1.4 supra, at note 27. 
218Matthaeus op cit (n 44) 48.7.1.9 and Van der Keessel op cit (n 4) 48.10.8.  See text under 2.1.4 supra, at 
note 28. 
 
219Act 24 of 1886.  See Gardiner and Lansdown op cit (n 147) 819.  This Act has been repealed and replaced 
by sections 40, 36-39 of Act 9 of 1983 (Tk).  See Hunt op cit (n 7) 162. 
 
220Section 110. 
221Section 111. 
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pervert or defeat the course of justice or the administration of law222
 
  
d. to dissuade or attempt to dissuade any person by threats, bribes, or other corrupt 
means, from giving evidence in any court of law.  To influence or attempt to 
influence by threats or bribes or other corrupt means any jury, assessor, or 
interpreter.  To accept a bribe or other corrupt consideration in order to abstain 
from giving evidence or on account of his or her conduct as a juryman, assessor or 
interpreter. 223
 
 
Some conduct in sections 110-113 of this Act overlaps with the common law crime of 
obstructing the course of justice.224
 
 Only the conduct which involves conspiracy does not 
overlap with the common law crime.  
2.4.8   Legislated obstruction of justice 
What has been discussed above are the acts that constituted the crime of defeating or 
obstructing the course of justice.  What about the legislation which authorises the State 
President to halt judicial proceedings?  Is the due administration of justice not supposed to 
proceed freely without being impeded, not even by the State President?  In our statute 
books we find a provision which authorised the State President to halt judicial proceedings  
if he or she felt that it would be in the national interest that the proceedings were 
discontinued.225
 
  
                                                 
222Section 112. 
223Section 113 (a)-(c). 
224Hunt op cit (n 7) 155-157. 
 
225The Defence Act 44 of 1957.  This Act has been repealed and replaced by the Defence Act 42 of 2002.  
This Act does not have any provision similar to, or resembling, section 103 ter (4) of its predecessor. 
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Section 103 ter (4) of the Defence Act provided:226
 
 
If any proceedings have been instituted in a court of law against the State, the State President, the 
Minister, a member of the South African Defence Force or any other person in the service of the 
State and the President is of the opinion –  
 
(a) that the proceedings were instituted by reason of an act advised, commanded, ordered, 
directed or done in good faith by the State President, the Minister or a member of the 
South African Defence Force for the purposes of or in connection with the prevention 
or suppression of terrorism in an operational area; and  
 
(b) that it is in the national interest that the proceedings shall not be continued, 
       he shall authorize the Minister of Justice to issue a certificate directing that the 
       proceedings shall not be continued.   
 
Carpenter227 said that the State President’s power to halt legal proceedings against the 
member of the Defence Force was a purely statutory provision which had no roots at any 
common law rule, but that did not mean it enjoyed superior status to any common law rule.  
She maintained that when the courts were barred from performing their normal function of 
establishing the facts and merits of the case, the inference was only too often drawn that 
“the dark deeds and skulduggery were the order of the day,” an inference which was most 
unfair to the members of the Defence Force who were unable to defend themselves against 
such rumours and accusations.228
   
 
The State President’s order to halt the judicial process against a member of the Defence 
Force who was accused of having committed a certain crime had a tendency to defeat or 
obstruct the due administration of justice.  This thesis agrees with Carpenter’s view that the  
entire principle underlying section 103 ter was unsound.229
                                                 
226The Defence Act 44 of 1957 and Rules, compiled by Lex Patria Publishers at 56 and G Carpenter 
“Interference with the judicial process: a case of conceptual confusion?” (1988) SAPL Vol 3 No 2 244. 
 This section is not part of our 
law anymore.  
 
227Carpenter op cit (n 226) 245.  
228Carpenter op cit (n 226) 247. 
229Carpenter op cit (n 226) 247. 
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2.4.9    Summary of early South African law 
The common law offence of obstructing the course of justice originates from the Roman lex 
Cornelia de falsis.  The development of this crime in our law cannot be viewed in isolation 
from the political and historical developments in the country in the Seventeenth Century, 
especially the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck in the Cape in 1652.  
 
It was these developments that led, inter alia, to the reception of the Roman lex Cornelia de 
falsis in South African Criminal Law.  The practice of charging the accused with the crime 
of obstructing or defeating the course of justice thus became established in South African 
law, and soon received the Appellate Division’s approval. However, before the decision of 
the Appellate Division, there were some statutory developments in the Transkei where 
certain acts were punished as defeating the course of justice.  This part of our criminal law 
developed from Roman and Roman-Dutch authorities.  English law did not play any role or 
played only a small role, if any.  Just as in the lex Cornelia de falsis, the following acts 
were considered to obstruct the course of justice: 
 
a. Interfering with witnesses. 
b. Tampering with documentary or other evidence. 
c. Obstructing the police. 
 
The Roman lex Cornelia de falsis was only limited to actions with regard to judicial 
proceedings but our courts have broadened the ambit of the crime to include pre-trial 
aspects of the administration of justice.  There was some overlap between the crime of 
obstructing the course of justice and offences like perjury, fraud, forgery, etc.    
 
The following acts were punishable in terms of the Transkeian Penal Code of 1886: 
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a. to mislead any court of justice or any person holding any such judicial proceedings, to 
fabricate or to contrive evidence by any means;  
 
b. to conspire to prosecute an innocent person for an offence, knowing full well that he 
or she is innocent; 
 
c. to conspire with another person to obstruct, prevent or defeat the course of justice or 
to wilfully attempt in any way, not otherwise criminal, to obstruct, prevent, pervert or 
defeat the course of justice or the administration of law;  
 
d. to dissuade or attempt to dissuade any person by threats, bribes, or other corrupt 
means, from giving evidence in any court of law.  To influence or attempt to 
influence by threats or bribes or other corrupt means any jury, assessor, or interpreter.  
To accept a bribe or other corrupt consideration in order to abstain from giving 
evidence or on account of his or her conduct as a juryman, assessor or interpreter. 
 
In the Defence Act 44 of 1957 there was a provision which authorized the State President to 
halt judicial proceedings if he or she felt that it would be in the national interest to do so.  
The State President’s order to halt the judicial process against a member of the Defence 
Force who was accused of having committed a certain crime had a tendency to defeat or 
obstruct the due administration of justice.  The entire principle underlying this provision 
was unsound.  This provision is not part of our law anymore.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
ENGLISH LAW 
3.1 GENERAL 
The common law crime of perverting the course of justice is defined as doing an act or 
series of acts which have a tendency to, and are intended to, pervert the course of justice 
(including proceedings before tribunals).1 At common law it is an indictable offence to 
pervert the course of justice and the offence is punishable at the discretion of the court.2 
Contrary to Halsbury’s3 views that the offence consists of an act, a series of acts or conduct 
which has the tendency to, and is intended to pervert the course of justice, it is said that the 
offence cannot be committed by an omission, hence the requirement of an act or series of 
acts.4 Ashworth5 says that the common law has always been wary of imposing liability for 
omissions.  English criminal law has tended to restrict criminal liability for omissions by 
limiting the range of situations in which a duty to do something can be said to arise.6 
However, a defendant can be criminally liable for an omission where there is a duty to act 
in a particular way.7 In R v Headley8 it was held that X had not committed the offence if he 
or she had failed to act positively.9
 
 In this case the Court of Appeal was called to consider 
whether or not the offence of perverting the course of justice could be committed by 
acquiescence or by omission.  
                                                 
1R Card, Card, Cross and Jones Criminal Law 16ed (2004) 536; P Murphy Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 
(2006) 731; Halsbury’s Laws of England 4ed Vol 11(1) Criminal Law (1990) 249 and Smith and Hogan op cit 
Chapter Two (n 93) 751. 
 
2Card op cit (n 1) 536.  
 
3Halsbury op cit (n 1) 249. 
  
4Cf Card op cit (n 1) 536. 
 
5Ashworth op cit Chapter One (n 5) 44. 
 
6Ashworth op cit Chapter One (n 5) 45.  In English law, a parent’s duty to ensure the health and welfare of his 
or her child is recognised by statute; a duty to care for another can be assumed by contract, or by undertaking 
the care of a relative, or even by undertaking the care of a stranger; the owner of property may have a duty to 
prevent the commission of offences on or with the property and a person who creates a dangerous situation, 
even accidentally, has a duty to take steps to avert or minimize the danger.  Beyond these situations, there 
appears to be no general duties imposed on citizens. 
  
7J Herring Criminal Law: Text cases and materials 2ed (2006) 87. 
  
8(1995) 160 JP 25. 
 
9At 25. 
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The facts of this case were as follows:  The appellant, Headley, had a brother Y.  The police 
stopped Y whilst he was driving Headley’s car.  He was ordered to produce, inter alia, his 
driving licence.  He produced Headley’s Army driving permit which he had found in the 
car.  He was told that a traffic ticket was issued and, therefore, he should produce the 
documents at a police station.  He did not do that.  A summons issued in Headley’s name 
was heard in his absence and he was convicted of driving without a licence and insurance. 
The mistaken identity was uncovered and Headley was charged with perverting the course 
of justice by allowing the information to be dealt with by the court.10 He pleaded guilty and 
was found guilty of perverting the course of justice.11 He applied for leave to appeal against 
the conviction.  His application was based on a question of law.  In allowing the appeal the 
court held:12
  
 
(1) The offence of perverting the course of justice is committed where a person acts or embarks upon 
a course of conduct which has a tendency to and is intended to pervert the course of justice (“the 
actus reus”). 
 
(2) The appellant did not act and did not pursue any course of conduct which could amount to the 
actus reus of this offence.  He simply did nothing, and therefore committed no offence. 
 
 
This case confirms that it is established law in England that X must have acted positively 
before he or she could be convicted of the crime of perverting the course of justice.  Mere 
omission does not amount to the actus reus of this offence.13 English law commentators are 
of the view that X cannot commit this offence by failing to do something (omission).14
 
 
It is said that, like contempt of court but unlike perjury, the offence of perverting the course 
                                                 
10At 25D-E and at 28-G.  
 
11At 25H. 
 
12At 25E-F. 
 
13Card op cit (n 1) 536. 
 
14Ibid. 
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of justice has a more general application.15 Card16 submits that the crime of perverting the 
course of justice penalises any conduct which has a tendency to wrongly interfere, directly 
or indirectly, with a criminal investigation, or with the initiation, progress or outcome of 
any criminal or civil proceedings, including arbitration proceedings and which is intended 
so to interfere.  According to Card,17 the defendant’s conduct will have the tendency to 
pervert the course of justice if he or she has done enough for there to be a possibility 
without further action on his or her part that a perversion of the course of justice may result.  
It is irrelevant that that possibility does not materialise.  For X to be convicted of this 
offence it is required that a direct intention to interfere with the course of justice be proved.  
The accused has the necessary intent to pervert the course of justice if he or she intended to 
bring about a state of affairs, which regarded objectively, amounts to such a perversion, 
whether or not he realised that the state of affairs would have the effect of perverting the 
course of justice.18 English law distinguishes between the course of justice and the ends of 
justice.  It is said that if X’s conduct tends, and is intended, to pervert the course of justice, 
it is irrelevant that he or she acts with the motive of promoting the ends of justice.19 So, for 
example, a person who presents false evidence in order to secure the conviction of someone 
he or she believes to be guilty commits the crime of perverting the course of justice.20
 
 
3.2 WHEN DOES THE COURSE OF JUSTICE BEGIN? 
In English law there are various academic opinions as to when the due course of justice is 
said to begin and therefore when it may be obstructed or perverted.  The first opinion is that 
                                                 
15Card op cit (n 1) 536-37.  
 
16Ibid.  
 
17Card op cit (n 1) 537.   
 
18Ibid.  See also Lalani (1999) 1 Cr App Rep 481 CA. 
 
19Card op cit (n 1) 537.   
 
20Ibid. 
 60 
of Smith and Hogan,21 who say that the course of justice begins to run and may be 
perverted before proceedings are “active.”22 Card23 supports this view and he maintains that 
this offence is not limited to matters directly concerning proceedings already in being, nor 
to imminent proceedings of some kind in a court or judicial tribunal, nor is it necessary that 
investigations which could result in proceedings be in progress.  He argues that this offence 
can be committed if the requisite tendency and the requisite intention are there.24 The 
offence can be committed after the perpetration of the principal crime, but before 
investigations into it have begun.  It is further said that this offence can be committed even 
though a crime has not been committed or the crime cannot be proved, so long as X 
believed that there might be an investigation which could result in judicial proceedings.25 If 
X, in order to prevent the detection of the offender, destroys the only evidence of a crime 
before an investigation can begin, he can be convicted of perverting the course of justice 
because such conduct has the tendency to pervert the course of justice.  X can even be 
convicted of this offence if he or she mistakenly believed that it was the only evidence of a 
non-existent crime.26
 
 
In R v Rafique,27
                                                 
21Smith and Hogan op cit Chapter Two (n 93) 752. 
 the accused were convicted of perverting the course of justice when they 
threw away the murder weapon and thereby impeded the police investigation.  The court 
was called upon to consider whether an act that occurs after the commission of the principal 
crime, but before the police begin their investigation, qualifies as perverting the course of 
 
22Ibid. 
 
23Card op cit (n 1) 537. 
 
24Ibid. 
  
25Ibid.  
 
26Ibid.  
 
27[1993] 4 All ER 1 CA.  
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justice.  The facts of the Rafique case were as follows:  The appellants drove to a park with 
their friend A to try out a gun that A had recently acquired. While the first appellant was 
carrying the gun it accidentally went off and killed A.  The appellants threw the gun and 
cartridges away, abandoned their car and went into hiding for twelve days before giving 
themselves up to the police.  For throwing away the gun and its cartridges, knowing very 
well that an investigation into the death of A was imminent, they were charged with acts 
that tended, and were intended, to pervert the course of justice.28 They were convicted of 
committing acts that tended, and which were intended, to pervert the course of justice.  
They appealed against their convictions.  The court held29 that an act performed after the 
crime had been committed, but before an investigation into the alleged crime had begun, 
was capable of tending to pervert the course of justice if an intention to pervert the course 
of justice was proved.  It was immaterial whether the alleged offence was investigated or 
even discovered.  The Court of Appeal found that there was an intention on the part of the 
appellants to impede the police investigations and that there was the intention to pervert the 
course of public justice.30 The appeals were dismissed.  Therefore, the course of justice 
begins to run, and may be impeded, at the time the principal offence has been committed 
even before it had been discovered.31
 
 
In 1994, subsequent to R v Rafique,32 the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in R v 
Kiffin33
                                                 
28At 1e. 
 was faced with another case of perverting the course of justice.  The court had to 
decide whether an investigation is “in the course of justice before evidence existed that a 
 
29At 1g-h. 
 
30At 8f. 
 
31See Card op cit (n 1) 537 and Smith and Hogan op cit Chapter Two (n 93) 752. 
 
32R v Rafique supra (n 27). 
 
33[1994] Crim LR 449. 
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crime has been committed.”34
 
 The facts of this case were as follows.  Applicant X was one 
of the trustees and signatory of the bank account of the management committee of a youth 
association in her area.  The media reported that there was misappropriation of funds and 
alleged that X had used some of the funds to purchase a house in Jamaica.  The Director of 
Public Prosecutions (DPP) authorised the Fraud Squad to instruct the accountants to find 
out how the money was spent, and considerable discrepancies were discovered between the 
accounting records of cash expenditure and actual cash expended.  The accountants needed 
the books and records to conduct further investigations, and a court order was obtained after 
a request for the records proved to be fruitless. 
X flew to Jamaica taking the papers with her.  The documents were completely washed 
away in a flood and the police never saw them.  She was charged with acts that tended, and 
were intended, to pervert the course of justice by removing the documents from the court’s 
jurisdiction and so impeding police investigation of possible offences of false accounting 
and theft.35 She was convicted of acts tending, and intended, to pervert the course of 
justice.36
 
 
On appeal following conviction it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the judge 
was wrong to reject a submission of “no case.”37 It was further argued on behalf of the 
appellant that an act impeding police investigation could not amount to the offence of 
tending, and intended, to pervert the course of justice unless it was proven that there was an 
investigation into a crime or suspected crime.38
                                                 
34At 449. 
 The court held that a police inquiry in order 
 
35Ibid. 
 
36At 450.  
 
37Ibid. 
 
38Ibid.  
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to establish whether an offence had been committed and, if so, who was responsible, was 
part of the administration of justice.39 The appeal was dismissed.40
 
 
Phillimore41 is of the opinion that the course of justice should begin only once a charge has 
been laid (in criminal cases) or on service of a summons (in civil cases).42 That means the 
period should start at the commencement of judicial proceedings.  This view is opposed to 
Smith and Hogan’s view, namely, that if the proceedings have not started they must be 
imminent or an investigation which might bring about proceedings must be in progress.43 
Phillimore’s view is also in conflict with The Queen v Vreones44
 
 where the accused was 
convicted of an offence although fabrication of evidence took place before the arbitrator 
was appointed. 
3.3 CONDUCT WHICH CONSTITUTES THE COMMON LAW OFFENCE OF 
PERVERTING THE COURSE OF JUSTICE  
In modern English law the following types of conduct have been held to constitute the 
offence of perverting the course of justice:45
 
  
a. Interference with jurors.46
                                                 
39Ibid.  
   
 
40Ibid.  
 
41Phillimore: Report of the Committee on Contempt of Court, 1974, Cmnd 5794, as cited by Smith and Hogan 
op cit Chapter Two (n 93) 774. 
 
42See Smith and Hogan op cit Chapter Two (n 93) 774. 
 
43Smith and Hogan op cit Chapter Two (n 93) 753.  See also R v Salvage (1982) 1 All ER 96 CA. 
 
44The Queen v Vreones supra at 360 in Chapter Two under 2.3 (n 93). 
 
45Card op cit (n 1) 538-40; Murphy op cit (n 1) 732-34 and SSM Edwards “Perjury and perverting the course 
of justice considered” (2003) Crim LR 527. 
 
46G Williams “Evading justice” (1975) Crim LR 430, 479, 608 and Mickleburgh [1995] 1 Cr App Rep 297 
CA. 
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b. Interference with witnesses.47
c. Destroying, falsifying or concealing potential evidence.
  
48
d. Making false allegations against another person.
  
49
e. Assisting another person to evade a lawful arrest.
  
50
f. Withholding of evidence in return for payment. 
 
51
g. Confessing, or pleading guilty to a crime committed by another person in order to 
shield him or her.
 
52
h. Knowingly acting outside the limits of one’s discretion as a police officer, so as to 
shield or excuse another person from criminal charges.
 
53
i. Making a false complaint to the police that is capable of being taken seriously, 
whether or not it identifies particular individuals.
  
54
 
 
3.3.1 Interfering with jurors  
Interference with, or intimidation of jurors or other persons involved in legal proceedings, 
may be punishable at common law not only as tending to pervert the course of justice but 
also as contempt of court.  It is said that any improper interference with the jury whether 
based on intimidation, bribery or persuasion is punishable.55 Approaching a jury or any 
member of a jury to discuss the case or express views about it may likewise constitute an 
attempt to pervert the course of justice.56
                                                 
47R v Rowell [1978] 1 WAR 763; Williams (1991) 92 Cr App Rep 158 CA; R v Ward and Hollister (1995) 
Crim LR 398 and R v Kellet (1976) QB 372.  
 
 
48The Queen v Vreones supra in Chapter Two under 2.3 (n 93); R v Murray (1982) 2 All ER 225 and Murphy 
op cit (n 1) 733. 
  
49R v Rowell supra (n 47) and Criminal Law Act 1967, section 5(2). 
 
50Card op cit (n 1) 538; R v Thomas [1979] All ER 577 and R v Spinks (1982) 1 All ER 587. 
 
51R v Bassi (1985) 2 All ER 255. 
 
52R v Devito and Devito (1975) Crim LR 175 and Murphy op cit (n 1) 733. 
53Murphy op cit (n 1) 733. 
54Card op cit (n 1) 539.  
55Murphy op cit (n 1) 733 and P Murphy Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (2002) 658. 
56Mickleburgh supra (n 46) at 304F-G. 
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In R v Mickleburgh57the Court of Appeal observed:58
 
  
Although it should be well known, we take the opportunity to reassert that any approach to a jury, or 
any member of it, to discuss the case, or express views about it, may well amount to a contempt of 
court, or even an attempt to pervert the course of justice.  That rule applies to court officials, ushers 
and jury bailiffs as much as anyone else.     
 
In R v Owen59
 
 it was observed that the crimes of contempt of court and the attempt to 
pervert the course of justice are interrelated.  The crimes overlap with each other, and with 
other crimes like bribery. 
3.4.2   Interfering with witnesses 
To interfere with witnesses or potential witnesses60 so as to prevent or dissuade them from 
giving evidence or to persuade them to change their evidence61 is both a common law 
misdemeanour62 and a statutory offence.63 It is said that there must be intent to influence 
the course or the outcome of the case in some way.64  The accused who knowingly tries to 
prevent true evidence from being given by the witness or who tries to obtain false evidence 
from the witness is guilty of an offence even if he or she did not bribe, or threaten, or 
unduly pressurise the witness.65
                                                 
57Mickleburgh supra (n 46). 
 If, however, the accused merely persuades a witness in 
order to prevent him or her from giving false evidence, he or she is not guilty of this 
58At 304F-G. 
 
59R v Owen supra at 239 in Chapter Two under 2.3.2, text at note n 127.  See also Smith and Hogan op cit 
Chapter Two (n 93) 752 and D Lanham “Payment to witnesses and contempt of court” [1975] Crim LR 146. 
 
60Card describes a potential witness as anyone who (although not actually called at the time to testify) is 
capable of giving relevant admissible evidence.  See Card op cit (n 1) 538.   
 
61Murphy op cit (n 1) 733. 
62Smith and Hogan op cit Chapter Two (n 126) 535.  
 
63See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, section 51.  This section is discussed infra under 3.4.3, 
text at note 190. 
 
64Murphy op cit (n 1) 733. 
65Ibid.  
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offence, even if he or she was wrong in believing that the witness’s proposed evidence was 
false.66 If the accused resorted to improper measures like threats, then his or her conduct 
falls foul of the offence of perverting the course of justice.  It is irrelevant that the threat is 
to do an otherwise lawful act such as to sue for damages.67 Murphy68
The leading cases on perverting the course of justice where the accused interfered with 
witnesses are R v Panayiotou
 is of the opinion that 
this offence is not committed by a person who seeks to persuade a witness to tell the truth, 
provided he or she does not use improper means such as threats, a bribe or undue pressure.  
69 and R v Toney.70
  
 R v Panayiotou provides authority that any 
agreement between two or more people to bribe a witness in order to induce him or her to 
withdraw statements or allegations made to the police constitutes the common law offence 
of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.  
The facts of the case were as follows:  A woman called Mrs Piasecka complained to the 
police that X had raped her.  Later Y, giving a fictitious name and claiming that they had 
met previously at a party, arranged to meet the woman.  The woman informed the police 
and when the meeting took place the police intervened.  It was alleged that Y told the police 
that he knew that the police wanted X; that X told him (Y) that he had sex with a girl 
against her will and that he (Y) wanted to hear what the girl was saying in order to see if he 
could arrange things for X.  Allegedly, he hoped to reach some agreement with her about 
compensation so that she would not continue with the complaint and that he had in mind 
                                                 
66Ibid. 
67Card op cit (n 1) 538; R Card, Cross and Jones Criminal Law 15ed (2001) 442; Murphy op cit (n 1) 733 and 
P Murphy Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (1996) 580-81. 
 
68Murphy op cit (n 1) 733. 
69[1973] 3 All ER 112 CA. 
70(1993) 1 WLR 264. 
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that he could find her a flat very cheap.71 X and Y were charged with conspiracy to pervert 
the course of justice by seeking, through bribery, to induce Mrs Piasecka to withdraw the 
allegation of rape which she had made against X.72
  
 
On appeal it was contended on behalf of the appellants, inter alia, that:73
 
 
(1) the particulars of the conspiracy charge disclosed no offence known to the law, and 
(2) there was no evidence of agreement or any intention to effect an unlawful purpose. 
 
The defence further contended that Mrs Piasecka was not to be regarded as a witness, but as 
a prosecutor and that an agreement to offer a bribe to her in order to withdraw her 
allegations could not be an offence unless it fell within section 4(1) or section 5(1) of the 
1967 Act74 and that the count charged no offence under either subsections.  Thus, the basic 
question in this appeal was whether Mrs Piasecka was to be regarded as a witness or a 
prosecutor.75
 
   
The court rejected the submission by the defence that the count disclosed no offence known 
to the law.  It held that the particulars which accompanied the count were sufficient to 
sustain a charge of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.76 On the matter of whether 
Mrs Piasecka was a witness or a prosecutor, the court held:77
                                                 
71R v Panayiotou supra (n 69) at 114C-E.  
 
 
72At 115D. 
73At 114J-15A.  
74The Criminal Law Act of 1967 is discussed infra under 3.4.2, text at note 164 and 3.4.3, text at note 182. 
75R v Panayiotou supra (n 69) at 115G-H. 
76At 116e-f.  
77At 116a-b.  
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If a person has made a statement with a view to the provision of evidence in support of criminal 
proceedings, certainly in that case such a person in relation to those proceedings is a witness, and it is 
a perversion of the course of justice to offer him or her an inducement to alter or withdraw the 
statement.  
 
On the first ground of appeal, the court held that the offence was recognised as an 
indictable misdemeanour by section 29 of Criminal Procedure Act of 185178 and that the 
Criminal Law Act of 1967 did not abolish the common law offence of perverting the course 
of justice.79 On the second ground of appeal the court found that there was evidence of an 
intention to interfere with the course of justice.80 The court upheld the appellants’ 
conviction.81
The importance of this case lies, firstly, in the fact that the court confirmed that any attempt 
to bribe a witness could be prosecuted under the common law offence of perverting the 
course of justice.  Secondly, the decision highlighted that, notwithstanding the coming into 
being of the Criminal Law Act of 1967, the common law offence of perverting the course 
of justice was never abolished. 
 
 
R v Toney82
                                                 
78Section 29 is discussed in Chapter Two supra under 2.3.3, text at note 143.   
 is another case which dealt with the offence of perverting the course of justice 
following interference with a witness. The facts of the case were as follows: Toney was 
convicted of an act tending, and intended, to pervert the course of justice.  It was alleged 
that he attempted to persuade a witness, May, to change the evidence which he was to give 
in the trial of Toney’s brother, Brian, on a charge of robbery.  The question before the court 
was whether the common law offence of perverting the course of justice by interfering with 
a potential witness can be committed where there is no evidence of any bribe, threat, undue 
79R v Panayiotou supra (n 69) at 115b-d.  
80At 116g-h.  
81At 117h.  
82R v Toney supra (n 70).  
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pressure or other unlawful means.83 He appealed against the conviction on the ground, inter 
alia, that at the conclusion of the prosecution case the court erred in law in ruling on the 
legal ingredients of the offence that the prosecution had to prove; that he had no intention to 
pervert the course of justice; that he intended that the witness should give different 
evidence; that what he did had a tendency to that effect and that the principle that the 
interference must be unlawful, or improper, applied.84 In dismissing the appeal the court 
held that although in the majority of cases where a defendant committed an act tending, or 
intended, to pervert the course of justice by interfering with a witness, the actus reus would 
be accompanied by unlawful means such as bribery, threats or unlawful pressure, the use of 
such unlawful means was not an essential ingredient of the offence. Therefore, even though 
there was no evidence of the use of unlawful means by the defendant to persuade the 
witness to alter his evidence, the appellant (Toney) could still be convicted of the common 
law offence of perverting the course of justice.85
 
   
The court clearly contemplated that if the end in view is shown to be improper, such as 
where the defendant has no genuine belief in the falsity of the evidence to be given, the 
actus reus may be complete even though the defendant has used no unlawful means.86
 
  
3.3.3    Destroying, falsifying or concealing potential evidence 
3.3.3.1    Fabrication of evidence 
Steps taken by the defendant for the manufacture or fabrication of false evidence infringe 
                                                 
83“Unlawful means” in this context includes a threat to do an otherwise lawful act or to exercise a legal right. 
For instance, in R v Kellet supra (n 47), D threatened to sue P for slander unless P withdrew a statement he 
had made to solicitors in connection with divorce proceedings instituted against D by his wife.  It was held 
that this was an offence of perverting the course of justice, though D believed P’s statement to be false and 
although he intended to carry out his threats.  See Smith and Hogan op cit Chapter Two (n 93) 754. 
84R v Toney supra (n 70) at 365H-66A. 
 
85At 365B-C.  
 
86R v Toney supra (n 70) at 370A.  
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upon the administration of public justice and are punishable as perverting the course of 
justice.87 This offence may be committed by fabrication of false evidence for the purpose of 
misleading a judicial tribunal even though the evidence is never tendered.88 In R v Murray89 
the court convicted the accused of attempting to pervert the course of justice by altering a 
blood specimen and subsequently delivering it to an analyst knowing that the resulting 
analysis was likely to be used in his defence in court proceedings against him.90
 
  
The facts of this case were as follows:  The police stopped Murray while he was driving his 
car.  He was asked to give a breath test but he refused.  The police took him to a police 
station where he was requested, and agreed, to give a specimen of blood.  The police kept 
one half of the specimen for analysis and the other half was handed to him so that he could, 
if he wished, have it analysed by an independent analyst of his own choice.  The level of 
alcohol found in the blood specimen by Murray’s analyst was far below that which was 
found in the blood specimen kept by the police.  The matter was investigated and Murray 
was then charged and convicted of attempting to pervert the course of public justice in 
relation to the blood specimen.  He appealed against the conviction on a point of law and 
against sentence.91
 
 
The court had to decide whether there was evidence which was fit to go to the jury to the 
effect that Murray had the intention to pervert the course of justice and, much more 
importantly, whether there was evidence that his act had a tendency to have that effect.  In 
                                                 
87See Card op cit Chapter Two (n 91) 429 and Turner op cit Chapter Two (n 109) 306.  
 
88Card op cit (n 1) 538. 
 
89R v Murray supra (n 48). 
 
90At 225d-e. 
 
91At 227c-d. 
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dismissing the appeal against the conviction the court held:92
 
  
In the view of this court, there must be evidence that the man has done enough for there to be a risk, 
without further action by him, that injustice will result. In other words, there must be a possibility 
that what he has done ‘without more’ might lead to injustice.  ...  in the present case there plainly was 
evidence of such a tendency or possibility …  
 
It is clear that the judicial body would have been misled by Murray’s evidence, that he 
would have been acquitted of driving a vehicle when his blood alcohol was over the limit 
and that this would have been a miscarriage of justice. 
 
In 1995, in R v Sinha,93 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal by Sinha who had been 
convicted of obstructing the course of justice for altering the medical records of a deceased 
patient.  It was observed that if the acts of the defendant had a tendency, and were intended, 
to mislead any of the judicial proceedings which might have ensued then that was enough 
to justify any conviction.  The facts of this case were as follows:  Sinha was the junior 
doctor in a partnership of three.  He prescribed a drug which contained a beta blocker to an 
asthmatic patient.  It was alleged that the patient took one of the tablets on the day of her 
death.  It was common cause that it was dangerous to prescribe a beta blocker to an 
asthmatic.  It was submitted on his behalf that he did not appreciate the deceased was an 
asthmatic, but he admitted that he should have ascertained that information from the 
deceased’s medical records.94
 
  
During the trial he admitted that on two or three occasions after the patient’s death he had 
deleted four separate references to her asthmatic condition from her computerised therapy 
records.  The alterations formed the basis of the count of perverting the course of justice.  
                                                 
92At 228g-j. 
93[1995] 1 Cr App LR 68. 
94At 68.  
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When the Coroner requested the senior partner to send the patient’s records, the written 
records could not be found.  The two senior doctors sent the computerized records which 
included the alterations.  Sinha admitted making the alterations, but he submitted that he 
did so out of fear that the other partners would use his mistake as a reason to force him out 
of the practice.95 He was nevertheless convicted of committing acts tending, or intended, to 
pervert the course of justice.96
 
  
The Court of Appeal was called upon to determine, inter alia, the following issues:  firstly, 
was it proved that the alterations had a tendency to pervert the course of public justice?  
Secondly, when making the alterations, did the appellant intend to pervert the course of 
justice?97
 
   
In dismissing the appeal the court stated:98
 
 
[I]f there was more than one possible type of proceedings which might ensue, if the act done might 
mislead the court in any or all of those proceedings, and it was proved that the defendant intended to 
mislead in any proceedings which might ensue, that of itself would be sufficient to justify conviction. 
 
If the defendant intended to mislead any judicial tribunal which might investigate the 
circumstances of his patient’s death he had sufficient mens rea.  The significance of this 
case lies in the fact that the defendant need not intend to mislead a specific judicial 
proceeding but any judicial proceeding which may be instituted.  It does not matter whether 
the defendant wanted to mislead a tribunal appointed in either the criminal proceedings or 
civil proceedings or the Coroner’s inquest, his act tended, and was intended, to pervert the 
                                                 
95Ibid. 
96Ibid.  
97Ibid. 
98Ibid. 
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course of justice. 
 
3.3.3.2    Destruction of evidence 
 
Destruction of any evidence can lead to the miscarriage of justice.  Therefore it constitutes 
the crime of perverting the course of justice.  One of the earliest English cases where the 
two accused were charged with the offence of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice 
following the concealment and destruction of evidence was R v Stringer.99
 
 In this case the 
Court of Criminal Appeal observed that it was sufficient to constitute the crime of 
conspiracy to defeat the course of public justice if persons conspired to conceal a crime 
which had been committed, although no proceedings were pending or had commenced. 
The facts of this case were the following: It was alleged that Stringer and Sharpe, in 
different cars, were on their way to a dance in one of the villages.  Stringer’s car struck and 
injured a cyclist, and Stringer did not stop.  On arrival at the village, Stringer told Sharpe 
about the accident.  They agreed that nothing would be said about the accident.  They also 
agreed to return home by another road in order to avoid going past the scene of the 
accident.  Later, Sharpe proceeded alone to the scene and found an ambulance and helpers 
there.  He said nothing of what he knew as to the cause of the accident.  The bicycle was 
found with some red paint on it and subsequently police called on Stringer and inspected 
his car, which was painted red.  They found a tin of black paint in the car and they also 
found that the headlamps were fitted with new bolts.  He was asked about the bolts and 
Stringer said that he had got them from a carpenter named Osborne on a neighbouring 
estate.  The next day Stringer went to Osborne and asked him to say that he had provided 
the bolts.100
                                                 
99(1937) 26 Cr App R 122. 
 Osborne told the lie to the police, as agreed, to the effect that he had provided 
the bolts to Stringer but later, when the police interviewed Stringer in Osborne’s presence, 
100At 123. 
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he admitted that he had made a false statement.  Stringer and Sharpe were indicted with 
conspiracy to defeat the ends of justice.101
 
    
During the trial, counsel for Stringer moved to quash the indictment on the ground that it 
did not disclose any offence known to the law, as there could be no offence of conspiracy to 
defeat the course of public justice unless proceedings were pending or had been 
commenced.102 The indictment was amended.103 It alleged that Stringer and Sharpe, 
together with Osborne, conspired to defeat the ends of public justice by concealing and 
destroying evidence of commission of a crime by attempting to mislead the police who 
were investigating the said crime by statements which they knew to be untrue.104 The 
accused pleaded guilty.105
 
 
The question before the court was whether that indictment, as amended, disclosed any 
offence known to the law.  If it did not, the appellants, though they pleaded guilty, would be 
entitled to have their convictions quashed.  Therefore, the court was called upon to consider 
whether persons who conspired to destroy evidence of the commission of a crime and got 
persons to conceal a crime and attempted to mislead a police officer, were guilty of the 
indictable offence of conspiracy to defeat the ends of justice.106
 
  
The court held that there was such an offence.  Therefore, what was left to consider was 
whether the offence of conspiracy to defeat the course of public justice could not be 
                                                 
101Ibid.  
102Ibid.  
103At 123-24.  
104At 125.   
105At 124.  
106At 125.   
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committed unless proceedings were pending or had been commenced.  The court viewed 
that as a hopeless proposition that could not form part of the law of the country.107 In 
dismissing the appeal the court held:108
 
 
Public justice requires not only that people should not take steps to conceal a crime or destroy 
evidence once a summons has been served upon somebody, but also that every crime should be 
suitably dealt with, and a man who obstructs public justice as soon as the crime is committed and 
endeavours to avoid the consequences of his wrongdoing by conspiracy with others is just as much 
guilty of an offence as if he waits until after proceedings are actually pending.   
 
There is academic authority which supports the court’s decision.  According to Card,109 a 
person who, in order to prevent the detection of the offender, destroys the only evidence of 
a crime before an investigation can begin, can be convicted of the offence of perverting the 
course of justice if he or she acts with intent to pervert that course.  The same would be true 
if he or she mistakenly believes that it is the only evidence of a crime which does not 
exist.110
 
 According to this decision, and in as far as the crime of perverting the course of 
justice by conspiring to destroy evidence is concerned, attempt to commit the impossible 
amounts to a substantive offence.  
In R v Welsh,111
                                                 
107At 126.   
 the appellant, Welsh, was convicted of the offence of attempting to defeat 
the course of justice.  It was alleged that a policeman had seen Welsh in his own motor 
vehicle and he was obviously unfit to drive due to excessive use of alcohol.  He was 
arrested and taken to the police station.  At the station, the arresting officer took a specimen 
of urine from Welsh.  The officer divided the specimen into two containers, and he left the 
108Ibid.  
109Card op cit (n 1) 537.   
110Ibid.  
111(1974) RTR 478 CA. 
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urine containers in the room alone with Welsh for a minute.  Allegedly, during the 
policeman’s absence, Welsh emptied the containers down a sink and he refused to provide 
another specimen.  He was charged and convicted, inter alia, of attempting to defeat the 
course of justice.112
 
  
3.3.3.3    Concealment of evidence 
Concealing evidence that may be vital during a trial constitutes a misdemeanour of 
perverting the course of justice.  For instance, in R v Rafique,113 X shot and killed D with 
his handgun and knowing that an investigation into D’s death was in progress or imminent, 
he threw the handgun and cartridges into a dam so that the police might not find them.  The 
court held that this conduct tended, and was intended, to pervert the course of justice.114
 
  
3.3.4   Making false statements to the police and false allegations against another 
person 
Making false allegations to the police or other officers of justice with a view to perverting 
the course of, or preventing judicial proceedings and knowingly making a false allegation 
of criminal conduct against another person, intending that he or she should be prosecuted or 
knowing that he or she might be prosecuted, constitutes the offence of perverting the course 
of justice.115 Some academic writers are of the opinion that the existence of this offence at 
common law is unclear and that such conduct should now always be charged under a 
provision in a statute.116
                                                 
112At 478D. 
 The offence of perverting the course of justice may be committed 
113R v Rafique supra (n 27).  
114At 7b. 
115Card op cit (n 1) 538 and Murphy op cit (n 1) 733-34.  
116Section 5(2) of the Criminal Law Act of 1967.  See the discussion of the provisions of this section infra, 
text at note 182. 
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when X makes false allegations against D, intending that he or she should be prosecuted or 
knowing that he or she might be prosecuted.117
 
 
3.3.5    Assisting another person to evade lawful arrest 
At common law anyone who gives assistance to any person who has committed an offence 
with intent to enable the assisted person to evade arrest, trial, or punishment, is guilty of the 
offence as an accessory after the fact.118 Card119 says that this offence amounts to 
committing an act tending to and with intent to assist a person to evade lawful arrest while 
knowing that the police are looking for that person.  In contrast to statutory law, in common 
law it does not matter whether the offence was arrestable and it is not strictly necessary to 
prove the guilt of the person who was assisted.120
 
  
3.3.6    Withholding of evidence in return for payment 
A person is guilty of the offence of perverting the course of justice when, as a potential 
witness, he or she makes an offer or agreement to withhold or change his or her evidence in 
return for money.  What is punishable here is the suppression of the truth in exchange for 
monetary reward.  There is no doubt that injustice will result where a person who might be 
of material assistance in securing the prosecution or conviction of the offender makes him- 
or herself unavailable to give testimony in return for reward.  It is said that the gist of the 
offence is an act which may lead, and is intended to lead, to a miscarriage of justice 
whether or not that miscarriage actually occurs.121
                                                 
117Murphy op cit (n 67) 581. 
 Proof of intention alone is not sufficient 
to invoke this offence.  There must be evidence that what that person has done is enough 
118Smith and Hogan op cit Chapter Two (n 93) 758-59. 
 
119Card op cit (n 1) 538.  
120Murphy op cit (n 1) 732.  See the discussion of the statutory offence infra, text at note 164. 
121R v Bassi supra (n 51) at 672. 
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for there to be a risk, without further action by him, that injustice will result.  In other words 
there must be a possibility that what he or she has done ‘without more’ might lead to 
injustice.122 The authority regarding this matter is R v Bassi.123 In this case, the accused was 
convicted of committing acts tending, or intended, to pervert the course of justice after he 
offered not to give evidence or to give evidence exonerating the other person, in exchange 
for payment.124 Bassi’s car had been involved in an accident with another vehicle.  The 
driver of the other vehicle had been charged with driving whilst disqualified.  Some time 
after the accident, Bassi phoned the wife of the other driver offering not to give evidence or 
to give evidence exonerating the other driver in exchange for payment.  It is not clear 
whether he received the payment.  He was convicted of committing acts tending, or 
intended, to pervert the course of justice.  He appealed.  It was submitted on behalf of the 
appellant that to absent oneself from court in such circumstances was not an act that 
perverts the course of justice and that the prosecution must show not only that this act had a 
tendency to pervert the course of justice, but moreover that it had in fact done so.125 In 
refusing the leave to appeal the court held:126
 
 
A person summoned as a witness who deliberately absents himself in return for payment does an act 
that tends to pervert the course of justice. 
 
R v Bassi has been criticised as being inconsistent with R v Murray,127
                                                 
122Ibid.  
 where it was said 
that the offence would only be complete where a person has done something which might, 
123R v Bassi supra (n 51).  
124At 671. 
125Ibid. 
126At 671-72. 
127R v Murray supra (n 48) at 228. 
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without further action on his or her part, lead to potential injustice.128 Murphy supports the 
Bassi decision,129 and argues that the course of justice is jeopardised as soon as such offer 
or agreement is made, even if the witness could eventually decide to tell the truth.130
justice constituted the substantive offence.
 The 
significance of this case lies in the fact that the court held that although the charge of 
committing acts that tend, and are intended, to pervert the course of justice had generally 
taken the form of an inchoate offence, to incite, conspire or attempt to pervert the course of 
131
 
 
3.3.7    Confessing, or pleading guilty to a crime committed by another person 
A person commits a common law misdemeanour if he or she confesses, or pleads guilty, to 
a crime he or she never committed, but which has been committed by another person, in 
order to protect the latter from prosecution.132 In this situation the judicial proceedings 
would carry on in a mistaken presumption that the person before the court is the right 
person and the judgment passed by the court would be directed to the wrong accused.  As a 
result, the factually guilty will escape conviction and the innocent will be judged falsely.133 
The leading case that dealt with pleading guilty to an offence not committed by oneself but 
by another was R v Devito and Devito.134 The defendants were father X and his son Y.  
While driving his father’s car without a licence, Y was stopped for speeding and he falsely 
gave his father’s name to the police.  He later presented his father’s driving documents.135
                                                 
128Murphy op cit (n 1) 733. 
 
129Ibid.  
 
130Ibid. 
  
131R v Bassi supra (n 51) at 672.  
132Murphy op cit (n 1) 733. 
133H Quirk “Identifying miscarriages of justice: Why innocence in the UK is not the answer” (2007) Modern 
Law Review Vol 70 No 5 759.  
 
134R v Devito and Devito supra (n 52). 
135At 175. 
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The summons was served personally to X and he instructed his lawyer that he wished to 
plead guilty.  The lawyer who represented X was completely deceived, and he had no idea 
of what was going on. Neither X nor Y appeared in court. The prosecution accepted the 
plea of guilty and X was disqualified from driving for six months.  The police inspector 
who investigated the case was alerted to the deception by the age of the suspect.  Upon the 
completion of the investigation, X and Y were charged and convicted of conspiracy to 
pervert the course of justice.136
 
 
The R v Devito and Devito case differs from R v Headley137 because in the latter case the 
defendant did not act and did not pursue any course of action which could have amounted 
to the necessary ingredient of the actus reus of perverting the course of justice.  He 
remained silent.138 In the R v Devito and Devito case, X explicitly instructed his lawyer to 
plead guilty to an offence he never committed.  Therefore, his action complied with the 
actus reus required for the crime of perverting the course of justice.139
 
 
3.3.8 Knowingly acting outside the limits of one’s discretion as a police officer so 
as to shield or excuse another person from criminal charges 
According to Murphy,140
 
 a policeman who knowingly acts outside the limits of his or her 
discretion so as to shield or excuse another person (for example, a friend or colleague) from 
criminal liability is guilty of the offence of perverting the course of justice.  Leading cases  
                                                 
136Ibid. 
137See the discussion of this case supra, text at note 8.  
138R v Headley supra (n 8) at 29. 
139R v Devito and Devito supra (n 52). 
140Murphy op cit (n 1) 733. 
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in this regard are R v Coxhead141and R v Ward Hollister.142
 
 
In R v Coxhead the court dismissed an appeal by the appellant Coxhead following his 
conviction of the common law offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice on the 
basis that he exceeded his discretion as a police officer.  The facts of this case were as 
follows:  Coxhead was a police officer convicted for conduct tending, and intended, to 
pervert the course of justice.  It was alleged that on the night of 16 November 1984, the 
constable who was on duty observed a car being driven in a reckless manner.  The 
constable requested the driver of the car to undergo a breath test.  The driver was arrested 
and taken to the police station where Coxhead was sergeant in charge.  Coxhead had been 
alerted that a case needing a breathalyser test was coming in, and Coxhead and/or his 
colleague in the police station made the necessary preparations.  The constable arrived at 
the police station with the driver he had arrested.  Coxhead recognised the driver as being 
the son of one inspector from one of the police stations. 
 
Allegedly, Coxhead knew that the inspector suffered from a serious heart condition.  He 
feared the prosecution of the inspector’s son might have serious consequences for the 
inspector’s health.  He decided, therefore, not to administer the prescribed breath test but 
instead telephoned the inspector to come and collect his son.  It was alleged that the 
sergeant aborted the proceedings.143
                                                 
141[1986] RTR 411.  
 Evidence at the trial revolved largely around the 
question as to the existence and ambit of a police officer’s discretion to abort proceedings 
in the way that Coxhead had, and particularly the ambit and scope of that discretion with 
regard to breathalyser cases.  One of the prosecution witnesses conceded that there was 
142See R v Ward and Hollister supra (n 47). 
143R v Coxhead supra (n 141) at 412A-G.  
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such discretion in certain trivial cases.  The sergeant was, nevertheless, convicted of an 
attempt to pervert the course of justice.144
 
 
On appeal he submitted that it was for the prosecution to prove as a matter of law that he 
had no discretion to act as he did.  He further submitted that there was not sufficient 
evidence on which the jury could come to the conclusion that no discretion existed.145 In 
dismissing the appeal, the court held that there was sufficient evidence upon which a jury 
could reach the conclusion which they did.146
 
  
In 1995, in R v Ward and Hollister,147
 
 police officials were charged with perverting the 
course of justice for failing to administer a breathalyser test.  The facts of this case were as 
follows:  G, an off-duty police officer, was seen on two occasions having a drink in a public 
house.  That night he drove his car into a traffic light.  An ambulance driver witnessed the 
accident and called the emergency services.  After some time, the police and an ambulance 
arrived at the accident scene.  G was reluctant to go to hospital although he was injured and 
in spite of signs that he had struck his head against the windscreen, which was broken.  
Ultimately, the ambulance crew persuaded him to go to hospital.  Those who attended to 
him at the hospital said he smelt of alcohol and his general behaviour was indicative of the 
consumption of alcohol. 
G discharged himself after treatment.  The police officers who were at the accident scene 
                                                 
144At 415C.  
145At 413K-L.  
146At 415L-16A.  
147R v Ward and Hollister supra (n 47).  
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took him home by police car.  They failed to administer a breath test which a member of the 
ambulance crew found surprising, so she reported the police officers for misconduct.  They 
were charged with perverting the course of justice by failing to administer a breath test at 
the accident scene or thereafter.148 They were convicted of this offence, but appealed.149 It 
was said that police officers had discretion to administer the breath test or not.  The court 
pointed out that if the jury thought that Ward and Hollister had exercised their discretion in 
a perverse way, or for an improper motive, namely, to protect a fellow police officer, then 
they might think conclude that their conduct had a tendency to pervert the course of justice 
and was intended to pervert the course of justice.150 One of the challenges was whether 
breath testing at the scene of the accident could have involved the risk of harm to G.  There 
was evidence that he was slightly injured.  The court held151
 
 that, in the light of 
considerations relating to the risk of harm to G if medical assistance were delayed, it would 
not be right to convict the officers of an offence which depended on failure to administer a 
breath test at the scene of the accident.  Accordingly, the charge of conduct perverting the 
course of justice was quashed.  
R v Ward and Hollister confirmed the academic view that the offence of perverting the 
course of justice cannot be committed by failure to do something (omission).152
(omission) to administer a breathalyser to a motorist who was suspected of drunk driving. 
 It 
contradicted the earlier decision in R v Coxhead where the court upheld the appellant’s 
conviction for the crime of attempt to pervert the course of justice following his failure  
 
                                                 
148At 398. 
149Ibid. 
150Ibid. 
151At 399. 
152See Card op cit (n 1) 536.  
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3.3.9 Making a false complaint to the police which is capable of being taken 
seriously, whether or not it identifies particular individuals 
According to Card,153
 
 unlawfully exposing individuals to the risk of arrest, imprisonment, 
pending trial and possible conviction and punishment clearly tend to pervert the course of 
justice.  It is said that in making the complaint, the defendant intends that it should be taken 
seriously and that there is a possibility of a police investigation being commenced.  It is 
said that where a complaint is so generalised that there is no risk or there is a minimal risk 
of anyone being arrested or prosecuted, it may be more appropriate to charge the offence of 
causing wasteful employment of the police. 
R v Cotter and Others154 is a case in point.  The facts of this case were the following:  
Cotter was the white boyfriend of a black Olympic athlete, H.  Their relationship was in 
difficulty.  Allegedly, Cotter had arranged to visit H.  When he did not arrive, H started to 
look out for him.  As she was looking outside, she noticed a car with no headlights passing 
her home.  Shortly after, Cotter appeared.  His body was covered with blood.  He stated that 
he had been mugged.  The police and ambulance services were contacted.  He stated that 
the attack was racial because he was dating a black person.  There was evidence of mobile-
phone activity between him and his friends, the other defendants, Wynn and Clair, on the 
evening of the attack.  There was also evidence that Clair had a car fitting the description of 
the one seen by H.  Further, Clair had informed a journalist about the attack on the same 
evening.  He told the journalist that it was a racist attack.  They were arrested and charged 
with conspiracy with intent to pervert the course of public justice.155
 
    
                                                 
153See Card op cit (n 1) 539.  
154[2002] Crim LR 824 CA.  
155At 824.  
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The prosecution’s case was that the attack on Cotter had been a charade to elicit sympathy 
from H and to re-establish a relationship with her.  It was also intended to enable the 
defendants to obtain money from the press for the story.  It was said that in order to achieve 
these aims the defendants intended to, and had indeed set in motion, a police investigation 
into a serious racially-motivated assault which resulted in widespread police investigations 
and put innocent individuals at risk of detention, arrest, charge and even prosecution.  After 
the state had closed its case, the defence made a submission of no case to answer.  The 
judge ruled against the defence’s submission.  The judge directed the jury that the course of 
public justice was a police investigation which may lead to criminal proceedings.  The 
appellants were convicted of the offence of conspiracy with intent to pervert the course of 
public justice.156
 
 
On appeal it was submitted on behalf of the appellants, inter alia, that the facts were not 
sufficient to justify a charge of perverting the course of justice as there was no binding 
English authority which justified the conclusion that simply to take an invented crime to the 
police was of itself sufficient.157 The court held that English law accorded with the 
proposition that for the purposes of the offence the “course of public justice” included the 
process of criminal investigation.158  The mischief at which it was aimed was the exposure 
of individuals, identifiable or otherwise, to risk of arrest, imprisonment and punishment.159   
The appeal was dismissed.160
 
  
 
                                                 
156At 825.  
157Ibid.  
158 Ibid. 
 
159Ibid. 
160Ibid.  
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3.4    STATUTORY OFFENCES 
3.4.1 General  
There are a number of statutory offences which criminalize conduct which has the tendency 
to obstruct or pervert the course of justice.  Some of these statutory offences overlap with 
the common law offence.  Others address conduct relating to the obstruction of the course 
of justice which is not punishable in terms of the common law.  
 
3.4.2   Concealing relevant offences 
Similar to the common law,161 it is a statutory offence162 to impede the apprehension or 
prosecution of a person who has committed a certain offence.  The statutory crime of 
perverting the course of justice by deliberately assisting another person to evade lawful 
arrest requires that X must have impeded the arrest of a person who has committed a 
relevant offence.163
 
  
Section 4 of the Criminal Law Act164
 
 provides: 
(1) Where a person has committed a relevant offence, any other person who, knowing or believing 
him to be guilty of the offence or of some other relevant offence, does without lawful authority 
or reasonable excuse any act with intent to impede his apprehension or prosecution shall be 
guilty of an offence. 
(1A) In this section and section five below, ‘relevant offence’ means – 
 
(a) an offence for which the sentence is fixed by law, 
 
(b) an offence by which a person of 18 years or over (not previously convicted) may be 
sentenced and imprisoned for a term of five years (or might be so sentenced but for the 
restrictions imposed by section 33 of the Magistrates Courts Acts 1980).   
 
According to Murphy,165
                                                 
161Card op cit (n 1) 358.  See supra (n 118).  
 this offence is not capable of taking the form of an omission.   
162The Criminal Law Act of 1967. 
163The Criminal Law Act of 1967. 
164The Criminal Law Act of 1967.  
165Murphy op cit (n 1) 739.     
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Unlike its common law counterpart,166 this offence requires that Y must have previously 
committed and at least been charged with a relevant offence before the accused X could be 
held liable for impeding his apprehension.167 It is said that it is not necessary for the person, 
X, who allegedly assisted Y, to be convicted of his or her offence before X can be 
convicted of assisting him or her.168 Nor is Y’s conviction conclusive proof of X’s guilt at a 
subsequent trial where he or she is accused of assisting Y.169 The prior conviction of a 
person assisted (Y) will raise a presumption that he or she was guilty and this will simplify 
the task of the prosecution at the trial.170 The relevant case here is R v Spinks.171 Spinks was 
found guilty of concealing a knife with intent to impede the apprehension or prosecution of 
a person who had committed a relevant offence.  Spinks and his friend, Fairey, were 
drinking together in a public house and one of Fairey’s friends became involved in a fight 
with other people.  Fairey went to assist his friend and he stabbed some members of the 
other group.  After the fight, Fairey gave the knife to Spinks to hide, which Spinks 
accordingly did.  Allegedly, Spinks was never at the crime scene and therefore he was not 
aware that Fairey had committed a relevant offence.  Spinks and Fairey were subsequently 
arrested.  Fairey was charged with wounding a person with intent to do grievous bodily 
harm.  Spinks was charged with concealing a knife with intent to impede the apprehension 
or prosecution of a person who had committed a relevant offence.172
 
  
The Crown had to prove (a) that a Fairey had committed a relevant offence, (b) that Spinks 
                                                 
166See Murphy op cit (n 1) 732.  See supra (n 120).  
167Murphy op cit (n 1) 739. 
168Ibid.  
169Ibid.  
170Ibid.  
171R v Spinks supra (n 50). 
172In contravention of section 4(1) of the Criminal Law Act of 1967.  
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knew or believed him to be guilty of that offence or some other relevant offence, and (c) 
that Spinks without lawful authority or reasonable excuse did some act with intent to 
impede the apprehension or prosecution of that other person, Fairey.173 The Crown had no 
admissible evidence against Spinks to prove the first ingredient of the offence, that is, that 
Fairey had committed the relevant offence of wounding.  The Crown relied solely on an out 
of court admission by Fairey which was not admissible against Spinks.174 The trial court 
ruled175that Fairey’s admission ‘was evidence in the case’ and that the jury could act on it 
when considering the case against Spinks.  Spinks was convicted of the statutory offence of 
concealing a knife with intent to impede the apprehension or prosecution of a person who 
had committed a relevant offence.176 He appealed.177
 
 
The appeal was allowed and the conviction was quashed178 because there was no 
admissible evidence against Spinks to prove the first ingredient of the offence, that is, that 
Fairey had committed the relevant offence with which he was charged, i.e. that of 
wounding.  The court held that where a person charged with an arrestable offence and 
another person charged with assisting him were tried together, the rule that out of court 
statements could not be used to provide evidence against a co-accused applied.179
 
 
 
 
                                                 
173R v Spinks supra (n 50) at 589A.  
174At 589C.  
175At 587F.  
176Ibid.  
177Ibid.  
178At 589H. 
179At 587F-G.  
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3.4.3   Wasting police time  
Wasting police time is akin to perversion of justice.  According to Murphy,180 making false 
allegations to the police of criminal conduct against another person will also amount to the 
statutory offence of causing wasteful employment of the police.  False stories that waste 
police time and resources amount to the statutory offence of wasting police time.181
Section 5 of the Criminal Law Act
    
182
 
 provides: 
(2) Where a person causes any wasteful employment of the police by knowingly making to any 
person a false report tending to show that an offence has been committed, or to give rise to 
apprehension for the safety of any persons or property, or tending to show that he has 
information material to any police inquiry, he shall be liable on summary conviction to 
imprisonment for not more than six months or to a fine of not more than level 4 on the standard 
scale or both.    
 
X may also be prosecuted for reporting a hoax crime to any person or to the police and if 
the police start the investigation of the purported crime, for example, if X calls his friend, to 
tell him that his car has been hijacked while knowing that it has not.  His friend reports the 
matter to the police and the police waste their scarce resources and time with the search.  It 
is said183
 
 that no proceedings for this offence may be instituted except by, or with, the 
consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). 
3.4.4   Intimidation of, or retaliation against witnesses, jurors and others 
Intimidation of witnesses by violence or threats or by exercising other means of pressure 
against them raises one of the most disturbing problems within the criminal justice 
system.184
                                                 
180Murphy op cit (n 1) 733-34.  
 When intimidation prevails and the giving of evidence is thereby prevented, the 
process of proof is prejudiced and the court is presented with only a partial and sometimes 
181Murphy op cit (n 1) 744. 
182The Criminal Law Act of 1967.   
183Murphy op cit (n 1) 744.  
184N Zaltzman “Admitting statements of missing or intimidated witnesses: Section 23(3) of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988 compared with the Israeli experience” (1992) Modern Law Review 478. 
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distorted picture of the facts.185 Some actions that constitute the common law 
misdemeanour of perverting the course of justice by interfering with witnesses or potential 
witnesses186 by threats or intimidation are now also criminalised in terms of legislation.187 
The legislation did not do away with the common law offence of perverting the course of 
justice – instead it preserved it.188 This means that the offence can be tried either in terms of 
the common law or in terms of the Act.  Murphy189
 
 submits that the offence created by 
section 51(1) has few advantages over the common law offence.  It is clear that the 
statutory offence of perverting the course of justice does not only overlap with the common 
law offence but it also has a lot of commonalities with the Roman and Roman-Dutch crime 
of the lex Cornelia de falsis.    
Section 51 of the Criminal Law and Public Order Act of 1994 provides:190
 
 
(1) A person commits an offence if− 
 
(a) he does an act which intimidates, and is intended to intimidate, another person (the 
victim), 
 
(b) he does the act knowing or believing that the victim is assisting in the investigation of an 
offence or is a witness or potential witness or a juror or potential juror in proceedings for 
an offence, and 
 
(c) he does it intending thereby to cause the investigation or the course of justice to be 
obstructed, perverted or interfered with.  
In R v Edmonds191
                                                 
185Ibid. 
 the court noted that incidents of witness intimidation were endemic and 
becoming worse.  The facts of this case were as follows:  Edmonds was convicted by the 
  
186See the position in the common law as discussed supra under 3.3.2, text at note 60.  
187Section 51 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 for criminal cases and Sections 30 to 41 of 
Criminal Justice and Police Act of 2001 for potential witnesses in civil cases. 
 
188By section 51(11) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994.  See Murphy op cit (n 1) 736. 
189Murphy op cit (n 1) 736. 
 
190See Murphy op cit (n 1) 734-35 and the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, Chapter 33 
(3.11.1994) 37.  
 
191[1999] 1 Cr App R (S) 475. 
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trial court of intimidation intended to obstruct the course of justice in contravention of 
section 51 of the Act.192 It was alleged that he intimidated a 16-year-old woman who was 
his girlfriend at that time.  It was also alleged that their relationship had become violent.  
He assaulted her twice on separate occasions.  The matter was reported to the police but she 
did not support the prosecution.193
 
    
It was alleged that even after the assaults Edmonds continued to live at her address.  She 
was afraid to make him leave.  She became aware that Edmonds was stealing motor cars or 
items of property from motor cars.  After a subsequent assault it was said that she saw 
Edmonds driving a stolen motor car and she asked him for a lift.  He took her to a friend’s 
house where she called the police and reported the matter.  She gave a statement to the 
police regarding the motor car, which she had seen him break into.194
same evening she received a telephone call from Edmonds threatening to carve her up and 
stab her, and that he was going to smash her place.  On her return home she found the 
message: “Grass. Remember this,” painted on a mirror, accompanied by an arrow which 
pointed to a depiction of a teddy bear.  A table lamp had been smashed and her belongings 
were thrown across the room.  All her photographs had been taken from their frames.
 It was alleged that the  
195 
Edmonds was convicted of intimidating a witness in contravention of section 51.196
 
 
In R v Singh,197
                                                 
192The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994. 
 it was held that section 51(1)(c) requires that there must an investigation 
under way, not merely that a defendant believed there to be one.  The facts of this case were 
193R v Edmonds supra (n 191) at 476. 
194Ibid. 
195Ibid. 
196The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994.  See R v Edmonds supra (n 191) at 475.  
197[1999] Crim LR 681. 
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the following:  The defendants were convicted of intimidating a witness and of assault with 
intent to cause grievous bodily harm.  It was alleged that they were involved in fraud in 
relation to a housing benefit in which the victim had refused to participate.  The victim was 
a relative of the defendants.  The victim reported the defendants’ unlawful activities to the 
police, the local authority and to the Official Receiver.  The defendants and another man 
visited the victim and assaulted him.  In relation to the count of witness intimidation, the 
judge directed the jury that it was sufficient that they (defendants) believed that there would 
be an investigation under way, not that such an investigation was in fact proceeding.  On 
appeal it was submitted that this was misdirection, and that there was no evidence that the 
investigation of an offence was proceeding.198
there was evidence before the jury that a housing benefit fraud officer
 The court held that the judge’s direction to 
the jury that the Crown did not have to prove that there was an investigation under way was 
wrong.  It was further held that section 51(1)(c) requires that there must be an investigation 
under way, not merely that the defendant believed there to be one.  The court observed that  
199 had visited the 
homes of two of the appellants, had interviewed the victim and obtained a witness 
statement from him.  The court held that the offence had accordingly been established200
 
 on 
the facts because there had already been an investigation in progress.  
Legal commentators are of the opinion that section 51(1)(b) is ambiguous as to whether the 
defendant needs to have knowledge or a belief in the role of the victim as well as the 
existence of an investigation.  It is said that the former interpretation is preferable because it 
is the one most favourable to the defendant.  They observe that this offence is already 
                                                 
198At 681. 
 
199This officer is not a policeman but is appointed by the Audit Commission, which is responsible for the audit 
of local government and the health services at local level to investigate possible fraud in housing benefit.  See 
http://www.nao.org.uk/pn/9798164.htm (accessed on 09 June 2007). 
 
200Ibid. 
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unusually harsh in creating a presumption of intention once the intimidation is proved.201 
Murphy202 submits that an offence under section 51(1) may be committed even where the 
victim refuses to be intimidated but that it cannot be committed on the basis of a mistaken 
belief that an investigation is in progress.  He further submits that ‘belief’ for the purposes 
of section 51(2) must also mean a correct or justified belief; a criminal attempt may 
however be committed on the basis of a mistaken belief.203
 
 
Sections 39, 40 and 41 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act204 also deal with intimidating, 
harming and threatening witnesses.  Various provisions in this Act overlap with provisions 
in other Acts that deal with the intimidation, harassment and threatening of witnesses with 
intent to dissuade them from testifying in judicial proceedings.205
 
 
Section 39(1) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act provides:206
 
 
 A person commits an offence if- 
 
 (a) he does an act which intimidates, and is intended to intimidate, another person (‘the victim’); 
 
(b) he does the act- 
 
(i) knowing or believing that the victim is or may be a witness in any relevant proceedings; and  
 
(ii) intending, by his act, to cause the course of justice to be obstructed, perverted or interfered 
with. 
 
 
                                                 
201R v Singh supra (n 197) at 681-82.  
202Murphy op cit (n 1) 736.  
203Ibid.  
204The Criminal Justice and Police Act of 2001.  
205Section 51 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994.  See the discussion of this section supra, 
text at note 190.   
 
206M Gale, G Scanlan and S Gale The Criminal Justice and Police Act, 2001:  A Guide to Practitioners (2000) 
84-88. 
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Section 39(2)207
 For the purpose of subsection (1) it is immaterial− 
 makes it clear that the scope of section 39(1) is fairly wide.  It provides: 
(c) whether or not the intention to cause the course of justice to be obstructed, perverted or 
interfered with is the predominating intention of the person doing the act in question.   
 
It is said that there is a presumption that the act was done “with the intention of causing the 
course of justice to be obstructed, perverted or interfered with” unless there is evidence to 
the contrary.208
 
  
A close look at section 39 reveals that the elements of this offence are: 
 
(1) an act that  intimidates or is intended to intimidate; 
(2) another person; 
(3) that could be a witness; and 
(4) with intention of causing the course of justice to be obstructed. 
 
The accused must perform a positive act that intimidates or that is intended to intimidate a 
person who could be called as a witness in relevant proceedings.  The accused’s intention 
must be to cause the obstruction of justice.  The mens rea presumed is intention to obstruct 
or pervert the course of justice.  In terms of section 39(3) the reverse onus of proving the  
absence of intention lies with the accused.  Gale, Scanlan and Gale209 say that sections 39 
and 40 were intended to deal mainly with witnesses in civil cases and a small number of 
criminal cases not covered by the Criminal Justice and Police Act.210
 
   
                                                 
207The Criminal Justice and Police Act of 2001. 
 
208Gale, Scanlan and Gale op cit (n 206) 85.   
209See Gale, Scanlan and Gale op cit (n 206) 84.   
  
210Act of 2001.  For the discussion of the provisions of this Act, see text at notes 206, 207 and 212.  
 95 
Section 40211 deals with the harming of witnesses.  It is an offence to threaten to harm a 
witness or someone believed to have been a witness212 in “relevant proceedings.”213 For 
purposes of sections 39 and 40, relevant proceedings mean “any proceedings in or before 
“the magistrates’ court,” the county court, the High Court, the Crown Court or the Court of 
Appeal.  In terms of section 40(3) an offence is committed if, for instance, X harms or 
threatens to harm Y who is a supposed witness in relevant proceedings.  The threat of harm 
to a witness is not limited to physical harm only.  Any kind of harm, for example, financial 
harm will suffice.  It is also irrelevant whether or not the person threatened is present when 
the threats are made.214
 
   
3.5 SUMMARY OF ENGLISH LAW 
For the common law crime of perverting the course of justice to be committed, the accused 
must perform a positive act which has a tendency to obstruct the course of justice.  It is said 
that the offence cannot be committed by an omission hence the requirement of an act or 
series of acts.  The perpetrator must also have intended that his act should pervert justice.  
This tendency and the intent to impede justice must be present simultaneously for the crime 
to be committed. 
 
It is clear that the “course of justice” includes police investigations, court proceedings, 
proceedings before an arbitrator and proceedings before a Coroner of inquiry.  However, 
the “course of justice” also begins to run and may be perverted before investigative or legal 
proceedings are active or have been instituted.  The offence is neither limited to matters 
                                                 
211The Criminal Justice and Police Act of 2001. 
  
212Gale, Scanlan and Gale op cit (n 206) 86.    
213See Gale, Scanlan and Gale op cit (n 206) 87. 
214Section 40(a)-(c). 
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directly concerning proceedings already in being, nor need the proceedings of some kind in 
a court or judicial tribunal to be imminent, nor is it necessary that investigations which 
could result in proceedings be in progress.  It may be committed after the perpetration of a 
crime but before investigation into it has begun.  It is established law that the “course of 
justice” begins when the principal crime is committed but before the police have begun 
with their investigation and before any judicial proceedings have commenced. 
 
It can even be committed though a crime has not been committed or cannot be proven, if X 
believed that there may be an investigation which could result in judicial proceedings.  If X, 
in order to prevent the detection of the offender, destroys the only evidence of a crime 
before an investigation had begun, he or she can be convicted of perverting the course of 
justice because such conduct has the tendency to pervert the course of justice.  X can be 
convicted of this offence even if he or she mistakenly believed that it was the only evidence 
of a non-existing crime. 
 
Numerous forms of conduct constitute this crime.  These are: interference with witnesses 
and jurors; laying a false criminal charge against an innocent person; reporting a false 
charge to the police; assisting another person to evade lawful arrest; withholding evidence 
in return for payment; pleading guilty to a crime committed by another person, and police 
officers acting outside their discretion in order to shield another from criminal charges.  
Inciting, or conspiring or attempting to pervert the course of justice constitutes the 
substantive offence.   
 
Some actions that constitute the common law misdemeanour of perverting the course of 
justice by threatening or intimidating witnesses or potential witnesses are now also 
punishable in terms of legislation.  The legislation overlaps with the common law.  This 
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means that the offence can be tried either in terms of the common law or in terms of the  
relevant Act.   
 
The following conduct is now also punishable in terms of legislation: 
 
a. To impede the apprehension or prosecution of a person who has committed a relevant 
(an arrestable) offence.  In contrast to the common law offence, this offence requires that X 
must have impeded the arrest of a person who has committed a relevant offence (meaning 
an offence identifiable in terms of the Act). Therefore, legislation has narrowed the scope 
of this offence. 
 
b. To do an act which intimidates and is intended to intimidate another person (the 
victim) while knowing or believing that the victim is assisting the investigation of an 
offence or is a witness or potential witness or a juror or potential juror in proceedings for an 
offence, and he or she does this act intending thereby to cause the investigation or the 
course of justice to be obstructed, perverted or interfered with.  Before the defendant can be 
found liable for this crime, there must an investigation under way, not merely that a 
defendant believe there to be one.   
 
c. To intimidate, harm and threaten witnesses in order to prevent them from testifying in 
judicial proceedings.  A person commits an offence if he or she does an act which 
intimidates and is intended to intimidate another person (‘the victim’).  The requirement is 
that the accused must know or believe that the victim is or may be a witness in any relevant 
proceedings.  It is immaterial whether or not the intention to cause the course of justice to 
be obstructed, perverted or interfered with, is the predominant intention of the person doing 
the act in question. 
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d. Legislation also targets conduct which leads to the wasteful employment of the 
police.  Wasting police time is akin to perversion of justice.   
These are the only types of conduct which are targeted in terms of the legislation.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
AUSTRALIAN LAW 
4.1 GENERAL  
In Australia, the common law offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice cannot 
be given a clear and precise definition, even though it seems to connote some unwarranted 
or unlawful interference with the process of the administration of justice.1 The substance of 
the offence of perverting the course of justice consists in “the doing of some act which has 
a tendency and is intended to pervert the administration of justice.”2 It is said that 
perverting the course of justice means an interference with the due exercise of jurisdiction 
by courts and other competent judicial authorities.3 Judicial authorities include tribunals 
whose jurisdiction extends to the enforcement or adjustment of rights and liabilities in 
accordance with law and whose procedure is judicial in character.  Committal proceedings, 
while administrative, are said to be “curial” and fall within the ambit of this offence.4
 
 
4.2 WHEN DOES THE COURSE OF JUSTICE BEGIN? 
Contrary to English law5
                                                 
1JK Bentil “Attempt to pervert the course of justice” (1984) Solicitors’ Journal Vol 128 213 and P Gillies 
Criminal Law 3ed (1993) 814. 
 where it is said that the course of justice begins to run and may be 
perverted before judicial proceedings are “active” or as soon as the crime is committed but 
  
2M Chesterman and RC Evans The Laws of Australia: Criminal Offences. Vol 10. (1998) 187; P Gillies 
Criminal Law (1997) 830-31 and The Queen v Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268 at 275-76.  This case is 
discussed infra at note 24.   
 
3The Queen v Rogerson supra (n 2) at 280. 
 
4Chesterman and Evans op cit (n 2) 187-88 and The Queen v Rogerson supra (n 2) at 270. 
5Cf Smith and Hogan op cit Chapter Three (n 21) 752-53; Card op cit Chapter Three (n 1) 537; R v Rafique at 
1G-H supra in Chapter Three under 3.2, text at note 26 and R v Kiffin supra at 450 in Chapter Three under 
3.2, text at note 30.  
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before police investigations have begun, Australian courts have ruled that the course of 
justice does not begin until the jurisdiction of some court or competent judicial authority is 
invoked.6 Therefore, as a general rule, police investigations before this stage do not form 
part of the course of justice and interference with them will not constitute the offence of 
perverting the course of justice.7 According to Gillies,8 police investigations will usually 
contemplate the bringing of a prosecution.  Thus, conduct which deflects or frustrates a 
police investigation or which has the potential to do so, will have the tendency to pervert 
the course of justice and, accordingly, it will have the potential to prevent the investigation 
from bringing a case within the jurisdiction of the court.  However, the Australian courts 
have held that for the purpose of the offence of perverting the course of justice, the course 
of justice does not commence in criminal proceedings until the laying of charges against, or 
the arrest of, an accused person.9 It is further said that in civil proceedings the course of 
justice does not commence until the institution of the proceedings.10
 
  
In The Queen v Todd11 and The Queen v Rogerson12
 
 it was held that police investigations 
do not form part of the course of justice.  The facts of The Queen v Todd were as follows:  
Todd, the accused, was charged with the common law offence of “effecting public  
                                                 
6The Queen v Rogerson supra (n 2) at 283.  In James v Robinson [1963] 109 CLR 593 the High Court of 
Australia held (at 606): “The proposition that the proceedings are pending in criminal cases after a person has 
been arrested and charged is firmly established ...”. 
 
7 Gillies op cit (n 1) 816-17. 
 
8Ibid. 
  
9The Queen v Rogerson supra (n 2) at 303. 
 
10At 303-04. 
 
111957 SASR 305 at 331.  
12The Queen v Rogerson supra (n 2) 276. 
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mischief.”  It was alleged that he made a misrepresentation that he had drowned and so 
caused the police to devote their time and services and to incur expenses in the search for 
Todd, or his body, thereby temporarily depriving the public of the services of the police 
officers involved in the search and thereby unlawfully created a public mischief.  The 
evidence before the court was that a police officer received instructions from his superior to 
accompany other police officers to the river where a vehicle was spotted.  As the river was 
in flood, it was suspected that the driver and the occupants of the car had been washed out 
by the floodwaters and probably drowned.  The police searched for the bodies for some 
days.  At a later time, Mr Todd was discovered alive and residing under an assumed name 
at a hotel.  At first, he gave a false name to the police, but upon further questioning by the 
detectives, he admitted to his real name and admitted that he had himself driven his car into 
the river “so that everyone would think I got drowned and then I could go away and start 
life afresh.”13 The accused pleaded not guilty to the charges.14
 
   
At the end of the state’s case, the accused applied for an acquittal on the ground that the 
offence that he was charged with, and with regard to the proven facts, was not an offence 
known to the law in the State of South Australia.  Alternatively, it was submitted on behalf 
of the accused that the facts proved did not come within the ambit of any conduct which 
had been recognised as constituting public mischief and that it was not the responsibility of 
the court to extend that ambit.15
 
  
 
                                                 
13The Queen v Todd supra (n 11) at 308.  
 
14At 306. 
 
15Ibid.  
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At the end of the case for the defence, the jury unanimously found the accused guilty of the 
charge of effecting public mischief.  The court, at the request of the counsel for the accused, 
reserved the following questions for the consideration and determination of the Full 
Bench:16
(1) Whether the offence alleged against the accused was an offence known to the law of the 
State of South Australia. 
 
(2) If yes, did the proven facts establish the commission of the offence and justify the guilty 
verdict? 
 
The contention of counsel for the accused was that a false representation by one person, 
without conspiring with other persons, and which did not constitute a charge against 
another person, and which did not place an innocent individual in jeopardy of prosecution, 
would be an extension of the crime of public mischief which the judges should not venture 
to make.17
 
 
After considering other cases,18 and although the particulars of the offence in the 
indictment against Todd differed from the facts in those cases, the Supreme Court found 
that there was no allegation that Todd by his actions “rendered liege subjects of the Queen 
liable to suspicion, accusation and arrest.”19
 
 This thesis interprets that statement by the 
Supreme  
                                                                                                                                                     
 
16At 307.  
 
17At 309. 
 
18Cases like R v Manley (1933) 1 KB 259 and Kerr v Hill (1936) SC (J) 71. 
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Court as concurring with the submission by counsel for the accused that false representation 
by the conduct of one person, without conspiring with other persons, and which did not 
constitute a charge against another person and which did not place an innocent individual in 
jeopardy of prosecution would be an extension of the crime of public mischief which was 
not allowed. 
 
In its reasons for judgment, the court held20 that it was unable to accept the proposition that 
police investigations were part of the “course of justice” as recognised by common law.  
The Supreme Court held that the offence alleged against the accused was not an offence 
known to the law of the State of South Australia.21 On the second reserved question the 
court observed that the facts proved did not establish the commission of an offence known 
to the law and therefore justify the guilty verdict.  The appeal was allowed.22
 
 
From the perspective of a “perversion of the course of justice,” the Supreme Court was 
ambiguous about whether all police investigations can be regarded as part of the “course of 
justice.”  What the court said was that it was unable to accept the proposition that the 
investigations that the police made in The Queen v Todd were part of the “course of 
justice.”  It should be noted that in the Todd case, police investigations were not directed 
towards a specific individual but to the possible death of the driver of the car and its 
occupants in the context of a natural disaster.  The court found that in the State of South 
                                                                                                                                                     
19The Queen v Todd supra (n 11) at 326. 
20At 331.  
21 Ibid. 
22Ibid.   
 104 
Australia there was no such offence as “effecting public mischief” known to the law, but  
 
“there is an offence known to the law of this state which may be described as perverting the 
course of justice.”23
 
 By implication the court meant that the accused was wrongly charged 
with the offence of “effecting public mischief.”  He should have been charged with 
perverting the course of justice.  It is submitted that the obiter dicta as regards perverting 
the course of justice in The Queen v Todd decision should be interpreted as referring only to 
police investigations into similar cases, namely, where there was no innocent individual in 
jeopardy of prosecution as a result of the investigation.  Until now, this case has been relied 
upon as authority for the proposition that police investigations, in general, are not part of 
the “course of justice.”  
In The Queen v Rogerson24 the question of whether or not conspiracy to mislead the police 
during an investigation for the purpose of ascertaining whether a crime has been committed 
might constitute the common law offence of attempt to pervert the course of justice was 
also a bone of contention.  In this case the Crown sought special leave to appeal against an 
order of the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales for acquitting three respondents 
indicted for conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.25 The court followed The Queen v 
Todd26 and rejected that police investigations form part of the course of justice,27
                                                 
23Ibid.   
 but the 
24The Queen v Rogerson supra (n 2). 
25At 275 and 295. 
26The Queen v Todd supra (n 11). 
27The Queen v Rogerson supra (n 2) at 276, at 283 and at 310. 
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majority28
 
 of the court held that an act which has a tendency to deflect the police from, 
inter alia, prosecuting a criminal offence or instituting disciplinary proceedings before a 
judicial  
tribunal, or from adducing evidence of the true facts, is an act which tends to pervert the 
course of justice and, if done with intent to achieve that result, constitutes an attempt to 
pervert the course of justice.29 The facts of the case were as follows:30
 
 The first respondent, 
Rogerson, was a police officer.  It was alleged that he and the second respondent, 
Nowytarger, arranged for the latter to deposit sums of money in false names into two bank 
accounts with the National Australian Bank.  The bank’s security cameras took photographs 
of the two accused when they were at the bank.  Another police officer told Rogerson that 
he had been photographed “with a criminal,” meaning Nowytarger.  Subsequent to that 
conversation, Rogerson and the third respondent, Paltos, met a solicitor called Dr Karp.  
Later, Nowytarger joined them.  Rogerson told Karp that he and a friend had money in 
bank accounts under false names.  They agreed that Karp would prepare a sale agreement 
which would falsely show that Karp had paid Rogerson and Nowytarger a sum of money 
for the sale of a car.  The sale agreement was backdated to December 1983.  
In 1985, a detective inspector, having been informed that Rogerson and Nowytarger had 
been photographed at the bank, initiated an investigation in order to ascertain whether 
Rogerson had breached any departmental regulations or had committed any criminal 
offence.  During an interview, Rogerson asserted that the December 1983 “sale agreement” 
                                                 
28On the majority were Mason CJ, Brennan J and Toohey J.  See also Chesterman and Evans op cit (n 2) 188. 
 
29The Queen v Rogerson supra (n 2) at 278 and at 283-84.   
  
30At 296-97. 
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was genuine, and that the money came from the sale of a vehicle to Karp.31 When police 
officials interviewed Nowytarger, he likewise maintained the genuineness of the “sale 
agreement.”32 When Paltos was interviewed, he declined to answer questions in respect of 
the matter.33
 
 
Rogerson, Nowytarger and Paltos were charged and convicted by the Supreme Court of 
New South Wales of conspiring to pervert the course of justice.34 The charge arose out of 
an alleged agreement to fabricate evidence that had as its object the frustration or diversion 
of a police investigation into the possible commission of a crime.35 The Court of Criminal 
Appeal set aside the convictions.36 The court said that the offence of attempt to pervert the 
course of justice by the kind of action that was alleged could not be established in the 
absence of proof by the Crown of the general nature of the offence which the accused had 
in his or her contemplation when he or she engaged in the conduct which resulted in him or 
her being charged.37
This case raised the following two important legal questions:  
 The Crown applied to the High Court for special leave to appeal. 
 
a. Whether or not police investigations of a suspected commission of a crime constituted 
the “course of justice” and whether an agreement to mislead the police during such 
                                                 
31At 296. 
32At 297.  
33Ibid. 
34At 269.  
35Ibid.  
36Ibid. 
37Ibid. 
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investigations amounted to conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.  
 
b. What the Crown needed to establish in order to prove the offence of conspiracy to  
pervert the course of justice. 
 
McHugh J, held38 that unless the prosecution proved that the course of justice, as a 
continuing process, had been perverted or proved facts that showed that an identifiable 
person had committed an identifiable crime, it was difficult to see how the prosecution 
could prove that the conduct of the accused interfered with the course of justice.  The court 
observed that it was not enough that the conduct of the accused had misled an investigation 
into whether a person had committed any offence against the law.  In granting special leave 
to appeal, the court held39
 
 that this application raises questions of exceptional importance 
concerning the scope of the offence of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.  
Therefore, special leave to appeal was granted. 
The court stated:40
 
 
[P]olice investigations are not part of the course of justice ... Unless the judicial proceedings, which 
would be the subject of the prosecution, are identified, it cannot be proved that the conduct of the 
accused had the tendency to affect the course of justice in judicial proceedings.  And proceedings 
cannot be identified if their subject matter is not identified.  Consequently, the directions of the learned 
trial judge were erroneous and, by themselves would require a new trial of the charge. 
 
 
The Crown must prove that an identifiable person (X) had committed an identifiable crime 
                                                 
38At 307. 
 
39At 312. 
 
40At 310.  
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(e.g. theft of money) and it was not enough that the conduct of the accused had misled an 
investigation into whether a person had committed any offence against the law.  It was clear 
that the Crown could not prevail with the charge of conspiracy to pervert the course of 
justice against X if the antecedent crime is unknown.  Police investigations do not form part 
of the course of justice.  It is said that the gravamen of an attempt to pervert the course of 
justice is an interference with the due exercise of jurisdiction by courts and other competent 
judicial authorities.41
 
 
The court did not follow its English counterparts42 and found that police investigations did 
not form part of the course of justice.43 It is said that neither police nor other investigative 
agencies administer justice.44 It is firmly established that police investigations do not form 
part of the course of justice.  Therefore, for the purpose of the offence of perverting the 
course of justice, the course of justice commences in criminal proceedings after the laying 
of charges against, or the arrest of, an accused person.45 In civil proceedings the course of 
justice commences after the institution of the proceedings.46
 
  
It is said that in both criminal and civil proceedings, the course of justice ends when the 
rights of the parties have been finally determined and declared after “an inquiry concerning 
the law as it is and the facts as they are, followed by an application of the law as determined 
                                                 
41At 284. 
  
42Cf The Queen v Vreones supra in Chapter Two under 2.3, text at note 93 and R v Kiffin supra in Chapter 
Three under 3.2, text at note 30. 
 
43The Queen v Rogerson supra (n 2) at 310. 
 
44At 283.  
 
45At 303. 
  
46At 303-304. 
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to the facts as determined.”47
 
 
4.3 THE COMMON LAW OFFENCE 
In Australia the actus reus of the common law offence of perverting the course of justice 
consists of an act which has the potential to deflect a civil or criminal court or other judicial 
tribunal from the due performance of its duty in the administration of justice.  It is also said 
that the offence targets conduct which has the tendency to pervert the course of justice.48
 
 
Conduct can either be a positive act or a failure to do something, but there is no judicial or 
academic authority that supports the proposition that at common law this crime can be 
committed by mere omission. 
The Australian justice system was protected by two very broad categories of crimes, 
namely, contempt of court which deals with internal aspects of this protection and 
perverting the course of justice which deals with external aspects.49 At common law 
attempting to pervert or to defeat the course of justice is a substantive offence.50 The 
Australian Capital Territory and Victoria continue to rely on the common law for 
prosecutions in this category of crime.51 Other states have statutory provisions which 
basically state that the common law offence also operates within those jurisdictions.52
                                                                                                                                                     
 
 This 
47At 304. 
 
48The Queen v Rogerson supra (n 2) at 279 and Gillies op cit (n 1) 816. 
49Chesterman and Evans op cit (n 2) 187. 
50The Queen v Rogerson supra (n 2) at 279; Chesterman and Evans op cit (n 2) 190 and Gillies op cit (n 2) 
830. 
 
51Chesterman and Evans op cit (n 2) 187. 
52Ibid. 
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means that the statutory offences exist apart from the common law offence.  According to 
Gillies,53 in New South Wales, the common law misdemeanour of attempting to pervert or 
defeat the course of justice was abolished and replaced with a broad statutory offence.54 In 
the State of South Australia, this offence was also made a statutory offence.55
 
 
Gillies says that the common law offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice is 
broadly conceived and defined.56 Due to the fact that Australian courts have not attempted 
to define this offence precisely, or the nature of its subject matter, the range of acts having 
the tendency to prejudice the administration of justice are unlimited.57 Just as in English 
law, this offence incriminates any person who with intent to pervert the course of justice 
perpetrates an act which has the tendency to, or does indeed, deflect a court or other judicial 
tribunal from its proper course in respect of the administration of civil or criminal justice.58
 
  
4.3.1 Conduct which constitutes the common law offence of perverting the course of 
justice  
In Australian common law the following conduct constitutes the common law offence of 
perverting the course of justice:59
 
  
                                                 
53Gillies op cit (n 2) 830.  
 
54Section 341 of the New South Wales Crimes Act of 1900. 
 
55Gillies op cit (n 2) 830.  
 
56Ibid.   
 
57Gillies op cit (n 2) 831. 
 
58Ibid. 
 
59Ibid. 
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a. Interfering with witnesses or potential witnesses by intimidation. 
b. Bribing a witness. 
 
c. Obtaining bail by improper means. 
d. Inducement to lie to the police or to commit perjury. 
e. Lying to the police in order to prevent the detection and arrest and ultimate 
prosecution of an offender. 
f. Concealment or fabrication of evidence.  
g. The improper institution of judicial proceedings. 
h. Bribing the police to hinder prosecution.  
i. Making false accusations against a person to the police. 
j. Publication of a newspaper article impugning the conduct and character of persons on 
trial. 
k. Destruction of documents. 
 
4.3.1.1 Interference with witnesses 
Interference with witnesses constitutes the common law offence of obstructing the course 
of justice.  The leading case in this regard is Healy v The Queen.60
                                                 
60[1995] 15 WAR 104 (FC).   
 The facts of this case 
were the following:  Healy was indicted on two counts, namely, fraud and attempt to 
pervert the course of justice.  In the first count it was alleged that Healy, with intent to 
defraud by deceit and fraudulent means, attempted to obtain money from a certain Mr 
Connell.  It is not clear what he intended to do with the money.  He was acquitted on the 
charge of fraud.  In the second count, it was alleged that he engaged in conduct that was 
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intended to discourage prosecution witnesses from testifying.  During the trial the defence 
argued that there was no prima facie case against Healy on the charge of attempting to 
pervert the course of justice because there was no attempt as such.  It was also said that the 
attempt was diverted because Mr Connell was not going to act on what Healy had done.  He 
was acquitted on the first count and convicted on the second count.61
 
 He appealed against 
his conviction. 
On appeal it was argued on his behalf that his act was merely preparatory to the 
commission of the offence.  It was argued that the trial judge was wrong in failing to direct 
the jury as to what acts would be capable of constituting the offence.62 In dismissing the 
appeal the court held:63
 
 
By doing what he did, the appellant was enabling Mr Connell to record material, which, if used, as 
he understood it would be used, had the capacity to pervert the course of justice.  He had done all 
that was required on his part to be done to enable Mr Connell to use the recorded material for the 
purpose of discouraging the two witnesses from testifying.  In my view, the evidence which the jury 
must have accepted in reaching their verdict, following the directions which were given to them by 
the learned judge, clearly established that the appellant’s conduct gave rise to a risk or possibility, 
without further action by him, that his conduct might result in the perversion of the course of justice 
(to use the expressions to be found in R v Murray) or his conduct had a tendency to fulfil his guilty 
intention ...   
 
Healy’s counsel approached the charge of attempt to pervert the course of justice as if it 
was an attempt to commit another substantive offence which would constitute an inchoate 
offence.  The court held that the argument that Healy’s acts were merely preparatory to the 
commission of the offence was irrelevant because the completed offence was committed 
                                                 
61At 106F. 
62At 104E. 
63At 116B-D.  
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whether or not justice was perverted.64
 
 
 
4.3.1.2 Bribing a witness 
In Meissner v The Queen,65 Meissner was charged and convicted of the common law 
offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice by improperly endeavouring to 
influence Ms Perger to plead guilty to a charge of making a false statutory declaration.66
 
 
The facts of the case were as follows:  Perger was facing charges of making a false 
statutory declaration in relation to statements she had made that she (Perger) had been a 
“political whore” and had been photographed in sexually compromising positions with a 
number of politicians on board a boat owned by Meissner.  Firstly, she indicated to her 
counsel that the charge would be defended.  It was alleged that she had discussed her plea 
with Meissner.  Allegedly, after discussing her plea with Meissner, she instructed her 
counsel that she wanted to plead guilty.  
Subsequent to that discussion, Meissner was charged with attempting to pervert the course 
of justice by improperly endeavouring to influence Perger to plead guilty, either by bribery 
or intimidation, or both.  The allegation of bribery was supported by evidence that Meissner 
had deposited money in Perger’s bank account and the same day that the money was 
deposited she instructed her lawyer that she wanted to plead guilty.  The allegation of 
                                                 
64At 116E-F. 
65(1995) 184 CLR 132. 
66A statutory declaration is defined as a written statement declared to be true in the presence of an authorised 
witness.  A person wishing to use a statutory declaration in connection with the law of the Commonwealth, 
the Australian Capital Territory or certain other Territories must make the declaration in accordance with the 
Statutory Declarations Act of 1959 and the Statutory Regulations of 1993.  See: http://www.ag.gov.au/statdec 
(accessed on 15 May 2007).  It seems that this is a form of an affidavit. 
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intimidation centred on a series of taped conversations between Meissner and other people 
(but not Perger).  He was convicted of attempting to pervert the course of justice.  He 
appealed.67
 
 The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the appeal but he was granted special 
leave to appeal to the High Court. 
It was argued on behalf of Meissner that the conduct alleged against him was not capable of 
constituting the offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice.  It was argued that 
inducing a person to plead guilty to a criminal charge could not amount to perverting the 
course of justice but may constitute other offences because it is something which an 
accused person is entitled to do.  It was said that cases involving interference with 
witnesses for apparently proper motives could be distinguished.68 In reaching its verdict, 
the High Court relied heavily on a number of cases, including leading English cases.69 The 
court held:70
 
 
Any conduct designed to intimidate an accused person to plead guilty is improper conduct and 
necessarily constitutes an attempt to pervert the course of justice even if the intimidator believes that 
the accused is guilty of the offence with which he or she is charged.  A plea made as a result of 
intimidation has not been made freely and voluntarily and the court that acts on the plea has been 
mislead and its proceedings have been rendered abortive, whether or not it ever becomes aware of 
the impropriety.    
 
The appeal was accordingly dismissed.71
 
 
                                                 
67Ibid. 
  
68At 133-34.  
 
69The Queen v Vreones supra in Chapter Two under 2.3, text at note 93; R v Toney supra in Chapter Three 
under 3.4.2, text at note 57 and R v Kellett supra in Chapter Three under 3.3, text at note 44.  
 
70Meisseer v The Queen supra (n 65) at 143.  
 
71At 147. 
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4.3.1.3 Obtaining bail by improper means 
In New South Wales, to obtain bail by improper means was regarded as a common law 
offence of perverting the course of justice.  Instances of conduct which constituted this type  
 
of offence included obtaining bail under false pretences.  One of the cases where the 
accused faced charges of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice for obtaining bail by 
improper means was R v Baba.72 The facts of the case were as follows:  Baba was charged 
and convicted of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.73
 
 The conspiracy alleged by the 
Crown culminated in the overt acts that Baba, Western and another unknown woman, had 
agreed beforehand that the woman would be falsely represented as a joint tenant of a house 
in order to provide security which would enable Western to be released on bail.  In order to 
procure Western’s release on bail she would join as such in executing the required 
document along with Baba.  It was known that Baba owned a house as a co-tenant with his 
divorced wife.  It was foreseen that the ownership of the house would be sufficient to 
establish the stature of Baba as an acceptable person to provide bail for Western.  The 
unknown woman was brought into the picture because it was foreseen that it might be 
difficult for Baba alone to be acceptable, because the house was registered in both his 
names and that of his ex-wife. 
After a number of unsuccessful applications Western was ultimately granted bail.  The 
Crown’s case was that prior to Western’s release on bail, Baba and Western had agreed that 
Baba would provide his house as security which would enable Western to be granted bail.74
                                                 
72(1977) 2 NSWLR 502. 
 
73At 503G. 
74At 505B-C.  
 116 
In its verdict the jury accepted that such conspiracy had been constituted as far as Baba was 
concerned.  He was convicted of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.75 On appeal, it 
was argued on his behalf that:76
 
 
a. the case should have been withdrawn from the jury because the facts, as alleged, did 
not support the offence charged, and 
b. the interference, in the manner alleged, with the processes of obtaining bail was not a 
perversion of the course of justice. 
 
In dismissing the appeal the court held:77
 
 
It cannot be overemphasized too strongly that the process of administration of the laws governing 
release upon bail are not to be lightly interfered with.  They represent a significant part of the 
machinery of criminal justice.  Those who conspire to pervert their due and orderly process must 
expect to find themselves confronted with serious consequences, as has the present appellant.  … I 
would accordingly propose that, in so far as there is an appeal against conviction, the appeal should 
be dismissed.      
 
4.3.1.4 Concealment or fabrication of evidence  
Lawyers are legal subjects, not legal saints.  In presenting their clients’ cases and in the 
quest to succeed, there is evidence that some lawyers will resort to unconventional legal 
methods.  One such case was Hatty v Pilkinton.78
                                                 
75At  503G. 
 The respondent, Mr Pilkinton, was a 
lawyer who represented the defendant, a certain Ms Camilleri, in a traffic-related criminal 
case.  Camilleri was not charged under her real name but under a false name, Rozanne 
Marie Crawford.  This was the name given to the police.  Pilkinton was aware that his client 
76At 502C. 
77At 505B-D. 
78(1992) 108 ALR 149. 
 117 
had given a false name to the police and that she was appearing before the court in answer 
to a false name.  Pilkinton appeared in court on her behalf and did nothing to correct the  
 
situation by revealing her true name to the court.  Consequently, she was convicted under a 
false name. 
 
Pilkinton was charged and convicted of the common law offence of perverting the course of 
justice for taking an active part in misleading the court.79 He appealed to the Supreme 
Court against his conviction.  The Supreme Court set aside the conviction and entered in its 
place a judgement of acquittal.80
 
  
The Crown appealed.  This was an appeal to the Full Bench of the Federal Court of 
Australia from a single judge of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory 
(ACT).  The argument for the Crown was that Pilkinton, knowing that the defendant he 
represented was being proceeded against under a false name, deliberately deceived the 
court and aided the defendant in that deception.81
The court held that the principle of public justice was seriously offended if proceedings in 
court were conducted on a false basis as they were in this case.  In allowing the appeal, the 
Federal Court of Australia held:
 The fact that the court was intentionally 
deceived had the tendency to pervert the course of justice. 
82
 
 
I consider it inevitable that Mr Pilkinton did not intend to pervert the course of justice by the deception 
                                                 
79At 157. 
 
80At 154. 
 
81Ibid. 
 
82At 158. 
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to which he was a party for the reason that there was not only a tendency for justice to be perverted but 
there was a virtual inevitability that justice would in fact be perverted in the way I have described.  I do 
not think it can be doubted that Mr Pilkinton knew that the due administration of justice would be 
obstructed by the entry of a false record even if he hoped that no further harm might come of it and  
 
 
 
even though he told his client that she should not drive during the period of disqualification imposed 
upon her in her false name. 
 
The conviction was therefore, restored.  The restoration of Pilkinton’s conviction should be 
applauded, because he clearly and intentionally assisted his client in conduct that he, as a 
lawyer, knew was criminal.  This case sent a message that lawyers are neither exempt from 
the reach of the criminal law nor immune from criminal prosecution and that criminal acts 
should not be tolerated at all.  It was clear that Mr Pilkinton’s conduct was both 
professionally undesirable and criminal in nature. 
 
4.3.1.5 Lying to the police in order to prevent the detection and arrest and 
ultimate prosecution of an offender 
Gillies 83 says another form of the common law crime of attempting to pervert the course of 
justice is to lie to the police in order to prevent the detection and arrest and, ultimately, the 
prosecution of the offender.  He cites The Queen v Debelis 84
 
 as one of the authorities. 
It is respectfully submitted that The Queen v Debelis cannot be regarded as authority for 
Gillies’s proposition that lying to the police in order to prevent the detection and arrest and 
ultimate prosecution of the offender amounts to obstruction of justice.  In The Queen v 
Debelis, the accused were charged with conspiracy to pervert the course of public justice 
when they attempted to bribe a police officer to arrange for the initial charges against 
                                                 
83Gillies op cit (n 2) 831.  
84(1984) 36 SASR 1.  See Gillies op cit (n 2) 831.  
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Debelis of conspiracy to grow Indian hemp to be dropped.85 In this case Debelis was 
already facing charges when they attempted to bribe the police officer.  The accused did not 
lie in order to prevent the detection and the arrest and ultimate prosecution of any offender.  
Gillies’s proposition cannot be reconciled with the case law.86
 
 In terms of Australian law, 
police investigations for ascertaining whether a crime has been committed do not form part 
of the course of justice. 
4.3.1.6 The improper institution of judicial proceedings 
The improper institution of judicial proceedings amounts to the common law offence of 
attempting to pervert the course of justice.  When, for example, prisoner X sends a false 
petition to the Chief Justice on which the Chief Justice may order a judicial inquiry into the 
question of X’s guilt, X may be found guilty of the offence of attempting to pervert the 
course of justice.87 In White v R,88 the accused, a lawyer, had been struck off the roll after 
conviction and sentence for stealing.  Allegedly, after serving his sentence for theft, White 
sent two false affidavits to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.  These affidavits were 
purported to come from and been declared by one Morsen.  The affidavits were intended to 
make it appear to the Chief Justice that the offences of which White had been convicted had 
in fact been committed by Morsen and not by him, and that he had been wrongfully 
convicted and that his name had been wrongfully struck off the roll.89
 
 White was charged,  
 
                                                 
85See The Queen v Debelis supra (n 84) at 1 and at 3. 
86Cf The Queen v Todd supra (n 11) at 331 and The Queen v Rogerson supra (n 2) at 304.  
 
87White v R (1906) 4 CLR 152.  
 
88White v R supra (n 87). 
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inter alia, with attempting to pervert the course of justice.90
 
  
Before plea, an objection was raised on behalf of the accused that the indictment did not 
disclose any attempt to pervert the course of law and justice.91 The objection was overruled.  
He was convicted on all counts, including attempting to pervert the course of justice.92 The 
court reserved the following questions for consideration by a Court of Appeal:93
 
 
(1) Whether the court was wrong in overruling the objection; and 
(2) whether the court was wrong in holding that there was evidence in support of each 
count. 
 
With regard to the charge of attempting to pervert the course of justice it was found that in 
sending documents to the Chief Justice, supported by affidavits purported to have been 
made by Morsen, X was attempting to pervert the course of law and justice.94 The court 
said that the first count of attempting to pervert the course of law and justice disclosed an 
offence.95 The court held that the court a quo rightly overruled the objection.96
                                                                                                                                                     
  
 The appeal 
89At 158.  
90At 152-53.  
 
91At 158.  
 
92At 153. 
  
93At 154. 
 
94At 160. 
  
95Ibid.  
 
96 At 164. 
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was dismissed.97
 
 
4.3.1.7 Bribing the police to hinder the prosecution 
This offence is committed, for example, where X, as a police officer, conspires with other 
persons and corruptly solicits and obtains rewards for showing or promising favours 
contrary to his duty as a police officer and thereby obstructs and defeats the course of 
justice.  In R v Hammersley, Heath and Bellson ,98 the accused were three police officers 
called Hammersley, Heath, Ridge and a bookmaker called Bellson.  They were charged 
with conspiracy to obstruct the course of justice.  Allegedly, they conspired together, and 
with other persons unknown to the Crown, to obstruct the course of public justice in that 
Hammersley, Heath and Ridge, over a long period and in a great number of cases, were 
corruptly taking rewards from people either to hinder prosecutions by not bringing 
offenders before the courts or by warning persons that charges were being contemplated or 
might be contemplated.99 Allegedly, Bellson introduced the persons concerned to one or 
more of the police officers charged.100 Ridge was acquitted101 but Hammersley, Heath and 
Bellson were convicted of conspiracy to obstruct the course of justice.102 They appealed 
against the conviction.103
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
97Ibid. 
98(1958) 42 Cr App R 207. 
 
99At 213.  
100At 208.  
101Ibid.  
102At 207.  
103At 208.  
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On appeal it was argued on behalf of the accused,104
 
 inter alia, that the indictment was 
vague, the count for conspiracy was bad on the grounds of (a) uncertainty, (b) duplicity, (c) 
prejudice to the defence, and (d) that the indictment was bad in law because it disclosed 
more conspiracies than one. 
The court found that the indictment contained sufficient particulars in the sense that it 
stated that the nature of the conspiracy was to obstruct the course of justice by acting 
contrary to their public duty as police officers in relation to the administration of the law.105  
The court held:106
 
 
[T]herefore it seems to the court that the particulars which were given in the indictment here do 
properly disclose the conspiracy with which these defendants were charged and do not show a series of 
conspiracies.  They show one conspiracy, the one conspiracy being that these three defendants … 
should act in this way for their own benefit instead of bringing the cases to justice. 
 
The court dismissed the appeal.107
 
 
4.3.1.8 Making false accusations against a person to the police 
It is said that a suspect is not obliged to incriminate himself when questioned by the police, 
but if he lies and blames another person for his crime then he is guilty of the offence of 
attempting to defeat the course of justice.108
                                                 
104At 210.  
 For instance, X steals a computer from a local 
computer shop and puts it in the boot of his car.  When questioned about the computer at a 
105At 216.   
106At 214.  
107At 218.  
108Cane v The Queen [1968] NZLR787. 
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police roadblock he tells the police that it was Y who stole the computer from the shop. If X 
had refused to answer the questions, no fault could be found with his silence, but if he 
falsely implicates an innocent person (Y) in order to escape liability, he commits the crime  
of attempting to pervert the course of justice.   
 
4.3.1.9 Publication of a newspaper article impugning the conduct and character of 
persons on trial 
The editor who publishes or conspires to publish any article in the newspaper which affects 
the character and conduct of persons in the course of the trial, commits the common law 
offence of attempting to obstruct and pervert the course of justice. 
 
In The King v Tibbits and Windust,109 Tibbis, the editor of a newspaper, and Windust, a 
reporter for the newspaper, allegedly printed and published statements about the case of 
two persons (Allport and Chappell) whilst there were charges pending against them in 
court.  It is said that the articles in question formed a considerable part of the issues before 
the court and contained statements making grave imputations against Chappell, evidence 
of which would have been inadmissible against those persons in the trial of the offence 
with which they were charged.110 They were charged, inter alia, with attempt to obstruct 
and pervert the due course of law and justice and conspiracy to obstruct and pervert the 
due course of law and justice.111 The accused were found guilty of all the charges.112
 
 
                                                 
109[1902] 1 KB 77-79. 
 
110Ibid.  
 
111At 77-78.  
 
112At 80.  
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The question before the court was whether all or any of the counts of the indictment alleged 
a criminal offence and whether there was evidence adduced at the trial upon which the 
accused could properly be found guilty upon all or any of the counts in the indictment.113
  
 
It was argued on behalf of Tibbis and Windust that there was no evidence to support either 
the counts of conspiracy with intention to pervert the course of justice,114 or, of any 
intention on the part of the defendants to pervert or interfere with the course of justice.115
 
   
The court held:116
 
 
Though the accused be really guilty of the offence charged against him; the due course of law and 
justice is nevertheless perverted and obstructed if those who have to try him are induced to approach 
the question of his guilt or innocence with minds into which prejudice has been instilled by published 
assertions of his guilt or imputations against his life and character to which the laws of the land refuse 
admissibility as evidence.  
 
The court found117 that there was evidence to convict the accused on both counts of 
conspiracy to pervert the course of justice and attempt to pervert the course of justice.  
Their conviction was confirmed.118
 
  
4.3.1.10 Destruction of documents 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
113Ibid. 
 
114At 81. 
 
115At 85. 
  
116At 89. 
  
117At 90. 
  
118Ibid. 
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Cameron and Liberman119
 
 say that evidence is essential to the effective exercise of the fact- 
finding and decision-making functions of the courts.  The process of discovery is one of the 
ways in which evidence is made available in the civil litigation process.  When relevant 
evidence is lost or destroyed, the fact-finding process is compromised.  According to 
Cameron and Liberman,120
 
 the offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice may 
apply to the destruction of documents prior to the commencement of civil proceedings. 
4.4 STATUTORY OFFENCES 
Most Australian states have codified their criminal law.  Queensland led the way in 1899, 
New South Wales in 1900, Western Australia followed in 1902, the Northern Territory in 
1983 and Tasmania in 1924.121 The term ‘code jurisdictions’ is used to refer to those 
jurisdictions which sought to replace the common law with a Criminal Code.122 As the 
various State, Territory and Commonwealth governments have their own separate crime 
legislation, there are literally thousands of criminal offences that are currently on the statute 
books of Australia.123
 
 
                                                 
119See C Cameron and L Liberman “Destruction of documents before proceedings commence: What is a court 
to do?” (2003) Melbourne University Law Review Vol 12 20, at: http://www.austlii.edu.au//cgi-bin/disp-
pl/au/journals/MULR/2003/12.htm?query=perverting%20course%20justice (accessed on 19 June 2007). 
120Cameron and Liberman op cit (n 119) 11.  
 
121RF Carter Carter’s Criminal Law of Queensland 9ed (1994) at IX; Gillies op cit (n 2) 831; JM Herlihy and 
RG Kenny An Introduction to Criminal Law in Queensland and Western Australia 3ed (1990) 1; RG Kenny 
An Introduction to Criminal Law in Queensland and Western Australia 5ed (2000) 1; C Howard Australian 
Criminal Law 2ed (1970) 3, M Bagaric and KJ Arenson Criminal Laws in Australia: Cases and Materials 
(2004) 17; L Waller and CR Williams Criminal Law: Text and Cases 7ed (1993) 5-6; EJ Edwards, RW 
Harding and IG Campbell The Criminal Codes: Commentary and Materials 4ed (1992) 3-13; C Howard 
Criminal Law 3ed (1977) 3 and B Fisse Howard’s Criminal Law 5ed (1990) 3. 
 
122E Colvin and S Linden-Laufer Criminal Law in Queensland and Western Australia: Cases and 
Commentary (1994) 3 and D Brow, D Farrier and D Weisbot Criminal Law 2ed (1996) 10. 
 
123Bagaric and Arenson op cit (n 121) 3.   
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The Australian Capital Territory and Victoria continue to rely on the common law for the 
prosecution of crimes, including the crime of perverting the course of justice.124 Those 
jurisdictions which have not codified their criminal law and still rely on the common law as 
a major source of criminal law are referred to as ‘common law jurisdictions.’125 All other 
Australian states have statutory provisions governing the offence of obstructing or 
perverting or attempting to obstruct or pervert the course of justice.126 Apart from the 
States’ legislation which prohibits the offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice 
in respective states, there is also the Commonwealth legislation127 which punishes the same 
crime in all States, Territories and the Commonwealth.  This legislation applies throughout 
the whole of the Commonwealth and the Territories, and also applies beyond the 
Commonwealth and the Territories.128
 
  
The statutory offences refer to perverting the course of justice or the due administration of 
the law.  According to Gillies,129
                                                                                                                                                     
 
 the expression “administration of the law” in the statutory 
provisions has extended the scope of the “course of justice” to include police investigations, 
but the matter awaits judicial determination.  Gillies’s view is opposed to the common law 
124See Chesterman and Evans op cit (n 2) 187 and Bagaric and Arenson op cit (n 121) 3.  
 
125Colvin and Linden-Laufer op cit (n 122) 3; Howard op cit (n 121) 7 and Fisse op cit (n 121) 7.  
 
126Section 319, of the Crimes Act of 1900 as amended in 1990 (New South Wales); Criminal Code (Northern 
Territory) section 109; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (South Australia) section 256 and Criminal 
Code (Tasmania) section 105.  See Carter op cit (n 121) 187.   
 
127The Crimes Act of 1914 (Cth).  Australia has a federal system of government and, due to various 
Constitutions in that system, criminal law is primarily a matter for the states.  However, there is a federal 
criminal jurisdiction created by the Commonwealth Parliament.  See Bagaric and Arenson op cit (n 121) 17.  
 
128Section 3A of the Crimes Act of 1914 (Cth). 
 
129Gillies op cit (n 2) 836-37.  
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position reached in The Queen v Rogerson130
 
 where it was held that police investigations do 
not form part of the course of justice.  The statutory offence of perverting the course of 
justice of all the relevant States, the Commonwealth and the Territories are discussed  
hereunder.  
 
4.4.1    New South Wales 
In 1990, the statute131 in relation to perverting the course of justice was amended by the 
insertion of a new Part 7, headed “Public Justice Offences.” A number of statutory offences 
were enacted and a number of common law offences were abolished.  Relevant here is the 
enactment of a provision132 under the heading of “General Offence Perverting the Course of 
Justice.”  When looking at the Act,133
 
 there are at least ten types of conduct which 
constitute the statutory crime of perverting or obstructing the course of justice.  They are 
the following: 
a. False accusations, etc.134
 
 It is an offence for X, knowing that Y is innocent, to 
intentionally accuse Y of an offence and so cause Y to become the subject of the 
investigation. 
 
 
                                                 
130Cf The Queen v Rogerson supra, text at note 2. 
131The New South Wales Crimes Act 1900 as amended in 1990.   
132Section 319.  
133The Crimes Act of 1900 (NSW).   
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b. Threatening or intimidating victims or witnesses.135
 
 It is an offence to threaten, or 
to cause, injury or detriment to another person with intent to influence that person not to 
bring material information about an indictable offence to the attention of the police or other 
appropriate authority.  It is clear that the purpose of this section is to prevent individuals 
from threatening or intimidating victims of crime or witnesses so that they cannot report the 
commission of crime to either the police or any appropriate authority. 
c. Concealing a serious, indictable offence.136 Section 316(1) provides that if Y has 
committed a serious indictable offence and X, who knows or believes that an offence has 
been committed and has information which might be of material assistance in Y’s 
apprehension or prosecution or conviction, fails, without reasonable excuse to bring that 
information to the police or other appropriate authority, commits an offence.  It is also an 
offence for X to solicit, accept or agree to accept any benefit for himself or herself, or any 
other person, in consideration for doing anything that would be an offence under subsection 
(1) above.137
 
 
d. Tampering with evidence.138
                                                                                                                                                     
134Section 314 of The New South Wales Crimes Act 1900 as amended in 1990.  
 X commits a crime if he or she, with intent to mislead 
135Section 315A(1).  
136Section 316(1) of the Crimes Act of 1900 as amended in 1990.  
137Section 316(2) of the Crimes Act of 1900 as amended in 1990. 
138Section 317.  
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any judicial tribunal in any judicial proceeding, suppresses, conceals, destroys, alters or 
falsifies anything knowing that it is or may be required as evidence in any judicial 
proceeding.  This crime can also be committed if X fabricates evidence or he or she  
 
knowingly makes use of fabricated false evidence.  
 
e. Making or using a false official instrument to pervert the course of justice.139 X 
commits an offence if he or she makes a false official instrument140 or makes a copy of an 
instrument which he or she (X) knows to be a false official instrument, with intent that he 
or she or another person will use it to induce another person to accept the instrument as 
genuine or to accept the copy as a copy of a genuine official instrument and that acceptance 
will pervert the course of justice.141 The Act also punishes the use of an instrument or a 
copy of an instrument, which the person who uses it knows to be a false official instrument 
or a copy of a false official instrument, with intent to induce another person to accept the 
instrument or its copy as a genuine official instrument and thereby perverting the course of 
justice.142
 
   
f. General offence of perverting the course of justice.143
                                                 
139Section 318.  
 A very broad and rather 
vague offence of perverting the course of justice was also created.  It does not specify 
which conduct constitutes the crime.  Section 319 provides: 
140Section 318(1) defines “official instrument” as an instrument of a kind that is made or issued by a person in 
his or her capacity as a public officer or by a judicial tribunal. 
  
141Section 318 (2)(a) and (b).  
142Section 318(3)(a) and (b).  
143Section 319.  
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A person who does any act, or makes any omission, intending in any way to pervert the course of 
justice144
 
 is liable to penal servitude for 14 years.  
It is clear that the provisions of section 319 punish both the positive act and an omission to 
do something which is intended to pervert the course of justice. 
 
g. Corruption of witnesses and jurors.145 It is an offence for X to confer or offer to 
confer or to procure or to attempt to procure any benefit on or for Y, intending to influence 
Y who is called or is to be called as a witness in any judicial proceeding to give false 
evidence or to withhold true evidence or not to attend as a witness or not to produce 
anything in evidence pursuant to a summons or subpoena.  It is also an offence for X to do 
what is mentioned above, intending to influence Y’s conduct as a juror in any judicial 
proceeding or not to attend as a juror in any judicial proceeding, whether he or she (Y) has 
been sworn as a juror or not and intending to pervert the course of justice.146 Y also 
commits an offence if he or she solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit for him- or 
herself or for any other person, in consideration for an agreement that he or she or any 
person will, as a witness in any judicial proceeding, give false evidence or withhold true 
evidence or not to attend as a witness or to produce anything in evidence pursuant to a 
summons or subpoena.147
                                                 
144The term “pervert the course of justice” imports much of the common law especially the common law 
offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice. 
 Soliciting, accepting or agreeing to accept any benefit for him- or 
herself or for any other person on account of anything to be done or omitted by him or her 
or another person as a juror in any judicial proceeding, or on account of his or her or 
145Section 321(1). 
  
146Sections 321(1)(a) and (b). 
 
147Section 321(2)(a). 
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another person’s not attending as a juror in any judicial proceeding, with intent to pervert 
the course of justice is also punishable.148
 
 
h. Threatening or intimidating judges, witness, jurors, etc.149 It is an offence to 
threaten or intimidate a judge, a witness, a juror, etc., with intent to influence him or her as 
a witness, to give false evidence or to withhold true evidence or not to attend as a witness or 
not to produce anything in evidence pursuant to a summons or subpoena or to influence him 
or her, as a juror, not to attend in any judicial proceeding, whether he or she has been sworn 
as a juror or not or to influence his or her conduct as a judicial officer or to influence his or 
her conduct as a public justice official in or in connection with any judicial proceeding.150
 
 
i. Influencing witnesses and jurors.151 If X commits an act intending to procure, 
persuade, induce or otherwise cause any person called or to be called as a witness in any 
judicial proceeding to give false evidence or to withhold true evidence or not to attend as a 
witness or not to produce anything in evidence pursuant to a summons or subpoena he or 
she is guilty of an offence.152 It is also an offence for X to do an act intending, other than by 
production of evidence and argument in court, to influence any person in his or her conduct 
as a juror in any judicial proceeding, whether he or she has been sworn as a juror or not.153
 
 
                                                 
148Section 321(2)(b).  
149Section 322.  
150Section 322 (a)-(d).  
151Section 323.  
152Section 323(a).  
153Section 323(b).  
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j. Preventing, obstructing or dissuading a witness or a juror from attending.154 It is 
an offence, without lawful excuse, to prevent, obstruct or dissuade any witness or potential 
witness or a juror who has been called in a judicial proceeding, to attend at the judicial 
proceeding.155
 
  
The new statutory offences against perverting the course of justice cover matters that were 
once punishable in terms the common law offence of attempting to pervert the course of 
justice.  They leave no scope for the charging of attempting to pervert the course of justice 
at common law.156 The offences are broadly defined to mean obstructing, preventing, 
perverting or defeating the course of justice.157 They do not, in literal terms, require the 
intentional doing of an act which actually perverts justice, or one having this tendency.  
Rather, they require simply that the conduct of the accused be accompanied by the intent to 
pervert the course of justice.158
 
  
In New South Wales an attempt to prevent, pervert or defeat the course of justice can also 
be punished in terms of the Commonwealth legislation.159 In Foord v Whiddet and 
Another,160
                                                 
154Section 325.  
 Foord, a judge of the District Court of New South Wales was committed to 
155Section 325(1)-(2).  
 
156Gillies op cit (n 2) 832. 
 
157See section 312 of New South Wales Crimes Act 1900 (as amended in 1990) and Gillies op cit (n 2) 837. 
 
158It is said that any act intended to pervert justice will suffice, even if it does not, from an objective view, 
either pervert the course of justice, or even have the tendency to pervert the course of justice.  See Gillies op 
cit (n 2) 837. 
 
159Section 43 of the Crimes Act of 1914 (Cth).  See the discussion of this section infra under 4.4.8.9, text at 
note 387. 
  
160(1985) 16 A Crim R 464.  
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stand trial on a charge of attempting to pervert the course of justice.161
 
 This case was an 
application for judicial review made against the decision of the second respondent, a  
magistrate, who had found a prima facie case against Foord for attempting to pervert the 
course of justice.162 The facts of the case were the following:  Allegedly, one Morgan John 
Ryan was facing committal proceedings, not related to this case, before a magistrate, Mr 
Jones.  Allegedly, Mr Jones had found a prima facie case against Ryan but had not decided 
whether to commit him for trial.  Allegedly, Foord had approached Mr Briese who was a 
chairperson of the bench of magistrates in New South Wales and Mr Jones’s supervisor, 
with a view to influencing Mr Jones to act in conflict with his duty in respect of the hearing 
of committal proceedings against Ryan.  Briese declined to act upon Foord’s request.163
 
  
Briese testified that in February 1982 he was aware that Mr Jones held that a prima facie 
case had been established against Ryan.  Briese stated that in the same week he received a 
telephone call from Foord requesting a meeting to discuss “a delicate matter.”  The two met 
and Foord said to him, “Neville wants something done for Morgan Ryan.  I don’t know the 
magistrate who is hearing the case, that’s Kevin Jones.  If it was one of the old Central 
Magistrates that I used to know in the past I would go and speak with him myself.”164
                                                 
161In contravention of section 43 of the Crimes Act of 1914 (Cth).  See Foord v Whiddet and Another supra (n  
160) at 465. 
 
Foord’s application for review of the second respondent’s decision to find a prima facie 
case on the charge involving his approach to Mr Briese were based on the following 
162Foord v Whiddet and Another supra (n 160) at 465. 
163At 464.  
164At 466.  
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grounds:165
 
 
(1) That there was no evidence upon which a prima facie case could be found. 
 
(2) That the offence was not committed in relation to the judicial power of the   
Commonwealth. 
 
The counsel for Foord did not submit that there was no evidence of intent on his part to 
pervert the course of justice.  Instead, it was submitted that there was no evidence of a 
tendency, arising from what Foord said to Mr Briese, to pervert the course of justice.  
Counsel for Foord relied upon the fact that Mr Briese was not under any duty to 
communicate any request associated with the way in which Mr Jones would discharge his 
magisterial duties because, he said, there was no communication to Mr Jones.166
 
   
The Federal Court noted that there were English authorities regarding the common law 
offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice.  It further noted that in none of the 
authorities was the conduct of a judicial officer the subject of an alleged offence and there 
was no precise guidance in relation to a case such as this one.167
 
 
The court painstakingly referred to the English cases of The Queen v Vreones168
                                                 
165At 465. 
 and R v 
166At 472.  
167At 468. 
168The Queen v Vreones supra in Chapter Two under 2.3, text at note 93. 
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Machin169
 
 where the accused were charged with attempting to pervert the course of justice 
and noted that it was established by these authorities that there should be evidence arising 
from what the accused was alleged to have done which disclosed that there was a tendency  
to pervert the course of justice.  The court held:170
  
 
Upon the assumption that the prosecutor’s case must be taken at its highest for the purposes of the 
argument under consideration, what the applicant is alleged to have done is to have attempted to 
persuade Mr Briese to attempt to bring the committal proceedings to an end and thus to prevent, in 
due course of the law, the judicial power of the Commonwealth arising which would occur when Mr 
Ryan was indicted and tried before a court which was exercising judicial power. In my opinion a 
case of this kind involves an attempt to pervert the course of justice in relation to judicial power of 
the Commonwealth.   
 
The court interpreted the words “in relation to judicial power of the Commonwealth” in 
section 43171 to include a proceeding in which judicial power is not being exercised.  In the 
court’s opinion the words “in relation to judicial power of the Commonwealth” were 
inserted for the purpose of making it clear that the section applied in Commonwealth 
matters as distinct from State matters.  The application was dismissed with costs.172 The 
Federal Court of Australia extended the scope of section 43173
 
 to include acts that were 
done outside judicial proceedings or where judicial power is not being exercised. 
Conspiracy to obstruct, prevent, pervert, or defeat the course of justice is also an offence 
                                                 
169[1980] 1 WLR 763. 
170Foord v Whiddet and Another supra (n 160) at 476. 
171The Crimes Act of 1914 (Cth).   
  
172Foord v Whiddet supra (n 160) at 477. 
 
173The Crimes Act of 1914 (Cth). 
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and is punished in terms of section 42(1).174
 
 In New South Wales, for the accused to be 
convicted of the statutory offence of perverting the course of justice he or she must act with  
 
intent to pervert the course of justice.175 In 1985, in R v Freeman176 the Court of Criminal 
Appeal observed that on a charge of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice, the Crown 
must prove a guilty intention, that is, an intention to pervert or wrongfully interfere with the 
course of justice.  The facts of this case were the following:  The crown alleged that the 
accused, a lawyer called Freeman, and others conspired together and amongst themselves to 
pervert the course of justice in that they attempted to obtain security bail for a man named 
Chin, who was in custody awaiting committal proceedings, and they used Chin’s own 
money for that purpose.177
 
 It was alleged that Freeman was instrumental in her professional 
capacity in arranging for the provision of bail for Chin.  It was further alleged that she 
visited Chin in prison and interviewed him.  Bail was granted to Chin, but he did not have 
the money to pay it.  Allegedly, Freeman made arrangements with him for the transfer of 
some funds from Malaysia to his trust account.  Shortly after the meeting a certain amount 
of money was credited to Chin in the trust account of Freeman’s employer solicitor, 
Christopher Watson. 
After the money was credited, Miss Freeman made a further attempt to arrange for another 
man to go and file bail papers and hand over the money that was taken from the trust 
                                                 
174Section 42(1) of the Crimes Act of 1914. 
  
175Section 42(3)(b) of the Crimes Act of 1914.  See Gillies op cit (n 2) 838.  Clearly this requirement is more 
or less the same as the requirement at common law. 
 
176(1985) 3 NSWLR 303.  
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account.  Freeman went back to the prison and arranged with other two co-conspirators to 
file bail papers in court.  The other accused, Kron, provided bail security.  She used cash 
provided from the trust account which was derived from money sent out to Chin from 
Malaysia.  The accused acted as surety and entered into a recognizance using an accused 
person’s money.  They were charged and convicted of conspiracy to pervert the course of 
justice.178
 
 
During trial Freeman gave evidence asserting her innocence of any wrongful intent on her 
part, asserting a belief that what she did was not unlawful and asserting that she was acting 
under the instructions of her employer solicitor.179 The court held that acting on the advice 
of a lawyer was not a defence to a crime.180 The court further held that if the surety entered 
into a recognizance using an accused person’s money, it was unlawful, and to agree that 
should happen could therefore be a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.181 After a 
lengthy trial the accused were found guilty of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.  
They appealed.  On appeal the court held that in its opinion the onus to establish the guilty 
intention on the part of the accused lay with the Crown.  This would involve the Crown 
proving the intention to agree and the accompaniment of the intention of a guilty mind, that 
is to say an intention to pervert or wrongfully interfere with the course of justice.182
                                                                                                                                                     
177At 304B. 
 The 
court further held that the trial court erred in withdrawing from the jury a deliberation upon 
 
178At 303F. 
 
179At 304E-F.  
180At 306B-C. 
181At 306C. 
182At 310E.  
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the state of mind of the accused in relation to their guilty knowledge of what they were 
doing.183 The appeal was unanimously allowed.184
 
  
This decision provides authority for the proposition that in a charge of conspiracy to pervert 
the course of justice the mens rea needed is a specific intent to wrongfully interfere with the 
course of justice. 
 
4.4.2  South Australia  
In 1935, in this part of the country, a statutory offence of “attempt to obstruct or pervert the 
course of justice or due administration of the law” was created in the Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act.185 The Act prohibits any threats or reprisals relating to duties or 
functions in judicial proceedings186 and any attempt to obstruct or pervert the course of 
justice or due administration of law.187
 
 In South Australia the following conduct constitutes 
the statutory offence of perverting the course of justice: 
a. Impeding investigation of offences or assisting offenders.188
                                                 
183At 310F-G.  
 A person who, 
knowing or believing that another person has committed an offence, acts with intent to 
impede the investigation of the offence or of assisting the offender to escape apprehension 
and prosecution or to dispose of the proceeds of the offence, is guilty of an offence.   
184At 311B. 
185The Criminal Law Consolidation Act of 1935 (SA).  
186Section 248. 
 
187Section 256.  
 
188Section 241(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act of 1935 (SA). 
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According to Gillies,189
 
 the offence of impeding investigation of an offence is not 
committed by a mere omission to disclose the existence of an offence, or the identity of the 
offender, on the part of the person who is not under an obligation to do so.    
b. Interference with judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and legal practitioners.190
Section 248 provides: 
  
 
(1) A person who causes or procures, or threatens or attempts to cause or procure, any injury or 
detriment with the intention of inducing a person who is or may be ─ 
 
(a) a judicial officer or other officer at judicial proceedings (whether proceedings that 
are in progress or proceedings that are to be or may be instituted at a later time); or 
 
(b) involved in such proceedings as a witness, juror or legal practitioner, to act or not 
to act in a way that might influence the outcome of the proceedings is guilty of an 
offence.  
 
It is clear from this section that any interference with any judicial officer or other officer in 
judicial proceeding, any witness, juror or legal practitioner is an offence.  Such interference 
must be accompanied by an intention to induce that person to act or not to act in a way 
which might influence the outcome of the proceedings.  It is also clear that the judicial 
proceedings should either be in progress or envisaged.   
 
                                                 
189Gillies op cit (n 2) 841. 
  
190Section 248(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act of 1935 (SA). 
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c. Attempts to obstruct or to pervert the course of justice or the due administration 
of the law.191 Just like in Queensland and the Northern Territory, the South Australian 
Criminal Code has a provision which creates a general offence of attempt to obstruct or to 
pervert the course of justice or the due administration of the law in a manner that is not 
dealt with by other provisions.192
(1)  A person who attempts to obstruct or to pervert the course of justice or the due 
administration of the law in a manner not otherwise dealt with in the preceding 
provisions of this Part is guilty of an offence. 
 Section 256 provides: 
 
According to Gillies,193
 
 this provision leaves no room for the charging of a common law 
offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice.  
4.4.3   Queensland  
With the passing of the Criminal Code in 1899194 a fundamental change was introduced 
into the criminal law of Queensland.  The Code almost abrogated all the common law 
crimes.  The Queensland criminal law thus became completely a creature of statute with 
most of the common law offences being incorporated in the Code.195 In Queensland the 
common law offences relating to acts or conduct which was intended and had the tendency 
to pervert the course of justice, was also codified in 1899.  Carter196
                                                 
191Section 256 (1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act of 1935 (SA). 
 deals extensively with 
the statutory offences that deal with the administration of justice in general and perverting 
  
192See Gillies op cit (n 2) 832. 
  
193Ibid.  
194The Criminal Code Act of 1899 (Qld).  
  
195Herlihy and Kenny op cit (n 121) 4 and Kenny op cit (n 121) 5.  
 
196Carter op cit (n 121) 3462-3504.  
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the course of justice in particular.  Just like its common law predecessor, the Code197
 
 
punishes the following conduct which is intended, and has the tendency, to pervert the  
course of justice:198
 
 
a. Judicial corruption.199
b. Official corruption.
  
200
c. Corrupting or threatening jurors.
 
201
d. Fabricating evidence.
 
202
e. Corruption of witnesses.
 
203
f. Deceiving witnesses.
 
204
g. Destroying evidence.
 
205
h. Preventing witnesses from attending.
 
206
i. Conspiracy to bring false accusations.
  
207
j. Conspiracy to defeat justice.
 
208
                                                 
197The Criminal Code Act of 1899 (Qld).  
  
 
198Carter op cit (n 121) 3462-3504. 
 
199Section 120 of the Criminal Code Act of 1899 (Qld). 
 
200Section 121. 
201Section 122. 
202Section 126. 
203Section 127. 
204Section 128. 
205Section 129. 
206Section 130. 
207Section 131. 
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k. Attempt to pervert justice.209
 
 
4.4.3.1 Judicial corruption   
The Act punishes any act by any person who is the holder of a judicial office who corruptly 
asks, receives or obtains or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain, any property or benefit 
of any kind for him- or herself or any other person on account of anything already done or 
omitted to be done, or to be done afterwards or omitted to be done by him- or herself in his  
or her judicial capacity.210 It also punishes any person who by corrupt means gives, confers 
or procures or makes any promises or offers to give or procure or attempt to procure, any 
property for any person holding a judicial office.211 According to Carter,212
 
 the term 
“holder of a judicial office” in this section includes an arbitrator or umpire.  It is clear that 
the objective of these provisions is to prevent judicial officers from receiving bribes and to 
prevent people from bribing judicial officers.  
4.4.3.2 Official corruption 
Public officials can easily commit the crime by interfering with the due administration of 
justice if there are no laws that punish any such interference with the smooth running of the 
justice system.  Section 121 of the Criminal Code of Queensland provides:213
  
  
                                                                                                                                                     
208Section 132. 
209Section 140. 
210Section 120(1). 
211Section 120(2). 
212Carter op cit (n 121) 3463.  
213Section 121(1) of the Criminal Code Act of 1899 (Qld).  See Carter op cit (n 121) 3463-64. 
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Any person who− 
 
(1) Being a justice not acting judicially, or being a person employed in the Public Service in 
any capacity not judicial for the prosecution or detection or punishment of offenders, corruptly 
asks, receives, or obtains, or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain, any property or benefit of 
any kind for himself or any other person, on account of anything already done or omitted to be 
done, or to be afterwards done or omitted to be done, by him, with a view to corrupt or  
 
improper interference with the due administration of justice, or the procurement or facilitation 
of the commission of any offence, or the protection of any offender or intending offender from 
detection or punishment … is guilty of a crime, and is liable to imprisonment for fourteen years, 
and to be fined at the discretion of the court. 
 
This provision deals with any official involved in the administration of justice who accepts 
a bribe to not act judicially, with a view to the corrupt or improper interference with the due 
administration of justice or to facilitate the commission of any offence or the protection of 
any offender or intending offender from detection or punishment.214 This provision is 
directed towards police officials, prosecutors, and any other official who is involved in the 
administration of justice, who may, in the execution of their duty, receive bribes in order to 
pervert justice.  Section 121(2) on the other hand is directed towards people who bribe or 
attempt to bribe a person being a justice to not act judicially, that is, for him or her to do or 
not to do something.215
 
  
R v Smith216
                                                 
214Carter op cit (n 121) 3463. 
 illustrates the application of section 121.  In this case the court observed that 
neither mutuality of purpose between the official and the person offering the benefit nor 
genuine intention on the part of the official that such person be adequately protected from 
detention or punishment nor genuine ability on the part of the official to ensure same, 
 
215Ibid.  
 
216[1993] 1Qd R 541. 
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comprised an element of the offence under section 121(1).217
 
 
The facts of the case were as follows:  During 1985 and 1986 Rodney Smith was a senior 
police constable.  He was, within section 121(1), a person employed as justice for the 
prosecution of offenders.  While Smith was working at a place called Sunshine Coast, there 
was one Suzanne Greskie who owned a brothel.  It was alleged that police officers used to 
frequent the place.218 Allegedly, around May 1985, Rodney Smith and his colleagues 
visited Greskie’s premises.  Smith had a conversation with her.  He asked her if it was okay 
if they saw the girls.  He meant that the policemen wished to have sexual intercourse with 
the prostitutes.  It was alleged that Smith and Greskie did not discuss the question of 
payment.  The police officers, on many subsequent occasions, went to Greskie’s place and 
had sexual intercourse with the prostitutes and they never paid.219
 
 
Prior to Smith and other police officers frequenting Greskie’s place to satisfy their sexual 
desires, it was alleged that Greskie had complained to the police about being blackmailed.  
It is also said that there was once a police raid of her place in which Smith participated.  It 
was shortly afterwards that Smith is alleged to have come to an agreement with Greskie to 
do (or omit to do) something with a view of protecting Greskie and her employees from 
punishment under the laws relating to prostitution.220
 
 
Smith was indicted on a single count of official corruption in contravention of section  
                                                 
217See Carter op cit (n 121) 3464. 
 
218R v Smith supra (n 216) at 542. 
 
219At 543. 
220Ibid. 
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121(1) of the Criminal Code.221 The main witness for the Crown was Ms Greskie.  She was 
an accomplice for purposes of the trial against Smith.  She, before giving evidence, pleaded 
guilty to the offence under section 121(1).222 The court was told, inter alia, that Smith had 
agreed with Greskie that the latter would be notified in advance when the raid was to take 
place and she was to arrange for the next girl to take her place at the escort agency and 
assume another name in order to hide the prostitution activities.  Smith was convicted of the 
offence of official corruption223 and appealed against his conviction.  After considering 
matters that were irrelevant the court looked at the following grounds:224
 
 
(1) It was submitted on Smith’s behalf that the trial judge erred in ruling that sexual 
services were a “benefit” within the meaning of section 121(1) of the Criminal Code.  It 
was said that the word “benefit” in section 121(1) must be understood in the context of 
property benefit.225
 
 
(2) The verdict of the jury was against the weight of the evidence and amounted to a 
substantial miscarriage of justice.   
                                                 
221At 549.  
222At 550.  
223At 549. 
224At 560-61. 
225At 560. 
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Regarding the former ground the court ruled “sexual favours are thought to be an advantage 
or benefit.”226 Regarding the latter ground, Pincus, JA, said that the Crown had to prove 
that the advantage contemplated ensured the absence of “genuine police action,” with a 
view to protecting Greskie and her employees from detection and punishment.  He further 
observed that it was not sufficient for the prosecution to satisfy the jury that sexual services 
were provided on account of an expectation of considerate treatment and absence of 
harassment.227 McPherson, JA, held228 that before the jury could find Smith guilty it was 
necessary that they should be satisfied beyond any reasonable doubt that the requisite 
relation under section 121(1)229 was in fact present.  He further observed that it was 
possible that refraining from prosecution was never part of the agreement to receive sexual 
services free of charge.230
 
  
Both McPherson, JA, and Pincus, JA, reached a conclusion that it would be unsafe to allow 
the conviction to stand, thereby allowing the appeal and setting aside of the verdict and 
conviction, with Thomas, J, dissenting.231
 
 This thesis will now briefly discuss the merits 
and demerits of the dissenting judgment of Thomas, J. 
Thomas J, in his dissenting judgment discussed the elements of the offence in section 
                                                 
226Ibid.  
227At 548.  
228At 547.  
229The Criminal Code Act of 1899 (Qld).  
230R v Smith supra (n 216) at 547.  
231At 548 and 562.   
 147 
121(1) that were to be proved by the Crown.  The following are the elements:232
 
  
(1) Accused in the prescribed capacity.  The judge found that this element was met as Smith 
was employed in the Public Service in a non-judicial capacity. 
 
(2) Date.  The judge, again, found no problem in the indictment regarding identifying the 
possible dates of the offence. 
(3) Corruptly.  The judge observed that it was not suggested that the jury could not 
reasonably regard Smith’s action as corrupt if the jury accepted that there was an agreement 
to receive benefits of the kind mentioned and if that was on account of his withholding 
police action against offenders.233
 
 
(4) Agreeing to receive a benefit.  The judge said that it would have been enough for the 
Crown to allege that Smith received benefits instead of alleging that he agreed to receive 
benefits. He further said that if Greskie’s evidence was accepted, it was sufficient to 
support a finding that Smith agreed to receive such benefit. 
(5) A benefit for him or for any other person.  The judge found that the evidence was 
capable of establishing that the benefits that Smith agreed to receive were for him and for 
other persons, namely other police officers. 
 
(6) A benefit on account of something to be done or omitted by Smith.  The judge had no 
problem in finding that the evidence was capable of establishing that Smith agreed to 
                                                 
232At 557-60.   
 
233At 558. 
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receive relevant benefits.  He referred to a 1991 unreported case234
 
 where the court held 
that  
 
 
the phrase “on account of” implies, in the case of an act already done or an omission 
already made, that the giving of property or conferring of a benefit is done in recognition of 
its having been done or omitted to be done.  He said Smith’s request for sexual favours 
should be seen against the background that Smith had some months earlier instituted, or 
purported to institute, an improper system that could be described as a charade.  Thomas J 
said that there was evidence which showed the non-prosecution of Greskie despite 
knowledge of her habitual offending and despite daily offences of which Smith was aware.  
 
(7) Something done by him to protect intending offenders from detection and punishment.    
 
Thomas J held:235
 
 
The evidence adequately justifies the inference that the appellant received (and agreed to receive) 
sexual benefits on the designated occasion in May 1985 and for a considerable time thereafter… 
These factors, when added to the discussion of this issue at 558 to 560, permit the inference quite 
reasonably to be drawn that one benefit was on account of the other and the appellant must have so 
regarded it.  There is no reason to think that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence or that 
there was any substantial miscarriage of justice.    
 
In this case what Smith did, or omitted to do, was to refrain from the prosecution of Greskie 
and her employees despite the fact that Smith knew they were still in the business of 
                                                 
234R v Herscu (CA 4/1991); Court of Criminal Appeal.  
235R v Smith supra (n 216) at 561-62.    
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prostitution.  Secondly, the words “on account of,” mean “because of something or reason 
for something.”236
 
 Therefore, it can be said that Smith received sexual benefits in advance 
of something to be done afterwards, namely, to refrain from prosecuting Greskie and to  
notify her when the next raid was to take place, and this he did.237 This can be inferred from 
un-contradicted evidence that prior to the arrangement, Smith was part of the team of police 
officers that raided Greskie’s place and harassed her on a number of occasions.238 There 
was also un-contradicted evidence that after Smith had agreed to receive sexual benefits 
from Greskie’s employees, neither he nor any other police officer, ever again harassed 
Greskie, despite his knowledge that she was contravening laws regarding prostitution.239
 
 
The only reasonable inference, based on the facts discussed above, was that Smith ceased 
seeking to prosecute Greskie and her clients because of the sexual benefits they received 
from the brothel.  Against this background this thesis is of the opinion that the conviction 
should have been confirmed and the appeal dismissed.  It is submitted that the dissenting 
judgement was correct.   
4.4.3.3 Corrupting or threatening jurors 
It is an offence to attempt, by threats or intimidation or by any benefits or promises of 
benefit of any kind or by other corrupt means, to influence the juror in any judicial 
proceedings.240
                                                 
236AP Cowie Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 4ed (1989) 8.   
 Any person acting as a juror also commits an offence if he or she accepts 
237See R v Smith supra (n 216) at 552 and at 561-62.  
238At 543. 
239At 562.    
240Section 121(1) of the Criminal Code Act of 1899 (Qld).    
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any benefit or promise on account of anything to be done by him or her as a juror in any  
 
 
 
judicial proceedings.241
 
  
4.4.3.4 Fabricating evidence 
Section 126(1)-(2) of the Code forbids any fabrication of evidence by any means and 
knowingly making use of fabricated evidence.  This section provides:242
 
 
Any person who, with intent to mislead any tribunal in any judicial proceeding- 
 
(1) Fabricates evidence by any means other than perjury or counselling or procuring the 
commission of perjury; or 
 
(2) Knowingly makes use of such fabricated evidence; 
 
is guilty of an offence … 
 
The term “judicial proceeding” includes any proceeding held before any court, tribunal, or a 
person, in which evidence may be taken under oath.243 To fabricate is to invent or concoct a 
story, to lie or to fake or forge.244
 
 Section 126 does not require that the accused’s intent 
should be to obstruct, pervert or obstruct justice.  The requisite intent must be to mislead 
any tribunal in any judicial proceeding.   
4.4.3.5 Corruption of witnesses 
                                                 
241Section 122(2). 
242Carter op cit (n 121) 3467.  
243Section 119 of the Criminal Code Act of 1899 (Qld). 
  
244See Collins English Dictionary: Complete and Unabridged 6ed (2003) 583. 
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In terms of section 127 corrupting witnesses is an offence.  This offence can be committed 
in various ways, such as sending a witness to another country so that he or she cannot 
testify in court or offering a benefit to a witness in order to withhold true testimony or give  
 
false evidence or to attempt by any means to induce a person to give false testimony.  
Section 127 provides:245
 
  
Any person who─ 
 
(1) Gives, confers, or procures or promises or offers to give or to confer, or to procure or 
attempt to procure, any property or benefit of any kind to, upon, or for, any person, upon 
any agreement or understanding that any person called or to be called as a witness in any 
judicial proceeding shall give false testimony or withhold true testimony; or 
 
(2) Attempts by any other means to induce a person called or to be called as a witness in any 
judicial proceeding to give false testimony or to withhold true testimony; or 
 
(3) Asks, receives, or obtains, or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain, any property or 
benefit of any kind for himself or any other person, upon any agreement or 
understanding that any person shall as a witness in any judicial proceeding give false 
testimony or withhold true testimony; 
 
is guilty of a crime …    
 
In terms of section 127(1) this offence is committed when X gives, confers, procures or 
attempts to procure any property or a benefit of any kind to Z with an understanding that Z, 
as a witness, will give false testimony in any judicial proceeding.  A mere offer of a benefit 
of any kind made by X to Z for the latter to return the favour by withholding true testimony 
suffices in order to revoke section 127(1).  The words “benefit of any kind” can be an offer 
of employment, a trip overseas at X’s expense or any other thing that Z was not entitled to 
receive if it was not for an agreement to withhold true testimony or give false testimony.  
Procuring or attempting to induce any person called or to be called as a witness in any 
judicial proceedings to give false testimony or to withhold true testimony is also an offence.  
                                                 
245Carter op cit (n 121) 3467. 
 152 
The Act also punishes any person who, as a witness or potential witness, receives or obtains 
or agrees to or attempts to receive or obtain any property or benefit so that he or she can 
give false testimony or withhold true testimony in judicial proceedings. 
 
In R v Danahay246 it was observed that the offence of corrupting a witness by entering into 
an agreement or understanding in terms of which the witness should withhold true 
testimony was complete whether or not true testimony is in fact withheld.247
 
 
The facts of the case were as follows:  There were outstanding charges against one Gibbs 
for possession and supply of a dangerous drug and of committing an act of gross indecency 
with one Edwards.  Edwards was to be called as a witness against Gibbs on these charges.  
It was alleged that Danahay offered to give Edwards benefits, namely a contract of 
employment in one of Danahay’s companies and overseas travel upon an understanding 
that Edwards should either withhold true testimony from such judicial proceedings or, in 
the event of being called upon to give testimony, to give false testimony.248
 
 
Allegedly, Danahay met Edwards and offered him a job overseas for two years if he signed 
a statement saying that nothing happened so that the case could be squashed.  It was alleged 
that he arranged for lawyers to visit Edwards for the purpose of taking a statement from 
him.  In the presence of the said lawyers, it was alleged that he told Edwards to tell the 
lawyers that nothing had happened.  Edwards agreed to make an affidavit purporting to 
withdraw all allegations he made against Gibbs.  What was interesting here was that Gibbs 
                                                 
246[1993] 1 Qd R 271. 
247See Carter op cit (n 121) 3468. 
248R v Danahay supra (n 246) at 276.  
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pleaded guilty to offences laid against him.249
 
 Danahay was convicted of contravening  
section 127(1) of the Criminal Code.250 He appealed alleging that:251
(1) the evidence did not establish that Edwards was a person about to give evidence in the 
judicial proceeding, and 
  
 
(2) the offence charged was not made out by the evidence that Danahay offered Edwards a 
benefit to go overseas and thereby not give evidence or go into hiding and thereby avoid 
giving evidence.  
 
The first submission on behalf of Danahay concentrated on the words contained in section 
127, “called or to be called as a witness.”252 Counsel for Danahay submitted that when a 
person is formally called upon to take the oath as a witness then that person has been called 
as a witness in a judicial proceeding.  It was submitted that until that point of time, even 
where a subpoena or summons to the witness had been served, it could not be said that a 
person had been called as a witness.253 Williams J254
                                                 
249At 277. 
 held that as a matter of practicality it 
would be more often than not too late for a person so minded to corrupt a witness after that 
person had been called to be sworn.  He observed that the category of person who might be 
250 At 271. 
251At 278.  
252At 279.  
 
253Ibid. 
 
254Ibid. 
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corrupted as a witness must be broadened.255 He said that the test to determine whether or 
not a person is “to be called as a witness”256 cannot be whether or not that person was in 
fact subsequently called as a witness.  The court held that the gravamen of the offence is 
corrupting a witness whether the inducement was effective or not.257 It was found that at all 
material times Edwards was a person “to be called as a witness” in the judicial 
proceeding.258
 
 
The second contention on behalf of Danahay was that the offence in question was not 
satisfied by proof of an offer to a potential witness to go away with assistance and simply 
not give evidence.  Counsel, on behalf of Danahay, submitted that the requisite proof under 
section 127(1) was an understanding that when the person gave evidence, he would 
withhold the truth.259 The court held that there was more than one way of withholding true 
testimony from a judicial proceeding.  One was to amputate the evidence.  Another was to 
withhold it entirely by not going to court.260 Concurring with Williams, J, Thomas, J, 
held261 that an agreement for corrupt consideration not to take the stand aptly satisfies the 
requirements of an agreement that true testimony be withheld.  The judge also held262
                                                 
255Ibid. 
 that 
the essential element of the offence created by section 127(1) was the corrupt “agreement 
or understanding” with a witness with intent that the witness ‘shall give false testimony or 
   
256Ibid. 
  
257Ibid. 
258Ibid.  Williams J, did not give any meaning to the phrase “to be called as a witness.”    
  
259Ibid. 
260At 273. 
261Ibid.  
262At 282. 
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withhold true testimony.’  It was against this background that the Criminal Court of Appeal 
in the split decision dismissed the appeal, with Lee, J, dissenting.263
In his dissenting judgment, Lee, J’s point of departure was that Danahay engaged in a 
course of reprehensible conduct designed to ensure that Edwards did not appear in court to 
give evidence on criminal charges against Gibbs.  Lee, J, was of the opinion that that 
conduct was capable of violating section 140 of the Criminal Code (attempting to pervert 
justice) and possibly section 132 (conspiring to defeat justice).
  
264 In addressing the question 
of whether the essential element was satisfied, namely that the offer was made by Danahay 
to give benefits to Edwards upon the understanding that the latter, being a person then to be 
called as a witness in a judicial proceeding, should withhold true testimony, the judge used, 
among other authorities, the R v Miras265
                                                 
263At 297.  
 case.  In his opinion the R v Miras decision was 
directly in point and supported the submission for the appellant that section 127(1) required 
that the agreement or understanding arrived at in consideration of the offer of a benefit 
should, at the time it was arrived at, be that the person then called or then to be called as a 
witness should, when called, “give false testimony or withhold true testimony.”  It is said 
that it must be contemplated by both parties to the understanding, at the time the 
understanding was made, that the person concerned was to be called as a witness.  The 
question that was dealt with by the judge was whether an understanding that the proposed 
witness would go out of the country and not give evidence at all was capable of constituting 
264At 288.  See the discussion of section 132 infra under 4.4.3.9, text at note 279. 
 
265(1986) 84 FLR 273.  In this case the Supreme Court of Australian Capital Territory dealt with the offence 
against section 37(a) of the Crimes Act of 1914 (Cth) which is the equivalent of section 127(1) of the 
Criminal Code.  In relation to the necessity for the Crown to prove that the evidence sought to be withheld 
was true, it was concluded that the phrase “withhold true testimony” should be read ejusdem generic with the 
phrase “give false testimony.”  The court said that it was essential to the charge to show that the attempt was 
made in relation to the testimony to be given by a witness when called or to be called.  It was further said that 
a mere attempt to prevent him or her from giving testimony at all did not amount to the offence charged under 
section 37(a).  See R v Danahay supra (n 246) at 293. 
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an understanding that the proposed witness should withhold true testimony within the  
 
meaning of section 127(1).266 In answering this novel and rather vexing question, Lee, J, 
observed that the expression “withhold true testimony,” when read with the expression 
“give false testimony,” suggested that evidence should in effect be given in such a way that 
a false or incomplete picture was presented before the court.  He further observed that those 
expressions suggested that evidence should be given.  A witness should be in court.  The 
judge observed that if the understanding between Danahay and the witness was that the 
witness should simply not attend the court proceedings at all, “that does not appear to 
constitute an offence against the subsection.”267 The judge concluded that it appeared that 
ground 2 of the appellant’s contention was established, that the evidence did not establish 
an offence against section 127(1).  As a result he held that he would allow the appeal and 
quash the conviction.268
 
  
It is respectfully submitted that the minority judgment was the correct one.  Danahay was 
charged under the wrong section and was wrongly convicted in terms of section 127(1).  
This section requires a witness to “withhold true testimony” or “give false testimony” or to 
merely agree to “withhold true testimony” or “give false testimony.”  The only place where 
one may withhold true testimony or give false testimony is in court or before a judicial 
tribunal.  The wording of section 127(1) implies that X can withhold his or her silence in a 
court of law.  He or she cannot withhold his or her silence when he or she has failed to 
appear in court.  This thesis respectfully submits that the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
266At 293.  
 
267At 294.  
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extending the expression “withholding true testimony” or “giving false testimony,” in  
 
section 127(1), to include going away in order not to testify.  This thesis does not suggest 
that Danahay did not commit an offence by offering a benefit to Edwards for going away in 
order not to testify.  It is further submitted that Danahay should have been charged under 
section 130 of the Criminal Code269 which deals with preventing a witness from attending 
any court or tribunal, or section 132270 which deals with conspiracy to defeat justice.  In R v 
Russell,271
 
 the court observed that on a charge of inducing a witness to withhold true 
testimony there must be evidence that the testimony that was to be withheld was true.   
4.4.3.6 Deceiving witnesses 
Deceiving witnesses in order to affect their testimony has a tendency of perverting the 
course of justice.  Such action is prohibited under the Criminal Code of Queensland. 
Section 128 prohibits deceiving witnesses with intent to affect their testimony during 
judicial proceedings.  Section 128 provides:272
 
 
Any person who practices any fraud, deceit, or knowingly makes or exhibits any false statement, 
representation, token, or writing, to any person called or to be called as a witness in any judicial 
proceeding, with intent to affect the testimony of such person as a witness, is guilty of a 
misdemeanour…  
 
 
A police officer (X), for example, takes a statement from Y, a witness who has been called 
or who is to be called as a witness in a judicial proceeding.  If, after Y has signed the 
                                                                                                                                                     
268At 297. 
269See section 130 infra under 4.4.3.7, text at note 275.  
 
270See section 132 infra under 4.4.3.9, text at note 279.  
  
271[1932] QWN 37. 
 
272The Criminal Code Act of 1899 (Qld). 
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statement, X, with intent to affect Y’s testimony as a witness, fraudulently removes some 
pages from Y’s statement and inserts other pages with a different version of what Y has 
said, X has contravened section 128.273
 
    
4.4.3.7 Destroying evidence 
The destruction of any form of evidence may lead to the miscarriage of justice.  Section 
129274
4.4.3.8 Preventing a witness from attending 
 punishes any person who, knowing that any book, document or other thing of any 
kind is, or may be, required in evidence in a judicial proceeding, wilfully destroys it or 
renders it illegible or incapable of identification, with intent thereby to prevent it from 
being used in evidence. 
Wilful prevention or attempt to prevent any person who has been duly summoned to attend 
as a witness before any court or tribunal from attending as a witness or from producing any 
evidence constitutes an infringement of section 130 of the Act.  Section 130 provides:275
 
   
Any person who wilfully prevents or attempts to prevent any person who was been duly summoned 
to attend as a witness before any court or tribunal from attending as a witness, or from producing 
anything in evidence pursuant to the subpoena or summons, is guilty of a misdemeanour …  
 
4.4.3.9 Conspiracy to bring false accusations 
Malicious vexation of a person with lawsuits or criminal action in order to harass him or 
her is an offence and is punishable in terms of section 131.276
                                                 
273The Criminal Code Act of 1899 (Qld). 
 This section prevents any 
   
274The Criminal Code Act of 1899 (Qld). 
275See also Carter op cit (n 121) 3468-69. 
276The Criminal Code Act of 1899 (Qld). 
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conspiracy to knowingly lay false charges against an innocent person. Section 131 
provides:277
 
   
Any person who conspires with another to charge any person or cause any person to be charged with 
an offence, whether alleged to have been committed in Queensland, or elsewhere, knowing that such 
person is innocent of the alleged offence, or not believing him to be guilty of the alleged offence, is 
guilty of a crime.    
 
In Conteh v R278
 
 it was observed that the gist of the offence of conspiracy to lay a false 
accusation against another person was that the accusation should be false to the knowledge 
of the conspirators.  It is not clear whether or not X commits this offence if there is no 
conspiracy, that is, if X acts on his own and brings a false accusation against another 
person. 
4.4.3.10 Conspiring to defeat justice 
As in Western Australia, section 132 of Criminal Code of Queensland creates a very broad 
and vague offence of conspiring to defeat justice.  This section provides:279
 
 
Any person who conspires with another to obstruct, prevent, pervert, or defeat the course of justice is 
guilty of a crime … 
 
Section 132 does not specify which conduct constitutes the offence of conspiracy to defeat 
justice.  It is only in the case law that the provisions of this section become clear.  In the 
case law the following acts are among those punished as conspiracy to defeat justice: 
 
 
                                                 
277Carter op cit (n 121) 3469.  
278[1966] AC 158.  See Carter op cit (n 121) 3469.   
 
279Carter op cit (n 121) 3469-70.  
 
 160 
 
a. Conspiring to obstruct the police in the execution of their duty.280
 
 An act which 
has a tendency to deflect police officials from the prosecution of a criminal offence or the 
institution of disciplinary proceedings before a judicial tribunal or from adducing evidence 
of the true facts, is an act tending to pervert the course of justice and if done with intent to 
achieve that result, it constitutes an attempt to pervert the course of justice.   
b. By abstaining from prosecution.281 Conspiracy to defeat the course of justice by 
abstaining from prosecution is an indictable misdemeanour.  A charge of this nature came 
before the court in the case of R v Hamp and Others.282 The indictment of conspiracy to 
defeat the ends of justice against Hamp and two others came about as a result of a case of 
fraud against Y and others, who had defrauded Hamp.  Hamp was notified to appear in 
court and prosecute.283
 
 It was alleged that while a charge of fraud was still pending against 
Y and others, Hamp, Watkins and Probert corruptly and unlawfully contrived and intended 
to defeat and obstruct the due course of justice, by conspiring with Y’s wife that the fraud 
charge would not be prosecuted and that Hamp would not attend to prosecute or give 
evidence upon the said ensuing trial.  It was agreed that Hamp would receive some money 
for not prosecuting the case.  As agreed upon, Hamp did not appear in court and he 
forfeited his right to prosecute.  They were then indicted on a charge of conspiracy to defeat 
the course of law and justice.  
                                                 
280See R v Field [1965] 1 QB 402.  
 
281R v Hamp and Others (1852) 6 Cox CC 167.  
 
282R v Hamp and Others supra (n 281).  
 
283At 168. 
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The jury returned a guilty verdict, “but strongly recommended the defendants to mercy, on 
the grounds that they were themselves victims of a base and infamous conspiracy.”284
 
 The 
court reserved the judgment.  It is not clear from a reading of this case why Hamp was 
bound by notification to appear in court and prosecute Y.  In ordinary circumstances Hamp 
would have been a state witness, but it is not clear from the case whether it was a public 
prosecution or a private prosecution.  Nevertheless, the Hamp decision raised a very crucial 
question that has not been dealt with in other jurisdictions.  That question is: what does the 
law say if the state has refused to prosecute Y, and X applied for private prosecution and 
after he had filed his papers with the court, he received a bribe from Y and his friends in 
order not to proceed with his private prosecution?  Would X’s conduct amounts to 
obstructing the course of justice?  This matter is not dealt with anywhere in Australian law. 
4.4.3.11 Attempt to pervert justice 
As in South Australia and the Northern Territory, the Criminal Code of Queensland 
contains a section which created a general offence of attempting to obstruct or to pervert the 
course of justice or the due administration of the law in a manner that is not dealt with by  
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other sections.285 This section provides:286
 
 
Any person who attempts, in any way not specifically defined in this Code, to obstruct, prevent, 
pervert, or defeat, the course of justice is guilty of a misdemeanour, and is liable to imprisonment for 
two years.   
 
A crime suspect has a right against self-incrimination when questioned by the police, but if 
he or she lies to the effect that someone else committed an act done by him- or herself, it 
would be a crime, and he or she is guilty of the offence of attempting to defeat the course of 
justice.287 For example, the police question X about the rape which has been committed.  If 
he keeps quiet when the police question him, X does not commit any offence, but if he lies 
to the police and says that Y committed the rape, X commits a section 140 offence.  This 
offence can also be committed by X when another offence has been committed and the 
police are investigating it and X conducts him- or herself in such a way that his or her 
conduct is aimed at preventing or obstructing a prosecution which he or she contemplates 
may follow.288
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
284At 173.  
285Section 140 of the Criminal Code Act of 1899 (Qld). 
  
286Carter op cit (n 121) 3502-03.  
 
287See Cane v The Queen supra (n 108). 
 
288R v Kane [1967] NZLR 60. In this case the court held that when a crime has been committed, public justice 
encompasses more than the process of adjudication by the courts, and a person commits the offence of 
attempting to pervert the course of justice who, when the offence has been committed and is being 
investigated, does something aimed at preventing or obstructing a prosecution which he or she contemplates 
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4.4.4 Victoria  
In Victoria,289 to conceal a serious indictable offence for benefit is a statutory offence 
punishable in terms of section 326.290
 
 Section 326 provides: 
(1) Where a person has committed a serious indictable offence, any other person who, knowing or 
believing that the offence, or some other serious indictable offence, has been committed and 
that he has information which might be of material assistance in securing the prosecution or 
conviction of an offender for it, accepts any benefit for not disclosing that information shall be 
guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years.    
 
According to Gillies,291 the offence may only be committed in relation to serious indictable 
offences where X acts on account of a benefit or a promise of a benefit.  The actus reus of 
the offence requires proof of the commission of a serious indictable offence and that X 
accepted any benefit or promise of a benefit in return for a failure to disclose material 
information which may lead to the prosecution or conviction of the offender. The mens rea 
for this offence consists of:292
 
 
a. knowledge or belief that a serious indictable offence in question or other such offence 
has been committed; 
b. knowledge or belief that he or she has information which might be of material 
significance in securing the prosecution or conviction of the offender; and 
c. the intent to receive a benefit or its promise for non-disclosure of this information. 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
may follow. 
289Although is has been said that Victoria continues to rely on common law for the prosecution of the offence 
of perverting the course of justice, (see supra under 4.3, text at note 51) concealing a serious indictable 
offence which is akin to perverting the course of justice is discussed here.  
 
290The Crimes Act of 1958 (Vic).  
291Gillies op cit (n 2) 842.  
292Ibid.  
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4.4.5   Tasmania 
In Tasmania the offence of perverting the course of justice is found in the Criminal Code of 
1924.293
 
 The Tasmanian Criminal Code deals with the crime of obstructing the course of 
justice comprehensively.  The Criminal Code prohibits the following acts or conduct: 
a. Judicial corruption.294 Section 90 punishes any person who, being a judicial officer, 
corruptly solicits, receives or obtains or agrees to receive or obtain any property of any kind 
on account of anything done or omitted or to be done or omitted by him in his judicial 
capacity.  This section also punishes any person who corruptly gives, confers or procures or 
promises or offers to give, confer, procure or attempt to procure, to, upon or for any judicial 
officer or any other person, any property or benefit of any kind on account of anything done 
or omitted or to be done or omitted by such judicial officer.295
 
 The provisions of section 90 
prevent X from bribing B (a juryman).  It also prevents B from accepting a bribe from X.  
b. Corrupting or threatening jurors.296
 
 Section 93 prohibits any person from 
influencing or threatening any juryman in any judicial proceeding, whether or not the 
juryman has been sworn in.  It also prohibits a juryman from accepting or agreeing to 
accept any benefit on account of anything done or to be done by him or her in any judicial  
 
                                                 
293The Criminal Code Act 69 of 1924 (Tas).  
294Section 90.  
295Section (90)(a)-(b). 
296Section 93.  
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proceeding.297
 
 
c. Fabrication of evidence.298 The Act prohibits any person who, with intent to mislead 
a judicial tribunal, fabricates evidence in any manner or knowingly makes use of fabricated 
evidence.299
 
 What is punishable here is both to fabricate evidence and to use fabricated 
evidence. 
d. Corruption of witnesses.300 The Act punishes any person who solicits, receives, etc., 
any property or benefit for him- or herself or for any other person with an understanding 
that he shall, as a witness, give false evidence in a judicial proceeding.  Any person who 
gives, confers or procures, etc., any property or benefit of any kind, upon any person with 
an understanding that any person called or to be called as a witness in any judicial 
proceeding shall give false evidence also commits an offence.301
 
 The crime is charged as 
corruption with regard to a witness or corrupting a witness. 
e. Suppressing evidence.302
                                                 
297Section 93(a)-(c).  
 Section 99 prohibits any person from wilfully destroying, 
altering or concealing any evidence with intent to mislead any tribunal in any judicial 
proceeding.  It is clear that the elements of the offence created by this section are the act 
itself (e.g. to destroy, alter, etc.), wilfulness and intent to mislead a tribunal.   
298Section 97.  
299Section 97(a)-(b).  
300Section 98.  
301Section 98(a)-(b).  
302Section 99.  
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f. Interfering with witnesses.303 Section 100 prohibits any wilful interference with 
another person by preventing, obstructing or dissuading him or her from attending as a 
witness at a judicial proceeding or from giving evidence or producing anything to be used 
as evidence at a judicial proceeding, with intent to obstruct the due administration of 
justice.304 This section also makes it a crime for any person to use, cause, inflict, procure or 
threaten any violence, punishment, damage, loss or disadvantage to another person for, or 
on account of, that other person having given evidence at a judicial proceeding or having 
produced or surrendered any document or thing at a judicial proceeding305 or any evidence 
given by that other person at a judicial proceeding or any document or thing produced or 
surrendered by that other person at a judicial proceeding.306
 
 
g. Falsifying evidence as a shorthand writer.307 Section 101 punishes any person who 
is a shorthand writer who wilfully falsifies or incorrectly records any evidence, ruling, 
direction308 or summing up which it is his or her duty to record or permits any person to 
falsify any such thing309 or any transcript thereof or wilfully certifies as correct any note or 
transcript of any such thing which is false in any manner.310
 
 
                                                 
303Section 100.  
304Section 100(a).  
305Section 100(b)(i).  
306Section 100(b)(ii).  
307Section 101.  
308Section 101(a).  
309Section 101(b).  
310Section 101(c).  
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h. Compounding crimes.311 Soliciting, receiving or obtaining or agreeing to obtain any 
property or benefit of any kind as a consideration for any agreement or understanding to 
compound or conceal a crime or to abstain from, to discontinue or to delay a prosecution 
for a crime is a punishable offence.312
 
 
i. Perverting justice.313 As in New South Wales, Tasmania has a broad crime of 
perverting the course of justice created by section 105 of the Criminal Code.314
 
 Although 
the conduct mentioned in sections 90, 93, 97-102 have the tendency to defeat or obstruct 
the course of justice, a broad crime of perverting justice in the form of section 105 was also 
created.  This section punishes any person who does any act or omits to do anything with 
intent in any way to obstruct, prevent, pervert or defeat the course of justice or the 
administration of law.   
4.4.6    The Northern Territory 
A fundamental point about the Northern Territory criminal law is that it has been 
codified.315 The Criminal Code was assented to on 4 October 1983 and came into force on 
1 January 1984.  It is said that the purpose of the Northern Territory Criminal Code is to 
replace the common law.316
                                                 
311Section 102.  
 In the Northern Territory, like the other States mentioned 
above, conduct that has the tendency to pervert the course of justice is also statutorily 
312Section 102(1).  
313Section 105.  
314Act 69 of 1924.  
315The Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT).  
 
316S Gray Criminal Laws of the Northern Territory (2004) 3-4. 
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defined.  The following conduct that has the tendency of perverting the course of justice is 
made punishable in the Criminal Code: 
 
a. Judicial corruption.317 Section 93 of the Act prohibits judicial corruption.  It 
punishes any person who holds judicial office and corruptly asks, receives or obtains or 
agrees or attempts to receive or obtain any property or benefit of any kind for him- or 
herself or any other person in relation to anything already done or to be done in future, by 
him or her in his or her capacity as a judicial officer.318 The Act also punishes the provider 
of the benefit.  A person, who corruptly gives, confers or procures or promises or offers to 
give property or any benefit to a judicial officer in relation to such conduct including an 
attempt to do the abovementioned conduct, is guilty of an offence.319
 
 
b. Corrupting or threatening jurors.320 In terms of section 95 it is an offence to 
corrupt or threaten jurors.  Any attempt by menace of any kind or benefits or promises of 
any kind or by any other corrupt means in order to influence that particular person in his or 
her capacity as a juror in any judicial proceeding is an offence.  It is not necessary for that 
particular person to have been sworn as a juror or not.321 Any threat of injury or threats to 
cause any detriment of any kind to any person in relation to anything done by that person as 
a juror in any judicial proceeding is also a punishable offence.322
                                                 
317Section 93.  
 The Act also punishes a 
318Section 93(1)(a).  
319Section 93(1)(b).  
320Section 95.  
321Section 95(a).   
322Section 95(b).  
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juror who accepts any benefit or promise of a benefit in relation to anything to be done or 
already been done by him or her in any judicial proceeding.323
 
  
c. Fabricating evidence.324 Fabrication of any evidence by any means (other than 
perjury or counselling or procuring the commission of perjury) with intent to mislead any 
judicial proceeding325 or to knowingly make use of such fabricated evidence is an 
offence.326 Just like section 97 of the Criminal Code327
 
 of Tasmania, section 99 also 
punishes the knowing use of fabricated evidence. 
d. Corrupting,328 deceiving,329 preventing witnesses from attending330 proceedings 
and intimidating witnesses.331 The Act punishes any person who corrupts any person who 
is a witness in a judicial proceeding with an understanding that that other person is called or 
is to be called as a witness in a judicial proceeding shall give false testimony or withhold 
true testimony.332
                                                 
323Section 95(c).  
 Any attempts by any means to induce a person called or to be called as a 
witness in a judicial proceeding to give false testimony or to withhold true testimony is an 
324Section 99.  
325Section 99(a).  
326Section 99(b).  
327Act 69 1924 (Tas).  See the discussion of section 97 supra under 3.4.5, text at note 298. 
328Section 100.  
329Section 101.  
330Section 103.  
331Section 103A.  
332Section 100(a). 
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offence.333 The Act also punishes a witness who asks, receives or obtains or attempts to 
receive or obtain any property or benefit for him- or herself or for any other person, upon 
agreement that he or she shall, as a witness in a judicial proceeding, give false testimony or 
withhold true testimony.334
  
 
In terms of section 101, it is an offence to deceive any person to be called as a witness in a 
judicial proceeding, with intent to affect the testimony of such a witness.  Section 103 
makes it a crime to prevent or attempt to prevent any person whom he or she knows has 
been summoned as a witness before any court or tribunal from attending as a witness or 
from producing anything in evidence pursuant to a subpoena or summons.  In terms of 
section 103A(1) and (2), it is also an offence to intimidate any person because he or she has 
appeared or has been called or may be called to appear as a witness in any judicial 
proceeding. 
 
e. Destroying evidence.335
 
 Destroying any book, document, tape recording, photograph 
or anything or rendering it illegible or incapable of identification with intent to prevent it 
from being used in evidence while knowing that it may be required in evidence in a judicial 
proceeding, is punishable in terms of section 102 of the Act.  
f. Compounding crimes.336
 
 This crime is committed when a person asks, receives or  
                                                 
333Section 100(b).  
334Section 100(c).  
335Section 102.  
336Section 104.  
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obtains or agrees or attempts to receive any property or benefit for him- or herself or any 
other person upon an agreement or understanding that he or she will compound or conceal a 
crime or will abstain from, discontinue or delay a prosecution of a crime.  This crime is 
punishable in terms of section 104(1). 
 
g. Attempting to pervert the course of justice.337
 
 As in South Australia and 
Queensland, the Northern Territory has a broader offence of attempting to pervert the 
course of justice.  Section 109 created an offence of attempt to obstruct, prevent, pervert or 
defeat the course of justice in any way not specified in this Code. 
4.4.7    Western Australia 
In Western Australia offences in relation to the administration of justice in general and 
obstructing the course of justice in particular are found in Chapter XVI of the Criminal 
Code.338
 
 In terms of the Criminal Code the following conduct constitutes the crime of 
obstructing the course of justice: 
a. Judicial corruption.339
 
 This crime is committed when X (the corruptee) being the 
holder of a judicial office, corruptly asks, receives or obtains or agrees or attempts to 
receive or obtain any property or benefit of any kind for him- or herself or any other person 
on account of anything already done or omitted or to be done or omitted in future, by him  
                                                 
337Section 109.  
338The Criminal Code Act 28 of 1913.  
339Section 121.  
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or her (X) in his or her judicial capacity.340 The Act also punishes the corruptor.  This is the 
person who corruptly gives, confers or procures or promises or offers to give or confer or to 
procure or attempt to procure to, upon, or for any person holding a judicial office as 
mentioned above, or to, upon or for any other person, any property or benefit of any kind 
on account of any such conduct on the part of the person holding a judicial office.341
 
 
b. Corrupting or threatening jurors.342 X commits a crime where he or she attempts, 
by threats or intimidation or by benefits or promises of benefit of any kind or by any other 
corrupt means, to influence Y who is a juror in a judicial proceeding.  The threats can 
manifest in causing any injury or detriment on account of anything done by Y in his or her 
capacity as a juror in a judicial proceeding.  Y also commits an offence if he or she accepts 
a benefit or promise of a benefit on account of anything he or she did as a juror in any 
judicial proceeding.343
 
 
c. Threatening witnesses before a Royal Commission.344
 
 The Act extended the 
punishment of threatening witnesses to threats of any kind made to people who are 
summoned to testify before a Royal Commission, in order to prevent or hinder them from  
                                                 
340Section 121(1).  
341Section 121(2).  
342Section 123.  
343Section 123(1)-(3).  
344Section 128.  A Royal Commission is a major government public inquiry into an issue.  The commission is 
created by Cabinet and formally appointed by Letters Patent.  It is said that once a Commission has started the 
government cannot stop it.  It has considerable powers, generally, even greater than those of a judge but 
restricted to the “Terms of Reference” of the Commission.  See B Stone “Constitutional design, accountability 
and Western Australian Government: Thinking with and against the “WA Inc” Royal Commission” (1994) 
The University of Western Australia Law Review Vol 24 No 1 51.  
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giving evidence.  This crime is also committed by any person who threatens or in any way 
punishes, damnifies or injures or attempts to do the above, to any other person for having 
given evidence before a Royal Commission, unless such evidence was given in bad faith.345
 
  
d. Fabricating evidence.346
 
 In terms of section 129(1) and (2), it is an offence to 
fabricate evidence or to make use of fabricated evidence with intent to mislead any tribunal 
in any judicial proceeding.   
In R v Love347 the word “fabricates” had been interpreted as not necessarily used in the 
pejorative sense in that the evidence was derived or contrived so that whatever is fabricated 
speaks falsely about itself as being genuine when it is not genuine.  It was said that the 
word might mean only to “make up” or to “get together” without any dishonest 
connotation.348 An example of the offence of fabrication of evidence is when the accused 
makes a false entry in a document that can be the subject of litigation as in R v Love.349
 
 In 
this case the accused was charged with fabricating evidence after he made a false entry in 
the company’s minute book of the directors’ meeting.   
The facts of the case were as follows:  This was an appeal arising out of the conviction of  
 
                                                 
345Section 128(1) and (2).  
346Section 129.  
347(1983) 9 A Crim R 1.  
348At 5.  
 
349Ibid.  
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the appellant, Mr Love, on a charge of fabricating evidence350 and of perjury.351 The 
offences were alleged to have occurred at an earlier trial which took place in 1980, where 
Love was facing charges of a false entry in a minute book with intent to defraud.352 In the 
first trial he denied that the document that the Crown claimed to be a false entry was in fact 
the official minutes of the company, and claimed it was only a draft.  He said that the true 
minutes353 were contained in another book which he produced and which he, under oath, 
claimed he purchased between June and July 1978.  He was acquitted in the initial trial.354
 
  
In the second trial the Crown contended that Love fabricated volume 2 that was produced at 
the initial trial.  The Crown alleged that it was not a true record of the minutes of directors’ 
meetings and was created for the purpose of the trial.  The Crown further alleged that 
Love’s sworn evidence that he had bought volume 2 between June and July 1978 was 
untrue.355
 
 The two charges of fabrication of evidence and perjury followed from the 
fabrication of the minutes of the directors’ meeting.  In October 1982 the jury found him 
guilty on both counts.  He appealed.   
Although it was never alleged in an indictment that Love fabricated the minute book in 
order to obstruct the course of justice, but to mislead the court, such fabrication and the 
resultant misleading of the tribunal of judicial proceeding constituted the crime of 
                                                 
350In contravention of section 129 of the Criminal Code Act 28 of 1913 (WA). 
351In contravention of section 124 of Criminal Code Act 28 of 1913 (WA).  
352R v Love supra (n 347) at 13-14.  
353Hereinafter referred to as volume 2.  
354R v Love supra (n 347) at 7.  
355Ibid.  
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obstruction of justice.  The appeal was dismissed.356
 
 
e. Corrupting,357 deceiving358 and preventing witnesses from attending.359 It is an 
offence to corrupt or attempt to corrupt a witness in any manner, in order to give false 
testimony or to withhold true testimony in a judicial proceeding.  A witness, who asks, 
receives or obtains or agrees to or attempts to receive or obtain any benefit for him- or 
herself or for any other person, in order to give false evidence or withhold true evidence in 
a judicial proceeding, is also guilty of an offence.360
 
 In terms of section 131, another way of 
interfering with witnesses is to deceive witnesses by fraud, or to knowingly make or exhibit 
any false statement, representation, token or writing to a witness in a judicial proceeding, 
with intent to affect the testimony of such a witness.  Section 133 also prohibits any person 
from wilfully preventing or attempting to prevent any witness from attending any court or 
tribunal or producing anything in evidence in any court or tribunal. 
f. Destroying evidence.361
 
 Any wilful destruction or rendering illegible or incapable of 
identification of any book, document or other thing of any kind which is or may be required 
in evidence in a judicial proceeding, with intent to prevent it from being used in evidence, 
is punishable in terms of section 132. 
                                                 
356At 26. 
  
357Section 130.  
358Section 131.  
359Section 133.  
360Section 130(1)-(3).  
361Section 132.  
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g. Making a false complaint.362
 
 It is an offence, in terms of section 133A, for X to 
knowingly sign a prosecution notice (a sworn declaration of complaint) which he or she 
knows very well is false. 
h. Conspiracy to bring a false accusation.363
 
 Any conspiracy by X with another 
person to bring false charges against an innocent person while knowing that the person is 
innocent is a contravention of section of section 134. 
i. Conspiracy to defeat justice.364
 
 Western Australia, like Queensland, has a broad 
offence of conspiring to defeat the course of justice.  This offence is committed when a 
person conspires with another person to obstruct, prevent, pervert or defeat the course of 
justice.  This broad offence is punishable in terms of section 135. 
j. Compounding or concealing offences.365
 
 This crime is committed when X obtains 
or seeks or agrees to receive any property or benefit for him- or herself or any other person 
upon an agreement or understanding that he or she will compound or conceal a crime or 
will abstain from, discontinue or delay a prosecution of a crime.  This crime is punishable 
in terms of section 136 of the Act. 
 
 
                                                 
362Section 133A.  
363Section 134.  
364Section 135.  
365Section 136.  
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4.4.8   The Commonwealth  
Australian States have their own legislation which deals, inter alia, with the offence of 
perverting, preventing or obstructing the course of justice.  A State’s legislation is 
applicable only within that particular state.  There is also Commonwealth legislation which 
is applicable to all the States and Territories.  Conduct which constitutes the offence of 
perverting the course of justice in terms of the Commonwealth legislation, is discussed 
hereunder. 
 
4.4.8.1    Fabricating evidence 
Under the Commonwealth legislation,366
 
 to fabricate evidence or make use of fabricated 
evidence with intent to mislead any tribunal in any judicial proceedings is an offence. 
4.4.8.2 Intimidation of witnesses 
X commits an offence when he or she intimidates any person who has appeared or is about 
to appear as a witness in a judicial proceeding.367
 
 X can commit this offence in the 
following ways: 
a. By threatening, intimidating or restraining a witness.368
b. By using violence to injure or by inflicting an injury on a witness.
 
369
 
 
 
                                                 
366Section 36 of the Crimes Act of 1914 (Cth). 
367Section 36A of the Crimes Act of 1914 (Cth).  
368Section 36A(a).  
369Section 36A(b).  
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c. By causing or procuring violence, damage, loss or disadvantage to a witness.370
d. By causing or procuring the punishment of a witness.
 
371
 
  
4.4.8.3 Corruption of witnesses 
Corruption of witnesses is an indictable offence under the Commonwealth law.372
  
 This 
section provides: 
Any person who: 
 
(a) gives, confers, or procures, or promises or offers to give, confer, procure or attempts to 
procure, any property or benefit of any kind to, upon, or for, any person, upon any 
agreement or understanding that any person called or to be called as a witness in any 
judicial proceeding shall give false testimony or withhold true testimony; or 
 
(b) does an act with the intention of inducing a person called or to be called as a witness in any 
judicial proceeding to give false testimony, or to withhold true testimony; or 
 
(c) asks, receives, or obtains, or agrees to receive or obtain, any property or benefit of any kind   
for himself, or any other person, upon any agreement or understanding that any person 
shall as a witness in any judicial proceeding give false testimony or withhold true 
testimony; 
 
shall be guilty of an indictable offence.    
 
X (the corruptor) commits this offence when he gives, confers, or procures, or promises or 
offers to give, confer, procure or attempt to procure, any property or benefit of any kind to 
Y who already has been called as a witness or who is not yet called but who might be called 
as a witness so that the latter gives false testimony or withholds true testimony.  Y (the 
corruptee), who has already been called or who has not yet been called as a witness also 
commits this offence when he asks, receives, or obtains, or agrees to receive or obtain, any 
property or benefit of any kind for himself, or any other person, in return for him to give  
 
                                                 
370Section 36A(c).  
371Section 36A(d).  
372Section 37 of the Crimes Act of 1914 (Cth). 
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false evidence or withhold true evidence in any judicial proceeding. 
 
4.4.8.4 Deceiving witnesses 
Deceiving a witness is an offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice under the 
Commonwealth legislation.373
 
 This legislation prohibits X from committing any fraud or 
deceit, or to intentionally make or exhibit, inter alia, any false statement to Y who has 
already been called as a witness or is yet to be called as a witness, with intent to affect the 
latter’s testimony. 
4.4.8.5. Destroying evidence 
Section 39374
 
 punishes any wilful destruction or rendering illegible or incapable of 
identification, of any book, document or other thing of any kind which is or may be 
required in evidence in a judicial proceeding, with intent to prevent it from being used in 
evidence. 
4.4.8.6 Preventing witnesses from attending the court 
Under the Commonwealth legislation,375
 
 X commits an offence of attempting to pervert the 
course of justice when he intentionally prevents another person who has been summoned to 
attend as a witness in a judicial proceeding from attending as a witness or from producing 
anything in evidence pursuant to the subpoena or summons.  It is clear that this offence can 
only be committed in relation to preventing a witness who has already been summoned to  
                                                 
373Section 38 of the Crimes Act of 1914 (Cth). 
374The Crime Act of 1914 (Cth). 
 
375Section 40.  
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attend a judicial proceeding.  This section does not apply to a person who is still to be 
summoned as a witness in a judicial proceeding.  
 
4.4.8.7 Conspiracy to bring a false accusation 
Under the Commonwealth law, X commits an indictable offence if he conspires with 
another person to bring false accusations against an innocent person or cause any person to 
falsely charge an innocent person.376
 
 This section provides: 
(1) Any person who conspires with another to charge any person falsely or to cause any person to 
be falsely charged with any offence against the law of the Commonwealth or of a Territory, 
shall be guilty of an indictable offence. 
 
To be convicted of this offence X must have entered into an agreement with one or more 
other persons377 even if the other party to the agreement is a body corporate378or a person 
who is not criminally responsible.379
  
 
4.4.8.8 Conspiracy to defeat justice 
The Commonwealth, just like Western Australia and Queensland, has a broad offence of 
conspiring to defeat the course of justice.  This offence is committed when a person 
conspires with another person to obstruct, prevent, pervert or defeat the course of justice.  
This broad offence is punishable in terms of section 42.380
 
 This section provides: 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
376Section 41. 
  
377 Section 41(2)(a). 
 
378Section 41(3)(b).  
 
379 Section 41(3)(c). 
 
380The Crime Act of 1914 (Cth). 
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(1) Any person who conspires with another to obstruct, prevent, pervert, or defeat the course of 
justice in relation to the judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be guilty of an indictable 
offence. 
 
To be convicted of this offence, X must have entered into an agreement with one or more 
other persons to prevent, pervert or obstruct the course of justice in relation to the judicial 
power of the Commonwealth.381 X may be found guilty of this offence even if obstructing, 
perverting or defeating the course of justice pursuant to the agreement is impossible382 or 
even if the other party to the agreement is a body corporate383 or a person who is not 
criminally responsible.384
 
 
4.4.8.9 Attempting to pervert justice 
As in South Australia and the Northern Territory, the Commonwealth has a broad crime of 
attempting to pervert the course of justice.385 The offence of attempting to pervert the 
course of justice may be committed, inter alia, by seeking to influence, bribe or by other 
means, persuading witnesses or potential witnesses to give false information.  This section 
provides:386
 
 
(1) Any person who attempts, in any way not specifically defined in this Act, to obstruct, prevent, 
pervert, or defeat, the course of justice in relation to the judicial power of the Commonwealth, 
shall be guilty of an offence.  
 
Any threat made to a witness is an attempt to pervert the course of justice if made with the 
                                                 
381Section 42(3)(a).  
 
382Section 42(4)(a).  
 
383Section 42(4)(b). 
  
384Section 42(4)(c). 
 
385Section 43 of the Crimes Act of 1914 (Cth). 
 
386Section 43. 
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intention of persuading him or her to alter or to withhold evidence, even if the threat was to 
exercise a legal right.  It is immaterial that the evidence was false or that the threat was 
made bona fide so long as one of the motives of the accused was to intimidate the witness 
into altering or withholding evidence.387
 
 
One of the leading cases in relation to attempting to pervert the course of justice in 
contravention of section 43 was R v Morex Meat Australia (Pty) Ltd.388 Appellants in that 
case were Morex Meat Australia (Pty) Ltd and its Managing Director, Doube.  Among 
other things, Doube was charged and convicted of attempting to pervert the course of 
justice.389
 
  
The facts of this case in relation to count 17 were as follows:  It was alleged that Doube had 
attempted to pervert the course of justice in contravention of section 43 by seeking to 
influence, bribe and persuade Laffey and Schmidt to give false information during the 
Department of Primary Industries (DPI) and Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service 
(AQIS) investigation, for the purpose of preventing a proper investigation of the alleged 
breaches of certain legislation which dealt with export control.390
 
 The DPI and AQIS were 
investigating allegations that Morex Meat Australia (Pty) Ltd and Doube put a set of new 
labels on the export beef to make it look as if it had been slaughtered in March 1992, when  
                                                 
387Carter op cit (n 121) 3503. 
388[1996] 1 Qd R 418. 
389In contravention of section 43 of the Act. 
390R v Morex Meat Australia (Pty) Ltd and Doube supra (n 388) at 437. 
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in fact it had been slaughtered in February 1992.391 It is said that Doube attempted to 
procure Laffey and Schmidt to give a version of events which omitted the involvement of 
Doube in paying for Schmidt’s trip to the United States of America.  It was submitted on 
behalf of Doube that it was not open to the Crown to charge a number of separate acts of 
different character as constituting a single offence under section 43 of the Crimes Act of 
1914.392
 
 It was said that doing so would create the risk that different jurors might reach 
different conclusions about each of the eight particulars. 
The court considered that Doube was properly charged and convicted on count 17 of a 
single offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice.  The appeal against the 
conviction failed.393 The court held that any threat made to a witness is an attempt to 
pervert the course of justice if made with an intention of persuading him or her to alter or to 
hold evidence, even if the threat was to exercise a legal right.  It is immaterial that the 
evidence was false or that the threat was made bona fide so long as one of the motives of 
the accused was to intimidate the witness into altering or withholding evidence.394
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
391At 422.  
 
392At 438.  
 
393At 441. 
394Carter op cit (n 121) 3503. 
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4.4.8.10 Compounding or concealing an indictable offence 
In terms of Section 44 of the Crimes Act, 395
 
 X commits an offence when he enters into an 
agreement or understanding with another person that he (X) will compound or conceal any 
indictable offence which has been committed against the law of the Commonwealth or a 
Territory.  Section 44 provides: 
Any person who asks, receives, or obtains, or agrees to receive or obtain, any property or benefit of 
any kind for himself or any other person, upon any agreement or understanding that he will compound 
or conceal any indictable offence against the law of the Commonwealth or a Territory, or will abstain 
from, discontinue, or delay any prosecution for any such offence, or will withhold any evidence 
thereof, shall be guilty of an offence.   
 
Section 44 punishes X (the corruptee) for, inter alia, receiving or obtaining any property or 
benefit of any kind not only for himself or herself, but also for any other person upon 
agreeing to either compound or conceal any indictable offence or that he or she will abstain 
from or discontinue or delay the prosecution of such offence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
395Section 44 of the Crimes Act of 1914 (Cth). 
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4.5 SUMMARY  
In Australia, the common law offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice does not 
have a clear and concise definition.  The substance of the common law offence of 
perverting the course of justice consists in the performance of conduct which has a 
tendency, and is intended to pervert the administration of justice.  It is also said that the 
offence targets conduct which does, or has the tendency to pervert the course of justice.  
Conduct means either a positive act or a failure to do something (omission), although there 
is no judicial or academic authority that supports the proposition that at common law this 
crime can be committed by mere omission.  It seems that the offence connotes some 
unwarranted or unlawful interference with the process of administration of justice by 
judicial authorities.  Judicial authorities include tribunals whose jurisdiction extends to the 
enforcement or adjudication of rights and liabilities in accordance with law and whose 
procedure is judicial in character.  Committal proceedings, while administrative, are curial 
and fall within the ambit of this offence.  
 
Australian courts have ruled that, at common law, the course of justice does not begin until 
the jurisdiction of a court or a competent judicial authority is invoked.  Therefore, as a 
general rule, police investigations do not form part of the course of justice.  There is 
scholarly support for the notion that because police investigations usually contemplate a 
prosecution, any conduct that deflects or frustrates a police investigation, or has the 
potential to do so, will have the tendency to pervert the course of justice and therefore have 
the potential to prevent the investigators from bringing a case within the jurisdiction of the 
court.  However, this view has not received judicial confirmation. 
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It is said that in criminal proceedings the course of justice commences when charges have 
been laid against the accused or when he or she has been arrested.  In civil proceedings the 
course of justice does not commence until the institution of the proceedings.  In both 
criminal and civil proceedings, the course of justice ends when the rights of the parties have 
been finally determined and declared after an inquiry concerning the law as it is and the 
facts as they are, followed by an application of the law to the facts as determined. 
 
The Australian Capital Territory and Victoria continue to rely on the common law for the 
prosecution of any attempt to pervert the course of justice.  Those jurisdictions which have 
not codified their criminal law and still rely on the common law as a major source of 
criminal law are referred to as ‘common law jurisdictions.’  In New South Wales the 
common law misdemeanour of attempting to pervert the course of justice was abolished 
and replaced by a broad statutory offence.  In South Australia, this offence was also made a 
statutory offence.  Some states have statutory provisions which basically state that the 
common law offence still operates within those jurisdictions.  This means that the statutory 
offences exist together with the common law offence.  Some states have statutes which 
completely replaced the common law offence of perverting the course of justice. 
 
The following conduct has been identified as constituting the common law offence of 
perverting the course of justice: 
 
a. Interfering with witnesses or potential witnesses by intimidation. 
b.  Bribing witnesses. 
c. Obtaining bail by improper means. 
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d. Inducement to lie to the police or to commit perjury. 
e. Concealment or fabrication of evidence.  
f. The improper institution of judicial proceedings. 
g. Bribing the police to hinder prosecution.  
h. Making false accusations against a person to the police. 
i. Publication of a newspaper article impugning the conduct and character of persons on 
 trial. 
j. Lying to the police in order to prevent the detection and arrest and ultimate 
 prosecution of an offender. 
k. Destruction of documents. 
 
In Australia the common law offence of perverting the course of justice differs from the 
offence in English law in the following ways: 
 
a. In English law, the course of justice is said to commence and may be perverted before 
proceedings are active.  The offence can be committed after the perpetration of the principal 
crime, but before investigation into it has begun.  In Australian law the course of justice 
does not begin until the jurisdiction of some court or competent judicial authority is 
invoked. 
b. In English law, police investigations form part of the course of justice whereas in 
Australia, as a general rule, they do not. 
 
Regarding similarities in both jurisdictions, judicial proceedings include proceedings before  
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tribunals whose procedure is judicial in character.  Also, in both jurisdictions, attempting to 
pervert the course of justice is a substantive crime.  In both jurisdictions the offence of 
perverting the course of justice cannot be committed by mere omission.   
 
Most Australian states have statutes which punish the offence of perverting the course of 
justice. ‘Code jurisdictions’ is the term used to refer to those jurisdictions that have sought 
to replace the common law with a Criminal Code.  All the states that have codified their 
criminal law have a broad, general offence and specific offences of perverting the course of 
justice.  In New South Wales, any conduct which perverts the course of justice is 
punishable in terms of section 319 of the Crimes Act of 1900 as amended in 1990.  This 
section punishes a person who commits any act or any omission intending to pervert justice.   
However, of particular significance is that in New South Wales, a specific offence makes 
failure to reveal that a serious indictable offence has been committed by somebody else, 
punishable in certain circumstances.  These circumstances are: (1) when any person who, 
knowing or believing that the offence has been committed and (2) that he has information 
which might be of material assistance in securing the prosecution or conviction of an 
offender for it.  In Victoria, the acceptance of benefit for not disclosing that a serious 
indictable offence has been committed by somebody else is punishable in the same 
circumstances as in terms of the specific offence in the New South Wales. 
 
In the Northern Territory, the offence is punishable in terms of section 109 of the Criminal 
Code Act (NT).  In South Australia, section 256 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act of 
1935 punishes conduct that has a tendency to pervert the course of justice.  The Criminal  
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Code Act 69 of 1924 is applicable in Tasmania and it punishes conduct (be it a positive act 
or an omission) that has a tendency to pervert the course of justice.  In Queensland, section 
120 of the Criminal Code Act of 1899 punishes similar conduct.  In addition to the specific 
sections which are mentioned above, the following acts constitute specific offences of 
perverting the course of justice in most Australian states and in the Commonwealth: judicial 
corruption; corrupting or threatening jurors; fabricating or destroying or suppressing 
evidence; corrupting, deceiving, or preventing witnesses from attending and intimidating 
witnesses; conspiring to falsely accuse an innocent person, conspiring to defeat justice; 
compounding or concealing a crime and attempting to pervert justice.  In Queensland 
official corruption (meaning corruption by or of a person being a justice not acting 
judicially) is also punishable.  In Western Australia, threatening witnesses before a Royal 
Commission is a punishable offence. 
 
Some commentators are of the view that the expression “administration of the law” in the 
statutory provisions has extended the scope of “course of justice” to include police 
investigations, but the matter awaits judicial determination.  This view is opposed to the 
common law position where it is said that police investigations do not form part of the 
course of justice. 
 
Under English law, it is a statutory crime to impede the apprehension of a person who has 
committed a relevant offence.  This crime is not mentioned in any statute of any Australian 
State except in South Australia, Victoria and the Commonwealth.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CANADIAN LAW  
5.1 GENERAL 
Canadian criminal law originates from English common law,1 but in 1892 the Canadian 
Parliament enacted its first complete Criminal Code which came into force in July 1893.2 
This is viewed as a major event in Canadian legal history.3 One of the readily 
acknowledged advantages of the codification was the constitutional imperative that no 
person could be convicted of an offence unless it was specifically provided for in a statute.4 
Between 1892 and 1899, amendments were made to the Criminal Code, but major 
amendments took place in 1955.5 The most important reform of the 1955 Code was its 
repeal of liability for common law offences,6
 
 which meant that in 1955 Canada abolished 
all common law offences. 
In 1984, the current Canadian Criminal Code was coming into being,7 and in December 
1986, Volume 1 of the Draft Code was tabled in Parliament.8
                                                 
1See: 
 This Code contained various 
http://www.duhaime.org/LegalResources/CriminalLaw.aspx (accessed on 28 November 2007).  The 
public policy of codification began in England at the end of the 18th Century where in the words of Canadian 
Federal Court Judge, Allen Linden, the Criminal law had evolved into “a bottomless pit of complex case law, 
petty anachronistic offences and harsh punishments.” 
 
2A M Linden and P Fitzgerald “Recodifying criminal law” (1987) Canadian Bar Review Vol 66 529-30 and 
AW Mewett “The Canadian Criminal Code, 1892-1992” (1993) Canadian Bar Review Vol 72 1. 
 
3One judge wrote to the then Prime Minister, Thompson, to say:  “Just think of it … Canada in the Van! It is 
far and away the best measure of the kind ever submitted to any legislature.” See: 
http://www.wwlia.org/Cacrhist.htm (accessed on 28 November 2007). 
 
4See: http://es/CanadianLegalHistory/tabid/1553/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/94/Canadas-Criminal-
Code-A-History.aspx (accessed on 28 November 2007). 
  
5Criminal Code, SC 1953-54.  This Code received Royal assent on the 26th of June 1954 and came into force 
on the 1st of April 1955.  See Mewett op cit (n 2) 7. 
  
6Mewett op cit (n 2) 7-8.  The Criminal Code was reduced from 1100 sections to 753 sections.  See: 
http://es/CanadianLegalHistory/tabid/1553/articleType/ArticleView/ArticleId/94/Canadas-Criminal-Code-A-
History.aspx (accessed on 28 November 2007). 
 
7RSC 1985 c - C46.  See Linden and Fitzgerald op cit (n 2) 533-35. 
 
8Linden and Fitzgerald op cit (n 2) 534-35. 
 191 
offences including offences against the administration of law and justice found in Part IV of 
the Code.  In this chapter the statutory crimes of obstructing or perverting the course of 
justice and crimes akin to obstructing or perverting the course of justice are discussed, 
together with the beginning and the end of the course of justice.  The phrase “course of 
justice” is understood to have a broad meaning and encompasses all aspects of the 
functioning of the justice system.9 The administration of justice is interfered with when the 
institution of a prosecution is improperly prevented or when a prosecution which has 
already begun is corruptly aborted.10
 
 
5.2 WHEN DOES THE “ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE” BEGIN? 
Canadian law distinguishes between conduct related to a “judicial proceeding”11 and 
conduct unrelated to a “judicial proceeding.”12 Section 139 of the Canadian Criminal 
Code13
 
 provides: 
(1) Everyone who wilfully attempts in any manner to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of 
justice in a judicial proceeding, 
 
(a) by indemnifying or agreeing to indemnify a surety, in any way and either in whole or in part,  
 
or 
 
(b) where he is surety, by accepting or agreeing to accept a fee or any form of indemnity       
 
                                                 
9L Vandervort “Mistake of law and obstruction of justice: A ‘bad excuse’ even for lawyers” (2001) University 
of New Brunswick Law Journal Vol 50 174.  
 
10See Kalick v The King (1920) 55 DLR 104 at 108-109. 
 
11Section 139(1) of the Criminal Code 1985.  See GP Rodrigues Crankshaw’s Criminal Code of Canada Vol 
1 (1997) 4-108; EL Greenspan and M Rosenberg Martin’s Annual Criminal Code (2007) 262; EL Greenspan 
and M Rosenberg Martin’s Annual Criminal Code (2005) CC/259; D Watt and M Fuerst Tremeear’s 
Criminal Code: 1996 Annotated (1996) 237-38; BJ Saxton and RT Stansfield Understanding Criminal 
Offences 2ed (1990) 50; AW Mewett and M Manning Mewett and Manning on Criminal Law 3ed (1994) 660-
62; R Heather Snow’s Annotated Criminal Code (1990) 4-13; R Heather Snow’s Annotated Criminal Code 
(1989) 4-12 and D Rose Snow’s Annotated Criminal Code (2006) 4-13. 
 
12Section 139(2) of the Criminal Code 1985.  See Greenspan and Rosenberg op cit (n 11) 262; Saxton and 
Stansfield op cit (n 11) 50 and Mewett and Manning op cit (n 11) 661; Heather op cit (n 11) 4-13 and Watt 
and Fuerst op cit (n 11) 237. 
 
13The Criminal Code 1985.  See Greenspan and Rosenberg op cit (n 11) 237-38; Saxton and Stansfield op cit 
(n 11) 50 and Mewett and Manning op cit (n 11) 660-62.  See also http:/ ime.org/LegalResources/ 
CriminalLaw/ tabid/340/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/117/Obstruction-of-Justice.aspx (accessed on 28 
November 2007). 
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whether in whole or in part from or in respect of a person who is released or is to be released 
from custody, 
 
is guilty of  
 
(c) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or 
                       
(d) an offence punishable on summary conviction. 
(2) Everyone who wilfully attempts in any manner other than a manner described in subsection (1) 
to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years. 
 
(3) Without restricting the generality of subsection (2), every one shall be deemed wilfully to 
attempt to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice who in a judicial proceeding, existing or 
proposed, 
 
(a) dissuades or attempts to dissuade a person by threats, bribes or other corrupt means from 
giving evidence; 
 
(b) influences or attempts to influence by threats, bribes or other corrupt means a person in 
his conduct as a juror; or 
 
(c) accepts or obtains, agrees to accept or attempts to obtain a bribe or other corrupt 
consideration to abstain from giving evidence, or to do or to refrain from doing anything as 
a juror. 
 
Section 118 of the Criminal Code broadly defines a “judicial proceeding” as a 
proceeding:14
(a) in or under the authority of the court 
 
 
(b) before the Senate or House of Commons, or a committee of the Senate or House of Commons, or 
before a legislative council, legislative assembly or house of assembly or a committee thereof that is 
authorised by the law to administer an oath 
 
(c) before a court, judge, justice, provincial court judge or coroner 
 
(d) before an arbitrator or umpire, or a person or body of persons authorised by law to make an 
inquiry and take evidence therein under oath, or  
 
(e) before a tribunal by which a legal right or legal liability may be established 
whether or not the proceeding is invalid for want of jurisdiction or for any other reason. 
 
It is clear that the validity of the proceeding itself is not a prerequisite.  Prior to the 
promulgation of the new Criminal Code of 1985 and section 118, the case law15
                                                 
14The Criminal Code of 1985.  See Rodrigues op cit (n 11) 4-1; Greenspan and Rosenberg op cit (n 11) 
CC/230-31; Watt and Fuerst op cit (n 11) 209; Mewett and Manning op cit (n 11) 658; Saxton and Stansfield 
op cit (n 11) 52 and Heather op cit (n 11) 4-1. 
 provided 
authority that established liability for the corruption of juries or witnesses if the judicial 
proceeding was authorized to take evidence from the witness, or, the jury had been 
 
15Rosen (1917) 27 CCC 259 (Sask CA) and St Jean (1938) 69 CCC 240 (Que KB). 
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empanelled.  Contrary to English law,16 where it is said that the course of justice begins to 
run and may be prevented before proceedings are “active,” section 139(1) of the 1985 
Canadian Criminal Code requires that the judicial proceeding must be “existing” or 
“proposed.”17 It is said that a judicial criminal proceeding is “existing” once a charge has 
been laid, and it is “proposed” when the decision to prosecute has been made, and perhaps 
when prosecution is contemplated.18 According to Mewett and Manning,19 a judicial 
proceeding is not proposed, for the purposes of section 139(3),20
 
 merely when an 
investigation to determine whether there has been criminal conduct is under way.  
Therefore, if X interferes with a potential witness before the Crown has decided to lay, or 
has considered laying charges in the matter, the proper charge will be under section 139(2) 
of the Criminal Code for obstructing the course of justice. 
Contrary to section 139(1) and (3), no mention is made of a “judicial proceeding” in section 
139(2).  Therefore the obstruction of justice does not have to occur in respect of a “judicial 
proceeding.”  This means that when a wilful attempt to tamper with prospective witnesses 
occurs at a stage before the state decides to lay, or considers laying, a charge in the matter, 
X has to be charged under section 139(2) for attempting to obstruct the course of justice.21 
This section is much broader than section 139(1).22
                                                                                                                                                     
  
 Therefore, it is clear that, under 
Canadian law, the “course of justice” describes the entire process, from the detection of the  
16Cf Smith and Hogan op cit Chapter Two (n 93) 752-53; Card op cit Chapter Three (n 1) 537 and R v Rafique 
supra Chapter Three (n 27) at 1G-H. 
 
17Section 139(3) of the Criminal Code 1985.  See Watt and Fuerst op cit (n 11) 237; Greenspan and 
Rosenberg op cit (n 11) CC/256; Heather op cit (n 11) 4-12 and Rose op cit (n 11) 4-13. 
   
18AW Mewett and M Manning Criminal Law 2ed (1985) 489. 
 
19Ibid. 
  
20Section 139(3) of the Criminal Code 1985. 
 
21Mewett and Manning op cit (n 18) 489. 
 
22Saxton and Stansfield op cit (n 11) 51; Mewett and Manning op cit (n 18) 489 and Watt and Fuerst op cit (n 
11) 239. 
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criminal act to the prosecution and punishment of offenders.23
 
  
According to R v Whalen,24 an attempt by X to dissuade Y from reporting an incident to 
police officials may amount to obstruction of justice regardless of the fact that neither 
police investigations nor judicial proceedings have been instituted.  In 1968, in R v 
Balsdon,25 the scope of the “course of justice” was extended to include post-trial activities.  
For instance, the course of justice may also be obstructed after judicial proceedings have 
been terminated, for example, when someone interferes with the execution by the police of 
a warrant of committal for non-payment of a fine.26
 
 
In 1985, following the R v Balsdon27 decision, the scope of the crime was extended even 
further in R v Wijesinha28
 
 to include proceedings of a quasi-judicial nature.  The latter case 
is discussed below. 
5.2.1 The broadening of the scope of the concept “the course of justice”  
In R v Wijesinha29 the phrase “the course of justice” used in section 139(2)30
                                                                                                                                                     
  
 was 
understood to include the investigatory stage of justice.  It was held that the term is also 
applicable to the disciplinary proceedings of the Law Society.  It was further held that the 
23Mewett and Manning op cit (n 18) 491. 
 
24(1974) 17 CCC (2d) 217 (Ont Co Ct) at 220. 
  
25[1968] 2 CCC 164 (Ont Co Ct). 
26At 164.  See also Mewett and Manning op cit (n 11) 664. 
  
27See R v Balsdon supra (n 25). 
28[1995] 100 CCC (3d) 410. 
29R v Wijesinha supra (n 28). 
30See the provisions of section 139(2) supra (n 13). 
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course of justice includes all judicial proceedings defined in section 118.31
 
 Any decision-
making body would be encompassed by the phrase “the course of justice” if: 
(1) it was a body which judged; 
(2) its authority to do so was derived from a statute; and 
(3) in terms of its empowering statute, it was required to act in a judicial manner.32
 
 
The facts of R v Wijesinha were as follows:  Wijesinha was a criminal defence lawyer.  He 
was charged with four counts of attempting to obstruct justice in contravention of section 
139(2).33
                                                 
31R v Wijesinha supra (n 28) at 411g-h.  See the provisions of section 118 supra, text at note 14.   
 It was alleged that he approached a police officer, Constable Stade, who was also 
a breathalyzer operator, and proposed that Stade refer persons who had failed breathalyzer 
tests to Wijesinha.  Allegedly, Wijesinha promised to pay Stade a sum of money for each 
person referred.  Stade was made to believe that another breathalyzer operator was already 
referring potential clients to the accused.  Stade reported the matter to his superiors who 
told him that he should appear to go along with Wijesinha’s proposition.  Stade, while 
equipped with a body-pack, met with another officer who was allegedly involved in the 
scheme and this fellow officer did indeed confirm that he was referring potential clients to 
the accused for a fee.  After obtaining advice from the Crown counsel, the police did not 
pursue the investigation of Wijesinha, and instead provided the Law Society with the 
evidence they had gathered in their investigation.  The Law Society wrote to the accused, 
setting out the substance of the allegations and invited him to respond to them.  The 
accused prepared false statutory declarations (affidavits) which he gave to the officer and 
three of the referred clients to sign.  The statutory declarations signed by the three clients 
contained a paragraph stating that: “At no time did any police officer direct or suggest that I 
 
32R v Wijesinha supra (n 28) at 412a-b. 
33The Criminal Code 1985.  See R v Wijesinha supra (n 28) at 416c. 
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retain [the appellant].  At no time did any police officer give me any business cards of [the 
appellant].”34 The charges of attempting to obstruct justice arose out of those false statutory 
declarations.35
 
 
The accused was convicted as charged and on appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal it was 
argued, inter alia, that the accused could not be convicted of the offence of attempting to 
obstruct the course of justice because the investigation by the Law Society into the alleged 
professional misconduct did not fall within the meaning intended by the phrase “the course 
of justice” in section 139(2) of the Criminal Code.36 The court determined that the 
preparation, swearing, and submission of the statutory declarations formed the very actus 
reus of the crime of “wilfully attempting by any means to obstruct the course of justice.”37 
The Appeal Court dismissed the appeal.38
 
 The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court 
of Canada. 
The Supreme Court of Canada was called upon to consider whether the phrase “the course 
of justice,” which appears in section 139(2) of the Criminal Code,39 applies to the 
investigatory stage of disciplinary proceedings before the Law Society of Upper Canada.40  
The court had to determine the following:  Firstly, does section 139(2) apply to the 
investigatory stage or only to formal legal proceedings?  Secondly, does section 139(2) 
apply to matters other than criminal and quasi-criminal offences?41
                                                 
34Rv Wijesinha supra (n 28) at 415g-h.  The appellant referred to here is Wijesinha. 
   
35At 411e. 
36At 411f. 
  
37At 417e. 
38At 411g. 
39RSC 1985 c C - 46 
40R v Wijesinha supra (n 28) at 419e. 
41At 419e-f. 
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In answering the first question, the court noted that any court proceedings or, indeed, the 
proceedings of most administrative tribunals would almost always commence with an 
investigation.  It further noted that investigation is necessary to determine if a crime has 
been committed or not, and that investigation is the essential first step in any judicial or 
quasi-judicial proceeding which may result in prosecution.  It follows that one who perverts 
the course of an investigation also perverts the course of justice.42 The court held that since 
a false statement at the investigation stage may prevent any proceedings from taking place 
and so prevent the course of justice, section 139(2) must encompass investigatory 
proceedings.43
 
 
In answering the second question, the court examined both section 11844 and section 139 of 
the Criminal Code.  The court noted that section 139(2) describes an offence which is much 
wider in its ambit and which encompasses many more acts than those in subsections (1) and 
(3).  The court was of the opinion that the section 118 definition of a “judicial proceeding” 
was of no relevance when considering the scope of the phrase “the course of justice.”45
 
 
The court, per Galligan JA, held that the phrase “course of justice” would include an 
investigation which could lead to proceedings being taken against a person.  He observed 
that the phrase would apply to any body which is authorised by statute to act and “which 
judges.”  He determined that the Law Society was just such a body and that section 139(2) 
                                                 
42At 420f-g. 
 
43R v Wijesinha supra (n 28) at 422d-e.  The court relied, among other authorities, on the Australian High 
Court decision of The Queen v Rogerson supra Chapter Four (n 5).  In that case, Mason CJ stated (at 277): 
 
[i]t is enough that an act has a tendency to frustrate or deflect a prosecution or disciplinary 
proceeding before a judiciary tribunal which the accused contemplates may possibly be instituted, 
even though the possibility of instituting that prosecution or disciplinary proceeding has not been 
considered by the police or the relevant law enforcement agency.  
 
44See the provisions of sections 118 supra, text at note 14.  
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of the Criminal Code extended to the investigatory stages of potential disciplinary 
proceedings before the Law Society.46 The appeal was dismissed.47
 
 
This thesis supports the decision of the court in finding that section 139(2) of the Criminal 
Code extended to the investigatory stages of potential disciplinary proceedings before the 
Law Society.  However, the reasoning of the court is questioned, but not the route followed 
by the court.  It is respectfully submitted that the court’s opinion that the definition of 
“judicial proceeding” in section 118 was of no relevance in considering the scope of the 
phrase “the course of justice” was in incorrect for the following reasons.  Firstly, both 
section 118 and section 139 are found in Part IV of the Criminal Code under the heading 
‘Offences Against the Administration of Law and Justice.’  The two sections should be read 
together.  Secondly, section 118(d) states that “judicial proceeding” means a proceeding 
before, among other things, a “person or persons authorised by law to make an inquiry and 
take evidence under oath.”  The investigatory proceedings of the Law Society fall within 
the definition of “person or persons,” because the oath is administered when statements are 
taken.  Section 118(e) is also applicable to the disciplinary proceedings of the Law Society 
because the sitting of such proceedings determined a legal right, or liability of the applicant 
in this case.  It is against this background that it is submitted that section 118 and section 
139 should not be interpreted separately, but should be read together when determining the 
meaning of the phase “the course of justice.” 
 
In 1983, the meaning of the words “course of justice” was interpreted even more broadly to 
include threats made after sentence was passed.  In R v Vermette48
                                                                                                                                                     
45R v Wijesinha supra (n 28) at 422f-g to 23a-f. 
 the court was of the 
46At 418e-h. 
47At 431e-f. 
48(1983) 6 CCC (3d) 97.  
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opinion that section 127(2)49 (now section 139(2)) was wide enough to include a threat by 
an accused to cause bodily harm to the complainant who was present in court, 
notwithstanding that at the time of the threat the accused had already been convicted and 
sentenced for the offence initially reported by the complainant.50
 
 
The facts of this case were as follows:  Vermette pleaded guilty and was sentenced for the 
offence of theft.  After his sentencing, he made threats of bodily harm against the 
complainant.  She reported these threats to the police, whereupon Vermette was arrested 
and charged with the common law offence of contempt of court.  He pleaded guilty and was 
convicted upon his guilty plea, but having obtained new counsel, he appealed to set aside 
his conviction.51
 
 
The Court of Appeal was called upon to consider whether or not Vermette had been 
correctly charged, and convicted.  Put differently, the issue was whether the charge of the 
common law offence of contempt of court was a correct charge against Vermette.  It was 
observed that in a case involving threats to a complainant outside court, the Crown could 
either charge the accused with attempting to obstruct justice under section 127(2) (now 
section 139(2) of the Criminal Code) or make a summary application to the court for 
contempt of court.52
 
 The court observed that Vermette was wrongly indicted for the 
common law offence of criminal contempt of court and that his conviction was an error.   
 
                                                 
49Section 127(2) provided:  “Everyone who wilfully attempts in any manner other than a manner described in 
subsection (1) to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice is guilty of an offence and is liable to 
imprisonment for ten years.”  See Mewett and Manning op cit (n 18) 489. 
 
50Greenspan and Rosenberg op cit (n 11) CC/261 and R v Vermette supra (n 48) at 97. 
51R v Vermette supra (n 48) at 98. 
52At 105. 
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The court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction.53
 
 
As far as obstructing the “course of justice” is concerned, the importance of this case lies, 
firstly, in the fact that the Court of Appeal broadened the scope of the meaning of “the 
course of justice” beyond matters which are sub judice in any specific instance to include 
threats made by an accused outside a courtroom after he had been sentenced.  This is very 
important, because possible retaliation by an accused towards witnesses could discourage 
future witnesses from testifying in courts and that would have far-reaching consequences 
for the proper administration of justice.  Secondly, this decision highlighted the overlap 
between the offence of obstructing the “course of justice” and contempt of court which is 
punished summarily by the courts.54
  
 
5.3 ACTS WHICH AMOUNT TO THE OFFENCE OF PERVERSION OR 
OBSTRUCTION OF THE COURSE OF JUSTICE 
The following acts or conduct are proscribed under the Canadian Criminal Code as acts, or 
conduct, which obstruct or pervert the course of justice:55
 
 
a. Indemnifying or agreeing to indemnify a surety.56
b. Accepting or agreeing to accept a fee or any kind of indemnity by a surety.
 
57
                                                 
53Ibid.  
 
 
54In terms of section 8 of the Criminal Code, which was in force before the enactment of the 1985 Criminal 
Code, it is stated that: “… nothing in this section affects the power, jurisdiction or authority that a court, 
judge, justice or magistrate had, immediately before the 1st day of April 1955, to impose punishment for 
contempt of court.”  See R v Vermette supra (n 48) at 100. 
 
55The Criminal Code RSC 1985 Chapter C-46. 
 
56Section 139(1)(a). 
 
57 Section 139(1)(b). 
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c. Attempting to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice.58
 
 
d. Interfering with witnesses.59
e. Interfering with a juror.
 
60
 
 
f. Acceptance of bribes by witnesses and juries.61
 
 
5.3.1 Indemnifying, or agreement to indemnify, a surety and accepting, or 
agreeing to accept, a fee or any kind of indemnity as a surety 
The offence in section 139(1) relates to conduct of, or in relation to, sureties.  This section 
proscribes two acts.  Firstly, it proscribes X, as the donor or offeror, from indemnifying Z, 
the surety, from entering into an agreement with Y to indemnify Z.  Secondly, this section 
makes it an offence for Z himself, the surety, to accept or enter into an agreement to accept 
indemnity in money or in kind from X, the donor or offeror.62 To indemnify a surety means 
to compensate a person who has undertaken to forfeit money in the event that the accused 
fails to appear in court for trial.63
 
 
It is said that the practical effect of this section is to eliminate the existence of professional 
bail bondsmen.64 According to Mewett and Manning,65
                                                                                                                                                     
 
 if bail is regarded as a personal 
58Section 139(2). 
 
59Section 139(3)(a). 
 
60Section 139(3)(b). 
 
61Section 139(3)(c).  
 
62Greenspan and Rosenberg op cit (n 11) CC/260 and Watt and Fuerst op cit (n 11) 238. 
63Saxton and Stansfield op cit (n 11) 50. 
64These are people who make their living by providing bail money to individuals awaiting trial in custody on 
the understanding that when he or she is released the accused will pay the bondsmen a fee.  See Saxton and 
Stansfield op cit (n 11) 50. 
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obligation undertaken by the surety towards the court to ensure the appearance of the 
accused, the personal relationship between the surety and the court is lost if the surety is in 
the business of providing bail for profit or if he or she has nothing to lose when the accused 
does not appear.  Bail then becomes nothing more than a monetary penalty rather than a 
personal obligation.  It is also important to note that this offence can be prosecuted by way 
of summary conviction or by way of an indictment.66
 
 We shall now look at the elements 
that the prosecution has to prove in order to secure a conviction in a charge made under 
section 139(1). 
The elements of the offence of indemnifying or agreeing to indemnify a surety and 
accepting or agreeing to accept, a fee or any kind of indemnity by a surety are the 
following:67
 
 
i. X must have acted, for example, by indemnifying Z, who is a surety, or, where he or 
she was a surety, by accepting money or agreeing to accept indemnity;  
 
ii. X’s act must have been intended, and must have had a tendency, to obstruct, pervert 
or defeat the course of justice in a judicial proceeding.68
 
  
5.3.2  Attempt or conspiracy to attempt to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of 
justice 
The second way in which an obstruction of justice can occur is when any attempt in any 
manner other than that mentioned in section 139(1) is made to obstruct, pervert or defeat 
                                                                                                                                                     
65Mewett and Manning op cit (n 18) 488. 
  
66Greenspan and Rosenberg op cit (n 11) CC/260. 
 
67Saxton and Stansfield op cit (n 11) 51.  See also the commentary in Watt and Fuerst op cit (n 11) 238. 
 
68As defined in section 118 of the Criminal Code supra, text note 14.   
 203 
the course of justice.69 Although it is framed in the language of an attempt, section 139(2) 
creates a substantive offence, the gist of which is the performance of an act which has a 
tendency to pervert or obstruct the course of justice and which is done for that purpose.70 
Section 139(2) constitutes a much broader offence than section 139(1) and is strictly an 
indictable offence.  No “judicial proceeding” is required for section 139(2).  There is 
judicial authority71 to the effect that conspiracy72 to attempt to obstruct the course of justice 
also amounts to obstructing the course of justice and is punishable in terms of section 
139(2).  The section 139(2) offence is also vague because there are no specific acts or 
conduct mentioned which amount to this particular form of the offence.73 Only through the 
case law did it become clear which acts infringe section 139(2).  The following acts have 
been recognised as such:74
 
 
a. Wasteful employment of police.75 Unlike English law76
                                                 
69Section 139(2).  
 where wasteful employment 
of police time and resources constitutes an offence akin to obstructing the course of justice, 
any diversion of the police which could cause time and effort to be wasted, impeding or 
retarding the course which the operation of justice would normally take, amounts to 
70See Greenspan and Rosenberg op cit (n 11) CC/26; Heather op cit (n 11) 4-13 and Rodrigues op cit (n 11) 4-
112. 
 
71R v May (1984) CCC (3d) 257.  See also Heather op cit (n 11) 4-13 and Rodrigues op cit (n 11) 4-112.  
72The history of the conspiracy offence suggests that the law applicable to this crime has at least in part 
developed from the view that conspiracy is an act inherently heinous or culpable and a substantive offence in 
its own right.  See P MacKinnon “Developments in the law of criminal conspiracy” (1981) Canadian Bar 
Review Vol 59 304. 
  
73It may be argued that it violates the principle of legality, which requires that crimes should not be 
formulated vaguely (the ius certum principle).  
 
74Mewett and Manning op cit (n 18) 491-92 and Rodrigues op cit (n 11) 4-111-118. 
 
75R v Snider (1953) 106 CCC 164 (Ont Ct).  
 
76The offence is punishable in terms of section 5(2) of the Criminal Law Act 1967.  See Chapter Three supra 
(n 174).  
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obstruction of justice for purposes of section 139(2) of the Code.77 This offence is 
committed, inter alia, by wilfully making a false report to the police tending to show that 
an offence has been committed.78
 
 
b. Removing a witness or the accused out of the court’s jurisdiction.79 This offence 
is committed by X, when contemplating a court case against himself or herself or against 
any other person and knowing that Z will be a Crown witness or accused, he or she 
attempts to remove the witness or that other person to another place where it will be 
difficult if not impossible for him or her to testify in the upcoming case.  A case in point 
here was R v Kadin.80
 
 The Court of Appeal heard an appeal by the Crown against Kadin’s 
acquittal on a charge of obstructing the course of justice for taking his wife out of the 
country while there were pending charges against her.  
The facts of this case were as follows:  Kadin’s wife was facing some criminal charges.  
While charges against his wife were still pending, he took her away from home to the 
United States of America with the intention of preventing her from being submitted to 
examination.  He was charged with an attempt to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of 
justice in contravention of section 180(d) of the then existing Criminal Code,81 because her 
attendance at her own trial was obviously essential to the due course of justice.82
 
 
It was argued that the trial against Kadin’s wife had not commenced and the trial court held 
                                                 
77Mewett and Manning op cit (n 18) 491-92. 
 
78Rodrigues op cit (n 11) 4-113. 
 
79Rodrigues op cit (n 11) 4-114. 
80(1937) 2 DLR 800 (BCCA).  
81Criminal Code 1927.  Section 180(d) became section 127(2) and in 1985, when the current Criminal Code 
came into being it became section 139(2).   
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that the accused (Kadin) had committed no offence since his wife, at that specific stage, had 
committed no offence in failing to attend the trial.83
   
 He was acquitted and the Crown 
appealed against the acquittal. 
On appeal Martin, JA held:84
 
   
If the real reason for her “default” was that her husband had, for example, attempted to take her out 
of Canada, or had assisted or induced her to leave Canada in order to enable her to evade her legal 
trial, then it is clear that his conduct would constitute an attempt to “obstruct, pervert or defeat the 
course of justice” within the meaning of subsection (d) of section 180, Criminal Code, because her 
attendance at her trial was obviously essential to the due “course of justice …   
 
However, the court was not convinced that proof of the husband’s attempt had been 
established with that reasonable certainty that the law required.  Therefore, the court 
unanimously dismissed the appeal.85
It is submitted that the importance of this case lies in the fact that the charge of wilful 
attempt to obstruct the course of justice was laid against a person who was not an accused 
in a case, but a third party who tried to encourage the accused to abscond.  This shows that 
the word “everyone” in section 139(2) of the Criminal Code and its predecessors applies to 
witnesses, accused, and anyone who attempts to prevent either an accused (as in this case), 
a witness, or officers of the court, etc., from attending judicial proceedings by taking them 
away with intent to obstruct the course of justice. 
 
 
c. Persuading a victim not to prosecute his or her assailant, or persuading a person 
not to report an incident to the authorities.86 In R v Whalen87
                                                                                                                                                     
82R v Kadin supra (n 80) at 801. 
 the court observed that an 
83At 801.  
84Ibid.   
 
85Ibid.  
86Rodrigues op cit (n 11) 4-115 and Mewett and Manning op cit (n 11) 663-65.  
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attempt to dissuade a person from reporting an incident to the authorities might constitute a 
mode in which the offence of obstructing justice could be committed.  The court further 
observed that it was irrelevant that neither formal police investigations nor judicial 
proceedings had been instituted.  In this case the accused were facing two charges of 
obstructing justice for: 
  
(1) the dissuasion or attempted dissuasion of persons, by threats or other corrupt 
 means, from giving evidence in judicial proceedings; and 
  
(2) dissuading or attempting to dissuade persons by threats or other corrupt means 
 from reporting to the police incidents which were known or ought to have been 
 known should have been dealt with by a court of law.88
 
  
The accused filled two motions, one of them to quash the indictment. In dismissing the 
motion the court made the following observation:89
 
  
I am persuaded that in our form of society where the individual has the right to conduct his affairs 
independently of his neighbour, within the confines of the law, that where someone attempts to 
dissuade him from reporting an incident, that may constitute an obstruction of justice.  
 
d. Destroying evidence.90
                                                                                                                                                     
 
 Another way of violating section 139(2) of the Criminal 
Code is when X wilfully attempts to destroy any evidence with intent to obstruct, pervert or 
defeat the course of justice in an existing or proposed judicial proceeding.  In R v 
87(1974) 17 CCC (2d) 217 (Ont Co Ct).  
88At 218. 
89At 220.  
90Rodrigues op cit (n 11) 4-113 and Mewett and Manning op cit (n 18) 492.  
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Andruszko,91
 
 the Court of Appeal was called upon to consider an appeal by the Crown 
following Andruszko’s acquittal on a charge of attempting to obstruct justice by destroying 
evidence.  The facts of this case were as follows:  Allegedly, a police officer, who was 
patrolling the streets around Andruszko’s neighbourhood, noticed Andruszko sitting in a 
car parked on private property adjacent to what the police official believed to be his 
property.  As the police vehicle approached Andruszko’s car,  Andruszko alighted from the 
car and the police officer drew up close to the parked car.  Andruszko then jumped back 
into the car, locked the doors and windows, with the exception of the driver’s window 
which he left partly open.  The police officer approached Andruszko and indicated that he 
wished to talk to him, and requested him to produce his driver’s licence and proof of 
ownership of the car.  It is said that Andruszko replied that he did not wish to talk to the 
police officer.   
The police officer then noticed that Andruszko had a small plastic bag in his hand from 
which he began to eat a greenish-brown plant material the officer suspected was 
marijuana.92
When he had finished eating from the plastic bag, Andruszko threw the bag onto the floor 
of the car and attempted to exit from the car.  The police officer chased him around and 
prevented him from escaping.  He was arrested a short distance from the car.  After the 
arrest, the police officer returned to Andruszko’s car and discovered on the floor on the 
passenger’s side a plastic bag containing a small quantity of marijuana. 
   
 
Andruszko was charged with attempting to obstruct the course justice by destroying 
evidence in contravention of section 127(2).93
                                                 
91(1978) 44 CCC (2d) 382 (Ont CA). 
 He was acquitted and the Crown appealed 
 
92At 383.  
93Now section 139(2) of the Criminal Code.  See the provisions of section 127(2) supra (n 49). 
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against his acquittal.94 On appeal, the court was satisfied that the offence charged under 
section 127(2)95
 
 was made out.  As a result the appeal was allowed, the verdict of acquittal 
set aside and the verdict of guilty substituted.   
The reasons which led to Andruszko’s acquittal were not advanced in the record of this 
case.  This makes it difficult to comprehend and to argue for or against the trial court’s 
decision.  Nevertheless, it suffices to submit that evidence is an essential component in any 
judicial proceeding.  Without evidence, courts will be unable to function properly and that 
can lead to the miscarriage of justice and the total collapse of the administration of justice. 
Another important matter worth mentioning in this case was the extension of the scope of 
the “course of justice” to include police investigations.  Andruszko destroyed evidence 
before he was charged with any offence.  By setting aside his acquittal and substituting the 
verdict of guilty, the Court of Appeal incorporated police investigations of suspected 
criminal activities into the “course of justice.” 
 
e. Misleading the court.96
misleading the court can be committed, for example, when X pleads guilty to an offence 
committed by another person (Y) or when X gives a false identification to the police during 
the investigation of the crime and ultimately X appears in court under that false name.  
These acts seriously offend the principle of public justice if the proceedings in court are 
conducted on a false basis.  In R v Doz
 The offence of obstructing the “course of justice” by  
97
                                                 
94R v Andruszko supra (n 90) at 382. 
 the Supreme Court of Appeal observed that a 
lawyer is under a duty not to mislead the court and may be convicted of obstructing justice 
where he participates in the client’s deception by arranging for the client’s friend to attend 
95Now section 139(2).  
96See Rodrigues op cit (n 11) 4-117-118. 
  
97(1984) 12 CCC (3d) 200.  
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in court and answer to a charge against a client who had previously given a friend’s name to 
the police as his own upon arrest. 
 
The facts of the case were as follows: Doz was a lawyer obtained to act as legal 
representative of Mark Woitt, a motorist, whom the police found vomiting beside his car 
and showing signs of impairment.  He was arrested and when requested to identify himself, 
he gave his friend’s name, Jeff Hutchinson.  He was charged with being in care and control 
of a motor vehicle while his ability to drive was impaired by alcohol.98
 
   
During his consultation with Doz, Woitt explained that he had falsely identified himself to 
the police as Jeff Hutchinson.  Doz told him to bring in Hutchinson, and the following day 
Woitt and Hutchinson came to see Doz.  It was agreed that Hutchinson would attend the 
trial instead of Woitt.   
 
It is important to note that during the trial Doz misled the court in the following ways: 
 
(1) The court directly asked Doz if his client was in court and he responded: “Mr 
Hutchinson is here.”99
 
 
(2) He cross-examined the state witness, thereby creating an impression to the court that the 
police did not know their facts.100
 
 
(3) He called Hutchinson to the witness box and examined him. Hutchinson denied having 
                                                 
98At 204. 
99At 205. 
100At 206.  
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been arrested, or taken to jail, or photographed, or fingerprinted by the police.101
As a result of the “mistaken” identification problems the court dismissed the case.
 
102
 
   
After the case, Hutchinson took his parents’ advice and obtained a lawyer, and through his 
lawyer he told the police authorities what had happened.  These revelations led to Doz’s 
indictment on two charges: count 1: impersonation, count 2: attempt to obstruct, pervert, or 
defeat the course of justice in contravention of section 127(2) (now section 139(2)).103
 
 He 
was convicted of these charges and he appealed. 
As to the charge of obstructing justice, it was noted that when Doz was called upon to 
identify his client in court, his words “Mr Hutchinson’s here” were correct, but it was not 
the honest answer to the question asked and it was intended by him to mislead the judge.  
He actively misled the court as to the accused being present in court.  At all material times 
Doz knew that he was misleading the court and that the actual accused was not before the 
court.  By his conduct Doz was not only guilty of conduct unbecoming a lawyer but also of 
the criminal offence of attempting to obstruct the course of justice.104
 
 
Like the English and Australian cases of R v Murray105 and Hatty v Pilkinton,106
                                                 
101At 207.  
 this was 
another instance where a lawyer was over-zealous and overstepped his duty to represent his 
client.  Furthermore, as an officer of the court he betrayed his duty not to mislead the court.  
Doz not only condoned his client’s misrepresentation of his identity to the police, he took 
102At 208.  
103At 202. 
 
104At 220.  
105R v Murray supra Chapter Three (n 48). 
106Hatty v Pilkinton supra Chapter Four (n 75).  
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part in maintaining the deception.  As an officer of the court, when he learned his client 
gave a false name to the police, he was expected to either tell his client not to carry on with 
the false name, or to tell the court the real name of his client, or to withdraw as legal 
counsel.  He made no effort to persuade his client to refrain from misleading the court.  
Instead, he became an active participant to that falsity.  
 
f. Refusal to testify at a preliminary inquiry.107 There is authority in the Canadian 
case law to suggest that if X refuses to be sworn in and to testify at a preliminary inquiry, 
such refusal amounts to obstructing the course of justice and he or she can be charged for 
contravening section 139(2) of the Criminal Code.  It is said that if X refuses to be sworn 
in, or refuses to testify after being sworn in, at the preliminary inquiry without any 
reasonable excuse, the justice may adjourn the inquiry and summarily commit him or her to 
prison in terms of section 545 of the Criminal Code.108 Section 545 is a summary 
conviction procedure at the disposal of the presiding officer of a preliminary inquiry where 
a witness, inter alia, refuses to be sworn in.  Two cases which deal with witnesses who 
refused to testify in a preliminary inquiry are R v Mercer109 and R v Poulin.110
                                                 
107Rodrigues op cit (n 8) 4-118.  
 In these 
cases the courts observed that if the witness refuses to be sworn in and testify, and the 
justice presiding over the preliminary inquiry has resorted to the section 545 procedure, the 
witness cannot be charged in terms of section 139(2) for the same conduct.  However, if the 
justice did not resort to the section 545 procedure, or if the conduct was repeated after the 
initial recourse to section 545, then the witness may be charged for contravening section 
108Canadian Criminal Code 1985.  See Greenspan and Rosenberg op. cit. (n 11) 1005. Section 545(1) 
provides:  Where a person, being present at a preliminary inquiry and being required by the justice to give 
evidence, (a) refuses to be sworn, (b) having been sworn, refuses to answer the questions that are put to him, 
(c) fails to produce any writings that he is required to produce, or (d) refuses to sign his deposition, without 
offering a reasonable excuse for his failure or refusal, the justice may adjourn the inquiry and may, by warrant 
in Form 20, commit the person to prison for a period not exceeding eight clear days or for the period during 
which the inquiry is adjourned, whichever is a lesser period.  
 
109(1988) 43 CCC (3 d) 347. 
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139(2) or for contempt of court.111
 
 The two cases will be discussed in more depth below, 
commencing with R v Mercer. 
R v Mercer112 was an appeal by the Crown following an acquittal of the respondent on a 
charge of attempting to obstruct justice in contravention of section 127(2) (now 139(2)) of 
the Criminal Code.  The facts of this case were as follows:  The accused, who was serving a 
prison sentence for an offence not related to the one in question, was called as a Crown 
witness at a preliminary hearing of a charge against one Milton Muise. He refused to be 
sworn in and refused to testify. The court resorted to the section 472 (now section 545) 
procedure and committed him for eight days.  The preliminary hearing was adjourned. 
Eight days later, the preliminary inquiry resumed.  Muise appeared, but this time the court 
did not ask him if he would consent to be sworn in and testify.  It was assumed that he 
would continue with his refusal.  Failure to ask the respondent whether he would consent to 
be sworn in and testify was a grave mistake in this case as will be discussed later.  He was 
then charged with attempting to obstruct the course of justice contrary to section 127(2) by 
refusing to testify at a preliminary inquiry.  He pleaded not guilty and, following a trial, he 
was acquitted.113 The court considered the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Lacroix and The Queen114 and held:115
 
 
[The] Supreme Court of Canada has said that where the power under section 472 has been used by 
the inferior court there is no further remedy – or there is no further criminal procedure to be taken 
against that accused.  That is what I hold now. 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
110(1998) 127 CCC (3d) 115 (Que CA). 
111Greenspan and Rosenberg op cit (n 11) CC/262.  
112R v Mercer supra (n 106). 
113At 349.  
114(1984) 15 CCC (3d) 265. 
115R v Mercer supra (n 109) at 349. 
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The Crown appealed against Mercer’s acquittal.  The following three issues were raised in 
this appeal:116
 
 
(1) Once exercised, was section 472 the only remedy against the disobedient witness at a 
preliminary inquiry? 
(2) Did section 472 create an offence that afforded the accused the defence of double 
jeopardy if a charge, arising from the same circumstances, was laid under section 127(2)? 
(3) Were the section 472 procedures the only way to deal with the disobedient witness? 
 
In reaching an appropriate decision, the judge had to look at the Lacroix and The Queen 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada.117 The court interpreted this decision to mean 
that if a judge at a preliminary inquiry did not act under section 472, it was open for him or 
her to act under section 127(2).  In dismissing the appeal the court held:118
If in the case at bar the respondent had in his second appearance been asked to testify and had again 
refused, he could have been charged under sections 127(2) or (8).  The respondent was, however, not 
given the opportunity to repent and the charge under section 127, the charge that is the subject of this 
appeal, was for his refusal in the first instance.  
 
 
The judgment of the court can be viewed in two respects.  Firstly, it is in respect to the 
discretion available to the judge presiding at a preliminary inquiry when is faced with a 
disobedient witness who refuses to be sworn in and to testify.  Section 545 provides that in 
such cases the court may adjourn the proceedings and may commit the witness to prison.  
                                                 
116At 350. 
117In the case of Lacroix and The Queen supra (n 114), the Quebec Court of Appeal held (at 271):  Regardless 
of inconvenience, or ineffectiveness, of the punishment provided for by section 472, it remains nonetheless, 
the penalty specifically provided for in the case of a witness who refuses to testify at a preliminary inquiry 
and no other punishment may be substituted for it.  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada, in allowing the 
appeal, found it unnecessary to consider the reasoning of the Quebec Court of Appeal because in the first 
instance the judge had not utilised section 472.  The Supreme Court of Canada noted :  ‘In view of the 
circumstances of the case at bar, and in particular the fact that the judge did not utilise the powers of 
committal conferred on him by section 472 of the Criminal Code, the questions raised by the accused in the 
Court of Appeal did not arise.’ See R v Mercer supra (n 109) at 351. 
     
118R v Mercer supra (n 109) at 352.  
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The presiding judge has the discretion to commit the witness to prison or to use other 
remedies.  If the judge resorts to the section 545 procedures, he or she is precluded to 
invoke section 139(2) for the same conduct of refusing to be sworn in and to testify.  
However, if, for the first refusal, section 545 is used and the accused is asked for the second 
time, after adjournment, to testify and he refuses, the Crown is not precluded from using 
section 139(2) for the second refusal. Each refusal to be sworn in and testify constitutes a 
separate offence.  In R v Mercer119 the witness was never asked to consent to be sworn in 
and to testify because it was presumed that he would not be interested.  This thesis supports 
the decision of the court in dismissing the appeal by the Crown because the witness was 
already punished for the first refusal and any trial in terms of section 139(2) for the same 
matter would lead to double jeopardy.  This takes us to the second aspect of this case.  
Considered in the second respect, the judgment implies that after committal to prison in 
terms of section 545, the witness cannot be vexed for the second time for the same act.  The 
doctrine of res judicata precludes parties from litigating the same cause of action that has 
been finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction.120
  
 
Similarly to R v Mercer, R v Poulin121
                                                 
119R v Mercer supra (n 109). 
 was an appeal by the Crown against the acquittal of 
the accused after he was charged with attempting to obstruct justice in contravention of 
section 139(2) for refusing to testify at a preliminary inquiry.  The facts of this case were as 
follows.  Poulin appeared as a witness at a preliminary inquiry of one Jose Boulet.  He 
refused to answer questions put to him by the Crown’s counsel.  The presiding judge 
adjourned the inquiry and issued a warrant of committal to prison in terms of section 545 of 
the Criminal Code.  On the second occasion, after being sworn in, Poulin again refused to 
 
120The doctrine of res judicata states that once an issue has been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction, 
the same issue cannot be re-litigated in future between the same parties.  See PW Hogg Constitutional Law of 
Canada 3ed (1992) 1247 and Hendricks, Charles and Williams “100 Years of double jeopardy erosion: 
Criminal collateral estoppel made extinct” (2000) Drake Law Review Vol 48 No 2 390.    
 
121R v Poulin supra (n 110).  
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testify.  This time the judge ordered that he be removed from the courtroom.  He did not 
issue a warrant of committal against him for the second refusal.  The charge of 
contravening section 139(2) against Poulin emanated from the second refusal to testify.  
It was advanced for the defence that Poulin could not be charged with the offence in 
question because a witness who refuses to testify at a preliminary inquiry could only be 
dealt with in terms of section 545.122 The trial court was of the opinion that when the 
presiding judge exercised the discretion, conferred on him by section 545, at the time of 
Poulin’s first refusal to testify, to commit Poulin to prison, he “set in motion” a process of 
punishment which had to apply to all subsequent refusals of the same nature.123
 
 The 
Supreme Court of Appeal was called upon to consider whether or not, after resorting to the 
section 545 procedure in the first refusal to testify, the Crown could charge Poulin under 
section 139(2) for the second refusal.   
The Supreme Court of Appeal observed that the decision of the court a quo was erroneous 
insofar as Poulin’s refusal to testify for a second time could form the offence of obstructing 
justice within the meaning of section 139(2) because the court had not exercised its 
jurisdiction under section 545.124 The acquittal was quashed and substituted by a verdict of 
guilty under section 139(2).125
 
 
It is submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in setting aside Poulin’s 
acquittal is correct.  The respondent’s refusal to testify on the first occasion before his 
committal to prison and the second refusal constituted two distinctive causes of action.  He 
was already punished for the first cause of action.  It was, therefore, absurd to say that the 
                                                 
122At 117-18. 
123At 118. 
124Ibid.  
125At 120.  
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judge should have followed the same process he followed to punish the first cause of action 
when dealing with the second refusal.  In R v Mercer126 it was said that if the respondent 
had in his second appearance been asked to testify and had again refused, he could have 
been charged under sections 127(2) or (8).127
 
 
The difference between the R v Mercer and R v Poulin cases is that in the former case, the 
respondent was never asked to be sworn in and to testify after his committal to prison for 
the first refusal.  Charging him under section 139(2) for the first refusal would be like 
vexing him twice for the same offence.  In the latter case, the respondent was again called 
upon to testify after he was sworn in, but again he refused to answer questions from the 
Crown counsel.  The first and the second refusals to testify constituted two distinctive 
offences that could be dealt with either under section 545 or under section 139(2) of the  
Criminal Code.  Another difference between these cases is that, in Mercer, the respondent 
refused to be sworn in whereas in Poulin he had been sworn in but refused to testify. 
 
g. Counselling false testimony.128 This offence is committed when X approaches Y, 
who is not necessarily a witness in a case against X, and requests him to provide false 
testimony in a judicial proceeding for the benefit of X with the intention of leading the 
court to reach a false conclusion.  Authority that deals with counselling false evidence is 
found in R v Hearn and Fahey 129 and R v Charbonneau.130
 
  
In R v Hearn and Fahey, the Court of Appeal was called upon to hear an appeal by the 
                                                 
126R v Mercer supra (n 109).  
127At 352. 
128Rodrigues op cit (n 11) 4-111.  
129(1989) 48 CCC (3d) 376.  
130(1992) 74 CCC (3d) 49. 
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Crown against the acquittal of the accused on a charge of attempting to obstruct justice by 
counselling false testimony to be presented in a judicial proceeding.  The facts of this case 
were as follows.  The respondents, Hearn and Fahey, were charged with wilfully attempting 
to obstruct the course of justice.  Allegedly, sometime in 1986, Mr Fahey was found in the 
driver’s seat of a vehicle in an intoxicated condition.  A peace officer demanded breath 
samples from him and Fahey refused, stating that he had not been driving the vehicle.  He 
was then charged for refusing to comply with a demand for breath samples. Allegedly, prior 
to trial, Fahey and Hearn, who was Fahey’s lawyer, approached one Donald Griffin and 
requested him to testify that he had been driving the vehicle on the said evening and that he 
abandoned it after it had broken down, leaving Fahey and another companion in it.  Griffin 
reported the matter to the police.  Fahey was convicted of refusing the peace officer’s 
demand for a breath sample.  After that trial Fahey and Hearn were charged with wilful 
attempt to obstruct the course of justice in contravention of section 127(2), now section 
139(2),131 by counselling Griffin to give false testimony.  The trial court considered 
Griffin’s evidence would have been irrelevant to the outcome of the trial of Mr Fahey on a 
charge of refusing to give a breath sample.  The court acquitted both respondents132 on the 
charge of obstruction the course of justice on the basis that the question of who was driving 
the vehicle earlier in the evening was not relevant to the issue which had been before the 
court on the breathalyser charge.133
The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether a person may be guilty of an offence of 
wilfully attempting to obstruct the course of justice by counselling another person to testify 
falsely at a trial when the false testimony proposed could not, as a matter of law, affect the 
outcome of that trial.
 The Crown appealed against the acquittal. 
134
                                                 
131R v Hearn and Fahey supra (n 129) at 378. 
 In answering the question, the Court of Appeal referred to English 
132At 379.  
133At 376.  
134At 379.  
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authorities like The Queen v Vreones,135 and R v Rowell136 and found that the gist of the 
offence under section 127(2) was the performance of an act which has a tendency to pervert 
or obstruct the course of justice and which was done for that purpose.137 The court noted 
that the gravamen of the offence under section 127(2) (now section 139(2)) was the wilful 
attempt to obstruct justice no matter whether the attempt was successful or not.  The court 
held that on a charge of wilful attempt to obstruct justice by counselling false testimony in a 
pending trial, if the evidence revealed a guilty mind, it did not matter that the intention 
could not be satisfied by the act undertaken.138
 
    
The court’s decision is supported because when Fahey and Hearn counselled false 
testimony from Griffin, they intended that false evidence be put before the court to 
exonerate Fahey in the breath sample charge.  Their conduct had the requisite tendency and 
requisite intent to pervert or obstruct the course of justice.  The offence of obstructing the 
course of justice was committed and completed the moment the respondents attempted to 
procure false testimony from Mr Griffin. 
 
It is against this background that this thesis respectfully submits that the trial judge’s point 
of departure was misplaced when he said: “… if that counselling had been brought to its 
intended conclusion, would have likely resulted in an obstruction of justice.”139
                                                 
135The Queen v Vreones supra Chapter Two (n 93). 
 The court 
concluded that the evidence of Mr Griffin would have been irrelevant to the outcome of the 
trial of Mr Fahey and dismissed charges against both respondents.  The trial judge 
approached this crime like a result crime, where justice had to be obstructed as a result of 
136R v Rowell supra Chapter Three (n 46).  
137R v Hearn and Fahey supra (n 129) at 380.  
138At 381. 
139At 379. 
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the respondents’ conduct.  This is not what section 127(2) (now section 139(2))140 says; it 
requires a wilful attempt to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice.  This leads us to 
the decision in R v Charbonneau.141
 
 
The facts of the case were as follows:  A lawyer, Charbonneau, was asked by a fellow 
lawyer to speak to one of that other lawyer’s clients in order to obtain an affidavit.  It was 
alleged that in November 1984 a violent explosion killed one Paul April and some of his 
friends.  In 1985, an inquest was held concerning the death of Mr April.  Mr Yves Trudeau 
testified to the effect that he and Michel Blass, Charbonneau’s client, had committed the 
killings by planting a time bomb in a television set delivered to the scene of the crime by 
Blass.  He told the Coroner that he and Blass had been engaged by one Allan Ross to kill  
April to avenge the killing of a drug dealer called Frank Ryan.142
 
 
After learning of Trudeau’s evidence at the Coroner’s inquest, Allan Ross, accompanied by 
his attorney, Sidney Leithman, went to the police and maintained his innocence.  Leithman 
told the police that he would attempt to obtain a statement from Blass which would confirm 
his client’s innocence.143 When Leithman contacted Michael Blass he was not willing to 
talk to anyone except Charbonneau.  Leithman requested Charbonneau to meet Blass and 
have him sign an affidavit denying the participation of Blass and Ross in the explosion that 
killed April and his friends.144
 
  
It was alleged that on September 20, 1985, Charbonneau remitted to Blass a draft affidavit 
                                                 
140The Criminal Code 1985. 
141R v Charbonneau supra (n 130). 
142At 53c-d. 
143At 53f-g.  
144At 53h. 
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prepared by Leithman and a copy of the transcript of Trudeau’s evidence before the 
Coroner.  In substance the affidavit claimed that the evidence given by Trudeau concerning 
Blass was false, that Blass had never delivered the television set and that he never received 
any money from Trudeau.145 Immediately after that conversation with Charbonneau, Blass 
complained to the police that Charbonneau was attempting to have him sign an affidavit 
that was false.  Police requested his permission to record his conversations with 
Charbonneau.  The police, without any judicial authorisation, fitted Blass with a body-
pack.146 Charbonneau was then charged with attempting to obstruct justice contrary to 
section 139(2) of the Criminal Code for counselling false testimony from Blass.147 He was 
convicted of attempting to obstruct the course of justice in contravention of section 139(2) 
of the Criminal Code for counselling false testimony from Blass.  He appealed against this 
conviction on the following bases:148
 
   
(1) That the trial judge erred as to the mens rea required for the crime of obstructing the 
course of justice.  He argued that the essential element of the crime of obstructing the 
course of justice to be proved by the Crown was the specific intent to obstruct the course of 
justice.  It was argued that the trial judge erred in not directing himself regarding to the 
specific intent required.149 On this point the Appeal Court observed that it was unlikely that 
the trial judge could have misunderstood or misdirected himself on the element of intent 
because he recognised that the “act had to be committed wilfully” and that the court 
acknowledged that the purpose or tendency to obstruct justice had to be present.150
                                                 
145At 54a-b.  
   
146At 54c-d. 
147At 50f.   
148At 51. 
149At 59d-e.  
150At 60b-c.  
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(2) That the trial judge erred in refusing to recognise Charbonneau’s defence that he 
honestly believed the facts set out in the affidavit to be true.  Charbonneau contended that 
even if allegations in the affidavit presented to Blass were false, he ought not to have been 
convicted of obstructing the course of justice if he honestly believed that the affidavit was 
true or if there was a reasonable doubt in the evidence that he believed so.151 After taking 
into context the whole judgment, the Appeal Court ruled that the trial judge did not exclude, 
in principle, the defence of honest belief.  It further observed that the trial court did not shift 
the burden of proving honest belief to Charbonneau.152
 
  
(3) That, even if the trial judge recognised, in theory, the defence of honest belief in the 
truth of the affidavit, the judge did not, in any event, give Charbonneau the benefit of a 
reasonable doubt as to his honest belief, but instead imposed on Charbonneau a burden that 
was heavier than that of raising a reasonable doubt as to his belief in the truth of the  
affidavit.  This ground of appeal was also overruled.153
 
  
(4) That the trial judge erred in concluding that the false affidavit would have a “tendency” 
to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice.  He contended that even if there was 
enough evidence that he intended to obstruct the course of justice, the act of counselling 
false evidence from Blass did not have a tendency to obstruct the course of justice and it did 
not meet the requisite tendency.  The Appeal Court noted that if the false affidavit had been 
delivered to the police or used to discredit Blass’s evidence during the trial, it would 
certainly have had that requisite tendency to pervert the course of justice.  The court held 
that Charbonneau knew that the affidavit was false and that he actively attempted to have 
                                                 
151At 60f-g.   
152At 62a-g.  
153Ibid.  The court provided the same reasons. 
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Blass execute it, in spite of Blass’s insistence that it was false.154
 
   
(5) That the trial judge erred in refusing Charbonneau access to statements given by Blass 
concerning his previous crimes.155
 
 
(6) That the trial judge erred in refusing to permit Charbonneau to cross-examine Blass on 
certain conversations with Charbonneau on grounds of attorney-client privilege.156 The 
court held that “the trial judge erred in limiting the cross-examination of Blass on grounds 
of privilege.”157
 
 
(7) That the trial judge failed to direct himself as to Blass’s credibility.  The court observed 
that this was unfounded.158
 
  
The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.159 It is clear that the appeal was 
allowed partly because of the sixth ground of appeal that was decided in Charbonneau’s 
favour.160
 
 
The difference between R v Charbonneau and R v Hearn and Fahey is that in Charbonneau 
the accused attempted counselling false evidence from a person who was not a potential 
witness in a case against him.  In the latter case, Blass was a potential witness in the 
Coroner’s inquest where Allan Ross was implicated by Trudeau’s testimony.  
                                                 
154At 63g-h.   
155At 56a. 
 
156At 56a-b. 
  
157At 71f. 
 
158At 64a-b. 
159At 73e. 
 223 
 
Contrary to section 139(3) where it is said that where the accused used corrupt means to 
dissuade a witness, in terms of section 139(2) it is immaterial whether he or she believed 
that evidence sought to be suppressed was true or false.161 Where no corrupt means are 
used and X is charged under subsection (2) for wilfully attempting to obstruct justice by 
inducing another to give false evidence the state must prove that X’s action was a wilful 
attempt to obstruct the course of justice.162 For the state to succeed on a charge under 
section 139(2) it is not necessary that the course of justice actually be impeded by the 
accused.  The offence is complete once he or she has wilfully attempted to impede the due 
administration of justice.  It is said that the actions of the accused must have a tendency to 
obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice.  This means that it must be possible to carry 
it through to its conclusion.163
 
 
Greenspan and Rosenberg164 say that any attempt to pay compensation in any form to a 
witness that has, as its purpose, a direct tendency to influence a witness not to give 
evidence in a judicial proceeding, irrespective of the motive for doing so, is a corrupt 
attempt to obstruct justice.  Similarly, an attempt by the assailant to pay compensation to 
the complainant in order to influence the proceeding, for example, persuading the state to 
withdraw the charge, is capable to amounting to an offence of obstruction of justice.  
However, in R v Kotch165
                                                                                                                                                     
160See the discussion of this ground of appeal supra (n 156 to n 157). 
 it was said that honestly approaching a witness who has made a 
false or mistaken statement and, by reasoned arguments supported by material facts, trying 
 
161Mewett and M Manning op cit (n 18) 490.  
 
162Mewett and Manning op cit (n 11) 663 490. 
163Mewett and Manning op cit (n 11) 664. 
164Greenspan and Rosenberg op cit (n 11) CC/261 and Rodrigues op cit (n 11) 4-115-116. 
165(1990) 61 CCC (3d) 132 (Alta CA). 
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to dissuade him or her from giving perjured or erroneous testimony does not constitute an 
offence. 
 
The facts of this case were as follows:  Kotch was charged with wilful attempt to obstruct 
the course of justice in violation section 139(2).166 A friend of Kotch had been charged with 
shoplifting.  In an effort to have the charges against his friend withdrawn, the accused 
approached Frederick Burton, an employee at the store concerned, and offered to pay a sum 
of money as a charitable donation on behalf of the store if they would withdraw the charge.  
He indicated that the store could take advantage of the charitable donation by making it a 
promotional gesture for the store.  In his conversation with Burton, the accused told Burton 
that he was not trying to bribe him.167 It was alleged that before the accused approached the 
said employee he sought legal advice, and he was told that it was not an offence provided 
that the particular store did not receive any benefit.  It was also alleged that he did not 
disclose to his lawyer the plan of making the seeming charitable donation on behalf of the 
store and the promotion attached to the gesture.168 During the trial Kotch indicated that he 
had no intention of committing a criminal offence, but that was dismissed.  He was found 
guilty of contravening section 192(2).  He appealed.169  The conviction was challenged on 
the grounds that the trial judge failed to tell the jury that although Kotch intended his 
actions there was enough evidence to support the fact that he did not know, or he did not 
intend, that his actions would have the effect of obstructing justice.  He argued that there 
was no proof that he had specific intent of wilfully attempting to obstruct justice.170
                                                 
166The Criminal Code 1985. 
 The 
court confirmed that the presence of the word “wilfully” in subsections (1),(2) and (3) of 
167R v Kotch supra (n 165) at 132. 
168Ibid.  
169At 135. 
170At 135-36. 
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section 139 and the presence of the phrases “corrupt means” and “corrupt considerations” 
in section 139(3) invite a declaration that the offence described within section 139(3) is an 
offence requiring proof of a specific intent.  Notwithstanding this confirmation, the court 
held that any attempt to pay compensation, in any form, to a witness that has as its purpose 
a direct tendency to influence the witness not to give evidence in a judicial proceeding, 
irrespective of the motive for doing so, is a corrupt attempt to obstruct justice.171 The 
appeal was dismissed172 because there was no doubt that Kotch offered the store a benefit 
in exchange for its withdrawal of the charges against his friend and that it was intended as 
such.  The court held that the gravamen of this type of obstruction of justice is the corrupt 
attempt itself.173 The court further held that the offence would not, however, cover a bona 
fide negotiation for the withholding, withdrawal or reduction of a charge that is conducted 
with a law officer of the Crown. 174
  
 
This thesis supports the dismissal of the appeal because Kotch’s actions were intended and 
had a tendency of obstructing the course of justice.  Although he was not going to benefit 
anything from the deal, his friend would benefit.  His acts aptly fitted the specific intent 
required by the words “wilfully” in section 139(2). 
 
5.3.3   Interfering with witnesses 
Any interference with witnesses and potential witnesses by threats, bribes or other corrupt 
means, in order to dissuade or attempt to dissuade them from giving evidence constitutes 
obstruction of the course of justice and is governed by section 139(3)(a).  This subsection 
does not refer to “witnesses,” but simply states to “dissuade a person.”  The law forbids the 
                                                 
171At 136. 
172At 139. 
173At 132.  
174At 132-33. 
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actual or attempted, and by corrupt means, dissuasion of a person from testifying in a 
particular way or to dissuade him or her from testifying at all.  Where the accused used 
corrupt means to dissuade a person, it is immaterial whether the accused believed that the 
evidence he or she sought to suppress was true or false.  It is sufficient for liability that the 
accused intentionally did the prohibited act for the purpose of dissuading a person from 
giving evidence.175
 
  
In R v Walker176 the court found that it was immaterial whether the accused believed the 
evidence he seeks to suppress by his corrupt dissuasion was true or false.177 The facts of R v 
Walker were as follows:  Y made a statement to the police that falsely implicated X, the 
accused, as the person who had committed a particular robbery.178
   
 Before he was formally 
charged, the accused threatened Y to dissuade him from repeating this false allegation in a 
later trial.  At a preliminary hearing, Y told the truth and the accused (X) was discharged. 
X was charged with the wilful attempt to dissuade Y from giving evidence in contravention 
of section 127(2)(a) (now section 139(3)(a)).179 The legal question in this case was, if the 
accused was not guilty of robbery, would his threat to Y which successfully induced Y to 
correct the statement he gave to the investigating officer, constitute obstructing the course 
of justice because he had dissuaded Y from giving evidence?180
                                                 
175Mewett and Manning op cit (n 11) 662-63 and Rodrigues op cit (n 11) 4-113. 
 It was held that the offence 
of obstructing the course of justice covers not merely attempts to dissuade a witness from 
176(1972) 7 CCC (2d) 270.  
177At 274.  
178By falsely implicating X to have committed an offence, Y commits an offence of public mischief in 
contravention of section 140(1) of the Criminal Code.  The provisions of section 140(1) are discussed infra, 
text note 207.  
  
179The Canadian Criminal Code 1985.  See R v Walker supra (n 176) at 274 
180R v Walker supra (n 176) at 272. 
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testifying, but also attempts to dissuade a witness from giving certain specific evidence.181 
The accused was convicted of attempting to obstruct the course of justice by attempting to 
dissuade a witness by threats to testify in a certain manner.182
 
   
It is submitted that the conviction of the accused was correct because section 127(2)(a) 
(now section 139(3)(a)) is clear on the matter.  Wilfully dissuading or attempting to 
dissuade a person by threats does obstruct or pervert the course of justice and the accused’s 
conduct fitted squarely into what this subsection forbids.  Any attempt to interfere with a 
witness in order to make him or her to change his or her testimony and to say what the 
accused thinks is the truth has a tendency of obstructing the course of justice.  Similarly, an 
offer of money to a witness to induce him or her to speak what the offeror believes to be the 
truth may be an offence.183
 
  
5.3.4    Concealing or suppressing evidence 
Wilfully concealing or suppressing evidence with intent to obstruct the course of justice is a 
violation of section 139(2).184
                                                 
181At 270.  
 This offence is committed when X, in contemplating a 
judicial proceeding, conceals or suppresses evidence that may be needed in that judicial 
proceeding. The wilful attempt to conceal or suppress evidence has the tendency to obstruct 
the course of justice and, therefore, infringes section 139(2).  Such concealment or 
suppression has far-reaching consequences for the proper administration of justice in all of 
its stages.  Any attempt to conceal evidence from the police, for example, may obstruct 
them in their duty to investigate criminal activities.  It may also deprive the court of 
admissible evidence. 
182At 275. 
183See Smith and Hogan op cit Chapter Two (n 93) 754.  
184Vandervort op cit (n 9) 171 and Mewett and Manning op cit (n 18) 490. 
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A charge of concealment or suppression of evidence came before the Canadian court in 
2000 in R v Murray.185 The accused was charged with attempt to obstruct the course of 
justice186 in terms of section 139(2).  Murray, a lawyer and a member of the Ontario Bar, 
was charged with attempting to obstruct justice by concealing six videotapes which he 
removed from his client’s home at the instruction of his client.  Murray kept the tapes for 
seventeen months without disclosing their existence to the prosecution.  The videotapes 
constituted material evidence against his client, Paul Bernado, who was charged with first 
degree murder and related offences concerning the deaths of two teenage girls.187 The 
charge of obstructing the course of justice emanated from the actions of Bernado’s defence 
team, Murray, Doyle and MacDonald, when they visited Bernado’s house, searched for and 
found the tapes, and then concealed them.  Murray found the tapes, as directed by his client, 
and he requested his colleagues to ensure that no one found out about the existence of the 
tapes.  Murray locked the tapes in a safe or a credenza at his office, because he felt the 
discovery of those tapes was a “bonanza” for the defence.  He was charged with attempt to 
obstruct the course of justice for concealing the tapes.  The six videotapes, and two critical 
tapes, formed the basis of the charge against the accused.  The critical tapes contained 
horrifying visuals of two girls of 14 and 15 years, who were abducted by Bernardo and his 
wife, Homolka, being forced to participate with Bernardo and his wife in the grossest 
sexual perversions.188
 
 He did not alert the prosecuting counsel about the existence of any 
videotapes. 
In his defence on charges of attempt to obstruct justice by concealing the tapes, Murray 
                                                 
185(2000) 144 CCC (3d) 289 (Ont SCJ). 
186In contravention of section 139(2). 
187R v Murray supra (n 185) 289. 
188At 295.  
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testified that he had to retain the critical tapes for Bernardo’s defence.  He testified that he  
had two alternative plans for the use of the tapes.  Firstly, to hold back the tapes, tie down 
the main prosecution witness’s evidence at a preliminary inquiry and show her the tapes in 
cross-examination during trial.  Secondly, he would use them in an attempt to negotiate a 
resolution of the charges against the client on the basis that the defence had evidence which 
would show that the main prosecution witness was not credible.  He told the court that it 
was never his intention to permanently conceal the tapes and that at the very least they 
would come out at the trial.189
 
  
The court held:190
 
 
The mens rea of the offence of attempting to obstruct justice required the crown to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused intended to obstruct the course of justice.  This required 
consideration of whether the accused intended to conceal the tapes permanently or only up to the 
point of resolution discussions or trial, and whether it was the accused’s honest belief that he was 
entitled to do so.  The accused’s explanation as to his use of the two critical tapes in the defence of 
his client was one that might reasonably be true, and he may well have believed under the 
circumstances that he had no legal duty to disclose the tapes until resolution discussions or trial.  
There was a reasonable doubt as to the accused’s intention to obstruct justice.    
 
The accused was acquitted on the charge of attempting to obstruct justice because, 
according to the court, in the context of the evidence, Murray’s testimony raised a 
reasonable doubt as to his intention to obstruct justice.191
 
 
The R v Murray decision is strongly criticised by some legal commentators, especially by 
Vandervort.192 According to Vandervort,193
                                                 
189At 290. 
 the trial judge erred in his interpretation and 
application of the law of mens rea in the offence of wilfully attempting to obstruct the 
190Ibid. 
191At 322. 
192Vandervort op cit (n 9). 
193Vandervort op cit (n 9) 171. 
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course of justice.  Vandervort argues that even if Murray honestly believed that he had a 
duty to his client not to disclose the existence of the videotapes, such belief could not 
provide him with an exculpatory defence because in Canada mistakes of law do not excuse 
the accused from responsibility for criminal conduct in the absence of statutory 
exception.194 The court held that the confidentiality of the tapes was not protected under the 
umbrella of attorney-client privilege.195 Attorney-client privilege protects communication 
between an attorney and his or her client.  It was further held that videotapes were not such 
communications and hiding them from the police on behalf of the client could not be said to 
be an aspect of attorney-client communication.196 It is said that the R v Murray case was 
wrongly decided in law and that it should not be followed as a precedent creating a judicial 
exemption from criminal responsibility for lawyers who obstruct justice.  Vandervort says 
that mistake of the law, as the defence to the offence of obstruction of justice is a “bad 
excuse” for lawyers and laymen alike.197
 
  
This thesis agrees with the critique of the Murray case as a poor decision, because at all 
material times the accused concealed the tapes knowing very well that they were material to 
the charge of murder against his client.  In keeping those tapes, Murray ventured outside the 
limits of attorney-client privilege, and entered the domain of section 139(2).  The 
concealment of the incriminating tapes was intended, and had the tendency, to obstruct the 
due administration of justice because it deprived the court of vital admissible evidence.  In 
the eyes of the general public, decisions like this create an impression that the courts are 
prepared to treat legal practitioners who find themselves on the wrong side of the law with 
leniency.  It is respectfully submitted that, if followed, the Murray decision has a tendency 
                                                 
194Ibid. 
195R v Murray supra (n 185) at 313.  See also Vandervort op cit (n 9) 175. 
196R v Murray supra (n 185) at 313.  
 
197Vandervort op cit (n 9) 185. 
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to bring any country’s judicial system into disrepute, and it must therefore be treated with 
the greatest circumspection. 
 
 
 
5.4 OTHER STATUTORY OFFENCES AKIN TO OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE 
Under the Criminal Code there are many specific provisions which cover conduct which 
has the effect of obstructing the course of justice, such as obstructing a peace officer, giving 
contradictory evidence in judicial proceeding, fabricating evidence, public mischief and 
attempting to bribe a trial judge.198 Mewett and Manning199
  
 argue that by enacting these 
specific provisions, Parliament intended to exclude the conduct contained in them from the 
general offence under section 139(2). 
5.4.1   Obstructing a peace officer 
Obstructing a peace officer is an offence related to obstructing the course of justice. The 
offence is found in the provisions of section 129 of the Criminal Code.200 This section 
provides:201
 
 
Everyone who─ 
 
(a) resists or wilfully obstructs a public officer or peace officer in the execution of his duty or any 
person acting in aid of such an officer, 
 
 (b) omits, without reasonable excuse, to assist a public officer or peace officer in the execution of 
his  duty in arresting a person or in preserving the peace, after having reasonable notice that he is 
required to do so, or 
 
(c) resists or wilfully obstructs any person in the execution of a process against lands or goods or 
in making a lawful distress or seizure, is guilty of  
 
                                                 
198Mewett and Manning op cit (n 11) 667 and Watt and Fuerst op cit (n 11) 240. 
  
199Mewett and Manning op cit (n 18) 494.  
 
200The Canadian Criminal Code 1985. 
  
201Greenspan and Rosenberg op cit (n 11) CC/245; Watt and Fuerst op cit (n 11) 237-38; Saxton and 
Stansfield op cit (n 11) 50 and Heather op cit (n 11) 4-7. 
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(d) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or 
 
(e) an offence punishable on summary conviction.  
 
Although it is a separate offence, section 129(a) and (c) are related to the offence of 
obstructing, perverting or defeating the course of justice found in section 139(2).  The 
scope of the course of justice includes the investigatory stage of the criminal act.  By 
implication, if X wilfully obstructs a peace officer, for instance, in the investigation of a 
criminal act, X obstructs the course of justice.  Seizure of any article, goods or documents 
that could be made available as evidence in a judicial proceeding is essential for the 
administration of justice.  If X obstructs a peace officer when executing the seizure of any 
piece of evidence that may be of assistance in court, such obstruction has a tendency to 
frustrate the course of justice.  Depending on X’s intent when obstructing the peace officer, 
a charge of obstructing the course of justice may also be invoked in some of the 
circumstances set out in section 129. 
  
5.4.2   Witness giving contradictory evidence 
Giving contradictory evidence in judicial proceedings is a punishable offence.  Section 136 
provides:202
(1) Everyone who, being a witness in a judicial proceeding, gives evidence with respect to any matter 
of fact or knowledge and who subsequently, in a judicial proceeding, gives evidence that is 
contrary to his previous evidence is guilty of an indictable offence … 
 
 
This offence may amount also to obstruction of justice because the witness withholds true 
evidence from the judicial proceeding.  This offence also overlaps with perjury. 
 
5.4.3   Fabricating evidence 
Under the Canadian Criminal Code, and unlike the law of England203 and Australia,204
                                                 
202Greenspan and Rosenberg op cit (n 11) CC/255; Watt and Fuerst op cit (n 11) 237-38; Saxton and 
Stansfield op cit (n 11) 50; Heather op cit (n 11) 4-11 and Rose op cit (n 11) 4-12. 
 the 
 
203The Queen v Vreones supra Chapter Two (n 93). 
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offence of fabricating evidence does not fall under obstruction of the course of justice, but 
nevertheless it is discussed under this heading.  The prohibition of fabricating evidence is 
found in section 137.205 This section provides:206
 
 
Everyone who, with intent to mislead, fabricates anything with intent that it shall be used as evidence 
in a judicial proceeding, existing or proposed, by any means other than perjury or incitement to 
perjury is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
fourteen years. 
 
This section creates an indictable offence of fabricating anything which the accused intends 
to use in a judicial proceeding.  Section 137 is broadly worded to apply to circumstances in 
which such proceedings are either in existence or are proposed at the time the fabrication 
occurs.207 The culpability required for this offence is that the accused acted with intention 
to mislead even if the evidence is not used.208
 
  
 
5.4.4   Public mischief 
X commits an offence and contravenes section 140(1) of the Criminal Code by causing the 
police or other peace officer to start or to continue an investigation with intent to mislead 
them.209 X, for example, makes a false statement to the police that Y is the person who 
committed a bank robbery.  As a result of that statement the police commence with the 
investigation against Y.  Section 140210
                                                                                                                                                     
 
 provides: 
204Gillies op cit Chapter Four (n 6) 815. 
205The Canadian Criminal Code 1985.  See Greenspan and Rosenberg op cit (n 11) CC/257. 
206Greenspan and Rosenberg op cit (n 8) CC/257; Watt and Fuerst op cit (n 8) 237-38; Saxton and Stansfield 
op cit (n 11) 50 Heather op cit (n 11) 4-11 and Rose op cit (n 11) 4-12. 
 
207EL Greenspan and M Rosenberg Martin’s Annual Criminal Code (2004) CC/225 and Watt and Fuerst op 
cit (n 11) 235.  
 
208Greenspan and Rosenberg op cit (n 11) CC/257 and Heather op cit (n 11) 4-11-12. 
209See Saxton and Stansfield op cit (n 11) 53 and Greenspan and Rosenberg op cit (n 206) CC/260.  
 
210Criminal Code 1985.  See Saxton and Stansfield op cit (n 11) 53-4; Watt and Fuerst op cit (n 11) 240-4 and 
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(1) Everyone commits public mischief who, with intent to mislead, causes a peace 
officer to enter on or continue an investigation by 
 
(a) making a false statement that accuses some other person of having 
committed an offence;  
 
(b) doing anything that is intended to cause some other person to be suspected 
of having committed an offence that the other person has not committed, or 
to divert suspicion from himself; 
 
(c) reporting that an offence has been committed when it has not been 
committed; or 
 
(d) reporting or in any other way making it known or causing it to be made 
known that he or some other person has died when he or that other person 
has not died. 
 
(2) Everyone who commits public mischief 
  
(a) is guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
five years; or 
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction. 
 
The actus reus of this offence is to cause the police or other peace officer to start or to 
continue an investigation.211 There must be a causal link between the police investigation 
and the false statement.212 The mens rea is intent to mislead the peace officer.213
 
  
5.4.5    Attempt to bribe a trial judge 
In terms of section 119(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, X, being, inter alia, the holder of a 
judicial office, commits an offence if he or she accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or 
attempts to obtain, any money, valuable consideration, etc., for himself or herself or another 
person in respect of anything done or omitted or to be done or omitted by him or her in his  
 
                                                                                                                                                     
Rodrigues op cit (n 11) 4-120.   
 
211Saxton and Stansfield op cit (n 11) 53 and Watt and Fuerst op cit (n 11) 241. 
 
212Watt and Fuerst op cit (n 11) 241. 
 
213Saxton and Stansfield op cit (n 11) 53 and Watt and Fuerst op cit (n 11) 241. 
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or her official capacity.214
 
 
In terms of section 119(1)(b), X commits an offence if he or she corruptly gives or offers 
any money, valuable consideration, etc., to, inter alia, the holder of a judicial office in 
respect of anything done or omitted or to be done or omitted by him or her (the holder of a 
judicial office) in his or her official capacity.215
 
 
5.5 SUMMARY 
The offence of obstructing, perverting or defeating the course of justice is governed by 
section 139(1)-(3) of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985.  Section 139(1) only creates an offence 
of perverting the course of justice by indemnifying a surety.  Section 139(2) creates a broad 
offence of obstruction of justice.  Section 139(3) deals with witnesses in judicial 
proceeding.   
 
Canadian law distinguishes between conduct related to a judicial proceeding and conduct 
not related to a judicial proceeding.  Sections 139(1) and (3) require that an attempt to 
obstruct, pervert or defeat “should relate to the course of justice in a judicial proceeding.”  
Contrary to section 139(1) and (3), no mention is made of a “judicial proceeding” in section 
139(2).  Therefore, in terms of this section, the obstruction of justice does not have to occur 
in relation to a “judicial proceeding.”  This means that when a wilful attempt to interfere 
with prospective witnesses occurs at a stage before the state has considered, or decided, to 
lay a charge in the matter, X has to be charged under section 139(2) for attempting to 
obstruct the course of justice.  Although this offence is framed in the language of an 
attempt, section 139 creates a substantive offence. 
 
                                                 
214See Heather op cit (n 11) 4-1-2 and Watt and Fuerst op cit (n 11) 211.  
 
215See Heather op cit (n 11) 4-2 and Watt and Fuerst op cit (n 11) 211.   
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A “judicial proceeding” is defined broadly in section 118 of the Criminal Code as a 
proceeding: 
 
(a) in or under the authority of the court; 
 
(b) before the Senate or House of Commons, or a committee of the Senate or House of 
Commons, or before a legislative council, legislative assembly or house of assembly or a 
committee thereof that is authorised by the law to administer an oath; 
 
(c) before a court, judge, justice, provincial court judge or coroner; 
 
(d) before an arbitrator or umpire, or a person or body of persons authorised by law to make 
an inquiry and take evidence therein under oath; or  
 
(e) before a tribunal by which a legal right or legal liability may be established whether or 
not the proceeding is invalid for want of jurisdiction or for any other reason.  It is clear that 
the validity of the proceeding is not a prerequisite. 
 
In terms of section 139(1) an attempt to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice is 
constituted by wilfully indemnifying or agreeing to indemnify a surety, or by a surety in 
accepting or agreeing to accept any form of indemnity in respect of a person who is 
released or is to be released from custody. 
 
Section 139(2) prohibits any wilful attempt to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of 
justice.  This includes, but is not limited to the following conduct: 
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a. Wasteful employment of police.  This offence is committed by wilfully making a 
false report to the police tending to show that an offence has been committed. 
 
b. Removing a witness or the accused from the court’s jurisdiction. 
 
c. Persuading a victim not to prosecute his or her assailant.   
 
d. Destroying evidence.  When X wilfully attempts to destroy any evidence with 
intention to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice.  
 
e. Concealing or suppressing evidence.  This offence is committed when X, in 
contemplating a judicial proceeding, conceals or suppresses evidence that may be 
needed in court.   
 
f. Misleading the court.  A lawyer, for example, is under a duty not to mislead the court 
and may be convicted of obstructing the course of justice where he participates in the 
client’s deception by arranging for the client’s friend to attend in court and answer to 
a charge against a client, who had previously given that friend’s name to the police as 
his own upon arrest. 
 
g. Refusal to testify in an inquiry.  If X refuses to be sworn in and testify at a 
preliminary inquiry, such refusal amounts to obstructing the course of justice and he 
or she can be charged with contravening section 139(2) of the Criminal Code. 
 
Section 139(3)(a)-(c) prohibits, in an “existing” or “proposed” judicial proceeding, the 
dissuasion or attempt to dissuade a person by threats, bribes, etc., from giving evidence, or 
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from corruptly influencing a juror or to accept or obtain, or any attempt thereof, a bribe in 
order to abstain from giving evidence or from doing anything as a juror.  Section 139(3) of 
the Criminal Code 1985 requires that the judicial proceeding be “existing” or “proposed.”  
It is said that a judicial proceeding is “existing” in the case of criminal proceedings once a 
charge has been laid, and it is “proposed” when a decision to prosecute has been made and 
perhaps when prosecution is contemplated.  It is said that a judicial proceeding is not 
“proposed,” for the purposes of section 139(3), when an investigation to determine whether 
there has been criminal conduct is merely under way.  Therefore, if X interferes with a 
potential witness before the Crown has decided to, or considered, laying charges in the 
matter, then the proper charge will be under section 139(2) of the Criminal Code for 
obstructing the course of justice.  The scope of the crime of obstructing the course of justice 
has been widened to include conduct which amounts to interference with police 
investigations of criminal activities and threats made by the accused after sentence has been 
passed.  The words used in section 139(2), namely, “the course of justice” are interpreted as 
including the investigatory stage of a crime.  The term is also applicable to disciplinary 
proceedings of the Law Society. 
 
There are similarities between the Canadian and Australian law as to when the course of 
justice begins.  Just as Australian law states that the course of justice only begins once the 
jurisdiction of some court or competent judicial authority is invoked, section 139(3) of the 
Canadian Criminal Code requires that there must be an “existing” or “proposed” judicial 
proceeding before the offence of perverting, preventing or defeating the course of justice 
can be committed.  On the other hand, similar to English law, under section 139(2) of the 
Canadian Criminal Code the proceedings need not be existing or proposed before the 
course of justice can be perverted.  It can be perverted before proceedings are active.  In 
Canadian (and English) law, but not Australian law, police investigations form part of the 
course of justice.  In all of these jurisdictions, the attempt to prevent or pervert or defeat the 
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course of justice is a substantive offence.  In all of these jurisdictions the intent to prevent, 
pervert or defeat the course of justice is an element of the offence.  Like in English law, this 
thesis could not find any case law or academic opinion to the proposition that an omission 
may give rise to liability for obstruction of the due administration of justice in terms of the 
Canadian law. 
 
In jurisdictions like England and Australia the fabrication of evidence falls within the ambit 
of the crime of obstructing the course of justice, but in Canadian law, this conduct is 
governed by section 137 of the Canadian Criminal Code.  There is no authority in case law 
where it was found that fabrication of evidence is also regarded as a contravention of 
section 139 of the Canadian Criminal Code.  The crime is discussed in this thesis because 
fabricating evidence in order to mislead a judicial proceeding also has the tendency to 
obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice. 
 
Unlike English law, the crime of obstructing a police officer in the execution of his or her 
duty, in terms of section 129 of the Criminal Code, does not fall within the scope of the 
crime of obstructing the course of justice. Likewise, the fabrication of evidence, obstructing 
a police officer, public mischief and attempt to bribe a judicial officer are discussed here 
because they have the tendency to obstruct or to pervert the course of justice.  They 
constitute separate offences from obstruction of justice in terms of section 139 of the 
Canadian Criminal Code. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
AMERICAN LAW 
6.1 GENERAL 
In the United States of America the crime of obstructing the course of justice is defined as 
an act by which one or more persons attempt to prevent or actually prevent the execution of 
a lawful process.1 This offence falls under offences against the administration of justice.2 
American law belongs to the common law family and the law is generally analogous to that 
of English common law.3 However, in the United States of America there is no federal 
common law as each state has its own common law.4 The influence of English common 
law on the United States of America is apparent in that it was a common law crime in the 
states to commit an act obstructing, or tending to obstruct public justice.5 In the United 
States of America, any act which prevented, impeded or hindered the administration of 
justice was considered a common law misdemeanour.6 Conduct which constituted the 
common law crime of obstructing the administration of justice included obstructing an 
officer, tampering with jurors or witnesses, preparing false evidence, destroying evidence, 
resisting arrest, and compounding a crime.7
 
 
United States federal law on the obstruction of justice dates back to 1831, when Congress 
confirmed the power of the judiciary to punish contempt of court and codified the common 
 
                                                 
1AZ Gammage and CF Hemphill Basic Criminal Law 2ed (1979) 298 and G Lou “Obstruction of Justice” 
(1999) American Law Review Vol 36 No 3 930. 
 
2Others are perjury, misconduct in office, bribery, etc.  
  
3R David and JEC Brierley Major Legal Systems in the World Today 2ed (1978) 377. 
 
4David and Brierley op cit (n 3) 387. 
  
5JM Scheb and JM Scheb II Criminal Law and Procedure 4ed (2002) 320. 
  
6Ibid. 
 
7Scheb and Scheb op cit (n 5) 320-22. 
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law crime of obstructing justice.8 Legislation was introduced by both the states and the 
federal government to legislate the offence of obstructing the course of justice.  It may be 
treated as a felony or a misdemeanour, depending on the seriousness of the offence.9 Scheb 
and Scheb10 point out that as the federal statutory law came into being, certain conduct 
previously prosecuted as common law crimes of obstructing the course of justice, such as 
escaping from prison or resisting arrest, are now dealt with as distinct crimes.  The federal 
statute11 forbids the obstruction of justice and protects the integrity of proceedings before 
the federal judiciary and other government bodies.12 It is said that crimes like obstruction of 
justice and perjury are quintessentially opposed to the American system of government.  It 
is said that obstruction of justice subverts the very judicial process on which the rule of law 
so vitally depends.13
 
 
6.2 WHEN DOES THE “COURSE OF JUSTICE” BEGIN? 
In the United States of America the federal offences of obstruction of justice and tampering 
with witnesses are two different offences.  Obstructing the due administration of justice in 
any court of the United States, corruptly or by threats or by force, is a criminal offence and 
is punishable in terms of sections 1503, 1507 and 1513 of the United States Code.14 
Tampering with witnesses is punishable in terms of section 1512.15
                                                 
8L Solum and S Marzen “Truth and uncertainty: Legal control of the destruction of evidence” (1987) Emory 
Law Journal Vol 36 1110. 
 Section 1503(a) 
 
9F Schmalleger Criminal Law Today: An introduction with capstone cases 2 ed (2001) 457. 
 
10Scheb and Scheb op cit (n 5) 320.  
 
11Sections 1501 to 1518 of Title 18 of the United States Code, (1994). 
 
12Lou op cit (n 1) 930 and JM Fedders and LH Gutterplan “Document retention and destruction: Practical 
legal and ethical consideration” (1980) Notre Dame Law Review Vol 56 32-53. 
 
13CJ Cooper “ ‘A perjurer in the White House?’: The constitutional case for perjury and obstruction of justice 
as high crimes and misdemeanours” (1999) Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy Vol 22 621.  
 
1418 United States Code. 
  
1518 United States Code. 
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provides:16
 
 
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavours 
to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United 
States, or officer who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding before any United 
States magistrate judge or other committing magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any 
such grand or petit juror in his person or property on account of any verdict or indictment assented to 
by him, or on account of his being or having been such a juror, or injures any such officer, magistrate 
judge, or other committing magistrate in his person or property on account of the performance of his 
official duties, or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, 
influences, obstructs or impedes, or endeavours to influence, or to obstruct, or to impede, the due 
administration of justice, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). 
 
It is said that section 1503 cannot be construed as proscribing conduct which takes place 
wholly outside the context of an ongoing judicial proceeding.17 Some academic writers also 
say that the statutory offence of obstruction of justice may be committed only once judicial 
proceedings are “pending.”18
                                                 
16United States Code Title 18 Crimes and Criminal Procedure Vol 19 (1994).  See also N Abrams and SS 
Beale Federal Criminal Law and its Enforcement 2ed (1993) 654.  Before 1982, section 1503 read:   
 The question is when are judicial proceedings regarded as 
pending in order to invoke section 1503?  There is no consensus among the circuit courts as 
to when judicial proceedings are pending for the purposes of section 1503 and there is no 
guidance, as yet, from the United States Federal Court.  In 1987, for example, in United 
 
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavours 
to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness in or of any court of the United States, or before any 
United States commissioner other committing magistrate, or any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of 
any court of the United States, or officer who may be serving at any examination or other proceedings 
before any United States commissioner, other committing magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or 
injures any party or witness in his person or property on account of his attending or having attended  
such court or examination before such officer, commissioner, or other committing magistrate, or on 
account of his testifying or having testified to any matter pending therein, or injures any such grand or 
petit juror in his person or property on account of  any verdict or indictment assented to by him, or on 
account of his being or having been such a juror, or injures any such officer, commissioner , or other 
committing magistrate in his person or property on account of the performance of his official duties, or 
[(2)] corruptly or by threats of force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, 
obstructs, or impedes, or endeavours to influence, or obstruct, or  impede, the due administration of 
justice, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.   
 
17United States Code Annotated, Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure sections 1361-1950.  It is said that 
the words in section 1503 “… other proceeding before any United States magistrate judge  ...” mean that there 
must be judicial proceedings in progress before this section can be invoked. 
 
18A Berg and J Levinson “Obstruction of justice”(2000) American Criminal Law Review Vol 37 No 2 761, 
Solum and Marzen op cit (n 8) 1111 and K Palfin and S Prabhu “Obstruction of Justice” (2003) American 
Criminal Law Review Vol 40 No 2 878. 
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States v Ellis19 the court refused to establish pendency where a federal grand jury was 
empanelled, but no subpoenas had been issued and the grand jury had not been appraised of 
the investigation.  According to Palfin and Prabhu,20 judicial proceedings are pending when 
an investigation is undertaken to secure presently contemplated evidence for presentation 
before a grand jury or as soon as an indictment is issued.21 Some circuit courts22 held that 
an investigation conducted by the grand jury per se constitutes judicial proceedings for the 
purposes of the provisions of section 1503.23 According to another point of view, the 
offence of obstruction of the course of justice can only arise when justice is being 
administered,24 in other words section 150325 applies only to pending judicial actions.26 
According to this view, the proscription of section 1503 does not begin until a grand jury 
has issued a subpoena in a criminal investigation, or a plaintiff has filed a complaint in a 
civil action.27 Most circuit courts agree that the obstruction of pending judicial proceedings 
is a prerequisite for conviction under section 1503.28
 
  
Unlike English law,29
                                                 
19652 F Supp 1415 (SD Miss 1987) at 1453.  See Lou op cit (n 1) 934. 
 it seems that for the prosecution to succeed with a charge of 
obstruction of the course of justice in terms of section 1503 there must be pending “judicial 
proceedings.” However, there is also authority for the proposition that the accused may be 
 
20Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 879. 
 
21Ibid. 
 
22The First, Second, Fourth, Fifth and Tenth Circuit Courts. 
 
23Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 879. 
 
24United States Code Annotated, Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure sections 1361-1950. 
 
25The provisions of section 1503 are discussed supra, text at note 16. 
 
26Fedders and Gutterplan op cit (n 12) 20.  
 
27Solum and Marzen op cit (n 8) 1112. 
  
28Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 878. 
 
29In English law judicial proceedings need not be in progress for the crime of obstructing the course of justice 
to be committed.  This matter is discussed supra under 3.2, text at note 22. 
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convicted of obstruction of justice for interfering with the following proceedings: 
 
 (a) a grand jury investigation,30
 (b) investigation by the United States Probation Officer (USPO),
 
31
 (c) investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI),
 
32
 (d) investigations by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
 and 
33
 
 
Section 1512(b)34 prohibits tampering with witnesses in “official proceedings.”35 Section 
151236
 
 provides: 
(b) [W]hoever knowingly uses intimidation, or physical force, threatens, or corruptly persuades 
another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with 
intent to ─ 
 
(1) influence, delay or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding; 
 
(2) cause or induce any person to─ 
 
(A) withhold testimony or withhold a record, document or other object, from an 
official proceeding; 
 
(B) alter, destroy, mutilate or conceal an object with intent to impair the object’s 
integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; 
 
(C) evade legal process summoning that person to appear as a witness, or to 
produce a record, document or other object, in an official proceeding or 
 
(D) be absent from an official proceeding to which such person has been 
       summoned by legal process … 
 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. 
                                                 
30Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 17) 978.  
 
31United States v Novak 217 F 3d 566 (8th Cir 2000).  
   
32See United States v Cueto 151 F 3d 620 (7th Cir 1998).  The case is discussed infra under 6.3.2.3, text at 
note 167.  
 
33See United States v Ladum 141 F 3d 1328 (9th Cir 1998).  This case is discussed infra under 6.3.1.2.1, text at 
note 89. 
 
3418 United States Code. 
 
35See Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 897. 
 
36United States Code (2000 and Supp II (2002) Titles 1- 18 (02 January 2001 to 06 January 2003). 
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In section 1515(a)(1),37
(i) a proceeding before a judge or court of the United States, a United States magistrate, a bankruptcy 
judge, a judge of the United States Tax Court, a special trial of the Tax Court, a judge of the United 
States Claims Court, or a Federal grand jury;
 an “official proceeding” is defined as: 
38
 
 
(ii) proceeding before the Congress; 
 
(iii) a proceeding involving the business of insurance before any insurance regulatory official or 
agency.   
 
For the purposes of section 1512(b) an “official proceeding” need not be pending or about 
to be instituted at the time of the offence.39 Section 151240
  
 provides: 
 (e) For the purposes of this section- 
   
(1) an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the 
  offence. 
 
In 1996, in United States v Morrison41
 
 the court observed that if the defendant realised that 
a federal proceeding might be commenced and acted in such a manner so as to affect the 
potential testimony, a conviction under section 1512 was permissible.  The conduct must be 
accompanied by the intent to interfere with the witness. 
It is unclear as to when the course of justice terminates in terms of the crime of obstruction 
                                                 
3718 United States Code. 
 
38A grand jury is a type of a jury which determines if there is enough evidence for a trial.  Grand juries carry 
out this duty by examining evidence presented to them by a prosecutor and issuing indictments, or by 
investigating the alleged crimes and issuing presentments.  A grand jury is traditionally larger and 
distinguishable from a petit jury, which is used during a trial.  See at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand-jury, 
(accessed on 12 July 2007). 
 
39Section 1512(e)(1). 
 
4018 United States Code (2002). 
 
41United States v Morrison 98 F 3d 619 (DC Cir 1996) at 630.  See L Raffer and J Teper “Obstruction of 
justice” (1998) American Criminal Law Review Vol 35 No 3 1009.  
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of justice for the purposes of section 1512(b) of the Code.  There is, however, authority to 
the effect that the scope of the course of justice has been extended to include post-trial 
proceedings.  It is said that for the purposes of section 1503, criminal action remains 
pending in court until disposition is made of any direct appeal taken by the accused on the 
error of law that could result in a new trial.42
 
 
In 2000, in United States v Novak,43 there was a dissenting view on the pendency of 
“judicial proceeding” requirement in order to invoke section 1503.  The court observed that, 
on the face of it, there was nothing in the statute that required a judicial proceeding to be 
pending.  The facts of this case were as follows:  Novak entered a conditional guilty plea to 
a charge of bank fraud for misrepresenting pledged collateral.  He was convicted and 
sentenced to five months’ imprisonment, followed by two years of supervised release with 
certain conditions, which included the monthly submission of a written, truthful and 
complete report to the United States Probation Officer (USPO) and that Novak must 
undertake to truthfully answer all inquiries by the Probation Officer.  During the period of 
supervised release, Novak violated the conditions of his release.  He admitted, inter alia, 
that he attempted to hide his employment, income and assets from the USPO in order to 
avoid payment of the court ordered restitution and provided false information to the United 
States Probation Officer in 1997.  He was charged, inter alia, with the violation of section 
1503 of Title 18 of the United States Code (1994) emanating from the false monthly 
supervisory reports he submitted to the United States Probation Officer.44
 
  
Novak argued that his misconduct occurred during his term of supervised release and, 
therefore, was not covered by section 1503, because there was no pending “judicial 
                                                 
42United States Code Annotated, Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure sections 1361-1950. 
  
43United States v Novak supra (n 31). 
 
44At 569.  
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proceeding” when the misconduct took place.45 The court held:46
 
 
While the instant prosecution may be unusual, there is nothing on the face of section 1503 requiring 
a pending proceeding nor precluding its use in targeting those who make knowing and fraudulent 
misrepresentation to the USPO in violation of the court order during a period of supervised release. 
 
However, having said that, on the face of it, there was nothing in section 1503 that required 
a pending “judicial proceeding.” The court had to consider whether this case satisfied the 
requirement of a pending “judicial proceeding”, assuming, arguably, the existence of such a 
requirement.  The court conceded that there was relatively little case law in the United 
States of America that addressed this question.  The court observed that a few cases have 
determined when a judicial proceeding begins for the purposes of section 1503, but no 
authority existed as to when a proceeding terminates.47 Nevertheless, the court agreed with 
the trial court that Novak’s misconduct occurred while a judicial proceeding was 
“pending.”  The reason for the court’s decision was that the relevant conduct occurred after 
sentencing, but within the period to file a motion to reduce the sentence pursuant to the 
federal rules of criminal procedure.48 Having reviewed all of Novak’s arguments the court 
found no basis to reverse the trial court’s finding and the appeal was dismissed.49
 
 
It is submitted that the importance of the Novak decision lies in the observation made by the 
court that, on the face of it, there was nothing in section 1503 that required the judicial 
proceeding to be pending.  Following the Novak case in 2001, in United States v Steele,50
                                                 
45At 571.  
 
 
46At 571-72. 
47At 572. 
48Ibid.  This federal rule of criminal procedure permits the government to make a motion to the district court, 
within one year after sentence is imposed, to reduce the defendant’s sentence to reflect that he or she gave 
subsequent and substantial assistance to the investigation or prosecution of another person. 
 
49At 578. 
50241 F 3d 302 (3rd Cir 2001) at 306.  This case is discussed infra under 6.3.1.2.3, text at note 105. 
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the United States Court of Appeals concluded that no formal act was required to establish 
that a grand jury investigation is pending for the purposes of a charge of obstruction of 
justice that arises in response to a subpoena for investigation.  
 
The circuit courts that have addressed the issue as to when the proceedings cease to be 
“pending” agree that, for purposes of section 1503, proceedings are pending after 
sentencing and until the disposition is made of any direct appeal that would result in a  
new trial.51 Finally, as in English law,52 the Eighth53 and Eleventh54 Circuit Courts have 
asserted that no judicial proceedings were required in order to invoke section 1503.55
 
  
6.3 CONDUCT WHICH CONSTITUTES THE STATUTORY OFFENCE OF 
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE IN TERMS OF SECTIONS 1503, 1507, 1512 
AND 1513 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE 
Chapter 73 of the United States Code56
obstructing the course of the course in terms of sections 1503, 1507, 1512 and 1513 of the 
Code:
 regulates the federal statutory crime of obstruction 
of the course of justice. The following conduct constitutes the federal statutory offence of  
57
 
 
                                                 
51See Lou op cit (n 1) 934 and Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 879.  
 
52See Card at 537 op cit Chapter 3 under 3.2, text at note 23 and Smith and Hogan at 752 op cit Chapter 3 
under 3.2, text at note 21. 
 
53United States v Novak supra (n 31) at 572. 
 
54United States v Veal 153 F 3d 1233 (11th Cir 1998) at 1250. 
 
55Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 17) 879. 
 
5618 United States Code. 
 
57MC Bassiouni Substantive Criminal Law (1977) 422-25, JU De Marco “A funny thing happened on the way 
to the court house: Mens rea, document destruction and the federal obstruction of justice statute”(1992) New 
York University Law Review Vol 67:570, No 67 573 and RM Perkins Perkins on Criminal Law 2ed (1969) 
495, CE Torcia Wharton’s Criminal Law 15ed Vol 4 (1996) 252-66, HB Rothblatt Criminal Law of New York 
the Revised Penal Law (1993) 315-19, Gammage and Hemphill op cit (n 1) 300-01, Scheb and Scheb op cit (n 
5) 321 and Schmalleger op cit (n 9) 457-58. 
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a. Tampering with the jury or judge.58
b. Concealment, alteration or destruction of documents.
 
59
c. Encouraging or rendering false testimony.
 
60
d. Picketing or parading or using sound amplifiers with intent to disrupt or influence 
judges, jurors, or witnesses.
 
61
e. Tampering with witnesses.
 
62
f. Intimidating, using physical force or threats against a witness.
 
63
  
 
Many states have also created crimes of “endeavouring to obstruct justice” and “conspiring 
to obstruct justice,”64
 
 but this thesis will discuss only the conduct which constitutes the 
federal statutory offence of obstruction of justice.  Conduct that constitutes the federal 
statutory offence of obstructing the course of justice discussed hereunder will commence 
with the conduct which is punishable in terms of section 1503.  
6.3.1 Conduct which constitutes the offence of obstructing the course of justice 
in contravention of section 1503 of the Code 
6.3.1.1 Tampering with a jury or a judge 
In the United States of America, to corruptly influence any grand or petit juror or officer of 
the court by threats, force, letter or communication, is a punishable offence in terms of 
section 1503 of the Code.65
                                                 
58Section 1503 of 18 United States Code.  
 Furthermore, it is also punishable to corruptly endeavour to 
 
59Sections 1503 and 1512(c)(2) of 18 United States Code.   
 
60Section 1503 of 18 United States Code.  
  
61Section 1507 of 18 United States Code.   
 
62Section 1512 of 18 United States Code.  
  
63Section 1513 of 18 United States Code.  
  
64Schmalleger op cit (n 9) 458. 
65 Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 17) 876.  
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influence, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice.  The latter conduct is 
prohibited by the omnibus provision66 of section 1503.67 It is said that the omnibus clause 
is essentially a “catch-all” provision that permits prosecutions for obstruction of justice 
even if the perpetrator’s actions were not specifically enumerated within section 1503 or 
some other section of Chapter 73 of the United States Code.68 The provision protects the 
grand and petit jurors as well as judicial officers from threats, intimidation and retaliation.  
The omnibus provision of section 1503 has also been applied to acts of obstruction of 
justice that affect witnesses in federal judicial proceedings, and thereby complements the 
prohibition of witness tampering in terms of section 1512.69 Some academic writers say 
that the provision is applied to both civil and criminal proceedings, and it applies to both 
actual and attempted obstruction of justice.70 It is also said that some courts even allowed 
prosecution of perjury under the omnibus clause of the federal obstruction of justice statute 
in terms of section 1503.71
 
  
Section 1503(a) protects the judicial process in two distinctive ways.  Firstly, it prohibits 
conduct which corruptly influences any grand or petit juror or officer of the court by threats 
or force, or by letter or communication.72
                                                 
66The omnibus clause of section 1505 of Title 18 of the United States Code commences from “corruptly 
endeavou[ring to influence, obstruct or impede], or endeavour[ing] to influence, or to obstruct, or to impede, 
the due administration of justice.”  
 Secondly, the concluding portion of section 1503, 
the omnibus clause, is essentially a “catch-all” provision that generally prohibits conduct 
that interferes with the due administration of justice or an “endeavour to interfere” with the 
  
6718 United States Code.  
6818 United States Code.  See TM Riley “Tampering with witness tampering: Resolving the quandary 
surrounding 18 United States Code sections 1503, 1512” (1999) Washington University Law Quarterly Vol 
77 254. 
 
69See Lou op cit (n 1) 930–31. 
   
70Ibid.  See also Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 877. 
 
71LC Harris “Perjury defeats justice” (1996) The Wayne Law Review Vol 42 1760.  
 
72United States Code Title 18 Crimes and Criminal Procedure Vol 19 (1994). 
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due administration of justice.73
 
  
In 1995, in United States v Aguilar,74 the accused was charged with corruptly endeavouring 
to influence, obstruct and impede the grand jury investigation in violation of the omnibus 
clause of section 1503.75 The facts of this case were as follows:  Aguilar was a United 
States District Judge.  He was convicted of illegally disclosing the presence of a wiretap76 
in violation of section 2232(c) of 18 United States Code.77 The authorization for the 
particular wiretap had expired before the disclosure was made.  However, because he lied 
to the agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) during a grand jury 
investigation, he was, in addition, convicted of endeavouring to obstruct the due 
administration of justice under section 1503.  The prosecution argued that Aguilar 
understood that his false statements would be provided to the grand jury and that he made 
the statements with intent to thwart the grand jury investigation and not only the FBI.78
                                                 
73Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 876; Lou op cit (n 1) 932 and Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 760.   
 The 
Court of Appeals concluded that the prosecution could not convince, on the trial of fact, 
that Aguilar knew that his false statement would be provided to the grand jury, and that the 
evidence showed only that Aguilar gave false testimony to an investigating agent.  The 
Court of Appeals held that the prosecution did not show that the agents acted as an arm of 
the grand jury, or indeed, that the grand jury had even summoned the testimony of those 
 
74United States v Aguilar 515 S Ct 2357 (1995). 
 
75At 2362.  See also Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 876-77; Lou op cit (n 1) 932-33 and Berg and Levinson 
op cit (n 17) 760.   
 
76A wiretap is a device used to connect to, and eavesdrop upon, a telegraph or telephone wire in order to 
obtain information secretly.  See Collins English Dictionary at 1842 op cit Chapter Four under 4.4.3.4, text at 
note 246. 
   
77Disclosure of a wiretap after its authorization expires violates section 2232(c), which provides criminal 
penalties for anyone who, “[1] having knowledge that a Federal  … officer has been authorized or has applied 
for authorization  … to intercept a wire  …  communication, [2] in order to obstruct, impede, or prevent such 
interception, [3] gives notice or attempts to give notice of the possible interception to any person.” See United 
States v Aguilar supra (n 74) at 2359. 
 
78United States v Aguilar supra (n 74) at 2362. 
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particular agents.79 In setting aside both convictions, the Court of Appeals held that uttering 
false statements to an investigating agent, who might or might not testify before a grand 
jury, was not sufficient to make out a violation of section 1503.80
 
 
The importance of this case lies in the fact that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused 
to accept that the scope of section 1503 included the investigations of agents of the FBI. 
 
6.3.1.2 Concealment, alteration or destruction of documents 
It often happens that friends or relatives of the accused are present at the crime scene.  
These people may, with the accused, do something that could render them guilty of 
destroying or suppressing evidence. When, for example, someone present at the crime 
scene removes the tire tracks of a getaway vehicle to prevent an accurate comparison with 
the actual vehicle, his or her conduct constitutes the crime of obstructing the course of 
justice.81
  
 
Concealment, alteration or destruction of documents is an offence in the United States and 
falls foul of section 1503.  There is academic opinion to the effect that, although the statute 
generally protects against such abuse of documentary evidence in both civil and criminal 
proceedings, traditionally, section 1503 did not apply to concealing or withholding 
discoverable documents in civil litigation. 82
 
 
6.3.1.2.1 Alteration of documents 
Alteration of documents falls within the enumerated acts which obstruct the course of 
                                                 
79Ibid.  
 
80At 2359. 
 
81Gammage and Hemphill op cit (n 1) 300. 
 
82Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 767; Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 884 and Raffer and Teper op cit (n 41) 
996-97. 
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justice.  The defendant who alters or destroys corporate records, knowing they are sought 
by a grand jury investigating the company’s activities, could be convicted of obstructing 
justice in terms of section 1503.83 In United States v Craft84 the United States Court of 
Appeals ruled that acts that distort evidence to be presented, or that otherwise impede the 
administration of justice, are violations of the statute that prohibit obstruction of justice.  It 
was further ruled that an act of altering or fabricating documents that are used, or are to be 
used, in judicial proceedings would fall within the scope of section 150385
 
 if the intent to 
deceive the court were proved. 
In 1998, in United States v Lundwall,86
York went against the traditional approach that section 1503 was not applicable to 
concealment, alteration, etc., of documents in civil litigation and extended the statute to the 
discovery process of a civil proceeding.
 the federal judge of the Southern District of New  
87 Thus, destruction of documents after a complaint 
is filed, but before any order has been entered, is said to violate section 1503.88
 
 
United States v Ladum89
                                                 
83See Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 884-85; Solum and Marzen op cit (n 8) 1085; Lou op cit (n 1) 939; Berg 
and Levinson op cit (n 18) 767-68 and Fedders and Gutterplan op cit (n 12) 19-20. 
 was another case which dealt with matters that emanated from 
civil litigation.  It was observed in this case that an obstruction of justice conviction was 
supported by evidence that the accused told witnesses to lie and alter documents before 
presenting them to a grand jury.  Evidence revealed that the accused directed witnesses to 
 
84105 F 3d 1123 (6th Cir 1997) at 1124. 
8518 United States Code, section 1503. 
861 F Supp 2d 249 (SDNY 1998) at 254-55. 
87JF Thompson “Spoliation of evidence:  A troubling new tort” (1989) University of Kansas Law Review Vol 
37 566. 
 
88DA Oesterle “A private litigant’s remedies for an opponent’s inappropriate destruction of relevant 
documents” (1983) Texas Law Review Vol 61 No 7 1206. 
 
89United States v Ladum supra (n 33) at 1338. 
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backdate documents.90 The facts of the case were as follows:  In a jury trial, the accused 
were convicted of various tax and bankruptcy fraud, and money laundering, charges.  They 
appealed against such convictions.  Robert Ladum, and the other accused, opened and 
operated seven second-hand stores, among others.  They concealed their ownership 
interests in these stores so that they could avoid paying tax on their income.  They used 
nominees who presented themselves as the “owners” of the stores.91 In order to prevent the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uncovering this tax fraud scheme in which he was involved, 
Ladum instructed the nominees to be as obstructive and uncooperative as possible and to 
refuse to give information to officials.  When the Internal Revenue Service agents 
approached the nominees, they falsely stated that they were the sole owners of the 
businesses.  In 1993, Ladum became aware of a grand jury investigation into his business 
affairs and he advised the nominees to lie to the grand jury.  He also approved plans to 
fabricate the records regarding the ownership of the stores and he assisted in the preparation 
of false tax returns and in the completion of false income tax returns.92
 
 
Allegedly, Ladum declared himself bankrupt.  He omitted from his petitions the second-
hand stores, the real property where they were located and the lodge he owned.  In 1995, 
the grand jury issued a second superseding indictment charging the accused with, inter alia, 
contravention of section 1503 for obstructing and defeating the IRS investigations to 
correctly ascertain, compute, assess and collect Ladum’s income tax.93
 
 The jury found the 
accused guilty of contravention of section 1503 of the Code. 
On appeal, Ladum argued that the court erred in convicting him on a charge of “corruptly 
                                                 
90At 1329. 
  
91At 1333. 
 
92At 1333-34. 
 
93At 1334. 
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[endeavouring] to influence, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice” in 
violation of section 1503 of Title 18 United States Code.  He argued that section 1503 did 
not prohibit witness tampering.  The court upheld the conviction of the accused on 
contravention of section 1503.94
 
 
6.3.1.2.2 Concealment of documents 
Just as to alter documents falls foul of section 1503, so does the concealment of 
documentary information.  It is said that before it may convict the accused of obstruction of 
justice for concealing subpoenaed documents, the grand jury must have been engaged in the 
due administration of justice,95 meaning that the grand jury must have been empanelled.  
The accused must have known that the grand jury investigation was in progress and what 
documents were covered by the subpoena.  He or she must have wilfully concealed or 
endeavoured to conceal such documents from the grand jury.96
 
   
6.3.1.2.3 Destruction of documents 
In the United States of America it also amounts to the crime of obstructing the course of 
justice to stifle, suppress or destroy evidence, knowing that it may be wanted in a judicial 
proceeding or is being sought by investigating officers.  Such conduct contravenes section 
1503.97 According to Perkins,98
                                                 
94At 1349. 
 in such a situation the individual cannot turn him- or 
herself, into a court and make a decision as to what records are admissible or inadmissible. 
An individual must be prepared to bring the documents to court and let the court make its 
 
95United States Code Annotated op cit (n 17) at 145. 
 
96Ibid. 
 
9718 United States Code.  See Oesterle op cit (n 88) 1191; Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 767 and Palfin and 
Prabhu op cit (n 18) 884-85. 
 
98Perkins op cit (n 57) 499. 
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own determination.99 A person who intentionally withholds or destroys tangible evidence, 
knowing very well that the grand jury investigation may need it, can reasonably be said to 
have corruptly obstructed or impeded or endeavoured to influence, obstruct or impede the 
due administration of justice in contravention of 1503.  A person who knows that a federal 
grand jury is busy investigating certain possible violations of federal law and who has 
reason to believe that a certain incriminating document is likely to come to the grand jury’s 
attention and who intentionally causes the destruction of the said document in order to 
prevent the grand jury’s access to it, may be properly convicted of obstructing the course of 
justice.100 It is said that even if the documents were not deliberately destroyed, shipping 
them out of the country so that they cannot be brought into court on a prosecution subpoena 
also amounts to obstructing the course of justice.  This removal of evidence from the reach 
of the court is regarded to be as damaging as if the documents were deliberately burnt.101
 
  
In civil actions, as in criminal proceedings, the destruction of documents is a wrongful 
interference with a plaintiff’s probable expectancy of prevailing in a civil action.  Such 
destruction can effectively eliminate a party’s ability to prevail on a claim or defence and 
thereby impede the administration of justice.102 According to Palfin and Prabhu,103
 
 for the 
accused to be convicted of obstructing the course of justice for having concealed or altered 
or destroyed evidence, the following is necessary: 
(i) the documents must have been subpoenaed, 
(ii) X must have knowledge of the pending grand jury investigation, and 
                                                 
99Ibid.  
 
100United States Code Annotated op cit (n 17) at 146. 
 
101Gammage and Hemphill op cit (n 1) 300. 
102See Thompson op cit (n 87) 564. 
103Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 884.   
 257 
(iii) X must have wilfully concealed or endeavoured to conceal them from the jury, or, must 
have wilfully altered or endeavoured to alter the documents before their presentation to the 
grand jury. 
 
However, Raffer and Teper104say that destruction of documents, even if they are outdated, 
in anticipation of a subpoena also constitutes the obstruction of justice.  In 2001, in United 
States v Steele,105 the United States Court of Appeals106 concluded that no formal act was 
required to establish that a grand jury investigation is pending for the purposes of an 
obstruction of justice charge. The facts of this case were as follows:  Charles Steele was 
indicted in April 1996 for mail fraud that emanated from a scheme to over-bill his law 
firm’s clients and for obstruction of justice for submitting altered documents to a grand jury 
subpoena.107 The jury found him guilty of mail fraud and four counts of obstruction of 
justice.  In January 1999, Steele filed a motion to appeal his sentence.  His contention was 
that the evidence to support the counts of obstruction of justice was insufficient to meet the 
standard set forth in United States v Nelson.108 In the Nelson case, it was said that not every 
investigation in which grand jury subpoenas are issued ripens into a pending grand jury 
investigation. The basis of Steele’s claim, therefore, was that the prosecution did not prove 
that the subpoena had been issued as part of an actual grand jury investigation.  The United 
States Court of Appeals was called upon to consider:109
 
 
(1) whether Steele was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion in the light of 
                                                 
104Cf Raffer and Teper op cit (n 41) 998. 
105United States v Steele supra (n 50) at 306. 
106Third Circuit. 
  
107United States v Steele supra (n 50) at 303. 
108852 F 2d 706 (3rd Cir 1988). 
109United States v Steele supra (n 50) at 304.  
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United States v Nelson’s110
 
 mandate that the accused be afforded an opportunity to question 
whether the United States Attorney secured the subpoena in furtherance of a then present 
contemplation that the subpoenaed evidence would be presented to a grand jury, and 
(2) if so, and if the facts in this case ultimately showed that the subpoena was not secured in 
furtherance of a then present contemplation that the subpoenaed evidence would be 
presented to a grand jury, whether he was actually innocent of the four counts of 
obstruction of justice. 
 
Addressing these questions the court found out that the deputy chairperson had signed the 
subpoena documents which were sent to Steele, and this document gave Steele’s law firm 
the option to send a representative to appear personally before the grand jury to present the 
records.  It was alleged that Steele’s partner waived that right.  The court was convinced 
that a grand jury was in existence when the subpoena was issued and that the subpoena was 
issued as part of a grand jury investigation.111 The court held, as matter of law, that the 
evidence before it did indeed warrant the rejection of Steele’s claim.112
 
  
Overlapping with section 1503 regarding destruction of documents is section 1512(c)(2).113
It is said that in the aftermath of several high profile corporate scandals, Congress enacted 
this section as part of a large effort to clamp down on corporate wrongdoing.
  
114
 
  
 
                                                 
110United States v Nelson supra (n 108). 
111United States v Steele supra (n 50) at 304-05.  
112At 306. 
11318 United States Code (2002).  The provisions of section 1512(c)(2) are discussed infra under 6.3.4.2, text 
at note 238. 
 
114Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 898-89. 
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6.3.1.3 Encouraging or rendering false testimony 
In terms of section 1503, the following conduct is sufficient to support a conviction of 
obstructing the course of justice:  
 
a. Giving false testimony that may influence judicial proceedings.  If the accused 
intentionally gives evasive evidence or testimony to the jury, designed to conceal his or her 
true knowledge of the facts, he or she may be convicted of the crime of obstructing the 
course justice.115 In United States v Russo,116 the circuit court ruled that the accused lied to 
a grand jury with intent to impede the due administration of justice, which amounted to 
obstruction of the course of justice.  The facts of this case were as follows:  Congressman 
Rostenkowski placed “ghost employees” on the Congress payroll, and in 1993, the grand 
jury investigated this irregularity.  Russo, a part-time employee of the Congressman, was 
subpoenaed.  The grand jury granted him immunity from prosecution.  In his testimony he 
told the grand jury that he worked as a cleaner in Congressman Rostenkowski’s Chicago 
District office five days a week.  He asserted that he was the only person who cleaned those 
offices during the ten year period he worked there.  Evidence put before the court directly 
contradicted Russo’s grand jury testimony.  It transpired that he actually worked on 
alternate Tuesdays, and sometimes on other evenings, but by no means did he work there 
every day.  The prosecution showed that Russo did not work for the money which was paid 
to him for 11 years from the Congressman’s office.  He was indicted and convicted of 
perjury and obstruction of justice in contravention of section 1503.117
                                                 
115Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 768 and Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 886. 
 Russo appealed 
against his conviction on the count of obstruction of justice, by falsely and evasively 
testifying to the grand jury concerning the nature and extent of work he did for 
Rostenkowski’s Congressional office.  He argued that the mere giving of false testimony to 
116104 F 3d 431 (DC Cir 1997) at 435. 
117Under 18 United States Code, section 1503.  See United Stats v Russo supra (n 116) at 432. 
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the grand jury did not contravene section 1503.118 The question to be answered was 
whether lying to the grand jury could be prosecuted under both section 1503 and perjury.  
Under section 1503, the state had to prove not only that the accused had lied to the grand 
jury but also that he had lied with intent to obstruct the due administration of justice.119 The 
Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that evidence that the accused had lied before the grand 
jury with intent to impede the due administration of justice supported the obstruction of 
justice conviction.120 It is said that when Russo was granted immunity from prosecution, 
the district court warned him that if he lied to the grand jury he could be prosecuted for 
obstruction of justice.121 The court held that anyone who intentionally lies to a grand jury is 
on notice that he may be corruptly obstructing the grand jury’s investigation.122 The 
conviction was confirmed.123 This case shows that there is a distinction between lying 
before a grand jury in order to obstruct the course of justice and giving false testimony 
under oath before the court.  The elements of these offences are not the same.  In a section 
1503 violation, it has to be proved that telling lies to the grand jury was done with intent to 
impede the due administration of justice.124
 
 
b. Refusing to testify before a grand jury.125 A person who refuses to testify before a 
grand jury, impedes the proper functioning of the grand jury and the due administration of 
justice and therefore contravenes the provisions of section 1503.126
                                                 
118United States v Russo supra (n 116) at 435. 
 
119Ibid. 
120At 431. 
121At 436. 
  
122Ibid. 
 
123At 437. 
124United Stats v Russo supra (n 116) 453. 
125Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 769 and Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 886. 
126Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 886. 
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c. Encouraging a potential witness to give false evidence.127 Encouraging a 
prospective witness to render false testimony may lead to indictment under section 1503.128
 
 
d. Making offers to witnesses.129 According to Berg and Levinson,130
 
 an accused may 
violate the federal statute by making offers to witnesses testifying in an investigation other 
than one involving a grand jury, for example, a witness in Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms investigation. 
e. Tricking grand jury witnesses into giving false testimony.  According to Berg and 
Levinson,131 tricking grand jury witnesses into giving false testimony is also a 
contravention of section 1503.  The leading case in this regard is United States v Bucey.132
Wesley Bucey was convicted of multiple related offences arising out of an elaborate money 
laundering scheme designed ostensibly to legitimise the source of illegally obtained cash 
and to evade tax.  His conviction was based on an indictment of twelve counts that charged 
him, inter alia, with contravention of section 1503
  
133 following an attempt to obstruct the 
administration of a grand jury.  He appealed against his conviction on all counts.134
                                                 
127Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 769 and Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 886. 
 It was 
alleged that he, “well knowing of the existence of the said federal grand jury investigation, 
did corruptly endeavour to influence and impede the due administration of justice by 
advising, counselling and encouraging a person known to him as ‘James O’Brien’ to give 
12818 United States Code. 
 
129Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 769 and Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 886. 
130Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 769.   
 
131Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 769 and Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 886. 
  
132876 F 2d 1297 (7th Cir 1989). 
13318 United States Code.  
134United States v Bucey supra (n 132) at 1298-99. 
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false and misleading testimony when appearing before a grand jury.”135 Allegedly, he 
counselled the witness on how to role-play his grand jury testimony with his attorney and 
instructed the witness to provide false and misleading testimony to the grand jury. On 
appeal, Bucey’s challenge was twofold.  Firstly, he alleged that the prosecution failed to 
prove that he had the requisite corrupt intent to impede the grand jury investigation.  
Secondly, he alleged that his actions were incapable of interfering with the administration 
of justice since the putative grand jury witness was a fictional character.136 It should be 
noted that O’Brien, the witness that Bucey attempted to influence, was in fact an 
undercover government agent.  In confirming Bucey’s conviction, the court held:137
 
 
We do not think the fact that O’Brien (agent Dembitz’ pseudonym) was a fictional grand jury 
witness precludes an obstruction of justice conviction.  The statute proscribes the endeavour to 
influence or obstruct the administration of justice; thus, the impossibility of accomplishing the goal 
of an obstruction of justice does not prevent a prosecution for the endeavour to accomplish the goal 
… Thus, Dembitz’ fictitious identity as a grand jury witness does not exonerate Bucey from his 
“endeavour” to influence the proper administration of the grand jury.   
 
It is submitted that Bucey’s second contention that his actions were incapable of interfering 
with the administration of justice since the putative grand jury witness was a fictional 
character was misdirected.  This contention implies that the section 1503 offence is an 
inchoate offence.  The section 1503 offence may be committed even if it is impossible for 
X to accomplish the goal of obstruction of justice.138 It may be committed, for example, 
even if the grand jury witness is a fictional character assumed by an undercover 
government agent.  The court expressed this when it held that “the impossibility of 
accomplishing the goal of an obstruction of justice does not prevent a prosecution for the 
endeavour to accomplish the goal.”139
                                                 
135At 1313. 
 
136At 1313-14. 
 
137At 1314.  
 
138Ibid. 
 
139Ibid. 
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6.3.1.4    Elements of the section 1503 offence 
For X to be convicted for contravening section 1503, the state is required to prove the 
following elements:140
 
  
a. A nexus between X’s conduct and the pending federal judicial proceedings. 
b. That X knew of or had notice about the proceedings. 
c. That X acted corruptly with intent to obstruct or interfere with the proceedings or due 
administration of justice. 141
 
 
6.3.1.4.1 Pending judicial proceedings 
Most circuit courts state that it is a prerequisite for a conviction in terms of section 1503 
that there be pending judicial proceedings.  In other words, there must be a nexus between 
the accused’s conduct and pending federal judicial proceedings.142 Obstruction of the due 
administration of justice in any court of the United States, corruptly or by threats or force, 
is a criminal offence.  The offence of obstruction of the course of justice can only arise 
when justice is being administered,143 in other words section 1503144 applies only to 
pending judicial actions.145 It is said that section 1503 cannot be construed to proscribe 
conduct, which takes place wholly outside the context of an ongoing judicial proceeding.146
Unlike the English law, for the prosecution to succeed with the charge of obstructing the 
  
                                                 
140Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 877-88; Lou op cit (n 1) 932; Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 760-66 and 
Raffer and J Teper op cit (n 41) 992-97.   
 
141Unite States v Collis 128 F 3d 318 (6th Cir 1997) and United States v De La Rasa 171 F 3d 215 (5th Cir. 
1999) at 220-21.  
 
142Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 877. 
 
143United States Code Annotated, Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure sections 1361-1950. 
 
144The provisions of section 1503 are discussed supra under 6.2, text at note 16. 
 
145Fedders and Gutterplan op cit (n 12) 20.  
 
146United States Code Annotated Title 18 Crimes and Criminal Procedure sections 1361-1950. The words, in 
section 1503, “… other proceeding before any United States magistrate judge ...” mean that there must be 
judicial proceedings in progress before this section can be invoked. 
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course of justice against X in terms of section 1503, there must be pending judicial 
proceedings.  Most circuit courts agree that obstruction of pending judicial proceedings is a 
prerequisite for conviction under section 1503.147
 
  
There are academic commentators who suggest that independent government 
investigations, such as those of the FBI or any official proceedings not connected with 
pending judicial proceedings, are generally excluded from the ambit of section 1503.148 In 
1995, however, the circuit court in United States v Maloney149 held that if the investigation 
was conducted to secure “presently contemplated presentation of evidence before the grand 
jury,” such an investigation qualifies as a pending judicial proceeding.150
 
  
However, there is no consensus among the circuit courts as to when judicial proceedings 
are pending for purposes of section 1503 and there is no guidance, as yet, from the Federal 
Court.151 As has been said above, one circuit court refused to establish pendency where a 
federal grand jury was empanelled, but no subpoenas had been issued and the grand jury 
had not been appraised of the investigation.152  In 1986, the Ninth Circuit Court ruled that 
proceedings are pending as soon as an indictment is issued or a complaint (in civil matters) 
has been filed.153 In some circuit courts154
                                                 
147Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 878. 
 it is said that an investigation conducted by the 
 
148Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 878-79 and Lou op. cit. (n 1) 933.  It is said that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations is an investigating arm rather than a judicial arm of the government. See United States Code, 
Title 18 Crimes and Criminal Procedure Sections 1361 to 1950. 
 
14971 F 3d 645 (7th Cir. 1995) at 647.  See also Lou op cit (n 1) 933-34.  
 
150See Lou op cit (n 1) 934. 
 
151As indicated in the discussion supra under 6.2. 
  
152See supra note 19. 
 
153In United States v Wash Water Power Co. 793 F .2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1986) at 1085.  See also Palfin and 
Prabhu op cit (n 18) 879. 
 
154The First, Second, Fourth, Fifth and Tenth Circuits.  
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grand jury per se constitutes a judicial proceeding for purposes of the provisions of section 
1503.155 As in English law,156 the Eighth157 and Eleventh158 Circuits have asserted that no 
judicial proceedings were required in order to invoke section 1503.159
 
 
Finally, the circuit courts that have addressed the issue as to when the proceedings cease to 
be “pending” agree that for purposes of section 1503, proceedings are pending after 
sentencing and until the disposition was made of any direct appeal that would result in a 
new trial.160
 
 
6.3.1.4.2 Notice of judicial proceedings 
It is a requirement that X must know or be aware of the existence of the pending judicial 
proceedings.  In 1997, in United States v Monus,161 the Court of Appeals observed that to 
sustain its burden of proof for a conviction for the crime of corruptly endeavouring to 
influence, obstruct or impede the due administration of justice, the prosecution should 
prove that there was pending judicial proceedings and that the accused knew that the 
proceedings were pending and that he or she then corruptly endeavoured to influence, 
obstruct or impede the due administration of justice.162
 
 
 
                                                 
155Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 879. 
 
156See Card at 537 op cit Chapter Three under 3.2, text at note 23 and Smith and Hogan at 752 op cit Chapter 
Two under 3.2, text at note 93. 
 
157United States v Novak supra (n 31) at 572. 
158United States v Veal supra (n 54) at 1250. 
159Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 879. 
160See Lou op cit (n 1) 934 and Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 879.  
 
161128 F 3d 376 (6th Cir 1997) at 377.  
162In violation of 18 United States Code, section 1503.  
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6.3.1.4.3 Acting corruptly with intent 
According to Berg and Levinson,163 section 1503 limits the scope of liability to those who 
corruptly and intentionally act to obstruct a pending judicial proceeding or the due 
administration of justice or to endeavour to interfere with the proceedings.164  X’s conduct 
must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of 
justice.165 The United States courts have ruled that since section 1503 was designed to 
forbid all corrupt methods of obstructing the course of justice, the use of force or 
intimidation is not an essential element of a corrupt endeavour to influence the juror.166
 
  
In United States v Cueto,167 the court held that this provision does not specifically prohibit 
the means employed by the accused, but rather his or her corrupt endeavour, which 
motivated his or her action.  Some academic writers are of the view that the accused need 
not be a party to the pending judicial proceedings in order to be convicted of contravening 
section 1503.168
                                                 
163Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 763; Raffer and Teper op cit (n 41) 994; Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 
880 and Lou op. cit. (n 1) 935. 
 The facts of the Cueto case were as follows: Y, the owner of a vending and 
amusement business operated an illegal video gambling business through a pattern of 
racketeering activities and illegal gambling payouts, in contravention of state and federal 
anti-gambling and racketeering laws.  Y requested X, an attorney, to represent both Y and 
the tavern owners in the event of any arrests and/or criminal charges for their participation 
in the illegal gambling operation.  Throughout the investigation, and prior to the owner’s 
indictment, X served as Y’s lawyer and advisor, but he was not Y’s attorney of record 
 
16418 United States Code, section 1503(a) (2000).  “[W]hoever … endeavours to influence … shall be 
punished.” “Endeavour” is defined as any attempt or effort aimed at obstructing justice. See Lou op cit (n 1) 
935 and Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 764. 
 
165Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 764. 
166Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 883. 
167United States v Cueto supra (n 32) at 631. 
168Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 767 and Lou op cit (n 1) 938. 
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during the trial.  Nevertheless, the record indicated that Y continued to rely on X’s advice 
throughout the prosecution of the racketeering case. 
 
The investigation disclosed that X and Y had developed more than a professional attorney-
client relationship.  They had entered into various financial and business deals, some of 
which involved secret partnerships.169
 
 Y was indicted, prosecuted and ultimately convicted 
for operating an illegal gambling enterprise. 
A few months after the racketeering convictions, the grand jury indicted X, Y and Z.  Count 
1 of the indictment charged X with conspiracy to defraud the United States in that he 
misused his office as an attorney, and unlawfully and intentionally conspired with Y and Z 
to impede, impair, obstruct and defeat the lawful function of the FBI, the grand jury and the 
federal district court in connection with the investigation, indictment and prosecution of Y 
in the illegal gambling and racketeering case.170 In the first part of the conspiracy it was 
alleged that X conspired to impede and delay the FBI investigation primarily by attacking 
the reputation of the Illinois Liquor Control Commission (ILCC) agent, Robinson, and by 
urging the St Clair County State’s Attorney to investigate, indict and prosecute Robinson 
for alleged extortion.  It was further alleged that X conspired to influence and hinder the 
functioning of the grand jury by filing false motions, which attacked the operations of the 
FBI.  The third aspect of the conspiracy focused on X’s attempt to obstruct the proceedings 
of the federal district court by persuading Y’s defence counsel to file various motions, 
including a motion to disqualify the district court judge to hear the racketeering case.171
 
  
X was convicted of the counts mentioned above and he appealed.  On his appeal he 
                                                 
169United States v Cueto supra (n 32) at 627. 
170At 628.  
171Ibid.  
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contended, inter alia, that each conviction for obstructing the course of justice in 
contravention of section 1503172 was invalid because the omnibus clause of this section was 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the conduct charged in the indictment.173 On the 
constitutional challenges of the omnibus clause of section 1503174 the court held:175
 
  
This clause was intended to ensure that criminals could not circumvent the statute’s purpose by 
devising novel and creative schemes that would interfere with the administration of justice but would 
nevertheless fall outside the scope of section 1503’s specific prohibition …We are not persuaded by 
Cueto’s constitutional challenges, and his focus is misplaced. 
 
 
The court confirmed Cueto’s convictions and the sentence imposed by the district court.176
 
 
The significance of the Cueto decision can be summarised as follows: 
• Firstly, the court confirmed the constitutionality of the omnibus clause of 
section 1503.177
• Secondly, the court confirmed that a lawyer’s misconduct and criminal acts 
are not absolutely immune from prosecution.  Lawyers do not have a 
privilege to commit crimes.
 
178 It is said that a lawyer should represent a 
client zealously within the bounds of the law.179
• Lastly, that investigations conducted by the FBI form part of the course of 
justice. 
 
                                                 
17218 United States Code. 
173United States v Cueto supra (n 32) at 629. 
17418 United States Code. 
175United States v Cueto supra (n 32) at 630-31.  
176At 639.  
17718 United States Code. 
 
178BA Green “The criminal regulation of lawyers” (1998) Fordham Law Review Vol 67 240. 
 
179MJ Kaufman “The role of lawyers in civil litigation: Obstructers rather than facilitators of justice” (1988) 
Illinois Bar Journal Vol 77 202-3.  
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There is no consensus among the circuit courts as to the meaning of the term “corruptly” in 
the statute.  The term varies in meaning based on the context of the prosecution.  Some 
courts have held that the offender must be prompted, at least in part, by a corrupt motive.180 
In United States v Brady,181 the court found that the corrupt element in section 1503 must 
have some content beyond mere knowledge of consequences because only a corrupt 
purpose creates guilt.182 Other circuit courts have held that they understand the term 
“corruptly” to mean specific intent.  Some academic commentators say that the act must be 
committed with the purpose of obstructing justice.183
 
 
In United States v Russell,184
In one of the first trials, Russell testified that he had purchased crack cocaine from the 
accused, Steve Block, who was in court for drug related charges.  However, after Block’s 
conviction, Russell signed an affidavit stating that he had never, at any time, purchased 
drugs from Block. This led to an investigation which revealed that Russell had signed 
 the court observed that when the accused lied in affidavits in 
order to exonerate drug dealers, he had the specific intent to influence the judicial 
proceedings.  The facts of this case were as follows:  The accused, Russell, was convicted 
of obstructing the course of justice and he appealed.  Russell was hired by the Arkansas 
state police to act as an informant in an undercover drug operation.  The state police and the 
FBI paid him to identify drug dealers and bring those who bought drugs under the 
supervision of an Arkansas State Trooper.  As part of the arrangement, Russell was 
expected to testify at the trials of those arrested for undercover drug deals. 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
180Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 881; Lou op cit (n 1) 936; Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 765 and Raffer 
and Teper op cit (n 41) 994.  
 
181168 F 3d 574 (1st Cir 1999) at 578. 
 
182Ibid. 
 
183Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 881; Lou op cit (n 1) 936; Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 765 and Raffer 
and Teper op cit (n 41) 995-96.   
 
184234 F 3d 404 (8th Cir 2000) at 407. 
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affidavits exonerating ten other accused likewise charged.  As a result, the United States 
Attorney dismissed the pending indictments against the fifteen accused, because Russell 
was the only person who could identify the accused as drug dealers.  In addition to signing 
affidavits exonerating Block and the other accused on other charges, Russell later testified 
in the federal court and directly contradicted his earlier testimony that he had never 
purchased drugs from Block.185
 
  
As a result of these events, he was charged with, and convicted of, obstruction of the course 
of justice (under the omnibus clause of section 1503) and of perjury.  He argued, inter alia, 
that he lacked any intent to interfere with the due administration of justice as required for 
an obstruction of justice conviction.186 Russell’s girlfriend testified that Russell claimed 
that he signed the affidavits for Block and the other accused, which helped them get out of 
their drug charges, in exchange for payment.  The United States Court of Appeals found 
that there was sufficient evidence to support Russell’s conviction for obstructing the course 
of justice.  The conviction was sustained.187 The Court of Appeals held that there was 
sufficient evidence to show that Russell had lied in affidavits that exonerated alleged drug 
dealers and that he had the requisite intent to influence a judicial proceeding.188
 
 
It is submitted that this case is authority for the proposition that it is not only a person who 
bribes a witness or a potential witness who obstructs the due administration of justice, but 
also a witness who accepts a bribe in order to obstruct the due administration of justice.   
Academic writers189
                                                 
185At 406.  
 agree that an actual obstruction of justice is not necessary to sustain a 
186At 406-7.  
187At 408. 
 
188At 404.  
189See Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 882-83; Lou op cit (n 1) 937-38; Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 765-
66 and Raffer and Teper op cit (n 41) 996-97. 
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conviction under section 1503.  They say that an “endeavour”190 to obstruct justice is 
sufficient.  It is said that the term “endeavour” means any effort or purpose to obstruct the 
course of justice.191 In United States v Wood,192 it was observed that the attempt by the 
accused to obstruct the course of justice need not necessarily succeed, but the conduct must 
be such that its natural and probable effect would be to impede the due administration of 
justice.  The facts of this case were the following:  In 1989, the FBI and a federal jury were 
investigating allegations of political corruption involving one Peter MacDonald, 
Chairperson of the Navajo Nation of Indians.  Wood, the accused, was a general manager 
of a construction company doing business with the Navajo.  The FBI interviewed Wood in 
his office regarding his dealings with MacDonald.  Allegedly, during the interview, Wood 
made some false or misleading statements.  He was subsequently charged for making false 
statements to the FBI and with obstructing justice contrary to section 1503.193 He applied 
for acquittal stating that the indictment failed to state a criminal offence.  The trial court 
held that because the FBI agents were acting under the auspices of the grand jury, their 
discussions with Wood were part of a judicial proceeding, thereby falling within the 
“judicial function.”194 As for contravening section 1503, the court ruled that the unsworn 
statements of the accused would not, as a natural probable consequence, impede the due 
administration of justice.  The court also noted a number of policy reasons why section 
1503 would not apply to statements of that nature given by accused.  Therefore, the court 
dismissed the charge,195
 
 and the prosecution appealed.  
                                                 
190See Lou op cit (n 1) 937. 
191See United States v Brady supra (n 181) at 578. 
1926 F 3d 692 (10th Cir 1993) at 695. 
193At 693. 
194At 694.  
195Ibid. 
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On appeal, the prosecution alleged that the FBI had asked Wood to explain the 
circumstances surrounding his lending of a car to MacDonald.  He allegedly said that he 
had recently purchased the car for his daughter, but MacDonald had borrowed it for a drive. 
The prosecution alleged that Wood had purchased the car and intended to give it to 
MacDonald, and that the car had “clocked” only 150 miles, not 1200 miles, as he had 
previously claimed. 
 
The United States Court of Appeals, in a split decision, held:196
 
 
We conclude that defendant’s unsworn exculpatory statements given in his own office to 
interviewing FBI agents did not have a natural and probable effect of impeding the due 
administration of justice in the sense required by 18 USC, section 1503, and the prosecution under 
that section is therefore barred. 
 
6.3.2 Conduct which constitutes the offence of obstructing the course of justice in 
contravention of section 1507 of the Code 
6.3.2.1 Picketing or parading 
Obstruction of justice may involve activities such as picketing or parading or the use of 
sound amplifiers with intent to disrupt or influence judges, jurors, or witnesses.197 This 
conduct is punishable in terms of section 1507.198
 
 This section provides: 
Whoever, with the intent of interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the administration of justice, 
or with the intent of influencing any judge, juror, witness, or court officer, in the discharge of his 
duty, pickets or parades in or near a building housing a court of the United States, or in or near a 
building or residence occupied or used by such judge, juror, witness, or such officer, or with such 
intent uses any sound-truck or similar device or resorts to any other demonstration in or near any 
such building or residence, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or 
both. 
This section punishes the actions of picketing or parading in, or near, the court or house of 
the judge or jury or witness or court official in order to influence either of the mentioned 
                                                 
196At 697.  
197Ibid.  
19818 United States Code.  
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people when performing their official duties.  It punishes, inter alia, what was in common 
law is referred to as embracery,199
 
 which means to tamper or interfere with a juror or jury. 
6.3.3 Conduct which constitutes the offence of obstructing the course of justice 
in contravention of section 1512 of the Code 
6.3.3.1 Tampering with witnesses 
The offence of obstruction of justice in the United States of America may also be 
committed by tampering with a witness or witnesses in contravention of section 1512.200  
As if the omnibus obstruction provision201 was inadequate for protecting witnesses, the 
Congress enacted further legislation in 1982202 in order to provide greater protection for 
witnesses than under section 1503 and other federal obstruction of justice laws.203 By 
enacting the 1982 legislation the Congress intended that intimidation and harassment of 
witnesses should thereafter be prosecuted under section 1512 of the Federal Code and no 
longer under section 1503.  Under the 1982 legislation all references to witnesses under 
section 1503 had been deleted204
 
 and appear only in section 1512.  The Victim and 
Witnesses Protection Act (VWPA) contains both criminal and civil remedies.  The former  
 
 
                                                 
199Embracery consisted of tampering with jurors by attempting to influence their decisions.  See NC Chameli 
and KR Evans Criminal Law for Policemen (1971) 209. 
 
20018 United States Code. 
  
20118 United States Code, section 1503.  
202The Victim and Witnesses Protection Act 1982. 
203Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 891; Lou op cit (n 1) 945; Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 776-77; Raffer 
and Teper op cit (n 41) 1002-03 and KR Taylor “The obstruction of justice requirement after Arthur Andersen 
and Sarbanes-Oxley (2008) Cornell Law Review Vol 93 No 2 409. 
 
204Riley op cit (n 68) 257-58.  
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is found in sections 1512 and 1513205 of the Federal Code.  It is also important to note that 
protection in terms of this Act lasts throughout the course of the judicial proceedings, from 
grand jury hearings to retrials.  It protects witnesses not only against the accused, but also 
against any individual who engages in the prohibited conduct.206 This section protects 
witnesses both prior to, and during, formal proceedings.207 Section 1512 (b)208 is said to be 
the most frequently invoked provision of section 1512.209 Section 1512(e)(1) does not 
require that there must be a pending official proceeding.210 For instance, if X realises that a 
federal proceeding might be commenced and acts in a manner that affects testimony, he 
may be convicted in terms of section 1512.211
 
 
The following conduct constitutes the offence of tampering with witnesses in terms of 
section 1512:212
 
 
a. To influence, delay or prevent any person in official proceedings.213
 
  
b. To cause or induce any person to withhold testimony or a record, document or other 
object from official proceedings.214
                                                 
20518 United States Code.  See Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 892. 
 
206Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 891; Lou op cit (n 1) 945 and Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 776-77. 
 
207TA Pesce “Defining witness tempering under 18 USC, section 1512” (1986) Colombian Law Review Vol 
86 1417. 
 
208The provisions of section 1512(b) are discussed supra under 6.2, text at note 36. 
 
209See Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 893. 
 
210United States Code Title 18 Crimes and Criminal Procedure Vol 19 (1994); Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 
897 and Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 783.  See the provisions of section 1512(e)(1) supra under 6.2, text 
at note 40. 
 
211Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 783. 
 
21218 United States Code. 
  
213Section 1512(b)(1).  
 
214Section 1512(b)(2)(A).  
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c. To cause or induce any person to alter, destroy, mutilate or conceal an object with 
intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in official proceedings.215 A 
recent case involving destruction of evidence by large corporations and their advisors is 
Arthur Andersen LLP v United States.216 This case began with the collapse of the energy 
trading enterprise, Enron Corporation, which at one time was the seventh largest 
corporation in America.  Arthur Andersen LLP was one of the biggest accounting 
corporations in the United States and the long-standing auditor of Enron.  In 2001, Enron 
filed for bankruptcy protection.  This resulted in Arthur Andersen LLP, as Enron’s auditor, 
instructing its employees to destroy documents in accordance with its document retention 
policy. Arthur Andersen LLP was indicted on one count of contravening section 
1512(b)(2)(A) and (B).217 Seeking to cover up their misconduct, Andersen’s employees 
started to shred sensitive documents and to delete critical e-mails and other computer-based 
records. These actions led to a Department of Justice inquiry.218 The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) opened its formal investigations in 2001.  In 2002, the 
Andersen firm was indicted on one count of obstruction of justice, because of its alleged 
destruction of documents and electronic data.219 The indictment alleged that Andersen LLP 
“did knowingly, intentionally and corruptly persuade … other persons, to wit: [the 
petitioner’s] employees, with intent to cause” them to withhold documents from, and alter 
documents for use in, ‘official proceedings and investigations.’220
                                                                                                                                                     
 
 One of Arthur 
215Section 1512(b)(2)(B).  
 
216555 US 1(2005).  At www.google.co.za/search?h/=en&ie=ISO-8859-
i&e=supreme+courts+of+the+United+States+Arthur+Andersen+v+the+United+States&btnG=Gooble+Se
arch&meta=  (accessed on 20 October 2006).  See also S Landsman “Death of an accountant: The jury 
convicts Arthur Andersen of obstruction of justice” (2003) Chicago-Kent Law Review Vol 78 No 3 1203. 
21718 United States Code  
218Arthur Andersen LLP v the United States supra (n 216) at 4. 
219At 5.  See also Landsman op. cit. (n 216) 1208. 
220Arthur Andersen LLP v United States supra (n 216) at 5. 
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Andersen’s defences was that its employees had no idea that there might be a Securities 
Exchange Commission investigation.  If no investigation was anticipated, then there could 
be no intent to obstruct justice by shredding or deleting documents.221 The auditor, 
Andersen, was nevertheless convicted of obstruction of justice.  The Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit upheld the verdict.222 It held that the court a quo’s instructions to the jury 
properly conveyed the meaning of the words “corruptly persuades” and “official 
proceeding” as they are used in section 1512(b) of the Code.223
and that the court a quo did not err.
 It further held that it was 
not necessary for the jury to find any intention of wrongdoing on the side of the accused  
224
The Supreme Court’s attention was focused on what it meant by the words “to knowingly 
… corruptly persuade” another person and “with intent to cause” that person to “withhold” 
documents from or to “alter” documents for use in an “official proceeding”
 Then Arthur Andersen petitioned the Supreme Court. 
225 as required 
by section 1512(b)(2)(A) and (B) of the Code.  The Supreme Court held that document 
retention policies that are created, in part, to keep certain information from getting into the 
wrong hands, including the government’s hands, were common practice in business.226 The 
Supreme Court found that the instructions to the jury regarding “corruptly,” led the jury to 
believe that it did not have to find any nexus between the “persuasion” to destroy 
documents and any particular proceeding.227
                                                 
221Landsman op cit (n 216) 1230-31. 
 The court held that a “knowingly” … 
“corrupt” persuader cannot be someone who persuades others to shred documents under a 
document retention policy when he did not have in contemplation any particular official 
222Arthur Andersen LLP v United States supra (n 216) at 1 and 5.  
223See the provisions of section 1512(b) supra under 6.2, text at note 36. 
224Arthur Andersen LLP v United States supra (n 216) at 5-6.  
225 At 6. 
 
226At 7.  
227At 9-10.  
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proceeding in which those documents might be material.228 The Supreme Court followed its 
previous decision in United States v Aguilar 229 where it held that section 1503 requires a 
nexus between the obstructive conduct and the proceeding, and that if the accused lacked 
knowledge that his actions were likely to affect the judicial proceedings, he lacked the 
requisite intent to obstruct the course of justice.230 The court required the same nexus for 
contravention of section 1512 as previously decided in United States v Aguilar in regard to 
1503.  In a unanimous decision the Supreme Court overturned Arthur Andersen’s 
conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.231
 
  
This case provides authority for the proposition that the words “knowingly” and with 
“intent,” in section 1512(b)(2)(A) and (B)232
 
 require that there must be a specific intent to 
persuade another person to destroy the said documents and that must be done in 
contemplation of an official proceeding.  In other words there must be a nexus between the 
corrupt persuasion and an official proceeding.  If the nexus is lacking, it cannot be said that 
the accused contravened section 1512(b)(2)(A) and (B). 
d. To cause or induce any person (Y) who has been summoned to appear as a witness or 
to produce a record, document or other object in an official proceeding to evade such legal 
processes.233
 
   
e. To cause or induce any person to be absent from an official proceeding to which Y 
                                                 
228At 11.  
229See the discussion of United States v Aguilar supra, under 6.3.1.1, text at note 74. 
230Arthur Andersen LLP v United States supra (n 216) at 11.  
231At 11-12.  
23218 United States Code.  
 
233Section 1512(b)(2)(C).   
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has been summoned as a witness.234 X commits an offence when he or she influences 
witness Y to leave the court’s jurisdiction so that he or she cannot testify.  It is not a 
defence that he or she consented thereto.235 This offence may be committed by attempting 
in any other way to prevent him or her from attending court or from testifying.  It is not 
important whether the witness had been served with a subpoena or not, as long as it was 
known that he or she is a potential witness.  Kidnapping and holding witnesses till the trial 
is over or beating them or intimidating them by threats of serious violence may amount to 
tampering with witnesses.  It is immaterial whether their testimony would have been 
unimportant or irrelevant.236 It is said that witnesses must have been tampered with to such 
an extent that they deliberately absented themselves from “official proceedings.”237
  
 
6.3.3.2 Destruction, mutilation or concealment of records or documents 
Section 1512(c)(2) 238
 
 provides: 
[W]hoever corruptly (i) destroys, mutilates or conceals a record, document or other object or 
attempts to do so, with intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official 
proceeding or (ii) otherwise obstructs or impedes any official proceeding or attempts to do so, shall 
be fined under this title or imprisoned. 
 
Any wilful destruction or rendering illegible or incapable of identification of any book, 
document or other thing of any kind which is or may be required in evidence in official 
proceedings, with intent to prevent it from being used in evidence, is punishable in terms of 
section 151(c)(2).  This section also punishes any attempt to do what is mentioned above.  
 
                                                 
234Section 1512(b)(2)(D).   
 
235Perkins op cit (n 57) 498. 
  
236Gammage and Hemphill op cit (n 1) 301.  
  
237Ibid.  
 
23818 United States Code. 
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6.3.3.3    The elements of the section 1512 offence 
Section provides comprehensive protection to witnesses.  It provides more protection than 
provided by the section 1503 omnibus clause.  This section extends its protection to any 
person239 and applies to all types of witness tampering, not just coercive acts.  In order to 
succeed on a charge of witness tampering in terms of section 1512(b), the prosecution must 
prove the following four elements:240
a. that X knowingly 
 
b. engaged in intimidation, physical force, threats, misleading conduct, or corrupt 
persuasion toward another person, 
c. with intent to influence, delay, or prevent testimony or cause any person to withhold a 
record, object, document or testimony, 
d. from official proceedings. 
 
6.3.3.3.1    Knowingly 
Firstly, the accused must knowingly commit the prohibited conduct.  It is not necessary that 
he or she acts with a corrupt purpose.  It is enough that he or she performs one of the listed 
acts with intent to influence, prevent or delay testimony.  In addition, the prosecution is not 
required to prove that the accused knew of the federal nature of the proceedings with which 
he or she was tampering.241 In 2000, in United States v Kellington,242 the court observed 
that the violation of section 1512(b) was a crime of specific intent.243
                                                 
239The term ‘the courts’ has been construed broadly to include potential grand jury and excused witnesses.  
 The facts of this case 
were as follows:  Kellington was an attorney who, in 1996, was tried and convicted of 
 
240Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 893; Lou op cit (n 1) 946 and Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 778. 
 
241Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 893-94; Lou op cit (n 1) 946-47; Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 778 and 
Raffer and Teper op cit (n 41) 1005. 
 
242217 F 3d 1084 (9th Cir 2000). 
 
243At 1098. 
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obstruction of justice and conspiracy to obstruct justice for conduct arising from his 
representation of a client who was apprehended for being a convicted drug trafficker.  In 
1994, Kellington received a call from a client, MacFarlane, who was in custody.  
Kellington knew MacFarlane only as “Richard Parker.”  He allegedly consulted with him in 
custody and MacFarlane confirmed that “Parker” was a pseudonym.  
 
MacFarlane requested Kellington to pass instructions to Young, one of MacFarlane’s 
employees, to remove some personal property from his house. Kellington agreed.  
MacFarlane then wrote out a list of the personal property he wanted Young to remove from 
his house.  He also wrote out instructions to Young telling him to retrieve and destroy an 
envelope that was hidden in a chair in the bedroom, and for Young to meet MacFarlane on 
a specified day to discuss other business.  Kellington read the list, discussed the priority of 
each task with MacFarlane, and entered numbers on the list to indicate MacFarlane’s sense 
of urgency.244
 
 He took the list back to his office.  He called the said Young and read the 
instructions to him.  Young asked Kellington how he should destroy the envelope.  
Kellington suggested that he could burn it. Young asked if he could get into trouble for 
executing the instructions, and Kellington said no. 
Young removed the listed items and loaded them on a truck.  He burnt the envelope.  He 
came across a driver’s license with MacFarlane’s photograph on it, but the driver’s name 
was recorded as “Branon.”  Young was alarmed when he recalled that the name Branon had 
appeared on the “official looking” papers he had already burnt.  After talking it over with 
his wife, he resolved to drive back to MacFarlane’s house and return the property.  While 
there, he met the police who had returned to the house to execute a search warrant.  Young 
explained to the police that he had been instructed by MacFarlane’s attorney, Kellington, to 
remove the property from the house and to destroy the contents of the envelope.  Kellington 
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was detained.  He and MacFarlane were charged with obstructing justice by “knowingly 
engaging in misleading conduct towards another person, with intent to alter, destroy, 
mutilate or conceal an object with intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for 
the use in an official proceeding” in contravention of section 1512(b)(2)(B) 245 and conspiring 
to obstruct justice.246
  
 
The prosecution had to prove that Kellington knew that he was participating in the 
concealment or destruction of objects useful to an official proceeding.247 The court held:248
 
 
This is a specific intent crime, so in the absence of an instruction on deliberate ignorance, the 
government was obliged to establish that Kellington knew the property Young removed/destroyed 
was useful to an official proceeding and that Kellington intended to impair the availability of those 
objects for use in the proceeding. 
 
The Court of Appeals remanded the case for a new trial.  The importance of this case lies in 
the explanation of the type of intent required by section 1512(b)(2)(B).  This section 
constitutes a specific intent crime as opposed to the prosecution’s theory of criminal intent 
that “any reasonable person and especially an attorney, would have known that he was 
being asked to impair the availability of objects for use in an official proceeding.”249
 
 The 
section required the prosecution to establish that Kellington knowingly caused or induced 
Young to alter, destroy, mutilate or conceal an object with intent to impair that object’s 
integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding. 
6.3.3.3.2    Engaging in prohibited acts 
                                                                                                                                                     
244At 1088. 
24518 United States Code.  
246United States v Kellington supra (n 242) at 1089. 
247At 1091. 
248At 1098. 
249At 1100. 
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The second requirement is that the accused must have engaged in some certain acts.  The 
following acts by the accused fall foul of section 1512(b): 
 
a. Intimidation or threats. 
b. Misleading conduct. 
c. Corrupt persuasion. 
 
a. Intimidation or threats. Intimidating and threatening witnesses is not only a 
statutory offence in the United States, but it also leads to double counting of sentence.250 In 
United States v Amsden,251 the accused was convicted of violating section 876 of the 
Code.252 He was remanded in custody while waiting to be sentenced.  While in prison, he 
pleaded guilty on two counts of mailing threatening communications to the witness in 
violation of section 1512(b).  He was convicted of contravention of section 1512(b).253 The 
trial court found that the accused “indirectly” attempted to influence the recipient of the 
letter not to testify at his sentencing hearing and his sentence was increased in terms of the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  He appealed against the sentence.  The United States Court of 
Appeals disagreed with the court a quo with regard to the increase in sentencing.  The court 
held:254
 
 
After careful review of the record, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district 
court was mistaken in its determination that the letter was an attempt to obstruct justice.  It seems to 
us that it is far more likely that the letters in question were actually a continuation of the illegal 
conduct for which Mr Amsden was convicted.  In reaching this conclusion, we found it important 
that the letter did not refer, directly or indirectly, to testimony or even to any court proceeding.  
                                                 
250“Double counting occurs when one part of the Sentencing Guidelines is applied to increase the defendant’s 
punishment on account of a kind of harm that has already been fully accounted for by the application of 
another part of the Guidelines.”  See United States v Amsden 213 F 3d 1014 (8th Cir 2000) at 1014. 
 
251United States v Amsden supra (n 250) at 1015.  
25218 United States Code.  This section is not relevant to the crime of obstructing the course of justice. 
25318 United States Code.  
254United States v Amsden supra (n 250) at 1015.  
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Although the court said that there was nothing in the record to indicate that the accused 
believed that the victim might testify in his sentencing hearing, the importance of this case 
lies in the fact that the courts in the United States of America may, in terms of the federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, increase the sentence of the convicted person from one level to 
another if the accused obstructed justice. 
 
b. Misleading conduct.  Section 1515255
 
 defines “misleading conduct” as: 
... knowingly making a false statement or intentionally omitting information from a statement or 
intentionally concealing a material fact with intent to mislead, knowingly submitting or inviting 
reliance on a writing or recording that is false, on an object that is misleading in a material respect or 
knowingly using a trick, scheme with intent to mislead. 
 
Palfin and Prabhu256 submit that “misleading conduct” focuses on the accused’s actions, not 
on his or her intent.  It occurs only when he or she resorts to coercive and deceptive 
conduct.  In 2000, the Second Circuit Court, in United States v LaFontaine,257 ruled that a 
witness tampering charge does not require physical force or threats.  The facts of this case 
were as follows:  The accused, LaFontaine and her husband, faced 17 counts of mail fraud, 
health care fraud, engaging in monetary transactions with criminally derived property, 
conspiracy and witness tampering in connection with their activities in the cosmetic surgery 
clinic they owned.258
                                                 
25518 United States Code. 
 She and her colleagues committed health care fraud by submitting 
false claims to health insurers for procedures that they did not perform.  Those procedures 
they did perform were purely for cosmetic purposes or were not performed by licensed 
physicians.  Lafontaine was arrested and her husband absconded to Canada.  During her 
bail application several pre-trail release conditions were imposed.  This included a 
256Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 895. 
  
257210 F 3d 125 (2nd Cir 2000) at 133. 
258At 127. 
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prohibition on contacting certain witnesses. 
 
In February 2000, the prosecution submitted a letter259 to the court requesting the 
revocation of LaFontaine’s bail.  Firstly, it was alleged that there was clear and convincing 
evidence that Lafontaine contacted one of the witnesses.  Therefore, she had violated her 
bail conditions.  Secondly, the prosecution alleged that there was probable cause to believe 
that she had also committed the crime of witness tampering in terms of section 
1512(b)(1)260 by attempting to influence the testimony of Reyes Jr, a witness.261
 
 
The prosecution contended that, contrary to her bail conditions, LaFontaine and Reyes Jr 
had met on several occasions in 1999.  Allegedly, on one occasion she asked Reyes Jr to 
“remind” her mother that she had a hernia operation and a procedure on her nose at the 
clinic, even though LaFontaine knew this to be false.  She actually tried to influence Reyes 
Jr’s testimony, hence the charge of witness tampering.  It was alleged that she knew that 
Reyes Jr was likely to be called as a prosecution witness.  The hearing was held on the 
prosecution’s motion to revoke bail and both sides had an opportunity to present arguments 
and evidence to the court.  In addition to the letter, the prosecution led evidence showing 
that LaFontaine had shredded documents, attempted to contact other witnesses and 
intimidated a doctor at a certain clinic.  It was argued on behalf of the prosecution that there 
was a danger of future obstruction by LaFontaine, both of Reyes Jr and other witnesses. 
 
The judge accepted the prosecution’s letter and concluded, inter alia, that there was 
                                                 
259The letter was submitted to the court ex parte because the prosecution feared that the accused might flee if 
she learned of the prosecution’s motion. 
 
26018 United States Code.  See United States v LaFontaine supra (n 257) at 126. 
26018 United States Code.  
261United States v LaFontaine supra (n 257) at 129. 
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probable cause to believe that LaFontaine had committed the crime of witness tampering.262
The judge ordered that bail be revoked.
  
263 LaFontaine applied for review of her bail 
revocation.  She contended, inter alia, that the argument should have been rejected because 
she was not accused of any violent or threatening behaviour towards witnesses.  The court 
held:264
  
 
The witness tampering statute plainly does not require “physical force” or “threats” to support a 
tampering charge; corrupt influence is sufficient.   
 
It observed that corrupt influence was sufficient to invoke section 1512(b)(1).265 It was 
further held that the district court did not err in revoking LaFontaine’s bail and the order of 
the district court was confirmed.266 It is important to note that in this case “official 
proceeding”267
 
 included such pre-trial proceedings as bail applications. 
c. Corrupt persuasion.  There is academic opinion, which states that corrupt 
persuasion includes any behaviour that falls short of coercion and communications that are 
not misleading but still show an attempt to influence testimony.268
 
 
6.3.3.3.3    Intent to influence, delay or prevent testimony 
In order to prove that the accused had the intent to influence, delay or prevent testimony, 
the prosecution need only prove that he or she was aware that the natural and probable 
consequences of his or her actions would be to influence the testimony of a witness.  It is 
                                                 
26218 United States Code.  
263United States v LaFontaine supra (n 257) at 130. 
264At 133.  
265At 126. 
  
266At 135. 
267As contemplated in 18 United States Code, section 1512(i). 
268Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 896 and Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 781.  
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said that it is immaterial whether the accused actually influenced the testimony.269 One of 
the leading cases dealing with the intent requirement was United States v Gabriel.270
 
 The 
facts of this case were as follows:  Following a jury trial, the accused were convicted of 
various counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, making false statements within the jurisdiction of 
federal agency and witness tampering in connection with misrepresentations by the accused 
about jet engine repairs. 
The accused, James Gabriel and Gerard Vitti were both executive vice presidents at 
Chromalloy Research and Technology Division (CRT).  CRT was one of the United States’ 
largest jet engine repair stations and it serviced most of the world’s airlines.  In 1992, the 
government learnt that Chromalloy Research and Technology was misrepresenting the 
nature of some of its jet engine repairs. An investigation was conducted and it led to the 
indictment of the accused for fraud.  Gabriel was indicted separately for witness tampering.  
It was alleged that when the grand jury began investigating Gabriel’s involvement in the 
1990 repair of a low-pressure turbine (LPT) case from Qantas Airline, Gabriel falsely stated 
that he had previously disclosed to Qantas that the low-pressure turbine case was only 
partially serviceable.  In an attempt to support his story, he then sent a facsimile to Donald 
Mealing, the Qantas representative with whom Gabriel had dealt.  Gabriel was charged with 
witness tampering for sending that facsimile.  The prosecution alleged that Gabriel 
attempted to mislead Mealing into believing that he, Gabriel, had previously disclosed to 
Qantas that the low-pressure turbine case was partially serviceable and that he intended 
Mealing to believe that lie and to repeat it to the grand jury.271 He was convicted of 
contravention of section 1512(b)(1).272
                                                 
269Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 897; Lou op cit (n 1) 949 and Berg and Levinson op cit (n 18) 782. 
  
270125 F 3d 89 (2nd Cir 1997). 
271At 93-4. 
 
272See 18 United States Code, which makes it a crime to: 
… corruptly persuade [ ] another person, or attempt[ ] to do so, or engage[ ] in misleading conduct 
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On appeal, Gabriel contended that the prosecution was required to prove that his actions 
were likely to affect Mealing’s grand jury testimony.  He further contended that because 
Mealing was in Australia, and beyond the grand jury’s jurisdiction, there was not enough 
evidence to prove that Mealing was likely to testify.  Therefore, there was not enough 
evidence to prove that Gabriel’s actions were likely to affect Mealing’s testimony.273 He 
relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v Aguilar274 which required that a 
“likely to affect” requirement be incorporated into section 1503.  In dismissing this 
contention and upholding the conviction the court held:275
 
 
[ ]… the government was not required to prove that Mealing was likely to testify or that Gabriel’s 
actions were likely to affect Mealing’s testimony.  Rather, the government was required to prove 
only that Gabriel endeavoured corruptly to persuade or mislead Mealing with the intent of 
influencing Mealing’s potential testimony before a grand jury.  
 
Gabriel’s crime was completed when he sent the facsimile to a potential witness 
“knowingly” and with intent to influence that witness’s testimony.  Whether or not his 
actions were likely to affect Mealing’s testimony was irrelevant because section 1512 
protects witnesses even prior to formal proceedings,276
 
 as was the case when Gabriel sent 
the facsimile to the witness. 
6.3.3.3.4    Official proceedings 
Section 1512(b) prohibits tampering with witnesses, with intent to prevent, delay or hinder 
testimony in an “official proceeding.”277 In section 1515(a)(1),278
                                                                                                                                                     
toward another person, with intent to- 
 an “official proceeding” 
  
influence  … the testimony of any person in an official proceeding. 
 
273United States v Gabriel supra (n 270) at 102. 
274United States v Aguilar supra (n 74).  
275United States v Gabriel supra (n 270) at 103. 
276Pesce op cit (n 207) 1421. 
27718 United States Code (1994) 321. 
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is defined as: 
 
(i) a proceeding before a judge or court of the United States, a United States 
magistrate, a bankruptcy judge, a judge of the United States Tax Court, a special trial 
of the Tax Court, a judge of the United States Claims Court, or a Federal grand jury; 
(ii) a proceeding before the Congress;  
(iii) a proceeding involving the business of insurance whose activities affect interstate 
commerce before any insurance regulatory official or agency. 
 
In 1997, the Third Circuit Court in United States v Bell279 had to deal with the interpretation 
of “an official proceeding.” The facts of this case were as follows:  The accused, Bell and 
others, were facing charges of murder and/ or intimidation of a witness.  These charges 
related to the killing of Ms Proctor, an informant of a Drug Task Force.280 Allegedly, in 
April 1992, Ms Proctor was to testify against Tyler, Bell’s boyfriend, in a drug related trial.  
On the day of the trial, it was alleged that Tyler, Bell and several others kidnapped Ms 
Proctor and killed her.281
 
 Bell’s co-conspirators were convicted of murder and/ or 
intimidation of a witness, but Bell was acquitted. 
The federal authorities then began their own investigation into Proctor’s murder, which led 
to a new trial and to Bell’s conviction.282
                                                                                                                                                     
27818 United States Code. 
 At the second federal prosecution trial, Bell was 
again charged with and convicted of, inter alia, murder of a witness in contravention of 
279113 F 3d 1345 (3rd Cir 1997) 1349. 
280The Task Force was comprised of local, state and federal investigators. 
281United States v Bell supra (n 279) at 1347. 
282Ibid.  
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section 1512(a)(1)(A) and (C),283 use of physical force and threats against a witness in 
contravention of section 1512(b)(1)-(3).284
  
 Bell appealed against her conviction. 
In order to prevail on the charges of murder of a witness, use of physical force and threats 
against a witness in terms of section 1512(b)(1)-(3), the prosecution had to prove that:285
 
 
(1) the accused killed or attempted to kill a person; 
(2) he or she was motivated by a desire to prevent the communication between that 
person and the law enforcement authorities concerning the commission or possible 
commission of an offence; 
(3) the offence was actually a federal offence; and 
(4) the accused believed that the person in (2) above might communicate with the 
federal authorities.  The prosecution need not prove any state of mind on the part of 
the accused with respect to the federal character of the proceeding or officer. 
 
The questions upon which the disposition of this appeal were based were: 
 
(i) whether the jury could have concluded that at least part of Bell’s motivation in killing 
the deceased was to prevent her from communicating further with the Task Force, 
 
(ii) and, if so, whether the jury could have concluded that at least one of the deceased’s 
further communications with the Task Force would have been with a federal officer.286
                                                 
28318 United States Code. 
 The 
court found that at least part of Bell’s motivation in killing Proctor was to prevent such 
 
28418 United States Code. 
285United States v Bell supra (n 279) at 1348-49. 
286At 1349. 
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communications because she was so heavily implicated in the drug trade trial.  The court 
also gave an affirmative answer to the second question. 287
 
 
This case highlighted the necessity of the motive of murder in order to invoke obstruction 
of justice in terms of section 1512.  If the accused intentionally kills a person in a fight over 
drugs, he or she could be charged and convicted of murder.  There is no obstruction of the 
course of justice in this instance.  However, if, in killing another person, the accused was 
motivated by preventing the deceased from disclosing another crime that the accused had 
committed, he or she can be charged with both murder and obstructing of the course of 
justice.288
 
  
It is said that an “official proceeding” exists when at least one of the law enforcement 
officer’s communications, which the accused sought to prevent, would have been with a 
federal officer.289 An “official proceeding” need not be pending or about to be instituted at 
the time of the offence in order to secure a conviction.  In 1996, in United States v 
Morrison,290 the court observed that if the accused realised that a federal proceeding might 
be commenced and acted in such a manner so as to affect the potential testimony, a 
conviction under section 1512 was permissible.  It must also be mentioned that an 
investigation by a federal agency,291 like the FBI, may constitute an “official proceeding,” 
but an investigation by a state agency like the Tennessee Human Rights Commission is 
generally not considered as an “official proceeding” under section 1512.292
                                                 
287At 1350. 
 It is said that the 
288In contravention of 18 United States Code, section 1512(a)(1)(C).  
289Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 897. 
290United States v Morrison supra (n 41) at 630.  See also Raffer and Teper op cit (n 41) 1009.  
 
291United States v Frankhauser 80 F 3d 641 (1st Cir 1996) at 650-51. 
 
292Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 898; Raffer and Teper op cit (n 41) 1008-09 and 18 United States Code 
(2002), section 1515(a)(1). 
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intimidation of witnesses who were supposed to testify before the Tennessee Human Rights 
Commission did not amount to interference with an “official proceeding.”293
 
  
6.3.4 Conduct which constitutes the offence of obstructing the course of justice 
in contravention of section 1513 of the Code 
Section 1513 protects witnesses, victims or informants against retaliation by the accused as 
a result of them having testified or given other evidence in an official proceeding.  Section 
1513294
 
 provides:  
(a)(1) Whoever kills or attempts to kill another person with intent to retaliate against any person for- 
 
(A) the attendance of a witness or party at an official proceeding or any testimony given or 
any record, document or other object produced by a witness in an official proceeding, 
 
shall be punished as provided in paragraph (2). 
 
(b) Whoever knowingly engages in any conduct and thereby causes bodily injury to another person 
or damages the tangible property of another person or threatens to do so, with intent to retaliate 
against any person for- 
 
(1) the attendance of a witness or party at an official proceeding or any testimony given or 
any record, document or other object produced by a witness in an official proceeding, 
 
 shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.  
The prosecution may charge the accused solely under this section but, in practice, the 
accused is often charged with a section 1513 violation in addition to a charge under section  
1512.  To succeed in terms of a section 1512 prosecution, the prosecution must also prove 
that: 
(1) the accused killed or attempted to kill another person  
(2) with intent to prevent either testimony or the production of evidence and 
(3) at an official proceeding.295
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
293See Puckett v Tenn. Eastman Co, 889 F.2d 1481 (6th Cir. 1989) at 1489-90.  This case is cited with approval 
in Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 898. 
 
29418 United States Code.  
29518 United States Code, section 1512(a) (2002).  See Palfin and Prabhu op cit (n 18) 898. 
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6.4 OVERLAPPING OF SECTIONS 1503 AND 1512 OF TITLE 18 OF THE 
UNITED STATES CODE  
Prior to the 2002 legislative amendment of section 1512 of Title 18 of the United States 
Code, the issue among the appellate courts was whether section 1512 was the exclusive tool 
to apply to witness tampering or whether section 1503 still played a role.  When enacting 
section 1512296 in 1982, all references to witnesses under section 1503 had been 
excluded.297 Some academic commentators interpret that Congress’s action of deleting of 
all references to witnesses from section 1503, while enacting section 1512, was an attempt 
to take witness protection out of the reach of section 1503.298 On the other hand, some 
academic writers construed Congress’s decision to leave the omnibus clause of section 
1503 untouched, and its failure to include a similar provision in section 1512, as an attempt 
to leave witnesses within the reach of section 1503’s omnibus clause.299 According to 
Riley,300
 
 as a result, some prosecutors use only section 1512 for witness tampering while 
others continue to use the omnibus clause of section 1503 to bring charges of witness 
tampering.  Others charge the accused with both sections.  This conflict has been 
recognised by the courts, but, regrettably, they have failed to resolve it with a uniform 
solution. 
6.5 SUMMARY   
Owing to the influence of English common law upon the legal system of the United States 
of America, it was a common law crime to commit an act obstructing, or tending to obstruct 
public justice.  In 1831, Congress confirmed the power of the judiciary to punish contempt 
                                                 
29618 United States Code.  See the provisions of this section supra under 6.2, text at note 36. 
297Riley op cit (n 68) 257-8. 
298Riley op cit (n 68) 258. 
299Riley op cit (n 68) 258-59. 
300Riley op cit (n 68) 259. 
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of court and codified the common law crime of obstructing justice. Both the states’ and the 
federal governments introduced legislation to punish acts which amounted to obstruction of 
justice.  It may either be a felony or misdemeanour, depending on the seriousness of the 
offence.  As the statutory law came into being, some common law offences which had been 
prosecuted as crimes of obstructing the course of justice, for example, prison escape and 
resisting arrest, came to be dealt with as distinct crimes. 
 
At present, a comprehensive federal statute forbids obstruction of the course of justice and 
protects the integrity of proceedings before the federal judiciary and other government 
bodies.  Obstructing the due administration of justice in any court of the United States, 
corruptly or by threats or force, is a criminal offence and is punishable in terms of section 
1503 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  Tampering with witnesses is punishable in 
terms of section 1512 of the Code.  There is academic opinion which suggests that the 
statutory offence of obstruction of justice in terms of section 1503 may be committed only 
once “judicial proceedings” are pending.  According to this view, section 1503 cannot be 
construed to proscribe conduct which takes place wholly outside the context of an ongoing 
judicial proceeding.  An investigation conducted by the grand jury per se constitutes a 
judicial proceeding for the purposes of the provisions of section 1503. 
 
Generally, it is said that the proscription of section 1503 does not begin until a grand jury 
has issued a subpoena in a criminal investigation, or a plaintiff has filed a complaint in a 
civil action.  Most circuit courts agree that the obstruction of pending judicial proceeding is 
a prerequisite for conviction under section 1503, but there is no consensus among the 
circuit courts as to when “judicial proceedings” are pending for the purposes of section 
1503.  Some courts, for example, refused to establish pendency where a federal grand jury 
was empanelled, but no subpoenas had been issued and the grand jury had not been 
appraised of the investigation.  It has been said that a “judicial proceeding” is pending when 
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an investigation is undertaken by the police to secure presently contemplated presentation 
of evidence before a grand jury, or as soon as an indictment is issued.  But there is also a 
different view on the “pendency of judicial proceeding” requirement in order to invoke 
section 1503.  This view suggests that, on the face of it, there is nothing in the statute that 
requires “pending” judicial proceedings.  Therefore, obstruction of the due administration 
of justice may be committed as soon as the principal crime has been committed, even 
before the police have undertaken an investigation. Nevertheless, for the purposes of 
section 1503, criminal action remains pending in court until disposition is made of any 
direct appeal taken by the accused assigning error that could result in a new trial. 
   
Section 1512(b) punishes tampering with witnesses in “official proceedings.”  In terms of 
section 1512(e)(1), for purposes of section 1512(b) an official proceeding need not be 
pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offence.  In section 1515(a)(1), “official 
proceeding” is defined as: 
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(i) proceedings before a judge or court of the United States, a United States 
magistrate, a bankruptcy judge, a judge of the United States Tax Court, a special trial 
of the Tax Court, a judge of the United States Claims Court, or a Federal grand jury; 
(ii) a proceeding before Congress; 
(iii) proceedings involving the business of insurance before any insurance regulatory 
official or agency. 
 
There is judicial authority to the effect that the proceedings of a Drug Task Force and an 
investigation by a federal agency, like the FBI, may constitute “official proceedings.”  
There is also authority to the effect that this crime may be committed for tampering with 
witnesses in respect of  
 
(a) a grand jury investigation, 
(b) investigations by a United States Probation Officer (USPO), and 
(c) investigations by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 
 
It is not clear as to when the course of justice ceases for purposes of the crime of 
obstruction of justice in terms of section 1512(b) of the Code, but there is authority to the 
effect that the scope of the course of justice has been extended to include the post-trial 
proceedings.  The circuit courts that have addressed the issue as to when the proceedings 
cease to be “pending,” agree that for purposes of section 1503, proceedings are pending 
after sentencing and until the disposition was made of any direct appeal that would result in 
a new trial. 
 
Section 1513 of the 18 United States Code punishes retaliation against a witness, victim or 
an informant.  This section requires that the accused must have killed or caused bodily 
injury to any person or to have caused any damage to the property of any person or to have 
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threatened to do so for, inter alia, attending as a witness or party at an “official 
proceeding.” 
 
The following conduct constitutes the federal statutory offence of obstructing the course of 
justice in terms of sections 1503, 1507, 1512(b) and 1513 of the United States Code: 
 
a. Tampering with the jury or judge (section 1503). 
b. Concealment, alteration or destruction of documents (sections 1503 and 1512(c)(2)). 
c. Encouraging or rendering false testimony (section 1503). 
d. Picketing or parading or the use of sound amplifiers with intent to disrupt or influence  
judges, jurors, or witnesses (section 1507). 
e. Tampering with witnesses in official proceeding (section 1512). 
f. Intimidation, using physical force or threats against a witness in official proceeding 
(section 1513). 
 
Section 1503 specifically prohibits the following acts:  
 
(i) Tampering with the jury or judge.  Corruptly influencing any grand or petit juror or 
officer of the court by threats or force or by communications is an offence prohibited by the 
omnibus clause of section 1503 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  There is consensus 
among academic writers that section 1503 applies in both criminal and civil proceedings 
and that it applies to both actual and attempted obstruction of the course of justice.  There is 
judicial authority to the effect that section 1503, the omnibus clause, serves as a “catch-all” 
provision because it is more general in scope than the earlier clauses in the statute. 
 
(ii) Concealment, alteration or destruction of evidence.  Some academic writers are of 
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the view that, although the statute generally protects against document abuse in both civil 
and criminal proceedings, traditionally, section 1503 had not been extended to apply to 
concealing or withholding discoverable documents in civil litigation.  However, the United 
States Federal Court went against this traditional approach and extended the statute to the 
discovery process of a civil proceeding.  Therefore, destruction of documents after a 
complaint is filed, but before any order has been entered is said to violate section 1503. 
 
(iii) Encouraging or rendering false testimony.  This offence can be committed in the 
following ways: 
  
(1) Giving false testimony that may influence judicial proceedings.  If the accused 
intentionally gives evasive evidence or testimony to the jury, designed to conceal his 
or her true knowledge of the facts he or she may be convicted of obstructing the 
course of justice in terms of section 1503. 
 
(2) Refusing to testify before a grand jury may also be sufficient to support an 
obstruction of the course of justice conviction. 
 
(3) Encouraging a potential witness to give false evidence. 
 
(4) Making an offer to witnesses testifying in an investigation other than one 
involving a grand jury.  
 
(5) Tricking grand jury witnesses into giving false testimony. 
 
For the accused to be convicted of the offence in terms of section 1503, the state must 
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prove the following elements of the offence:  
 
a. A nexus with the pending judicial proceedings.  There is no consensus among the 
circuit courts as to when “judicial proceedings” are pending for the purposes of section 
1503 and there is no guidance, as yet, from the United States Federal Court.  Some courts, 
for example, refused to establish that there was “pendency” where a federal grand jury was 
empanelled, but no subpoenas had been issued and the grand jury had not been appraised of 
the investigation.  There is also judicial authority to the effect that “judicial proceedings” 
are pending as soon as the indictment is issued or a complaint in civil matters has been 
filed.  Some circuit courts have held that an investigation conducted by the grand jury per 
se constitutes a judicial proceeding for the purposes of the provisions of section 1503. 
 
b. That the accused knew of and had notice about the proceedings.  The circuit courts 
which require that there must be pending “judicial proceedings” in order for the state to 
succeed on the charge of contravention of section 1503, also require the prosecution to 
show that the accused knew of the pending “judicial proceedings.”  If the accused lacked 
the knowledge that his or her actions were likely to affect judicial proceedings, he or she 
lacked the requisite intent to obstruct justice.    
 
c. That the accused acted corruptly and with intent to obstruct or interfere with judicial 
proceedings.  This means that there must be a specific intent to obstruct the course of 
justice.  Section 1503 limits the scope of liability to those who corruptly and intentionally 
act to obstruct a pending proceeding or the due administration of justice or to endeavour to 
interfere with the proceedings.  This provision does not specifically prohibit the means 
employed by the defendant, but rather his or her corrupt endeavour, which motivated his or 
her action. 
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Witness tampering is prohibited by section 1512 of Title 18 of the United States Code, but 
section 1512(e)(1) does not require that there should be a pending official proceeding at the 
time of the offence.  However, tampering with witnesses should have been in respect of 
official proceedings.  This offence may be committed by:  
 
(1) inducing or attempting to induce another person (Y) to abscond from court 
where he or she is legally bound to appear as a witness; 
(2) attempting to prevent a witness from testifying.  It is not important whether or 
not a witness has been subpoenaed; 
(3) spiriting away a witness so that he or she cannot testify; 
(4) endeavouring to intimidate a witness; and  
(5) endeavouring to procure false testimony. 
 
The most serious incidents of witness tampering, like retaliating against a witness, a victim 
or an informant are covered by section 1513 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  
Whoever kills or attempts to kill any person with intent to retaliate against that person for 
having testified or given a record or a document or other object in an official proceeding 
contravenes section 1513 of 18 United States Code. 
 
Similar to Canadian and Australian law, but unlike English law, the United States of 
America has comprehensive federal statutory law to punish any conduct which attempts or 
endeavours to obstruct the due administration of justice.  As in the English and Canadian 
jurisdictions, but not in Australia, police investigations of a commission of a crime form 
part of the judicial proceedings and thus the course of justice.  As is the position in 
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Australia, where the crime of perverting the course of justice is codified, the last part of 
section 1503 of Title 18 of the United States Code contains a catch-all provision.  The 
omnibus provision of section 1503 ensures that criminals cannot circumvent the statute by 
devising novel and creative schemes that would interfere with the administration of justice, 
but would nonetheless fall outside the scope of section 1503 prohibitions.  The omnibus 
clause punishes any conduct which is not enumerated in the Code and which attempts or 
endeavours to obstruct the due administration of justice.  Like in English and Canadian law, 
this thesis could not find any case law or academic opinion to the proposition that an 
omission may give rise to liability for obstruction of the due administration of justice in 
terms the American law. 
 
Unlike English, Australian and Canadian law, it is not clear under American law whether 
any attempt or endeavour to commit the crime of obstructing the course of justice is a 
substantive offence or an inchoate offence. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW  
7.1 GENERAL 
This chapter will examine the crime of obstructing or defeating the course of justice in 
South Africa.  The time when the course of justice is considered to begin and end is 
discussed, as are the elements of the crime of obstructing the course of justice.  Those 
statutory provisions that are akin to the crime of obstructing the course of justice are also 
analysed. 
 
South African academic writers define the crime of obstructing the course of justice as 
consisting in unlawfully engaging in conduct which defeats or obstructs the course or the 
due administration of justice1 or unlawfully committing an act which is intended to defeat 
or obstruct and which does defeat or obstruct the due administration of justice.2 This crime 
developed from the provisions of the Roman and Roman-Dutch lex Cornelia de falsis, the 
lex Calumnia and the lex Remmia.  It now has a wider scope than under Roman and 
Roman-Dutch law,3 where an act which obstructed the course of justice was regarded as 
falsity and falsity was defined broadly as alteration, suppression or counterfeiting of the 
truth committed with wrongful intent to harm and prejudice another.4
                                                 
1See CR Snyman Criminal Law 5ed (2008) 338. 
 In our law there is no 
single definition of this crime.  Firstly, some writers refer to it as “conduct” which defeats 
2See Gardiner and Lansdown op cit Chapter Two (n 167) 817; FG Gardiner and CWH Lansdown South 
African Criminal Law and Procedure: being a treatise upon the law and practice in criminal matters in the 
Union of South Africa 3ed Vol II (1930) 756; Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 143; N Boister “Refusing to 
allow the taking of a blood sample: Is it defeating or obstructing the administration of justice?” (1994) SACJ 
Vol 7 No 1 115 and Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 939-40. 
 
3Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 141; Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 337 and Burchell and Milton op cit 
Chapter Two (n 148) 939-40. 
 
4D 48.10.1.  See the discussion of this offence supra in Chapter Two under 2.1.1, text at note 3.  
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and obstructs the course of justice.5 Snyman’s6 definition of this crime, for instance, uses 
the word “conduct” which can either be a positive act or a failure to do something (an 
omission).  He confirms that the crime may be committed by either a positive act or an 
omission.7 There is also case law to support this view.  For instance in S v Gaba8 it was 
observed that an omission, in appropriate circumstances, might lead to a conviction of 
attempt to defeat or obstruct the course of justice.  It was found that where a detective was 
aware of the identity of a detainee, he had a legal duty to impart this knowledge to his 
fellow investigating officers.  Such an omission could amount to an attempt to defeat or 
obstruct the course of justice.  The facts of this case were the following:  The accused, Gaba 
(a detective), stood trial in the regional court on a charge of attempting to defeat or obstruct 
the course of justice.  Allegedly, two police officers, Mofokeng and Mokoena arrested and 
interrogated, in Gaba’s presence, one Amos Vilakazi with reference to a series of murder 
cases in Bethlehem.  The state alleged that when the accused was asked whether he knew 
who the “Godfather” was, and whether he was aware that Amos Vilakazi was the 
“Godfather” who was a member of a gang which made a living by robbing and stealing 
from people and selling alcohol illegally on trains, he, with the intent to defeat or obstruct 
the course of justice, omitted to mention to Detective Constables Mofokeng and Mokoena 
that Amos Vilakazi was in reality the Godfather.9
                                                 
5Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 337. 
 Therefore, the case against the accused 
was fundamentally that he was aware that the police were looking for the Godfather in 
connection with certain serious crimes, and that he, as a member of the investigation team, 
was aware who “Godfather” was, but failed to pass that information to other police 
6Ibid.  There is Roman-Dutch authority that people were punished for falsity for failure to prevent falsity 
when they were able to do so.  See D 48.10.1 op cit Chapter Two (n 80). 
 
7Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 339. 
  
81981 (3) SA 745 (O) at 746. 
  
9At 747.  
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members.10
 
 
Mofokeng testified that Gaba entered the office where Amos Vilakazi was being 
interrogated and that he, Mofokeng, had asked Gaba if he knew this Amos Vilakazi.  
Allegedly, Gaba did not reply.  “He just kept quiet and went out.”11 Mokoena also testified 
that Gaba knew before the date of Amos Vilakazi’s arrest and interrogation that the police 
were looking for a certain “Godfather.”12
 
  
During trial it was argued on behalf of the accused that the charge sheet did not reveal a 
crime because “the crime of defeating the ends of justice per definition cannot be 
committed through omission.”13 It was further argued on Gaba’s behalf that even if the 
mentioned crime could be committed through omission, the charge sheet was defective 
because it did not allege that a legal duty rested on him, Gaba, to reveal his alleged 
knowledge to the two police officers.14 The court a quo found that the charge sheet was not 
defective simply because it did not contain an allegation that the accused had a legal duty to 
convey his knowledge about Godfather to his fellow police officers.15
 
 Gaba was convicted 
as charged. 
On appeal, it was argued on Gaba’s behalf that the defect in the charge sheet was brought to 
the attention of the court at the beginning of the trial but the state did not amend it and the 
                                                 
10At 749-50.  
 
11At 747.  
 
12At 748.  
 
13Ibid. 
  
14At 747.  
 
15At 749. 
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defect was also not cured by evidence16 as required by the provisions of section 88 of Act 
51 of 1977,17 the trial court erred in convicting him.  On the issue of the existence of a legal 
duty the court held:18
 
 
I am of the opinion that the legal conviction of the community definitely demands that a detective 
should reveal his knowledge under such circumstances to his fellow investigation officer and that 
therefore he had a moral obligation to do so.  In the event that the state evidence is accepted, it appears 
that appellant’s silence actually lead to Godfather’s release.  By doing so the police investigation was 
defeated or at least delayed, because Godfather was arrested the following day by other members of 
the police force is a neighbouring town and handed again to the team who originally detained him for 
interrogation. Thereafter he was charged and found guilty on a charge that arose from the investigation 
referred to above.  My finding is therefore that in relevant circumstances an action can lead to a finding 
of guilt of attempting to defeat or obstruct the course of justice.19
 
 
 
The court found that notwithstanding the fact that the defect in the charge sheet was 
brought to the attention of the court by the acussed’s legal representative at the start of the 
trial, the charge sheet was never amended.  In the court’s opinion, the provisions of section 
88 of the Criminal Procedure Act are clear and unambiguous and essentially that the state 
could argue that the evidence led had cured the defect.20 As the charge sheet was defective 
the court unanimously allowed the appeal and the guilty finding and sentence were set 
aside.21
 
 
Other academic writers use the words “an act,” meaning that this crime can, generally, only 
be committed through a positive act and not through omission.22
                                                 
16Ibid. 
 Secondly, in some 
  
17Section 88 of the Criminal Procedures Act provides: 
 
Where a charge is defective due to the omission of an allegation, which is an essential element of the 
relevant crime, the defect is, unless it is brought to the attention of the court before the judgement, 
restored by evidence at the trial which proves the alleged matter. 
  
18S v Gaba supra (n 8) at 751.  
 
19[My translation]. 
  
20S v Gaba supra (n 8) at 752. 
  
21At 753. 
  
22Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 939 and Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 143. 
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definitions it is said that X’s conduct must be intended to defeat or obstruct the due 
administration of justice.  Thirdly, sometimes this crime is referred to as “defeating” the 
course of justice, sometimes as “obstructing” the course of justice,23 sometimes as 
defeating and obstructing the course of justice,24 sometimes as defeating or obstructing the 
course of justice25 and sometimes as defeating the ends of justice.26
 
 The words “defeating” 
and “obstructing” the course of justice will now be discussed hereunder. 
(1) According to Hunt27 and Burchell and Milton,28
 
 the actual defeating of the course of 
justice, in the context of criminal cases, occurs when the accused’s act causes:  
(i) Y who is guilty, to escape conviction either because the prosecution is 
induced to decline to prosecute or because the court is compelled to acquit 
him or her (or else to impose a punishment which would have been different 
but for the act or acts); or  
(ii) Y who is innocent, to be convicted.   
 
In the context of civil proceedings, defeating connotes the obtaining of a judgment different 
from that, which would otherwise have been given.29 According to Burchell and Milton,30
                                                 
23S v Tanoa 1955 (2) SA 613 (O); R v Nhlapo 1958 (3) SA 142 (T); S v Binta 1993 (2) SACR 553 (C) and S v 
Kiti 1994 (1) SACR 14 (E). 
 
 
24Queen v Foye and Carlin supra Chapter Two under 2.4.2, text at note 162. 
25R v Watson 1961 (2) SA 283 (R) 286; S v Greenstein 1977 (3) SA 220 (RAD); S v Gaba supra (n 8); S v 
Mene 1988 (3) SA 641 (A) and S v Bazzard 1994 (1) SACR 302 (NC) at 303.  
 
26S v Saueman 1978 (1) SA 1073 (N); R v Bekker 1956 (2) SA 279 (AD) and GE Devenish “Defeating the 
ends of justice” (1979) SALJ 30. 
 
27Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 150.  
 
28Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 941.  
 
29Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 144.  
30Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 941.  
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“defeating” is more serious than “obstructing” because it means that justice has not been 
done; it has been defeated.  It is said that “obstructing” has a less drastic meaning than 
“defeating” and criminal proceedings are obstructed if either the investigation by the police 
or the court proceedings themselves are prolonged or otherwise delayed or disturbed.31 
There were also cases where the accused were charged with attempting to defeat the ends of 
justice32 or attempting to defeat or obstruct the course of justice.33 There is authority that 
some courts prefer the use of “attempt to defeat the ends of justice” to “defeating the ends 
of justice.”  In R v Cowan and Davies34 Solomon, J held:35
 
   
It appears to me that the proper way of designating the offence is not “defeating the ends of justice,” 
but “an attempt to defeat the ends of justice,” because I do feel that in the majority of cases – in 
almost every case – it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to prove that the ends of justice have 
been actually defeated.  Take the strongest case which one can imagine, where there is only one 
witness against a criminal, and that witness has been induced to leave the country so as not to give 
evidence; there again it may be said that the ends of justice had been defeated, but it would be 
impossible to prove it, because non constat if the witness had given evidence the result might have 
been the same.  It seems to me almost impossible to prove positively in any case that the ends of 
justice have been defeated.   
 
Therefore, it is preferable to charge X with an inchoate offence (an attempt to defeat or 
obstruct) rather than with a choate offence (an actual defeating or obstructing).36 According 
to Hunt,37
 
 the words of Solomon, J, in R v Cowan and Davies may be construed in one of 
two ways.  Firstly, it may be construed to mean a choate crime of attempting to defeat or  
                                                 
31S v Greenstein supra (n 25) at 225E. 
  
32Duuring v R supra Chapter Two under 2.4.3, text at note 191; S v Naidoo 1977 (2) SA 123 (N) and B Clark 
“Attempting to defeat the ends of justice” (1989) SALJ Vol 106 33. 
  
33S v Mdakani 1964 (3) SA 311 (T).  This case is discussed infra under 7.4.3, text at note 200.  See also S v 
Van Niekerk 1972 (3) SA 711 (AD).  This case is discussed infra under 7.4.9, text at note 359.  
 
34R v Cowan and Davies at 798 supra Chapter Two under 2.4.3, text at note 182.  
35At 804.  
36Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 941.  
 
37Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 153. 
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obstruct the administration of justice.38 Hunt39 refers to the decision of the English Court of 
Appeal, in R v Rowell40 where the court held that attempt to pervert the course of justice is 
a choate offence.  Secondly, the words may be interpreted to mean that it is preferable 
(indeed mandatory) to charge X with an inchoate offence (an attempt to defeat or obstruct) 
rather than with a choate offence (an actual defeating or obstructing).  Snyman says that a 
charge of defeating or obstructing the course of justice (or attempting to do so) is one single 
offence, not one involving two distinct alternative offences.41 This is construed to mean that 
a charge of defeating or obstructing the course of justice (or attempting to do so) is a choate 
offence.  In the same vein, Burchell and Milton42 seem to support the view that the crime 
should be charged as an attempt to defeat or obstruct the course of justice.  They say that 
the charging of this crime as an attempt to defeat or obstruct the course of justice (in their 
view, an inchoate crime) alleviates the agony, on the prosecution’s part, of proving that 
justice was in fact defeated or even obstructed by the accused’s act or series of acts.43 
According to Snyman,44
                                                 
38Ibid. 
 the correct designation of the crime in the charge sheet will depend 
upon the nature of the act, which the accused is alleged to have committed.  He also 
submits that a reference to “ends of justice” in the description of this crime should be 
avoided because it unduly restricts the ambit of the crime which deals with interference in 
the course of the administration of justice and which can be committed even though justice 
does triumph in the end. It is also said that the crime of defeating or obstructing the course 
of justice may overlap with crimes like contempt of court, perjury, fraud, extortion and 
  
39Ibid. 
  
40See R v Rowell at 671 supra Chapter Three under 3.3, text at note 47.  See also Card and Hogan op cit 
Chapter Two under 2.3, text at notes 95 and 96. 
 
41Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 338. 
  
42Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 941. 
43Ibid.  
44Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 337.   
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many others.45
 
   
It is submitted that when Solomon, J said that the offence should be charged as “attempting 
to defeat the ends of justice”46 he was referring to “attempting to defeat the ends of justice” 
as an inchoate offence, not as choate offence.47 However, attempting to pervert the course 
of justice is a choate offence under English,48 Australian,49 and Canadian law.50 It is said 
that the use of the word “attempt” in the designation of the offence is misleading because 
the attempt itself is the choate offence.51 Snyman agrees with this point of view,52 although 
Hunt says that as a general rule in South Africa attempting to defeat or obstruct the course 
of justice is regarded as an inchoate offence.53
 
 This leads us to the next question, namely, 
the meaning of “obstructing the course of justice.” 
(2) It is said that, “obstructing,” means less than “defeating.”54
 
 “Obstruction” occurs if the 
proceedings are impeded or interfered with in a more than trifling degree.  It is further said 
that this kind of interference may occur before proceedings are pending or after the  
                                                 
45Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 338 and Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 185. 
46R v Cowan and Davies at 804 supra Chapter Two under 2.4.3, text at note 182   
47This inference is drawn from the judge’s words, “in the majority of cases — in most every case — it would 
be very difficult, if not impossible, to prove that ends of justice have been actually defeat.”  
 
48Card op cit Chapter Two (n 91) 427 and Smith and Hogan op cit Chapter Two (n 93) 751. 
 
49See also Healy v The Queen at 106D supra Chapter Four under 4.3.1.1, text at note 246. 
 
50See Greenspan and Rosenberg op cit Chapter Five (n 11) CC/261.   
51See supra Chapter Two under 2.3, text at notes 95 and 96. 
52See supra (n 41). 
  
53Cf Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 153. 
  
54Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 338. 
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proceedings are pending.55 Hunt56 submits that the issue of mens rea leads to interpreting 
“obstructing” more widely than “defeating.” He says that if these terms were synonymous, 
the mens rea required for an attempt to commit the crime, as for the crime per se, must be a 
foreseeable possibility that the course of justice may be defeated.  It must then follow that if 
X commits his actus in the certainty (stemming perhaps from great experience of judicial 
proceedings) that what he does will eventually make no difference, but will cause 
considerable delay, he cannot be convicted either of defeating or obstructing or an attempt 
thereto.57 Hunt58says, however, that such a result would be most undesirable with regard to 
the interests in the unimpaired administration of justice which this crime exists to protect.  
He suggests that such a result can be avoided only by interpreting “obstructing” more 
widely than “defeating” for only then can the mens rea be interpreted as foresight of the 
possibility of something less than a defeat (in the above case).59
 
 
Considering the existence of the view that defeating is more serious than obstructing,60
                                                 
55See Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 941 and Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 151. 
 it is 
submitted that the discrepancies in the designation of this crime may cause legal uncertainty 
because prosecutors are not sure whether to charge the accused with defeating or 
obstructing the course of justice.  The accused is placed at the mercy of the specific 
prosecutor as it depends on the specific prosecutor how the charge sheet is drawn up.  This 
may lead to a situation where two accused (X1 and X2) commit a similar offence, for 
example, they both dissuaded state witnesses not to testify in their respective trials, and yet 
are charged with different offences.  X1, for example, might be charged with defeating the 
 
56Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) at 151-52.   
57Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 152. 
58Ibid. 
 
59Ibid.  
60Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two  (n 148) 941 and Hunt op cit (n 7) 151.  
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course of justice and X2 might be charged with obstructing the course of justice.  The 
discrepancy in the designation of the crime is not an ideal state of affairs.  This crime 
subverts the same judicial processes on which the rule of law so virtually depends,61
 
 and so 
there must be certainty regarding its designation.    
7.2 WHEN DOES THE COURSE OF JUSTICE BEGIN? 
It has been said that the conduct element of the common law offence of defeating or 
obstructing the course of justice requires that the accused defeats or obstructs the 
“administration of justice.”62 When does the administration of justice begin so that it could 
be defeated or obstructed?  Once the matter is before the court, justice is clearly being 
administered. What about pre-trial processes like obstructing the police in their 
investigations?  Hunt63 says that for purposes of this crime the term “administration of 
justice” means the judicial administration of justice in civil or criminal proceedings.  There 
is judicial authority and academic opinion that say that if it is quasi-judicial proceedings 
which are obstructed or defeated then the crime is not committed.64 In S v Thompson,65
 
 the 
court refused to extend the scope of the crime to include proceedings of a quasi-judicial 
nature and set aside a conviction where the accused was convicted of defeating or 
obstructing the course of justice in relation to a disciplinary enquiry conducted by the South 
African Medical and Dental Council.  
The facts of this case were as follows:  Accused number 1, Thompson, was a medical 
                                                 
61Cooper op cit Chapter Six (n 13) 621. 
62Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 940; Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 143 and Snyman op cit 
Chapter Two (n 151) 337. 
 
63Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 148.  
64Ibid.  See also S v Thompson and Another 1968 (3) SA 425 (E).  
65S v Thompson and Another supra (n 64) at 429B-E.  
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practitioner, while accused number 2 was a retired bank manager who assisted Thompson 
with his accounts and certain secretarial duties.  Allegedly, the accused were supposed to 
appear before an enquiry conducted by the South African Medical and Dental Council into 
an allegation of improper and disgraceful conduct by Thompson.  It was alleged that a 
certain Ms Gous was to testify against the accused at this inquiry and with intent to defeat 
or obstruct the course of justice, the accused approached her and attempted to persuade her 
to falsely declare that she had in fact been Thompson’s patient and had been examined by 
him.66 Thompson and the bank manager were charged with defeating or obstructing the 
course of justice.  In the court a quo the defence counsel took exception to the indictment 
on the ground that it did not disclose an offence recognised by the court.67 It was contended 
that the crime of attempting to defeat or obstruct the course of justice could only be 
committed in respect of proceedings before a court of law and that neither the Medical 
Council nor its disciplinary committee were courts of law,  nor were they in any way 
concerned with the administration of justice, and that consequently any attempt to interfere 
with its functions or to obstruct it could not amount to an attempt to defeat the course of 
justice.68 The court rejected this contention and convicted the accused of defeating or 
obstructing the course of justice.69 The accused appealed.70
 
  
On appeal the court held that although it is a statutory body, it is clear that the Medical and 
Dental Council is not an ordinary court of law.  The council, in conducting the enquiry, is 
not bound by the strict rules of evidence and is only required to act in a quasi-judicial 
manner.  No appeal lies from its decisions although its proceedings are subject to review by  
                                                 
66At 425F-G.  
67Ibid.  
68At 425H-426.  
69Ibid.  
70Ibid.  
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the Supreme Court according to the general principles governing review.71 In setting aside 
the conviction the court held:72
 
 
To extend the scope of the offence of defeating the ends of justice to include the proceedings before … 
or to disciplinary enquiries before the Medical Council would, to my mind, be flying in the face of the 
very clear definition of this offence … 
 
Hunt73 notes that South African courts are still in the process of delimiting the ambit of the 
crime of obstructing or defeating the course of justice.  Although it is said that in relation to 
criminal matters the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice may be 
committed only once the proceedings are pending, this does not seem to be the preferred 
view of our courts and academic writers.74 It is said that South African courts have 
extended the scope of this crime to include the pre-trial aspects of the administration of 
justice.75 In particular there is a tendency to hold that conduct which interferes with police 
investigations of crimes or police efforts to prevent the commission of crimes may amount 
to obstructing or defeating of the due administration of justice.76 According to Boister,77
when a crime is committed and the police are investigating it and even before investigation 
has started.
 
obstructing the police in their investigations has become an accepted form of the crime of 
obstructing the course of justice.  This means that the course of justice begins immediately  
78
                                                 
71At 427C-F.  
 South African courts have not restricted the scope of the crime to the 
72429B-C.  
73Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 141.   
74Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 149 and Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 339. 
75Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 141.   
76Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 141 and Neil Boister “Where the administration of justice begins” (1993) 
SALJ Vol 110 No 2 204.  
 
77Boister op cit (n 76) 204. 
78For example, in S v Daniels 1963 (4) SA 623 (E) at 624B the accused was convicted of attempting to defeat 
the course of justice for conduct he did before the police could investigate the principal offence.  This case is 
discussed in detail infra (n 90). 
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defeating or obstructing of pending proceedings and have held that the crime may be 
committed even where, at the time of the unlawful conduct, proceedings were not even 
contemplated.79 Hunt80 maintains that the principle of legality is violated when conduct 
which does not fall within the provisions of the lex Cornelia de falsis is treated as 
punishable.  According to him, although it seems correct and necessary to regard police 
activities as falling within the scope of the concept of the administration of justice, only 
those activities which relate to the investigation of crimes and the collection of evidence 
relating to such crimes should come within the ambit of the concept of the administration of 
justice.81 He submits that routine police activities which are not connected with the 
investigations of crimes, are essentially of an administrative nature and thus fall outside the 
ambit of the crime of defeating or obstructing the administration of justice.82
 
 
However, it is said that our courts have paid little attention to defining the precise limits of 
the concept of “administration of justice.”83 Our courts have convicted accused for 
defeating or obstructing the course of justice following their attempts to interfere with 
police investigations of crime or police efforts to prevent the commission of crime.84
                                                 
79Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 143.  
 If the 
course of justice begins when the police start with their investigations, the question to be 
asked is, what will happen if, before the police could start with their investigations, X threw 
away his murder weapon after killing Y or physically removed a potential witness away so 
that he or she could not be called to testify?  It is submitted that the commencement of 
police investigations should not be the determinative moment for the crime to be 
  
80Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 142.  
81Ibid.  
82Ibid. 
83Boister op cit (n 76) 204.  
84See S v Naidoo supra (n 32).  
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committed.   
 
Snyman85 submits that it is not a requirement for the crime that the conduct allegedly 
constituting it should have been committed in relation to a specific pending case.  He says 
that it is not even necessary that the police or private litigants envisage a court case at the 
time of the accused’s conduct.86 It is said that it is sufficient that the accused subjectively 
foresees the possibility that his conduct may lead to a case being prosecuted or being 
investigated by the police.87
 
 By stating that “no pending case” is necessary, it is submitted 
that Snyman means that there is no requirement that there must be “pending judicial 
proceedings” before the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice could be 
committed.   
Lansdown, Hoal and Lansdown88 say that to constitute an attempt to defeat the course of 
justice it is not essential that the judicial proceedings which are said to be obstructed should 
have commenced or be pending.  It is said that it is sufficient that the accused contemplated 
or should have contemplated them.89
 
  
In S v Daniels,90
                                                 
85CR Snyman Criminal Law (1984) 303 and CR Snyman. Strafreg 2ed (1986) 387. 
 the accused was convicted of attempting to defeat the course of justice for 
misleading the police in order not to detect the crime that was committed.  The facts of this 
case were as follows:  Daniels appeared before the court on three charges, among them, a 
 
86Ibid.  
 
87Ibid.  
 
88CHW Lansdown, WG Hoal and AV Lansdown Gardiner and Lansdown South African Criminal Law and 
Procedure 6ed (1957) 1114. 
 
89Ibid.  
 
90S v Daniels supra (n 78). 
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charge of an attempt to defeat the course of justice.  Allegedly, he collided with another car 
while driving an unlicensed and uninsured motor vehicle.  It was alleged that at the scene of 
the accident, before the arrival of the police, Daniels asked one Holstein to bring up another 
vehicle owned by Daniels.  They exchanged the car registration numbers with those of the 
vehicle that was involved in the collision.  Later, it was found that the license disc and third 
party insurance disc of Daniels’s second vehicle had been attached to the windscreen of the 
unlicensed and uninsured vehicle.  The only inference that could be drawn from the facts 
was that Daniels, after the collision, deliberately sought to convey a false representation to 
members of the police who would be called upon to investigate the circumstances of the 
accident that the vehicle which he was driving at the time was licensed and insured as 
required by law.91
 
 In this case the suspected offence that would be under investigation was 
one of culpable homicide. 
On appeal, it was submitted on behalf of Daniels that his conduct did not constitute the 
crime of an attempt to defeat the course of justice.92 It was argued on behalf of the accused 
that whether or not the suspected driver’s vehicle was licensed and insured could have no 
bearing on the question of whether the suspect was or was not guilty of ‘an unlawful 
homicide.’93 The court held:94
 
   
Police investigation into deaths caused in road accidents embraces examination of the qualifications 
of the drivers concerned and the conditions of their vehicles.  Such examination may disclose the 
commission of offences not directly concerned with the death of a person, and it appears to me that 
anyone who knowingly endeavours to mislead the police in order to prevent detection of a crime that 
might otherwise be revealed is guilty of the offence of which the appellant was convicted.     
 
                                                 
91At 624H.  
92At 624-25H.  
93At 625D.  
94At 625C-E.  
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The appeal was dismissed.95 The conviction and the dismissal of the appeal imply that the 
course of justice commences when the initial crime is committed and even before the police 
could detect it.  It is submitted that when X commits a crime that may lead to police 
investigations and later to judicial proceedings, the course of justice is initiated.  It is further 
submitted that any conduct (act or omission)96 by X with intent to defeat or obstruct the due 
course of justice falls within the scope of this crime.  Therefore, as Hunt puts it, the 
interference may occur before proceedings are ‘pending’ as where the police are put to the 
trouble of investigating the truth of a false statement which is made to them in connection 
with the matter which is being investigated.97 Conduct that interferes with quasi-judicial 
proceedings falls outside the scope of the due administration of justice.98
 
  
Authority from our case law could not be found for when “the course of justice” ends.  
However, there are two academic opinions as to when the administration of justice ends.  
Hunt99 says that the judicial administration of justice is completed after the court has 
pronounced its judgment and anything which delays or obstructs the execution of judgment 
is not proper subject matter for a criminal charge of defeating or obstructing the course of 
justice.  Lansdown, Hoal and Lansdown100
 
 submit that the crime of defeating or obstructing 
the course of justice may be committed in respect of proceedings which have been 
concluded, for instance, where a person contriving the release of X, a convicted prisoner, 
wilfully and falsely files an affidavit that Y and not X committed the crime. 
                                                 
95Ibid.  
96See S v Gaba supra (n 8) at 746 and Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 339.  
97Hunt op cit Chapter Two  (n 7) 151. 
98Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 141.  
99Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 149. 
 
100Cf Lansdown, Hoal and Lansdown op cit (n 88) 1114.  
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7.3 ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENCE 
The essential elements of this offence are101
(1) defeating or obstructing 
  
(2) the administration of justice  
(3) unlawfully 
(4) intentionally. 
7.3.1 Conduct—defeating or obstructing 
Some courts refer to this crime as defeating or obstructing the course of justice, defeating or 
obstructing the administration of justice and others as defeating the ends of justice.102 
Hunt103 says that there is a difference between the notion “ends of justice” on the one hand, 
and the “course” or “administration of justice” on the other.  The “ends of justice” is a 
restrictive concept connoting at most the due and proper disposal either of a civil or 
criminal matter by the courts of law.  The “course” or “administration of justice” is a wider 
concept comprehending the various stages of the process of administering justice.  This 
means the crime can be committed not in relation to the work of the courts but also in 
relation to the work of other agencies (such as the police) involved in the administration 
and enforcement of the law.104
 
 
The conduct element of the common law offence of “defeating or obstructing the course of 
justice” requires that X defeats or obstructs the due administration of justice.105
                                                 
101Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 940 and Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 337.  
 The 
accused must do something or omit to do something (omission) in order for the crime to be 
102Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 143.  
 
103Ibid. 
 
104Ibid. 
  
105Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 940; Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 143; Snyman op cit 
Chapter Two (n 151) 337 and Boister op cit (n 76) 204.  
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committed.106 An example of an act which defeats or obstructs the course of justice is to 
interfere with witnesses.  Most commonly X requests a person whom he foresees may be a 
witness in a trial, but who need not have been subpoenaed, to give false evidence.107
 
 A 
possible example of an omission is as follows:  Y, a senior police official, is involved in a 
car accident.  X, another police official who is also Y’s subordinate, arrives at the scene of 
the accident.  Suspecting that his boss is drunk, he neither conducts a breathalyser test nor 
takes a blood sample from Y.  At the end Y cannot be charged with drunk driving.  X, as a 
police officer has a legal duty to order Y to have his or her blood sample taken or conduct a 
breathalyser test on Y to ascertain whether or not the alcohol level in his blood is above the 
legal limit.  It is submitted that in this situation the crime of obstructing the course of justice 
through omission has been committed. 
However, our courts108 have held that an accused who, when requested to give a sample of 
his or her blood, merely refuses and does not perform any positive act, cannot be convicted 
of the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice.  One of the earliest cases that 
dealt with refusal to allow blood sample to be taken was S v Oberbacher.  The facts of S v 
Oberbacher were as follows:  The accused was arrested for being suspected of driving 
while under the influence of alcohol.  He was taken to a state hospital in order that a blood 
sample be taken from him in terms of section 267 of Ordinance 34 of 1963 as amended by 
section 12 of Ordinance 4 of 1968.109
                                                 
106S v Gaba supra (n 8) at 746 and Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 339.  
 However, the accused refused to allow the doctor to 
107Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 155.  
 
108Cf S v Oberbacher 1975 (3) SA 815 (SWA) at 815H; S v Binta supra (n 23) at 553g and S v Kiti supra (n 
23) at 14b-c. 
 
109Section 267 of Ordinance 34 of 1963 as substituted by section 12 of Ordinance 4 of 1968 reads: 
 
Any peace officer may take or cause to be taken the finger prints, palm prints, and foot prints of any 
person arrested upon any charge and may make or cause to be made available such person for 
identification in such condition, position or apparel as such peace officer may determine, and the 
medical officer of any prison or any district surgeon or (except in a case of a woman) any peace officer 
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take a blood sample from him.110 The arresting officer was instructed to use force if 
necessary in order to obtain the blood sample from the accused.  Dr Koning refused to take 
the blood sample if force was to be used.111 Nevertheless, the accused was charged with (1) 
driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor and (2) the crime of defeating 
the ends of justice for refusing to allow the doctor to draw blood from him, thus rendering it 
impossible for the state to properly prosecute the charge of drunk driving against him.  The 
court a quo convicted the accused on both charges.  He appealed.112
 
  
On appeal it was argued on behalf of the accused that Dr Koning was neither a medical 
officer of any prison nor a District Surgeon, therefore he was not vested with powers in 
terms of Section 267 of Ordinance 34 of 1963 as amended by section 12 of Ordinance 4 of 
1968, to draw a blood sample from the accused.113 It was also argued that there was no 
provision in the Ordinance, which compelled any person charged with any offence relating 
to driving a vehicle under the influence of liquor to allow a blood sample to be taken from 
him or her.114  According to the court, an act connotes something more than mere passivity 
on the part of the accused.115 The court also found that in this matter the accused, when 
requested to allow a blood sample to be taken from him, did nothing.  He merely said “no.”  
The court held:116
                                                                                                                                                     
may take or cause to be taken such steps, including (except in the case of a peace officer) any blood 
test, as he may deem necessary in order to ascertain whether the body of any such person bears any 
mark, characteristics or distinguishing feature or shows any condition or appearance. 
  
 
110S v Oberbacher supra (n 108) at 817A.  
 
111Ibid  
 
112At 816D. 
 
113At 817 H. 
  
114At 817F. 
  
115At 818D. 
 
116At 818 E. 
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There must be something more than mere mental determination – the latter must be accompanied by 
some overt conduct before what was only an intention becomes an act…Nowhere in the cases do I find 
that a negative attitude by a suspect or accused…has been construed as an act intended to defeat or 
obstruct the course of justice.  
 
 
The court allowed the appeal and on the charge of defeating the ends of justice and set aside 
both the conviction and sentence.117
 
 
In S v Binta118 and S v Kiti,119 the Oberbacher decision was relied upon when the accused 
were charged with defeating or obstructing the course of justice for refusing requests to 
give samples of their blood samples as envisaged by section 37(2)(a) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act.120
 
  
In 1993, in S v Binta,121
 
 the court set aside the conviction of X for obstructing the course of 
justice by pulling his arm away whilst an attempt was being made to draw blood from him.  
The facts of this case were the following:  The accused, Binta, was arrested on the 
following charges:  
(1) drunken driving,  
(2) defeating the ends of justice, and  
(3) assault.   
                                                 
117At 819G. 
  
118S v Binta supra (n 23). 
 
119S v Kiti supra (n 23).  
 
120The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.  This section provides: 
 
Any medical officer of any prison or a district surgeon or, if requested thereto by any police official, 
any registered medical practitioner or registered nurse may take such steps, including taking of a blood 
sample, as may be deemed necessary in order to ascertain whether the body of any person referred to 
in para (a)(i) or (ii) of ss (1) has any mark, characteristics or distinguishing feature or shows any 
conditions or appearance. 
 
121S v Binta supra (n 23).  
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He was taken to the local District Surgeon, Dr Van Niekerk.  The latter was requested to 
perform an examination on the accused and to draw blood from him for analysis.  This 
analysis was crucial in order to determine the accused’s state of sobriety and also to 
determine the level of alcohol, if any, in his blood.  In respect of count 2, allegedly, the 
accused unlawfully and with the intention of obstructing and defeating the course of justice, 
refused to have blood drawn from him and in so doing obstructed and defeated the ends of 
justice.122 During trial, Dr Van Niekerk testified that the accused had refused to allow him 
to draw blood from him and even to examine him.  It was submitted on behalf of the 
accused, on the strength of the Oberbacher123 case, that an arrested person’s refusal to 
allow blood to be drawn from him or her, inasmuch as it involves a mere omission, does 
not constitute the crime of obstructing or defeating the ends of justice or an attempt to do 
so.124 It was argued that in order to constitute this offence a positive act is required.125 
Ackermann, J, noted that one of the essential elements of the offence i.e. “an act of 
defeating or obstructing the ends of justice” was missing in this case.126 The court held that 
“there are no statutory provisions compelling a person under sanction of penalty to submit 
to the taking of a sample of his blood.”127 The court further held that the provisions of 
section 37(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act did not place a legal duty on any person to 
allow a blood sample to be taken from him or her when requested by either the district 
surgeon or any other person indicated in the Act.128
                                                 
122At 554d.  
 But according to Ackermann, J, the 
provisions of section 37(2)(a) could hardly be construed to apply only to those cases where 
 
123See S v Oberbacher supra (n 108).  
 
124Sv Binta supra (n 23) at 559e.  
 
125Ibid.  
 
126At 560b.  
 
127At 561h-i.  
 
128Ibid.  
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the other person voluntarily consented to the particular acts being performed.129 Such a 
construction would render the relevant provisions redundant, because at common law, 
according to the court, the consent of X would make lawful what would otherwise be an 
assault.  In the court’s view, the provisions of section 37(2)(a) also apply where X refuses 
to submit to have his blood sample taken or drawn.130 But according to the court, there is no 
fundamental difference in principle between the case of a person refusing to answer 
questions put by the police in an investigation and the case of the police wishing to obtain a 
blood sample.131 The court held that the legal conviction of the community does not require 
that a mere omission by X in refusing to allow the taking of his or her blood sample should 
be the object of criminal sanction.132 Therefore, a person who refuses such a request cannot 
be found guilty of obstructing the course of justice or attempting to defeat the ends of 
justice.133 The accused’s conviction of the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of 
justice was set aside.134
 
 
The facts of the Kiti decision were the following:  The accused, Kiti, was arrested and 
charged with drunken driving.  He was taken to the police station and the District Surgeon 
was called out to take a sample of his blood for analysis.  Allegedly, Kiti was uncooperative 
and he refused to allow the district surgeon to take a blood sample.  When the police and 
the district surgeon attempted to take his blood by force the accused actively resisted by 
pulling his arm away, making it impossible for them to draw his blood.135
                                                 
129At 562a-b.  
 He was charged 
 
130At 562b-c. 
 
131At 564a.  
 
132At 564c-d. 
  
133At 564f.  
 
134At 564g.  
 
135S v Kiti supra (n 23) at 14h-i.  
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with driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor.  He was also charged with 
the common law offence of obstructing the course of justice.  The latter charge arose out of 
his refusal to allow a blood sample to be taken.136 He was convicted on both charges.137
On appeal, it was argued on behalf of the accused that it is not a wrongful act to refuse to 
consent to allow a blood sample to be taken and to actively resist if an attempt is made to 
take a blood sample by force.
 
138 It was further argued that section 37(2)(a) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act does not compel the person whose bodily condition is the subject of the 
investigation to agree that his or her blood sample be taken.  Therefore, it is not a criminal 
offence to refuse.139 Jones, J, held that there is nothing in section 37(2)(a) which makes it a 
criminal offence of obstructing the course of justice to refuse to allow a blood sample to be 
taken from the suspect or the accused.140 The court set aside both the conviction and the 
sentence on the charge of obstructing the course of justice.141
 
 
The difference between the Kiti and Oberbacher decisions is that in the latter case, X 
passively resisted an attempt to take his blood sample.  In the former case, X actively 
resisted an attempt to take a blood sample from his arm.  However, X was acquitted on the 
ground that he had not acted unlawfully in resisting an attempt to obtain his blood sample.  
 
In South Africa there is legislation that prohibits driving while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor or a drug having narcotic effect in one’s blood or breath.  Section 65 of 
                                                 
136At 15a. 
  
137Ibid.  
 
138At 15c. 
   
139At 15i.  
 
140At 19f-i. 
  
141At 20d.  
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the National Road Traffic Act (NRTA)142
 
 provides: 
(1) No person shall on a public road  
(a) drive a vehicle; or 
(b) occupy a driver’s seat of a motor vehicle the engine of which is running, while 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a drug having a narcotic effect.  
 
Section 65(9) of the Act143 provides that no person shall refuse that a specimen of blood or 
a specimen of breath be taken from him or her.  In terms of section 37(2)(a) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act144 the district surgeon, a registered nurse or a prison medical officer will take 
a specimen of an arrested driver's blood, which is then submitted to a state laboratory for 
scientific analysis.  That analysis enables experts to ascertain the presence and estimated 
quantity of alcohol in the person's blood at the time of the examination.145 Notwithstanding 
the provisions of section 65(9) of the NRTA and section 37(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act, South African High Courts146
 
 are still reluctant to confirm the accused’s conviction of 
attempting to defeat or obstruct the course of justice for refusing to allow a blood sample to 
be taken from them when they were suspected of driving or occupying a drivers’ seats of 
motor vehicles the engines of which were running while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor or a drug having a narcotic effect on a public road.   
                                                 
142Act 93 of 1996. 
  
143National Road Traffic Act (NRTA) 93 of 1996. 
  
144Act 51 of 1977.  See the provisions of section 37(2)(a) of this Act supra Chapter Seven (n 120). 
  
145If the specimen is taken within two hours of the commission of the alleged offence then, if the alcohol 
concentration of the specimen is not less than 0,05g per 100ml, the alcohol concentration in the blood at the 
time of the alleged offence will be presumed to have been not less than 0,05g per 100ml.  In terms of the 
amendment to the National Road Traffic Act, the same presumption is made where the concentration of any 
alcohol in any specimen of breath exhaled by a person is not less than 0,38mg per 1000ml.  However, the 
concentration in any breath specimen shall be ascertained by using the prescribed equipment.  For this reason, 
the blood specimen will almost always be taken within two hours after the arrest.  
 
146See S v Oberbacher supra (n 108); S v Kiti supra (n 23) and S v Binta supra (n 23). 
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According to some academic writers, refusal to allow a blood sample to be taken from 
oneself, refusing to answer questions or give information to the police or to refuse to co-
operate with the police in obtaining evidence against oneself or another person is not 
regarded as obstruction of the due administration of justice.147 One’s refusal or omission 
does not constitute an actus sufficient to make one’s conduct a crime.148
 
 
It has been said, above149 that “obstructing,” means less than “defeating.” “Obstruction” 
occurs if the proceedings are impeded or interfered with in a more than trifling degree.  
Attempt to defeat or obstruct the course of justice occurs when someone (X) deliberately 
supplies the police (Y) with false information which is, however, immediately disbelieved 
and not acted upon by Y.  So X neither defeats nor obstructs the course of justice.  
Nevertheless, his or her conduct constitutes an attempt to defeat or obstruct the course of 
justice.150 An attempt to defeat or obstruct the course of justice may be described as 
unlawfully committing an act in the furtherance of an intention to defeat or obstruct the 
administration of justice, provided the act is one of execution and not one of preparation.151 
If, for example, X persuades Z to agree to approach Y in order to induce him or her (Y) to 
give false evidence in contemplated proceedings, X is guilty of an attempt to defeat or 
obstruct the course of justice even though Z does not try to influence Y to give false 
evidence.152
 
 
 
                                                 
147Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 160. 
  
148Ibid. 
  
149See supra (n 30-31).  
 
150Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 341. 
  
151Ibid.  See also Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 942 and Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 153.  
  
152Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 153.  
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7.3.2 The administration of justice 
Burchell and Milton153 point out that administration of justice means judicial administration 
of justice in both civil and criminal proceedings and not quasi-judicial or administrative 
proceedings.  The course of justice that is required to be obstructed in order to constitute a 
crime is the process which is destined to eventuate in a court case concerning an actual or 
intended suit between parties or between the state and its subjects.154
 
 
7.3.3 Unlawfulness 
Hunt155 and Burchell and Milton156 are of the opinion that a false denial of guilt, though it 
obstructs the course of justice, is not unlawful.  They say that to hold otherwise would be 
indirectly to require the accused to admit that he or she is guilty and nullify the common 
law and the constitutional principle that an accused has a right to remain silent.157 The right 
to remain silent is now a constitutional right found in section 35(1)(a) of the 
Constitution.158 These writers also submit that in the absence of some statutory provision, it 
is not unlawful for an ordinary person to refuse to assist the police in the investigation of 
crimes even though by so doing he or she may defeat or obstruct the administration of 
justice.159
 
  
An obstruction of justice may be lawful in certain circumstances,160
                                                 
153Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 943. 
 for example, if an 
154See S v Bazzard supra (n 25) at 303a and Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 340. 
  
155Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 144.  
 
156Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 940.  
 
157Ibid.  
158The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
159Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 940 and Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 144. 
160Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 145. 
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attorney suspects that his client is guilty, he or she may advise him or her not to testify for 
the defence.  By doing so, the attorney is not guilty of defeating or obstructing the course of 
justice.  This is because it is lawful for the attorney to give legal advice to his or her client 
and inform his or her client of his right to remain silent.  However, if the attorney exceeds 
the permissible limits of the law and of professional ethics, and, for example, counsels his 
or her client falsely to deny statements the client has already made, or makes up a false 
story for the client to tell in evidence, he or she is guilty of defeating or obstructing the 
course of justice.161
 
 
7.3.4   Intention 
The accused must intend to defeat or obstruct the course of justice.  He or she must 
subjectively foresee the possibility that his or her conduct may lead to defeating or 
obstructing the course of justice.162 X must have been aware of the fact that his or her 
conduct might thwart or interfere with judicial proceedings which were to take place in the 
future, or would at least hamper or forestall the investigation of an offence.163 It is said that 
if intention in this sense is present, it is immaterial whether X’s motive is good or bad.164
 
 
7.4 CATEGORIES OF THE ACTUS REUS OF THE OFFENCE 
The course of justice may be defeated or obstructed in various ways.  Some of these acts 
overlap with crimes like perjury, contempt of court, bribery of public officers, fraud, etc.165
                                                 
161Ibid. 
 
  
162Snyman op cit (n 1) 342; Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 145 and Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two 
(n 148) 944. 
 
163Snyman op cit (n 1) 342. 
  
164Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 145 and Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 944. 
165Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 155. 
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Just like in other jurisdictions,166 South African common law punishes certain acts or a 
series of acts or conduct as defeating or obstructing the course of justice and sometimes as 
an attempt to defeat or obstruct the course of justice.  The following acts or conduct (which 
do not amount to numerus clausus) are said to obstruct or defeat the course of justice:167
 
 
a. Interfering with witnesses. 
b. A witness demands money for giving or not giving evidence. 
c. Tampering, altering, fabricating, concealing and destroying evidence. 
d. Laying of false charges. 
e. Interfering with the police in the execution of their duties. 
f. Making false statements to the police or someone else. 
g. Lying to the police. 
h. Misleading the police in order to prevent the detection of a crime.  
i. Interfering with the judiciary. 
j. Improperly influencing a party to a civil case. 
k. Unlawful releases of a prisoner. 
 
7.4.1 Interference with witnesses 
There are several forms of interference with witnesses.168 The most common way is for the 
accused to request another person whom he foresees to be a witness in his or someone 
else’s trial, but who need not have been subpoenaed yet, either to give false evidence169
                                                 
166In English law, see Card op cit Chapter Two (n 230) 442-43.  The conduct is discussed supra in Chapter 
Two under 2.4, text at note 267. 
 or 
 
167Lansdown, Hoal and Lansdown op cit (n 88) 1114-15; Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 
942-43; Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 155-62 and Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 338-39. 
 
168Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 155. 
169R v Zackon supra Chapter Two under 2.4.5, text at note 200 and R v Hirschhorn 1934 TPD 178.   
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falsely deny a statement170 or to deny the voluntary nature of a statement already made.  
Hunt171 says that it is essential in these cases that the statement, evidence or denial must be 
false.  X lacks mens rea unless he or she foresees the possibility of this falsity.172  He says 
that it is immaterial whether or not the witness agrees to do what X asks.173 In some cases 
X does not make a direct approach to the witness (Z), but persuades another person (Y) to 
do this.  He (X) is then guilty of an attempt to defeat or obstruct the course of justice even if 
Y does not actually approach Z to make the request.  However, if Y does not agree to 
approach Z, X is guilty of incitement, not attempt to defeat the course of justice.174 The 
other way in which this form of the actus reus manifests itself is the unlawful physical 
removal of a material witness from the court’s jurisdiction or inducing a witness to abscond 
so that he or she cannot give testimony, with intent to defeat or obstruct the due 
administration of justice.175 It is also irrelevant whether or not the witness has already been 
subpoenaed.  A witness who enters into an agreement to do the above also commits the 
crime.176 This offence can also be committed by unlawfully soliciting a complainant to 
withdraw charges.177
 
  
Court decisions where forms of witness interference were dealt with are now discussed.  In  
R v Hirschhorn178
                                                 
170S v Mtshizana 1965 (1) PH H80 (AD).  This case is cited with approval in Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 
155. 
 it was observed that on a charge of attempting to defeat the course of 
 
171Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 155-56. 
172Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 155-66.  
  
173Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 156.  
174Ibid. 
 
175See Queen v Foye and Carlin supra Chapter Two under 2.4.2, text at note 162. 
176R v Cowan and Davies at 798 supra Chapter Two under 2.4.3, text at note 182. 
177S v Vittee 1958 (2) PH H347 (T) and S v Du Toit 1974 (4) SA 679 (T). 
178R v Hirschhorn supra (n 169).  
 330 
justice by inciting prosecution witnesses to give false testimony in a criminal prosecution, it 
is no defence for the accused to prove that the prosecution in question was bound to fail 
owing to the invalidity of an industrial agreement.179
 
  
The facts of this case were as follows:  Hirschhorn was initially charged with contravening 
certain clauses of an industrial agreement framed under certain legislation.  While the case 
against him was still pending on the latter charge, it was alleged that he attempted to incite 
prosecution witnesses to give false testimony at his trial and he was charged with 
attempting to defeat the course of justice.180 He was convicted of attempting to defeat the 
course of justice,181 but, while the case was still pending, the Supreme Court declared the 
industrial agreement that led to the initial trial, not to be binding between the parties.  As a 
result the prosecution against him was withdrawn.182 He appealed against his conviction for 
attempting to defeat the course of justice on the ground that the prosecution for the original 
crime was bound to fail.  The court held:183
 
 
[A]s dolus malus or mens rea was proved on the part of the appellant, the present case falls within 
these definitions.  The fact that the original prosecution could not succeed owing to the invalidity of 
the industrial agreement is irrelevant.   
 
What can be learnt from this decision is that the “course of justice” does not need the 
judicial proceedings against the accused to succeed for it to be defeated or obstructed.  
There may be a punishable attempt to defeat or obstruct the due administration of justice by 
interfering with a witness even if the judicial proceedings are bound to fail, or where the 
accused has been charged with contravening certain provisions under a piece of legislation 
                                                 
179At 181. 
180At 178.  
181Ibid.  
182Ibid.  
183At 181. 
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that does not exist or has been repealed. 
 
In R v Kramer,184 the court held that it is not an offence of obstructing or defeating the 
course of justice if X takes witnesses to his attorneys and induces them to speak the truth.  
The facts of this case are as follows:  The accused was charged and convicted of a crime of 
attempting to defeat or obstruct the course of justice.  Allegedly, the accused had sold 
liquor from his licensed premises earlier that 10 o’clock in the morning and aided and 
abetted two other persons, M and K, to commit the offence of selling liquor without the 
necessary licence.  It was further alleged that M and K were necessary and material 
witnesses for the state upon the said charges against X.  It was alleged that X unlawfully 
and with intent to defeat or obstruct the course of justice, induced the said M and K to 
appear at the office of the accused’s attorneys, and there to state to his attorneys that he, X 
did not sell liquor to them before 10 o’clock in the morning.185 When the matter was heard 
in court the accused raised objection to the indictment in that it did not state that what he 
(the accused) induced the witnesses to state to his attorneys was false and further, that it 
was false to his knowledge.186 The objection was overruled.187 However, on appeal the 
court held:188
 
 
The objection taken in the magistrate’s court was a perfectly sound one because clearly it is not the 
offence of obstructing the course of justice if an accused person takes witnesses to his attorneys and 
induces them to speak the truth.  The essence is that he [accused] induced them to make a false 
statement, and that such statement was false to his knowledge. 
 
This decision is authority to the proposition that the crime of attempting to obstruct or 
                                                 
1841936 CPD 144. 
 
185At 145. 
 
186Ibid. 
  
187Ibid. 
  
188At 145-46. 
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defeat the course of justice cannot be committed by inducing witnesses to tell the truth. 
Therefore, in order for the accused to be convicted of the crime of attempting to defeat or 
obstruct the course of justice, the state must prove that the statement the accused induced to 
the witness is false and that the accused knows that it is false. 
 
One of the cases where the accused was charged with defeating the ends of justice 
following his attempt to induce a complainant to withdraw charges against him is now 
discussed.  In S v Du Toit,189
 
 the trial court convicted the accused of defeating the ends of 
justice following an attempt to persuade the complainant in a theft case, to withdraw the 
charge by offering money.   
The facts of this case were as follows:  The accused (Du Toit) and another person were both 
charged with theft of meat and of defeating the course of justice (regsverydeling). Although 
Du Toit pleaded not guilty, he was found guilty on both charges.  He appealed against the 
conviction and sentence on the second charge (defeating the course of justice).190 The state 
alleged that he and his co-accused, after they were arrested and while the theft charges were 
pending, attempted to offer a R100 bribe to the complainant so that the theft charges against 
them could be withdrawn.191
charges.
 It was submitted on behalf of the accused that he and his co-
accused believed that they were entitled to enquire from the complainant whether he could 
withdraw the charges and that the R100 offer was not made with the intention of buying the  
192
 
  
                                                 
189S v Du Toit supra (n 177) at 679.  
190At 680E.  
191At 680G-H.  
192At 680-81H.   
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On appeal the court said that, according to the testimony that it had received, Du Toit had 
indeed attempted, by improper means, to make an offer to prevent the serious charge 
against him from running its normal course.193 In other words the court was satisfied that 
Du Toit had attempted to prevent the smooth running of the course of justice.  The court 
confirmed the finding and sentence of the trial court and the appeal was dismissed.194
 
  
7.4.2   A witness who demands money for giving or not giving evidence 
As under the Roman and Roman-Dutch lex Cornelia de falsis,195 a person commits this 
crime when he or she, as a potential witness, demands that he or she be paid money for 
absconding or not absconding or for giving false or true evidence.196 This conduct is 
punished in order to prohibit witnesses from accepting money in respect of testimony, so 
that evidently no serious suspicion of false testimony should arise from the fact that it was 
given for sordid gain.  In R v Cowan and Davies,197
 
 the accused were convicted of 
attempting to defeat the ends of justice following an attempt to accept money from the 
accused so that they could leave the country in order not to give testimony against accused. 
What is clear from both the case law and academic writings is that receiving money in 
order to give or not to give evidence constitutes the crime of defeating or obstructing the 
course of justice.  What is not clear is whether a person who gives money to potential 
witnesses in order to give or not to give evidence with intent to defeat the course of justice, 
commits the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice or an attempt thereto.  
                                                 
193At 681-82H.  
194At 682D-E.  
195Van der Keessel op cit (n 4) 48.10.8.  See the discussion of this crime supra in Chapter Two under 2.2.2.3, 
text at note 61. 
 
196Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 339.  
197R v Cowan and Davies supra Chapter Two under 2.4.3, text at note 182. 
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The writer has found neither precedent nor authority in our law which deals with this 
situation.  It is submitted that there is no reason why such conduct cannot be punished at 
least as an attempt to defeat or obstruct the course of justice.   
 
7.4.3   Tampering with evidence  
Tampering with evidence that could be used in judicial proceedings constitutes the crime of 
obstructing the course of justice.  Tampering with evidence may take the form of 
fabricating or destroying or altering or concealing documents or exhibits such as goods.198 
According to Hunt,199 the most serious manifestation of tampering with evidence is the 
fabrication of evidence.  In S v Mdakani,200 the accused concocted a chain of evidence that 
included falsified documents to implicate an innocent person in certain subversive activities 
and organisations.  The facts of this case were the following:  Mdakani, a police officer, 
was accused of attempting to defeat or obstruct the course of justice.  He was convicted and 
he appealed against his conviction.201
 
 The course of action which led to this was a family 
feud that developed between the relatives of Mdakani’s wife and one Cornelius 
Hlatshwayo’s family at Vlakpoort in the Amersfoort district.  Allegedly, on a certain 
occasion when Mdakani’s wife and young children were visiting at Vlakpoort, they were 
nearly burnt to death when the hut in which they were sleeping was deliberately set alight 
by Cornelius and his brother, Mishak, who was facing a charge of attempted murder.  
Mdakani decided to take vengeance on the Hlatshwayo family. 
It was alleged that he telephoned the Railway Police, and under an assumed name, reported 
                                                 
198Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 156. 
199Ibid. 
200S v Mdakani supra (n 33).  
201At 312. 
 335 
that he had information to the effect that Mishak was the leader of the gang that was 
responsible for the burning of trains and that he would try to obtain Mishak’s address.  On 
the following day, he phoned and used a different assumed name, and stated that he had 
received information that Mishak was an agitator and that he was distributing subversive 
pamphlets.202
 
 On the third occasion he called the Railway Police to tell them that Mishak 
was responsible for the burning of trains and that he had posted a letter to Cornelius 
containing information in regard to the killing of whites planned to take place on a specific 
date, but which had to be deferred to another date.  He requested the police officer to 
intercept the letter.  
In the meantime Mdakani had typed or caused to be typed, an envelope addressed to 
Cornelius at Vlakpoort and purporting on the outside thereof to come from Mishak in 
Johannesburg and also two documents which purported to emanate from the African 
National Congress (ANC) which was a banned political organisation.203
 
    
The police decided to act on Mdakani’s last anonymous telephone call.  On the following 
day, two police officers, accompanied by Cornelius, went to Vlakpoort Post Office and 
Cornelius took delivery of the letter which the police immediately impounded.  The police 
arrested Cornelius and they investigated the possible charges against the two Hlatshwayo 
brothers (Cornelius and Mishak) arising out of the telephone calls but concluded that they 
were actually innocent.  They were consequently not charged.204
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It was proved that Mdakani had fabricated the evidence against Cornelius and Mishak by 
creating the spurious documents and sending them to Cornelius, and then arranging that 
Cornelius should be caught either in the act of receiving them or in their possession.  There 
was no doubt that he intended such evidence to be used against the two Hlatshwayo 
brothers, not only for their arrest but also in their prosecution.205 He was then charged and 
convicted of attempting to defeat or obstruct the course of justice.  He appealed against his 
conviction.206 On appeal, counsel for Mdakani maintained that the conviction was bad in 
law because:207
 
 
(1) no charge had been preferred against the Hlatshwayo brothers or no prosecution had 
been instituted against them at any time and  
(2) all Mdakani did in effect, was to lay a false charge against the Hlatshwayo brothers 
which by reason of R v Chipo,208
 
 was no longer an offence in our law.   
In reaching its decision the court cited both academic work209 and case law210
                                                 
205At 313H-14C. 
 and found 
that the scope of the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice had been 
widened considerably to include acts which were done before judicial proceedings had 
actually commenced.  It also concluded that if the acts were intended and had the tendency 
to defeat or obstruct the course of justice, a charge of attempt to defeat or obstruct the 
206At 311C-D.  
207At 314C-D.  
208See R v Chipo 1953 (4) SA 573 (AD).  See a detailed discussion of this case infra (n 228). 
209S v Mdakani supra (n 33) at 314E citing with approval Lansdown, Hoal and Lansdown op cit (n 88) 1113.  
210R v Cowan and Davies at 804 supra Chapter Two under 2.4.3, text at note 182 and R v Hirschhorn supra (n 
169) at 64A. 
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course of justice could succeed even if the intent could not be fulfilled.211 In dismissing the 
appeal, the court held:212
 
 
In the present case the accused not merely laid false charges against the Hlatshwayos but in addition 
he manufactured false evidence and documents in support of those charges and maliciously arranged 
for the police to come into possession thereof.  Those acts went far beyond mere calumnia and in my 
view constituted an attempt to defeat or obstruct the due administration of justice.   
 
The court found that Mdakani’s conduct, ‘went far beyond mere calumnia.’  The court’s 
decision will now be analysed in two respects, starting with calumnia and then fabrication 
of evidence.  Mdakani committed the crime of calumnia when he called the Railway Police 
and falsely implicated the Hlatshwayo brothers of having committed a certain crime and 
planning to commit others, while knowing very well that they were innocent.213
 
 He 
intended that they be arrested, charged and convicted for the offences he falsely accused 
them of having committed.  His acts were intended and had the tendency to obstruct the 
course of justice.  It is submitted that the fact that the Hlatshwayo brothers were never 
charged and convicted for the alleged offences was immaterial.   
He did not stop at phoning the police to lay false charges against the Hlatshwayo brothers.  
He went further and concocted false incriminating evidence against them.  He wrote a letter 
purporting to have been written by one of the brothers, Mishak, addressed to Cornelius and 
he fabricated some documents which purported to have emanated from the African 
National Congress.214
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some serious offences.  The Queen v Vreones215 was an English case similar to Mdakani’s 
case in the sense that it also dealt with the fabrication of evidence.  In that case the accused 
had falsified samples of wheat, which had been taken from a cargo and sealed for the use in 
the event of a dispute.  In our law, it is not required that the judicial proceedings be 
pending.216
 
 
Another case where the accused was charged with an attempt to defeat or obstruct the 
course of justice following the concoction of false evidence to be presented in court was S v 
Mtshizana.217 In this case the accused, an attorney, counselled his clients to deny statements 
they had previously made to the police and made up a false story for them to tell in 
evidence.  The facts of this case are as follows:  Mtshizana was convicted of an attempt to 
defeat or obstruct the course of justice for advising his clients, who were charged under the 
Suppression of Communism Act, to deny the truth of the original statements they made to 
the police and to say that they were made under coercion.218
 
 The accused knew that the 
incriminating statements made to the police would be inadmissible as evidence whether or 
not they had been made under compulsion, and that any confession made by the accused to 
the court would likewise be inadmissible if not voluntarily made.  The court found that the 
real reason Mtshizana gave such advice to his clients was to prevent the clients from 
becoming witnesses for the state against other co-accused, thereby attempting to defeat or  
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obstruct the course of justice.  The court dismissed the appeal.219
 
  
Other conduct which constitutes the common-law crime of obstructing the due course of 
justice in relation to evidence, is when X conceals his or her criminal actions in order to 
evade detection.  In 2007, in Pakane and Others v S,220 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
confirmed the accused’s convictions of murder and defeating the course of justice after he 
had killed another person and concealed his actions in order to evade detection.  The facts 
of the case were as follows:  In the early hours of the 13th December 1999, the accused, 
Pakane, Sigagayi and Mahogo, who were police officers, were sent to investigate a 
shooting incident at Coffee Bay in the Eastern Cape.  Allegedly, they shot and killed one 
Mr Louis Fourie, a local resident.  They did not report the shooting incident to their 
superiors.221 The police investigated the murder case and two innocent people were arrested 
in connection with the murder and were kept in custody for two years before they were 
released without being charged.222 Regarding the crime of defeating the course of justice, 
the state alleged that Sigagayi, after the shooting incident, swapped the weapon (R4 rifle 
number 295) which was used during the shooting incident and had torn some pages from 
the occurrence book.  He also instructed one Mr Ngxumza to rewrite entries in the 
occurrence book without informing his superior officer about the state of the book.223 The 
court a quo convicted accused number 2 of murder and obstructing the course of justice.  
The two other accused were convicted only of being accessories after the fact.224
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appealed.225 It was argued on Sigagayi’s behalf that the state failed to prove that he 
(Sigagayi) had tampered with the occurrence book or had tried to conceal the fact that rifle 
number 295 (murder weapon) was in his possession when the shooting incident took place.  
In dismissing the appeal against the conviction on the charge of defeating the course of 
justice, the court, per Maya, JA, held:226
I agree with the conclusion of the court below that he tampered with the occurrence book to remove 
proof that he had booked out rifle 295, which, very conveniently, was subsequently not sent for a 
ballistics test. Therefore, his conviction for defeating the course of justice was proper. 
 
 
This thesis, respectfully, agrees with the court a quo and the Supreme Court of Appeal, that 
concealing one’s criminal actions in order to evade detection, investigation, arrest and 
prosecution constitutes the common law crime of obstructing the due course of justice.  
 
7.4.4   Laying of false charges 
Notwithstanding the fact that in Roman and Roman-Dutch law it was an offence to lay false 
charges against an innocent person,227 this crime received a very cold reception especially 
in our courts.  In 1953, in R v Chipo,228 the Appellate Division said that in South African 
law the crime of laying false charges against another person was obsolete.229
 
  
The facts of this case were as follows:  The accused (four youths whose ages ranged from 
14 to 16 years) reported to the police that, after they had complained about the conditions of 
their employment, their employer had twice fired a rifle towards them.  Two of the accused 
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said that he did not want to kill them, but rather that he wished to frighten them into going 
back to work.  Others expressed no opinion, but said that one of the bullets struck the tree 
six feet from where they were sitting on the ground.  Police investigated the complaints.  
They found that the allegations were false and the employer was not prosecuted.  The 
accused were then jointly tried and convicted on a charge of having committed criminal 
injuria against their employer.230 The records of proceedings were submitted for review to 
the High Court.  In a majority judgment the court quashed the convictions and sentences.  
The Minister of Justice, Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) appealed against the decision 
of the High Court.231 The Appellate Division in a judgment delivered by Hoexter, JA, 
held:232
 
 
It appears therefore that in the Roman and Roman-Dutch law the malicious laying of a false criminal 
charge, although it might have been classed as a criminal injuria, was treated as a specific crime 
known as calumnia.  But in our modern textbooks of criminal law and in the law reports of Southern 
Rhodesia and the Union I can find no reference to the specific crime of calumnia.  The obvious 
inference is that this crime has become obsolete.   
 
On the strength of the crime of calumnia being obsolete the Appellate Division confirmed 
the High Court’s decision to quash the convictions and sentences in the case and the appeal 
was dismissed.233
 
 
Where did the court go wrong in the Chipo decision?  In trying to answer this question this 
decision is examined from two points of view.  Firstly, the criminal injuria charge laid in 
the court a quo and secondly, the fact that calumnia was viewed as obsolete in our law.  
The accused were alleged to have falsely laid a complaint against another person.  They 
were charged with a crime of criminal injuria, not with a specific crime known as 
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calumnia.  It is respectfully submitted that from the onset the crime was wrongly charged 
because in Roman and Roman-Dutch law, to maliciously lay a false charge fell under the 
broad crime of criminal injuria but it was specifically charged under calumnia.234
 
 It is 
respectfully submitted that the state was not supposed to have charged the accused with 
criminal injuria but with obstructing the course of justice in the form of calumnia.  The 
High Court should have used its inherent powers of quashing the convictions and refer the 
matter back to the trial court for a new trial on a charge of obstructing or defeating the 
course of justice.  The court did not see it that way.  It dismissed the convictions. 
The Appellate Division correctly observed the fact that maliciously laying of a false charge 
against another person constituted calumnia but the court declared the crime obsolete.  It is 
submitted that the court erred in declaring the crime of calumnia obsolete in our law only 
on the strength that there was no reference to the crime in our textbooks and law reports.  In 
terms of the principle of legality, especially the ius acceptum principle,235 courts do not 
have the powers to create a new crime.  But, it is submitted nevertheless that courts should 
be hesitant to declare certain crimes obsolete.  This thesis supports Van der Merwe’s236
 
 
views that R v Chipo was only authority for the proposition that the laying of a false 
criminal charge could not constitute criminal iniuria.  But it constitutes the crime of 
defeating or obstructing the course of justice. 
The decision in R v Chipo left its mark also in S v Sauerman237
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quashed the accused’s conviction on a charge of attempt to defeat or obstruct the course of 
justice.  The court was of the opinion that something more than the laying of a false 
criminal charge was required before it could be punishable in our law.238 The facts of this 
case were as follows.  The charge against Sauerman alleged that he unlawfully and with 
intent to defeat or obstruct the course of justice, arrested one Bhengu and took him to the 
police station and made a statement to the South African Police setting out the 
circumstances in which an alleged theft took place.  On the strength of this false statement, 
he then laid a false charge of theft with the police against Bhengu, knowing full well that 
Bhengu had not stolen his watch.  Sauerman was later charged and convicted of attempting 
to defeat or obstruct the course of justice.  After the Natal Provincial Division dismissed his 
appeal,239 Sauerman appealed to the Appellate Division.  The Appellate Division was of the 
opinion that to commit the crime something more than the laying of a false criminal charge 
was required before it could be punishable in our law.  The court held:240
 
 ‘Dit vereis egter iets 
meer as slegs die blote anhangigmaking van ‘n valse klag, voor dit in ons reg strafbaar is.’ 
The decision of the Appellate Division was heavily criticized in academic circles.241 
According to Snyman,242 this judgment was based solely on the fact that the case was 
indistinguishable from R v Chipo,243
 
 and that the court was bound by the latter case to hold 
that such conduct was no longer a crime in our law.   
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Snyman244 says that the court erred in coming to this conclusion.  He says that calumnia is 
a form of iniuria, and the court in R v Chipo confined itself to investigating whether the 
form of iniuria known as calumnia was still part of our law.  According to him, laying of a 
false criminal charge was punishable, not only as a form of iniuria, but also as a form 
falsitas.245 He says that ‘just as the due administration of justice demands that guilty 
persons be convicted, so it must equally ensure that the innocent shall not be prosecuted or 
convicted.’246 It is said the outcome of S v Sauerman has been to create a gap in our 
criminal law which only the legislature could close.247 It is further said that the ‘gap could 
have been avoided had the Appellate Division properly applied the principles of our 
common law, as well as the principles underlying the crime of defeating or obstructing the 
course of justice.’248
 
 
In 1988, the Appellate Division in S v Mene,249
                                                 
244Snyman op cit (n 241) 455.  
 overruled its previous decision in R v Chipo 
where it had decided that the crime of laying false charges against someone else (calumnia) 
was obsolete in our law.  It accepted that the conduct constitutes an attempt to defeat or 
obstruct the course of justice.  The facts of this case were the following:  The accused, who 
were police officers, together with certain other members, were on patrol in certain 
townships in Port Elizabeth.  During the course of the morning pupils who had been 
boycotting classes had gathered at one of the schools to discuss certain matters and were 
singing songs.  A mini-bus in which the accused were driving stopped beyond the school’s 
boundary fence and the accused got out of the bus.  It was alleged that, as the school gate 
245Ibid.  
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was locked, they jumped the gate, approached one of the teachers and requested the keys.  
They slapped one of the teachers and approached the students who then ran away in various 
directions.  The accused fired a number of shots and it was then discovered that two 
students were fatally injured.  They later died.  The post mortems showed that the deceased 
had died of gunshot wounds.250
 
 
The accused off-loaded the other members who had been with them and damaged their 
vehicle and made false reports stating that the school children had attacked and damaged 
the vehicle and that they had shot them when trying to arrest them.  They then opened a 
police docket of public violence ostensibly against those people who had allegedly 
damaged the above-mentioned vehicle, knowing very well that the information was false.251 
The opening of the docket against those who had allegedly damaged the vehicle and the 
filing of a false statement led to the charge namely, laying a false criminal charge with 
intent to defeat or obstruct the course of justice (calumnia).252
 
 
The accused police officers were charged and found guilty of, inter alia, attempt to defeat 
the course of justice (count 8) and they appealed against such convictions.253 Following this 
appeal, the Appellate Division was again called upon to answer the question of whether or 
not it is an offence in South African law to lay a false criminal charge against an innocent 
person.254
 
 
The court started by examining the correctness of the legal proposition of the Sauerman 
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case and considering how the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice was 
defined in our courts prior to this case.  The useful starting point was Queen v Foye and 
Carlin255 where it was observed that the means by which justice is defeated must vary with 
the facts of each particular case.  The court also found guidance in R v Cowan and 
Davies256 and R v Zackon.257After considering these cases the court concluded258 that a 
finding to the effect that the laying of a false charge with intent to obstruct the course of 
justice did not constitute a crime in our law would have important practical implications 
and would be fraught with serious consequences for the due administration of justice in this 
country.  The court overruled its earlier decision in the Sauerman case which stated that the 
offence of laying a false charge against an innocent person was obsolete.  Hoexter, JA, 
held:259
 
  
[I] nevertheless entertain the firm opinion that in the Sauerman AD case the Court was palpably 
mistaken in interpreting Chipo’s case as it did; and that it is the duty of this Court not to abide by that 
decision but to overrule it. 
 
Having overruled its previous decision, the Appellate Division found that the “appellants 
were rightly convicted by the trial court of the crime of attempting to defeat the ends of 
justice.”260
 
 It is submitted that S v Mene correctly reflects the norms of our current society 
where laying of false charges against innocent persons cannot be tolerated as this would 
lead to chaos and the collapse of the due administration of justice.    
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It was said that to lay false charges to the police is a crime as it involves the making of false 
statements to the police and as such amounted to defeating or obstructing the due 
administration of justice.261 Hunt262 argues that there are two possible reasons as to why 
laying of a false charge could be punished as an obstruction of justice: (1) Police could 
become involved in making abortive investigations and that could result in wasteful 
employment of their resources.  He says that such reactions amount to obstructing or 
defeating the administration of justice. (2) In laying a false complaint against another 
person, the accused foresees the possibility that the other person (Y) could and might be 
wrongly prosecuted and even convicted.  It is said that such a result would amount to 
obstructing the course of justice.  Hunt263 argues that in South African law calumnia does 
constitute the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice.  The S v Mene264
 
 
decision vindicated the views of some of our academic writers who maintained that the 
wrongful laying of a false charge against an innocent person, knowing very well that he or 
she is innocent, constitutes the offence of defeating or obstructing the course of justice. 
The crime of obstructing or defeating the course of justice by laying false charges against 
an innocent person may be also be committed through a conspiracy.  In 1937, in R v 
Cilliers,265
                                                 
261Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 157. 
 the accused, a police officer, was charged with conspiracy to defeat or obstruct 
the course of justice.  The facts of this case are as follows:  Allegedly, Cilliers and four 
other socii criminis conspired with two persons, Opperman and Basson, to defeat or 
obstruct the course of justice by trapping a certain Abelson (a proprietor of a bottle store) 
262Ibid. 
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and cause him to be fined.266 In pursuance of this conspiracy, Opperman and Basson caused 
charges to be preferred against Abelson in the magistrate’s court for selling liquor outside 
authorised hours.267 Allegedly, during Abelson’s trial, Opperman and Basson gave false 
evidence in court.  They accused Abelson of having supplied liquor outside authorised 
hours.  In consequence of such evidence Abelson was convicted of contravening some 
sections of Act 30 of 1928.268 The court a quo found a conspiracy between Cilliers and 
Opperman not to be proved, though proof of conspiracy between Cilliers and Basson was 
essential.  Cilliers could only have been responsible for the acts of the other co-accused if 
he had been proved to be a conspirator.  Had it not been alleged that he was a conspirator, 
he could not have been tried jointly with the other accused.269
 
 This case serves as authority 
to the proposition that conspiracy to obstruct or defeat the course of justice is a crime in our 
law. 
The accused were convicted of conspiracy to defeat or obstruct the course of justice.  The 
court a quo reserved the question of law as to “whether there was any legal evidence to 
support the finding of the court that the accused was guilty as found.”270
 
 On appeal, in 
answering this question of law, the Appellate Division found that the court a quo could not  
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have convicted Cilliers.271 The conviction and sentence were set aside.272
 
 
7.4.5   Interfering with police in the execution of their duties 
Police are civil servants whose duty is to investigate alleged offences; and to see to it that 
offenders are properly tried in public courts.  The police investigate alleged offences and 
submit the docket to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP); he or she decides whether 
or not a prosecution should be instituted.  It is a serious offence to prevent an investigation 
from taking place.273 It is also an offence to attempt to influence an investigation after it has 
commenced or attempt to influence the course of a trial in order to obtain the accused’s 
acquittal.274 The first-mentioned conduct, the prevention of a police investigation, amounts 
to defeating or obstructing the course of justice.275 Any person who tries to prevent the 
investigation of suspected offences commits the crime of defeating or obstructing the 
course of justice.276
 
 
Other conduct that constitutes the offence of defeating or obstructing the course of justice 
in relation to interfering with police duties is to interfere with a speed trap.277 According to 
Snyman,278 a motorist who warns the oncoming motorists of the presence of a speed trap by 
flashing his or her lights interferes with the due administration of justice.  In S v Naidoo,279
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the conviction of the accused on a charge of attempting to defeat the ends of justice after he 
(the accused) and the passenger warned other motorists of the presence of a speed trap in 
the vicinity was confirmed on review.280
 
  
The facts of this case were the following:  A traffic inspector who was called as a witness, 
told the court that while driving on his way to assume duty at a speed trap, he noticed a 
vehicle approaching from the opposite direction.  Its lights were flashing at all the 
oncoming vehicles far ahead of him.  The officer stated that he could see the brake lights of 
the vehicles travelling in front of him coming on as they slowed down.  It was alleged that 
the inspector made a “U” turn and followed that vehicle and stopped it.  He asked the driver 
to explain his actions and the driver said that it was not him who had flashed the lights but 
his passenger who was with him in the vehicle.  Allegedly, the passenger was intoxicated.  
The driver of the car was then charged with attempting to obstruct the ends of justice but 
the nature of the alleged offence was not outlined to the accused.281 It was held that in order 
to sustain a conviction, the court of first instance had to be satisfied beyond reasonable 
doubt,282 (1) that the accused associated himself with the actions of his passenger, that is, 
that the accused was a socius criminis and (2) that to flash a motor vehicle’s headlights in 
the circumstances constituted an attempt to defeat the ends of justice.  On review the court 
held:283
 
 
I do not think there can be any doubt that an actual interference with the work of those involved in 
the speed trap would constitute an “obstruction of the due administration of justice.”  By actual  
Interference, I contemplate acts committed while the trap is in operation, such as tampering with the 
timing mechanism employed, threatening, man-handling or assaulting the traffic officers, destroying 
their records, and so on.  
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On review the court observed284 that it was not a crime to warn a person who was not 
committing an offence to desist from doing so but the conduct of the accused and his 
passenger, the court said, could not be treated solely as a general warning to others not to 
speed.  In the court’s view, what the accused and his passenger did was to warn the 
approaching drivers of the existence of the speed trap.  In so doing the work of the speed 
trap was likely to be frustrated and that amounted to an attempt and intentional interference 
with the due administration of justice.  For these reasons the court confirmed the conviction 
of the accused.285
 
 
Hunt286 submits that the police in operating a speed-trap are engaged in law enforcement 
which is a function distinct and distinguishable from the administration of justice by the 
courts of law.  He submits that hampering the police in the performance of their duties 
ought to be charged as a statutory offence of obstructing the police in the performance of 
their duties, not as defeating of obstructing the administration of justice.287
 
  
In S v Perera,288 the proposition in S v Naidoo289 that the mere act of warning another of 
the existence of a speed trap without more was an offence has been dissented from as 
stating the law too widely.290 The short version of S v Perera was as follows:291
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289S v Naidoo supra (n 32).  
 
290See Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 161.  Citing S v Perera supra (n 288) at 527H.  
291As discussed in Devenish op cit (n 26) 30-31.  
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on the road between Middelburg and Belfast.292 Following that conduct, the accused was 
charged with attempting to defeat the ends of justice.  The accused pleaded guilty to the 
charge and was convicted.  The Supreme Court reviewed the case and posed the question as 
to whether in the circumstances of the case, a crime had in fact been committed.  The 
magistrate furnished reasons for his decision and then the matter was argued before the full 
bench of the Transvaal Provincial Division.293 Trengove, J, held:294
 
 
Hieruit volg dit, na my mening, dat waar ‘n motoris geen rede om te glo dat die bestuurder van ‘n 
aangekomende voertuig besig is om die snelheidsgrens te oorskry nie, en ook geen rede om te 
vermoed dat so ‘n bestuurder van voornemens is om dit te doen nie, sou hy hom nie aan poging tot 
regsverydeling skuldig maak nie indien hy die bestuurder van die snelstrik waarsku nie.  
 
 
This is the preferable view amongst academic writers.295
 
 It says that where the accused has 
no reason to believe that the oncoming motorist was exceeding the speed limit and no 
reason to presume that he or she intended to do so, he or she did not attempt to defeat the 
course of justice by warning other motorists about the presence of a speed trap.    
7.4.6    Making false statements to the police 
There is case law296 and academic writings297
                                                 
292S v Perera supra (n 288) at 524. 
 which support the proposition that the act of 
misleading, or attempting to mislead the police by making exculpatory or inculpatory 
statements could amount to defeating or obstructing the course of justice.  It is said that this 
offence could be committed when an investigation was being made into a suspected crime 
293Devenish op cit (n 26) 31.   
294S v Perera supra (n 288) at 528A-B.  
295Devenish op cit (n 26) 31; Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 161 and Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 339. 
 
296R v Watson supra (n 25) at 283 and R v Adey and Hancock 1938 (1) PH H75 (C). 
 
297Boister op cit (n 76) 205; Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 942; Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 
7) 158-59 and Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 338. 
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and X persuaded Y to make a false statement which tended to show that he or she (X) was 
not guilty of the suspected crime.298 X also commits the offence where he falsely 
incriminates him- or herself in order to shield Y from prosecution.299 Hunt300
 
 says that it is 
not clear, however, whether X commits the crime where he or she makes a false statement 
in order to exculpate him- or herself. 
In 1938, in R v Adey and Hancock,301 the accused (Adey and Hancock) were charged with 
attempting to defeat the due course of justice.302 It was alleged that they wrongfully, 
unlawfully and with intent to defeat or obstruct the due course of justice induced and 
persuaded C to make a false statement to the South African Railway and Harbour (SAR & 
H) Police that exonerated H who was being investigated for suspected theft of a tin of 
oil.303 Allegedly, C falsely informed the investigating officer that he (C) had supplied a tin 
of oil to the said H so that the latter could not be prosecuted for theft.  For inducing and 
persuading C to make false statements to the police, Adey and Hancock were then charged 
with the crime of attempting to defeat the due course of justice.  Counsel for the accused 
took exception to the indictment on the ground that it did not disclose an offence known in 
our law.304
                                                 
298Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 159. 
 It was contended on behalf of the accused that before it could be said that the 
crime of attempting to defeat the due course of justice was committed, it had to be alleged 
either that criminal proceedings had actually commenced at the time that the attempt was 
alleged to have been made, or that criminal proceedings were contemplated in respect of the 
  
299Ibid. 
  
300Ibid. 
 
301R v Adey and Hancock supra (n 296). 
  
302At 80. 
  
303Ibid. 
 
304Ibid. 
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commission of a crime.305 In dismissing the exception to the indictment Centlivres, J, 
held:306
 
 
[W]hen an investigation was being made into a suspected crime, and a person persuaded another to 
make a false statement, which tended to show that the suspected criminal was not guilty of the 
suspected crime, he was thus interfering with the due course of justice…  It would be lamentable if 
the court were to lay down that when the police were investigating a suspected crime anybody who 
tried to obstruct or thwart the administration of justice by persuading people to put false information 
before the police was not liable to be charged with the crime of attempting to defeat the due course of 
justice. 
 
In S v Burger,307 the accused negligently ran down a pedestrian.  He abandoned his vehicle 
and fled the scene of the accident.  It was alleged that he went to the police and made a 
false statement claiming that his car had been stolen shortly before the occurrence of the 
accident.308 He did not implicate a specific person as was the case in R v Chipo.309 Instead, 
this was a case of fabrication of important information outside the court and before any 
court proceedings had commenced and even before a charge of culpable homicide had been 
laid against him.310
 
 He was charged and convicted of an attempt to obstruct the course of 
justice.  He appealed against his conviction on the ground that because such conduct was 
not punishable in terms of Roman-Dutch law it was also not punishable as the crime in 
South African law. 
The Court of Appeal ruled that the conduct of the accused did not amount to calumnia 
because it did not implicate an identifiable person of having committed an offence.  
However, the court held that the crime could be committed also by making a false 
                                                 
305Ibid. 
  
306At 81. 
 
3071975 (2) SA 601 (C). 
 
308At 601C.  See also Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 159.  
 
309S v Burger supra (n 307) at 604G-H, referring to R v Chipo supra (n 208).  
 
310At 605B. 
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statement to the police containing allegations which are intended to lead them off the track 
of the true offender.  It pointed out that there are many examples in South African law 
where the crime had been found to have been committed where a person did something to 
prevent the further investigation of an alleged offence by the police.  The court referred to, 
inter alia, the case of S v Neethling.311 In that case, a police sergeant, who drove an official 
car into a tree, persuaded his passenger, a colleague to say at a police investigation that the 
motor car had been stolen and that he did not know about the accident.  Neethling was 
convicted of an attempt to obstruct the course of justice even if there was no pending 
charge against him at the relevant time.  According to the court in Burger,312 the principle 
that emerges from Neethling’s case is that if a person has reason to believe that he had 
committed an offence and realises that legal steps may possibly be taken against him and 
that a police investigation will be launched, and he intentionally does something with intent 
to obstruct or prevent such investigation, he is guilty of the offence of an attempt to obstruct 
the course of justice.  In the court’s view, it makes no difference if the guilty person, who 
wants to avoid criminal proceedings against him, persuades a friend to give false 
information to the police or, do it himself.313
 
  
The court made the following important statement regarding the ambit of the offence:314
 
 
Dit is dus, myns insiens, duidelik dat die misdaad waaraan appellant skuldig bevind is nie noodwendig 
in ŉ hof gepleeg moet word nie;dit staan nie noodwending in verband met hofverrigtinge nie; dit 
behels nie noodwending die fabrisering van valse (mondelikse) getuienis of dokumente nie; dit behels 
nie noodwendig ŉ geknoei met getuies of die afkoop van getuies nie; die verloop van die gereg kan, 
soos deur SCHREINER, A.R., gesệ is, “be defeated in many ways” (R. v. Bekker, 1956 (2) S.A. 279 
(A.A.) op bl. 281E); en na my mening is ‘n valse verklaring aan die polisie, bevattende bewerings wat 
bedoel is om hulle van die spoor van die ware misdadiger af te bring, maar een daarvan.  Die gereg 
                                                 
3111965 (2) SA 165 (O) referred to at 612C-E in the Burger decision. 
  
312S v Burger supra (n 307) at 612H.  
 
313The court also referred to S v Daniels supra (n 78) and pointed out that the facts in that case were very 
similar. 
  
314S v Burger supra (n 307) at 616F-617B. 
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duld geen optrede wat of daartoe sal lei dat ŉ persoon, aan ŉ misdryf skuldig of moontlik skuldig, uit ŉ 
hof gehou sal word; of wat, nadat hy voor die hof gebring is, ŉ behoorlike verhoor sal voorkom.  Die 
beginsels soos in die gewysdes uiteengesit, is wat belangrik is, nie die spesifieke voorbeelde van die 
misdaad regsverydeling wat ek genoem het nie.  Die gereg groei en ontwikkel met die verloop van tyd; 
hy staan nie stil nie.  Sedert die tyd van die Romeins-Hollandse skrywers het daar groot ontwikkellinge 
plaasgevind op gebied van die strafreg.  Een van die belangrikste ontwikkelings op hierdie gebied is 
dat daar vandag Staatsamptenare aangestel is wie die plig opgelệ is om verdagte misdaad te 
ondersoek; en om te sorg dat hulle daar in die openbaar behoorlik verhoor word.  Die ondersoek van 
verdagte misdaad word deur die polisie uitgevoer; die dossier word voor die Prokureur-generaal gelệ; 
hy besluit of daar vervolg sal word al dan nie.  Dit is net so ernstig om te verhoed dat ŉ ondersoek 
plaasvind as om te probeer om die ondersoek te beїnvloed nadat dit eers ŉ aanvang geneem het, of om 
die verloop van die verhoor te probeer beїnvloed ten einde die vryspreek van die beskuldigde te 
bewerkstelling.  In wese is aldrie tipes van optrede ŉ ondermyning van die gereg .  Eerste gemelde 
optrede, die voorkoming van ŉ ondersoek deur die polisie, is ŉ geval  waa r die regspleging ab initio 
gefnuik word.  As dit gevind word dat ŉ poging tot die voorkoming van die ondersoek van ŉ misdaad 
gemaak is, sal die howe onder geen omstandighede ledig bly staan nie.  Dit is die opnebare belang dat 
alle verdagte misdade onmiddellik ondersoek word; en enige persoon wat sodanige ondersoek probeer 
voorkom, maak hom aan poging tot regsverydeling skuldig. 
 
 
According to Hunt, lies told to the police by X in order to avoid incriminating himself 
should not be punishable as defeating or obstructing the course of justice.  He says that to 
hold otherwise would be to deny X the benefit of the common-law privilege against self-
incrimination.315 Hunt points out that Burger’s case “is against the view that there is a 
difference between false statements made in order to avoid self-incrimination and false 
statements made to mislead the police as to the criminal responsibility of one other than the 
maker of the statement.”316 This is because the court said that it makes no difference 
whether the guilty person who wishes to escape criminal proceedings, persuades a friend to 
give false information to the police or whether he or she does so him- or herself.317 
However, Hunt submits that the case can be distinguished on the ground that what Burger 
did was in fact to fabricate false evidence in the form of the statement to the police which 
could be used to “prove” that he was not the driver of the vehicle which was involved in an 
accident.318
                                                 
315Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 159.  
 It is submitted that the court was correct in dismissing Burger’s appeal because 
when he went to the police to report that his car had been stolen before the accident, he 
 
316Ibid.  Hunt is referring to Baker, J, in R v Burger supra (n 307) at 614E. 
 
317Ibid. 
  
318Ibid. 
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intended to mislead the police investigation of the accident and he had foreseen that his 
false statement would mislead the police in their investigation.  The false statement was not 
made in order to avoid self-incrimination (like a mere denial), but to obstruct the due 
administration of justice.  Therefore, his conduct constituted the crime of defeating or 
obstructing or attempt to defeat or obstruct the course of justice.  It is submitted that a 
distinction must be drawn between false statements made in order to avoid self-
incrimination (for example, a mere denial of liability) and false statements made to mislead 
the police with a view to obstruct the course of justice and to prevent an investigation.  In 
the former case, X’s conduct cannot be viewed as an unlawful obstruction of justice 
because his right against self-incrimination should be accorded more weight.  But in the 
latter case, X’s conduct amounts to punishable obstruction of justice.  
 
In S v Sauerman,319 it was held that merely to make a false statement to the police without 
doing anything else, does not constitute the crime of defeating or obstructing the justice.320 
However, S v Mene321 overruled the Sauerman322 decision.  But it is said that refusing to 
answer questions or to give information to the police or to refuse to co-operate with the 
police in obtaining evidence against oneself or another person does not amount unlawful 
obstruction of the administration of justice.323 Hunt324
 
 submits that where this point has 
come up for consideration it is usually disposed of on the basis that X’s refusal or omission 
does not constitute an actus sufficient to make his conduct a crime. 
                                                 
319S v Sauerman supra (n 26).  
 
320See Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 160. 
  
321S v Mene supra (n 25).  
 
322Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 160. 
  
323Ibid. 
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In S v Cassimjee,325 the court confirmed the proposition that a false denial of guilt by the 
accused, though it obstructs or defeats the course of justice is not unlawful.  In this case, a 
collision occurred between a truck and a motor car.  Police investigated a possible charge of 
reckless and negligent driving against Cassimjee.  The accused, Cassimjee, furnished a 
statement to the police and denied that he was the driver of the truck at the time of the 
accident.  This statement formed part of the charge of attempting to defeat the ends of 
justice.326 The state argued that the accused’s denial that he was the driver of the truck at 
the time of the accident was false.  The trial court found that the denial was false and 
convicted the accused of attempting to defeat the ends of justice.327 On appeal, Wallis, AJ, 
held:328
 
  
The statement in the present case was nothing more nor less than a simple denial that the appellant was 
the driver of the truck at the time.  I do not think that anything is added to that statement by the fact 
that in making that denial he falsely implicated someone else as the driver.  That is a necessary 
implication of the denial.  In my view, it follows that, in the circumstances of this case, the statement 
made by the appellant, albeit false, was not unlawfully made. 
 
In the court’s view, the accused did not commit the crime as charged.  The conviction and 
sentence were set aside.329
 
 
7.4.7   Lying to the police that a crime has been committed 
There is academic opinion which suggests that lying to the police that a crime has been 
committed constitutes obstruction of the due administration of justice.330
                                                 
3251989 (3) SA 729 (N). 
 However, the 
  
326At 729F-G. 
 
327At 729G-H. 
  
328At 730D-E. 
 
329At 730E.  
 
330Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 942.   
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crime is not committed by merely wasting the police officials’ time and energy331 or by 
refusing to answer questions put by the police or to refuse to co-operate with the police in 
obtaining evidence against oneself or another, because in most cases, there is no legal duty 
on the individual to assist the police.332
 
 
According to Boister333 and Burchell and Milton,334 the crime of obstructing the course of 
justice is not committed by merely wasting the police officials’ time and energy.  The court 
in S v Bazzard335 has confirmed this proposition.  The facts of this case were the following:  
The accused, Bazzard, while under the influence of dagga called the police and informed 
them that he had kidnapped a young girl.  He demanded a ransom for her to be released or 
else he would kill her.336 The police conducted a search.  They traced the accused in order 
to establish the truth of the allegations.  They found him and discovered that he did not 
kidnap any girl as he had alleged.337 As a result of the search the police wasted time and 
energy.338 He was charged and convicted of defeating or obstructing or attempt to defeat or 
obstruct the course of justice.339
 
 
The question to be determined by the review court was whether a false report made to the 
police that a crime has been committed constitutes the common law crime of defeating or 
                                                 
331Boister op cit (n 76) 205 and Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 942. 
332Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 942-43. 
333Boister op cit (n 76) 205. 
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obstructing the course of justice.340 The court found that the course or administration of 
justice connotes that the crime can be committed not only in relation to the work of the 
courts but also in relation to the work of agencies (like the police) involved in the 
administration of law enforcement.341  The court in Bazzard distinguished this case from 
the S v Mene342 decision.  In the latter case the accused laid a false charge against specific 
individuals knowing that they were innocent.  That constituted the crime of calumnia.343 In 
S v Bazzard the accused did not lay a false charge against a specific individual thereby 
exposing a certain individual to the risk of arrest, imprisonment, possible conviction and 
sentence.344 As the accused implicated himself, he did not defeat or obstruct the course of 
justice.345 The court held that the accused’s report to the police also did not amount to an 
attempt to conceal any crime as in the Burger case.346 However, the court did not think that 
the crime should be limited to instances where an innocent person had been implicated, or 
where a crime had been concealed.347 The court explained the application of the offence as 
follows:348
 
 
Ek dink egter nie dat die voorbeelde noodwending beperk moet word tot die verdoeseling van die 
misdaad of die implisering van ŉ onskuldige persoon nie.  Daar mag moontlik ander gevalle ook wees, 
byvoorbeeld iemand wat inmeng met die uitvoering van die polisie se pligte by die arrestasie van ŉ 
verdagte met die doel om aan die verdagte die geleentheid te gee om te ontsnap, kan, volgens my 
oordeel, ook skuldig wees aan belemmering, of ŉ poging tot die belemmering van die regspleging. 
 
Die wese van die betrokke misdaad is dat daar met die ‘regspleging’ gepeuter word.  Die 
‘regspleging’ in hierdie sin bestaan uit ŉ ‘proses’ waartydens sekere handelinge  deur landsburgers 
verrig word en die daaropvolgende uitvoering van sekere pligte deur verskeie amptenare, byvoorbeeld 
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341At 304e. 
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die getuie wat kennis dra van die pleging van ŉ misdaad (of wat iemand valslik wil impliseer by die 
pleging van ŉ werklike of denkbeeldige misdaad) maak ŉ rapport aan die polisie; die polisie 
ondersoek die beweerde misdaad; die Prokureur-generaal se personeel besluit of daar ŉ vervolging 
ingestel gaan word of nie; waar die beskuldigde vervolg word, beslis die hof aan die einde van ŉ 
hofgeding oor die skuld of onskuld van die aangeklaagde. 
 
Die uitdrukking ‘regspleging’ in die misdaadsomskrywing het dus te make met daardie proses wat 
daarop gerig is om uiteindelik sy voltooiing te vind by die beregting in ŉ hofgeding van ŉ werklike of 
vermeende geskil tussen partye onderling of tussen die Staat en sy onderdane.  Enige handeling wat 
daardie proses wederregtelik en opsetlik aan die gang sit, deur byvoorbeeld die lê van ŉ vals aanklag 
(Rv Tanoa 1955 (2) SA 613 (O); S v Mdakani 1964 (3) SA 311(T)), of enige handeling wat die 
voortsetting of voleinding van daardie proses wederregtelik en opsetlik belemmer of verydel of poog 
om dit te doen, kan strafbaar wees onder die betrokke misdaad. 
 
Daarenteen is die blote mors van die tyd en energie in die algemeen van sekere van die amptenare, 
byvoorbeeld die polisie of die Prokureur-generaal se personeel, nie belemmering van die ‘regspleging’ 
in voormelde sin nie. 
 
The court accordingly set aside the conviction. 
 
Boister says that calumnia involves the false implication of a specific person.349 Where X 
does not falsely accuse anyone but rather implicates him- or herself the crime is not 
committed because wasting police time is different from exposing other individuals to the 
operation of the criminal law.350 It is submitted that the academic writers who hold the view 
that a mere wasting of police time and energy does not constitute the crime of defeating or 
obstructing the course of justice are correct.351 The daily administrative work of police 
cannot be equated with the administration of justice. 352
  
 
Therefore, a mere misrepresentation made by a person in the form of a hoax report to the  
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police that led the police to waste their time, energy and resources in investigating a 
fictitious crime falls within the ambit of normal police duties.353 It does not constitute the 
crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice.  But it is submitted that if the hoax 
report may lead to the arrest or detention and trial of an innocent person, then the conduct 
of X (the maker of the hoax report) amounts to obstructing the course of justice.  X, for 
example, phones the police and reports that her daughter and her granddaughter have been 
hijacked.354
 
 The police rush to the first suspect, Y, and arrest him.  After a day or two later, 
it becomes clear that X’s daughter and her child are alive and well and are staying at the 
house of the daughter’s boyfriend and were never hijacked.  In this case an innocent person 
was arrested.  It is submitted that, like laying a false charge against an innocent person, X 
may be guilty of obstructing the course of justice if the state can prove that X had dolus 
eventualis ― that he or she (X) had foreseen that somebody may be arrested and had 
reconciled him- or herself to this possibility.    
7.4.8   Misleading the police in order to prevent the detection of a crime  
Another way of committing the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice is by 
misleading (or attempting to mislead) the police in order to prevent the detection of a crime, 
which might otherwise be revealed to the police.355
                                                 
353Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 150 and Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 942.  
 This can be done where a person (X) 
has committed an offence by, for example, stealing a computer from his office and selling it 
to another person.  The police are called in to investigate.  X, in an endeavour to prevent the 
detection of the initial offence, purchases another computer and puts it in Y’s office so that 
it appears as if the computer was never missing but that Y used it in his office.  In this 
 
354See this example in Hamman “Cellphone technology, human rights and the Criminal Justice System” 2005 
Criminal Justice 10th Conference Consolidating Transformation at 
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355Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 339.  
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situation X has misled the police in order to prevent the detection of a crime.  In S v 
Daniels,356
 
 the court dismissed the accused’s appeal following his conviction for attempt to 
defeat the course of justice after he had made endeavours to mislead the police 
investigating one crime in order to prevent detection of another crime.  
7.4.9   Interfering with the judiciary  
Any attempt by the accused to influence the judiciary by, for example, exhorting them not 
to give any credence to certain types of evidence contrary to their duties,357 amounts to the 
common law offence of attempt to defeat or obstruct the course of justice.  It may also be 
charged as corruption or as contempt of court or as a statutory contravention, depending on 
the circumstances of the case.358 The case where an accused was charged with attempting to 
defeat the course of justice following exhorting the judiciary not to give credence to certain 
evidence was S v Van Niekerk.359
 
   
The facts of this case were the following:  Van Niekerk was a Professor of Law at the 
University of Natal, and was charged both with contempt of court and with attempting to 
defeat or obstruct the course of justice.  These charges had arisen out of a public protest 
meeting held in the city hall directed against certain aspects of the Terrorism Act,360
                                                 
356S v Daniels supra (n 78).  This case is discussed supra (n 90). 
 
especially the detention for interrogation without trial, solitary confinement and to the 
circumstance that various people had died while detained under the Act.  At the time of the 
meeting a much-publicised trial under the Act was under way.  It was alleged that Van 
Niekerk had personally invited counsel appearing in that trial to attend the meeting.  
357Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 161 and Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 338-39. 
358Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 161-62. 
359S v Van Niekerk supra (n 33). 
360Act of 1967. 
 364 
Allegedly, he had spoken from a typewritten speech and a copy of it had been handed to the 
press.  In it, he supported a demand that there be a judicial enquiry into possible abuses 
under the Terrorism Act.  In his speech, he further criticised what he considered to be 
reprehensible inaction on the part of lawyers and the judiciary to the suppressive provisions 
in the Act.  He advanced a “solution” in which he had advised the judiciary to adopt, 
including an advice to all judges that they should, in effect, ignore the testimony of all 
witnesses who had previously been detained under the Act.361 Allegedly, in his speech Van 
Niekerk did mention the R v Hassim trial which was going on in Pietermaritzburg.362
 
  
Following his speech at that meeting, Van Niekerk was charged with the crime of contempt 
of court and of attempting to defeat or obstruct the course of justice.  He was convicted on 
the first mentioned charge and acquitted on the charge of attempting to defeat or obstruct 
the course of justice.363 In an appeal against the conviction, the state reserved the question 
of law as to “whether the facts found by the court to have been proved and the facts not put 
in issue did not in law constitute the crime of attempting to defeat or obstruct the course of 
justice.”364 The court observed:365
 
 
[C]riticism of these, and other, provisions of the Act is readily understandable and, provided it be 
expressed within legitimate bounds, constitutes no contravention of the criminal law.  Nor are either 
individual judges or the Judiciary above all criticism.  A radical distinction, however, exists between 
on the one hand, legitimate criticism and, on the other hand, the generic crime of defeating or  
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362At 711E.    
363At 711D.  
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obstructing (or attempting to defeat or obstruct) the course of justice and the species of that crime 
designated contempt of court.  
 
In answering the reserved question the court found that a certain paragraph attached as 
Annexure A to the indictment, exhortated the judiciary not to give credence to the evidence 
of all witnesses who had previously been detained under the Terrorism Act.366In the court’s 
opinion, it plainly constituted an attempt to defeat or obstruct the course of justice as 
averred in the second count of the indictment.367 Factually, the court said that the 
exhortation was directed to the judiciary in general and as such, it applied to all future cases 
involving detainee evidence.368 It was further held that the exhortation extended beyond the 
then pending R v Hassim case and aptly fell within the ambit of the crime of attempting to 
defeat or obstruct the course of justice.  The court submitted that the question of law 
reserved should be answered in favour of the state.369
 
    
This decision can be viewed in the following respects:  Firstly, whether any reference to the 
Hassim case constituted the crime of defeating or obstructing or attempting to defeat or 
obstruct the course of justice.  Secondly, does “the course of justice” include future cases; if 
yes how long into the future does this course run and does it not reach closure?   
 
In Roman and Roman-Dutch law this crime could be committed by corrupting or 
attempting to corrupt a judge370 or by fraudulently preventing a judge from deciding as he 
should.371
                                                 
366Act of 1967.  See S v Van Niekerk supra (n 33) at 725C. 
 It is clear that for this manifestation of the crime to be committed there must be 
 
367At 725D. 
  
368At 725B.  
 
369At 725C-26A. 
370D 48.10.12.  See supra Chapter Two under 2.1.2 (n 13) and Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 137-38.  
 
371Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 137. 
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corruption or attempted corruption or fraud by the accused and it must be intended to 
influence the judge.  The general academic-political statements made by Van Niekerk and 
the reference to the Hassim case could not be said to have amounted to corrupting or 
attempting to corrupt a judge or fraudulently preventing a judge from deciding as he should.  
It is said that Van Niekerk attempted to influence the judiciary not to give credence to 
certain evidence; he never corrupted or attempted to corrupt the judiciary.  It is submitted 
that by accepting that such an exhortation or attempt to influence the judiciary not to give 
credence to certain evidence, constitutes the common law crime of defeating or obstructing 
the course of justice, the court extended the common law crime of judicial interference 
outside the ambit of the original lex in the Roman and Roman-Dutch law.     
 
Regarding the latter question, it is respectfully submitted that X’s alleged conduct of 
exhorting or attempting to influence the judiciary in “all future cases involving detainee-
evidence”372 is not sufficient for the crime of attempt to defeat or obstruct the course of 
justice because there is no principal offence committed as yet.  There is no possibility of a 
real court case ensuing.  Although Snyman373 says that it is not a requirement for the crime 
of defeating or obstructing the course of justice that the conduct allegedly constituting it 
should have been committed in relation to a specific pending case, he cautions that there 
must be a possibility of a real court case, ensuing:374
 
  
[ ] it is, in fact, not even necessary that a court case be envisaged by the police or a private litigant at 
the time of X’s conduct.  It is sufficient that X subjectively foresees the possibility that his conduct 
may, in the ordinary course of events, lead to the case being prosecuted or at least being investigated 
by the police.  However, there must be a possibility of a real court case, either civil or criminal, 
ensuing, because, … the crime is not committed if X merely plays the fool with the police by telling 
them that a crime has been committed whereas X knows that no crime has in fact been committed. 
 
                                                 
372See S v Van Niekerk supra (n 33) at 275B. 
  
373Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 339. 
 
374Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 339-40. 
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In English law it is said that the “course of justice” commences and may be obstructed 
when the proceedings are “active.”375 It is further noted that it is not necessary that 
proceedings should have been started or even that the tribunal should be in existence but if 
proceedings are not in being, they must be imminent or an investigation, which might bring 
about proceedings must be in progress.376 Our law has adopted this view, as the course of 
justice does not require any pending judicial proceedings.377 But any reference to “all future 
cases involving detainee-evidence” suggests that there were not even judicial proceedings 
which were imminent in order to have commenced the course of justice.  Therefore, the 
fountain-source of the course of justice was not there. A comparative legal study 
demonstrates that in English law there should be an investigation in progress or at least a 
violation of a legal rule that would lead to an investigation.  It is respectfully submitted that 
in S v Van Niekerk, regarding “all future cases involving detainee-evidence,” there was 
neither an investigation in progress nor a violation of a legal rule that might have led to an 
investigation nor judicial proceedings which were imminent.  It is respectfully submitted 
that the court, in the quest to protect the integrity of the judiciary against criticism, tried to 
widen the scope of the course of justice to unimaginative limits.  If by “future detainee-
evidence” the court meant also cases which will take place in the 21st
 
century that would 
create a limitless ambit of the course of justice. 
It is acknowledged that courts have a secondary lawmaking function which involves, inter 
alia, the development of the common law to adapt to the modern circumstances.378
                                                 
375Smith and Hogan op cit Chapter Two (n 87) 752. 
 Such 
development of the common law together with creative judicial discretion must always be 
 
376Smith and Hogan op cit Chapter Two (n 87) 752-53.   
377Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 339-40.  See supra Chapter Two under 2.3, text at notes 246 and 247.  
378C Botha Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction for Students 3ed (1998) 14.  
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based on legal rules and principles.  There is a principle of legality, which requires that a 
court should interpret the definition of a crime narrowly rather than broadly (ius strictum 
the principle).  It is respectfully submitted that the court overstepped its lawmaking 
function by widening the scope of the crime to include future cases.  Section 35 of our 
Constitution has endorsed this principle.379
 
 Section 35 of the Constitution provides: 
(3) Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right– 
 
(l) not to be convicted for an act or omission that was not an offence under either national or 
international law at the time it was committed or omitted.  
 
 
The constitutional principle of legality is discussed in more detail in Chapter Eight.  From 
the perspective of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence it can be argued that this 
decision violates the right to freedom of expression as endorsed by section 16 of the 
Constitution380
 
 especially freedom to receive and impart information and ideas.  Section 16 
provides: 
(1) Everyone has a right to freedom of expression, which includes- 
 
(a) freedom of the press and other media; 
 
(b) freedom to receive and impart information and ideas; 
 
(c) freedom of artistic creativity; and  
 
(d) academic freedom and freedom of scientific research. 
 
(2) The right in subsection (1) does not extend to – 
 
(a) propaganda for war; 
 
(b) incitement of imminent violence; or  
(c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that 
constitutes incitement to cause harm.   
 
Freedom of expression has been universally recognised in all democracies as pivotal to the 
                                                 
379The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.  
 
380The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
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growth and enhancement of the constitutional state and vital to the progress and 
development of humankind.381 In 1996, the Constitutional Court, per Mokgoro, J, in Case 
and Another v Minister of Safety and Security and Others; Curtis v Minister of Safety and 
Security and Others382 observed that freedom of expression is one of a “web of mutually 
supporting rights” in the Constitution.  Freedom of expression lies at the heart of our 
democracy.383 Our Constitution protects the rights of individuals not only individually to 
form and express opinions of whatever nature, but also to establish associations and groups 
of like-minded people to foster and propagate such opinions.384
 
 
The most serious and unprecedented allegation of interference with the judiciary since the 
coming into being of our constitutional democracy in 1994 was an alleged attempt by a 
certain judge of the High Court to improperly influence two judges of the Constitutional 
Court to decide cases pending in that court in favour of one of the parties in those cases.  
The case in point here is Thint (Pty) Ltd and Another v Director of Public Prosecutions and 
Others, Zuma and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others.385 This 
case concerns various search and seizure warrants issued by a judge in terms of section 29 
of the National Prosecuting Authority Act386
                                                 
381Freedom Front v South African Human Rights Commission 2003 (11) BCLR 1283 (SAHRC) at 3. 
 by a judge.  It concerns the validity of the 
terms of those warrants and the lawfulness of the manner of their execution.  Finally, it 
raises the question about the appropriate relief for an unlawful search and seizure operation 
in the context of the fight against serious, complex and organised crime.  The two 
   
3821996 (5) BCLR 609 (CC) at para 27.  
 
383NM and Others v Smith and Others 2007 (7) BCLR 751 (CC) at para 66.  
 
384South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Another 1999 (6) at para 8 and The 
Islamic Unity Convention and Others v The Independent Broadcasting Authority and Others 2002 (5) BCLR 
433 (CC) at para 26. 
 
3852008 (2) SACR 421 (CC). 
 
386Act 32 of 1998. 
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applications before the Constitutional Court were heard together at the direction of the 
Chief Justice.  They were applications for leave to appeal against two judgments handed 
down by the Supreme Court of Appeal on 8 November 2007.387 In both judgments, the 
Court held, by a majority, that the application for issue and execution of the respective 
warrants were lawful.  The orders respectively overturned the judgment of Hurt J in the 
Durban High Court388 and confirmed the judgment of Du Plessis J in the Pretoria High 
Court.389
 
 The applicants then applied to the Constitutional Court to have the two orders of 
the Supreme Court of Appeal set aside. 
Allegedly, after judgment was reserved in these cases on 13 March 2008, Hlophe, J, 
approached two judges of the Constitutional Court and attempted to improperly influence 
them to decide these cases in favour of Mr J.Z. Zuma.390
 
 This resulted in a complaint being 
lodged with the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) by the judges of the Constitutional 
Court against Hlophe, JP.  The latter in turn lodged a counter-complaint against the judges 
of the Constitutional Court alleging improper conduct on their part which amounted to a 
violation of his constitutional rights.  The basis of his complaint is that the judges of the 
Constitutional Court issued a statement to the media about their complaint before it was 
lodged with the JSC.   
At the time of writing this thesis, the JSC was busy investigating the alleged misconduct391
                                                 
387Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2008 (1) All SA 229 (SCA) and National 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma and Another 2008 (1) All SA 197 (SCA). 
 
 
388Zuma and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2006 (1) SACR 468 (D); 2006 
(2) All SA 91 (D). 
 
389Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others Case No 268/2006 of the 
Pretoria High Court, 4 July 2006, unreported. 
 
390At para 4. 
 
391In terms of section 177 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 the JSC is the forum 
which is empowered to decide whether or not a judge is guilty of gross misconduct.  If the JSC makes a 
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by Hlophe, JP, after the latter approached the High Court and sought an order declaring that 
the lodging of a complaint of gross misconduct against him by all the judges of the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa violated the judicial authority of the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa.392 Hlophe further sought orders to declare that the publication of a 
media statement by the judges of the Constitutional Court of untested allegations of gross 
misconduct against him (Hlophe) made by two of the judges of the Constitutional Court 
was unlawful, and unreasonably and unjustifiably violated his constitutional rights to 
human dignity, privacy, right to a fair hearing, right to equality and his right to access to 
courts.393 Further he sought an order to declare that the decision by the Constitutional Court 
judges to lodge a complaint with the Judicial Services Commission was unlawful and 
legally incompetent.394
 
 
The writer is mindful of the fact that the allegations against Hlophe, JP, are still untested, 
but these allegations are very serious especially as they are made against a member of the 
judiciary.  It is submitted that allegations of such serious misconduct against a judge may 
erode the confidence of the public in the integrity and impartiality of our judiciary.  An 
independent and impartial judiciary is indispensable to the South African justice system.  
According to Manyane, 395
                                                                                                                                                     
finding of gross misconduct and the national Assembly by two-thirds majority calls for the removal from 
office of the judge concerned, the must remove him or her.    
 the allegations and attendant controversy surrounding Hlophe, 
JP, presents South Africa with a potential constitutional crisis.  He says that it also 
highlights problems relating to the failure of having a practical mechanism to deal with 
  
392See Hlophe v The Constitutional Court of South Africa and Others (08/22932) [2008] ZAGPHC289 (25 
September 2008) at para 1 (accessed on 26 September 2008). 
  
393At para 1. 
  
394Ibid. 
 
395S Mpanyane “Our last hope against judicial impropriety: ISS today: on last hope against judicial 
impropriety”(10 July 2008) 1 at 
http:www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=24&slink_type=6264&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3 
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judicial impropriety.  He says that if the allegations against Hlophe, JP, are true, there is a 
strong case of interference with due administration of justice.  This would clearly 
undermine the independence of the judiciary.  The writer agrees with Manyane’s views that 
South Africa’s judicial system finds itself in an untenable position.  Members of the 
Constitutional Court appealed against the decision of the Johannesburg High Court (now 
South Gauteng High Court) that found that members of the Constitutional Court had 
infringed Hlophe’s rights by briefing the media about his alleged misconduct before they 
approached the JSC.   
 
In Langa and Others v Hlophe,396
 
 the Supreme Court of Appeal has upheld the appeal by 
members of the Constitutional Court.  Hlophe, JP, has approached the Constitutional Court 
and appealed against the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal after it (the Supreme 
Court of Appeal) ruled in favour of members of the Constitutional Court.  The question is, 
who will judge the judges as Hlophe has appealed to the Constitutional Court?  That will 
lead the country into a constitutional crisis because the current judges of the Constitutional 
Court, as interested parties in the matter, will have to recuse themselves.  Will such recusal 
create a vacancy or vacancies which will necessitate the JSC to interview other judges who 
will preside over the case?  No.  These judges will be still in office.  The recusal of the 
Constitutional Court judges would be unprecedented. 
In Roman law, to fraudulently prevent a judge from deciding as he should, was a 
contravention of the lex Cornelia de falsis and the lex Julia de vi publica.397
                                                                                                                                                     
(accessed on 30 May 2009). 
 Therefore, it is 
further submitted that the conduct of attempting to improperly influence members of the 
 
396(697/08) [2009] ZASCA 36 (13 MARCH 2009] at 20, available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2009/36.rtf (accessed on 14 April 2009).  
 
397See a detailed discussion of these Roman law crimes op cit chapter two under 2.16, text at notes 32 and 33.  
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judiciary or fraudulently preventing members of the judiciary from deciding as they should 
by basing their decisions on the strength of evidence before them is not only in conflict 
with the judicial code of conduct, which embraces the highest standards of ethical conduct, 
but it also constitutes the common law crime of obstructing or defeating the course of 
justice.  If the alleged conduct by Hlophe, JP, took place, it would constitute both 
misconduct and a criminal offence.  As a crime was allegedly committed, it is respectfully 
submitted that members of the Constitutional Court should have reported the matter to the 
police as well, who would then investigate it.  The investigations by the JSC and the police 
can run concurrently because the former has powers to investigate any misconduct by a 
member of the judiciary and the latter has powers to investigate the criminal part of the 
judge’s alleged misconduct. 
 
7.4.10 Improperly influencing a party to a civil case 
Improperly influencing a party to a civil case to drop the case constitutes the crime of 
defeating or obstructing the course of justice.398 In civil proceedings a party, for instance, 
the defendant can persuade the other party, for instance, the plaintiff or the applicant, not to 
come to court.  It must be clear that in this example there are no witnesses involved, only 
parties to the proceedings.  In R v Pokan399
 
 it was observed that this crime could also be 
committed in relation to a party to the proceedings who may or may not be a witness in the 
civil proceedings.  
The facts of the case were as follows:  Pokan was charged with the crime of defeating or 
obstructing the course of justice.  It was alleged that the plaintiff, Singh’s Stores (Pty) 
Limited, had issued civil summons from the magistrate’s court of Cape Town calling upon 
                                                 
398Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 338. 
399(1945) CPD 169. 
 374 
the defendant, one Van Vuuren, to answer a claim for an order of eviction from the 
premises he occupied.  Singh’s Stores (Pty) Limited had applied for judgment against Van 
Vuuren and he was called upon to appear before the court on a specific day to be cross-
examined under oath in connection with the said application for judgment.  It was alleged 
that the accused (Pokan) wrongfully and intentionally and with intent to defeat and obstruct 
the due course of justice and to prevent Van Vuuren from being cross-examined under oath 
as aforesaid, induced and persuaded Van Vuuren to refrain from attending the court.400
 
 
Pokan was convicted of defeating or obstructing the course of justice.  He appealed against 
such conviction.401 Firstly, it was argued on Pokan’s behalf that the indictment as it stood 
did not disclose an offence.  It was said that there should be something in the nature of 
fraud alleged in the indictment.  Secondly, it was argued that the facts in the case did not 
substantiate the charge as it was laid.  It was said that there was no duty or obligation on the 
part of Van Vuuren to come to court.  It was further argued that he might as well, without 
having been induced to do so, had stayed away and that the offence was  not, therefore, 
committed.402
 
   
Regarding the first argument, the court concluded that all that was needed to be alleged in 
the indictment was an act which was done with intent to defeat or obstruct the course 
justice and that it did defeat or obstruct the due administration of justice.  Whether the act 
was one which was fraudulent was found to be irrelevant.403
                                                 
400At 170. 
 The court did not see any force 
in the second argument either.  The court observed that the crime of defeating or 
401Ibid.  
402At 171. 
403At 170-71.  
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obstructing the course of justice is usually committed in relation to a witness who might be 
called to give testimony in a case but that it could also be committed in relation to a party to 
the proceedings who might or might not be a witness to them.404 The court upheld the 
conviction and dismissed the appeal.405
 
   
It can be said that this case has highlighted the following three vital issues:  
 
(1) that the designation of the crime is never consistent.  The accused was charged 
with defeating and obstructing the course of justice406 but throughout the case 
reference was made to defeating or obstructing justice;407
(2) that the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice can be committed 
in both civil and criminal proceedings;
 
408
 
 and  
(3) that sometimes it is required that “the course of justice” must, in fact, have been 
obstructed or defeated.409 The latter proposition is not supported by some 
academics who are of the opinion that this crime can be committed even though 
justice does triumph at the end.410
 
 
 
 
                                                 
404At 171. 
405At 172. 
406See R v Pokan supra (n 399) at 170. 
407At 171. 
408Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 943. 
409R v Pokan supra (n 399) at 171. 
410Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 337.  
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7.4.11 Unlawful releasing a prisoner 
There is academic opinion to the effect that the accused commits the crime of defeating or 
obstructing the course of justice by unlawfully releasing a prisoner awaiting trial.411 It is 
submitted that unlawfully releasing a prisoner awaiting trial prisoner so that he or she 
cannot stand trial has a tendency to defeat or obstruct the course of justice.  It is further 
submitted that this should be limited only to unlawful release of a prisoner awaiting trial 
and not to prisoners who are serving sentences.412 The reason is that the legal hostilities and 
the due administration of justice cease to exist immediately after the accused has been 
either acquitted or convicted and sentenced unless there is an appeal.  Extending the course 
of justice beyond the appeal process to include the unlawful release of a prisoner who is 
serving a sentence cannot be justified because there is no interference with judicial 
proceedings as such an act would fall within executive functions.  Under the Canadian law, 
however, the scope of the course of justice was expanded beyond post-trial issues.  
According to R v Baldsdom,413
 
 the course of justice may be obstructed after judicial 
proceedings have terminated as where the police are interfered with in the execution of a 
warrant of committal for non-payment of a fine following a conviction.   
7.5. THE COURSE OF JUSTICE AND BAIL APPLICATIONS 
It has been said above that any attempt to interfere with witnesses or conceal or destroy 
evidence constitutes the crime of defeating or obstructing or attempt to defeat or obstruct 
the course of justice.414
                                                 
411Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 339.  
 It is submitted that any attempt to interfere with witnesses or to 
conceal or destroy evidence undermines or jeopardises the objectives or the proper 
412See also Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 162.  
413R v Baldsdom at 144 supra Chapter Five under 5.2, text at note 25.  
 
414See supra notes 167 and 198. 
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functioning of the administration of justice.  Therefore, in the criminal justice system, X 
may be refused bail if there is a likelihood that he or she, if released on bail, may, inter alia, 
attempt to influence or intimidate witnesses or conceal or destroy evidence.415 Section 
60(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act416
 
 empowers the courts not to grant bail to X if there is 
the likelihood that if X were released on bail he or she will: 
(a) endanger the safety of state witnesses; 
 
(b) attempt to evade her trial; 
 
(c) attempt to influence or intimidate witnesses or conceal or destroy evidence; and 
 
(d) undermine the criminal justice system.  
 
 
In S v Hlongwa,417 the Appellate Division (now the Supreme Court of Appeal) held that if 
there is a reasonable possibility that the accused would tamper with state witnesses if he 
were released on bail, he might be refused bail.  The court further held that the accused 
would have failed to discharge the onus if, on all the evidence, there was a possibility that 
he would tamper with witnesses if he were released.418 The past record of the accused, 
especially if it includes a conviction for defeating or obstructing or attempt to defeat or 
obstruct the course of justice by interfering with state witnesses is relevant during bail 
application.419
 
  
In S v Yanta,420
                                                 
415Section 60(4)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.  See also E du Toit et al Commentary on the 
Criminal Procedure Act (ed) (2007) 9-30. 
 the court refused to grant bail to the accused because there was a possibility 
  
416Act 51 of 1977.  
 
4171979 (4) SA 112 (AD) at 113H.  
 
418Ibid. 
  
419Ibid. 
  
4202000 (1) SACR 237 (Tk) at 242. 
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that the accused, if released, would interfere with witnesses.  The facts of this case were as 
follows.  Allegedly, the accused (Yanta) entered into an agreement with other people to 
murder one Mr Sixesha who was a witness against the accused in another case.421  The 
accused was charged with Mr Sixesha’s murder.  The magistrate refused to grant her 
bail.422 She appealed against the magistrate’s refusal to grant bail.423 Since the accused was 
charged with a schedule 6 offence the provisions of section 60(11)(a) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act424 were applied.  The effect of these provisions is to shift the onus to the 
accused to convince the court on a balance of probabilities of the existence of exceptional 
circumstances which make it in the interests of justice for the accused to be released on 
bail.425 The court held that in deciding whether the interests of justice permit the release on 
bail of an awaiting trial prisoner, courts must look at the broad factors mentioned in section 
60(4)(a)-(d) of the Act.426 In dismissing the appeal the court held:427
 
 
Acknowledging the appellant’s entrenched (but qualified) right to personal freedom …, and weighing 
these factors against those found by the magistrate to militate against the granting of bail, such as the 
prospects of her endangering the safety of state witnesses or of interfering with state witnesses, I am 
not persuaded that the appellant discharged the onus of satisfying the court of first instance that 
exceptional circumstances exist which in the interest of justice permit her release from custody.  
 
The appeal was dismissed.428
                                                 
421At 247. 
 The importance of this case is the recognition of the 
  
422At 240. 
  
423Ibid. 
 
424Act 51 of 1977.  Section 60 provides: 
  
(11) Notwithstanding any provision of this Act, where an accused is charged with an offence referred 
to — 
(a) in schedule 6, the court shall order that the accused be detained in custody until he or she is 
dealt with in accordance with the law, unless the accused, having been given a reasonable 
opportunity to do so, adduces evidence which satisfies the court that exceptional circumstances 
exist which in the interests of justice permit his or her release;….  
 
425S v Yanta supra (n 420) at 241.  See also Gade v S 2007 (1) All SA 43 (NC) at 43. 
  
426At 244.  
 
427At 250. 
  
428At 251. 
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importance of the fight against the possible commission of the offence of obstructing or 
defeating the course of justice.  In this case there was a possibility that the accused, if 
granted bail, would interfere with witnesses.  In order to prevent the accused from such 
witness interference, the court may be justified in limiting the accused’s right to personal 
freedom.   
 
7.6 LEGISLATION  
In South Africa conspiracy to commit a crime is not a common law crime.429 In 1914, 
legislation430 was passed to criminalise conspiracy to commit either a common law offence 
or a statutory offence.  In 1956, Parliament passed legislation,431 which repealed the 1914 
legislation.  Section 18(2)(a) of the Riotous Assemblies Act432
  
 provides: 
Any person who- 
(a) conspires with any other person to aid or to procure the commission of or to commit; or … 
any offence, whether at common-law or against a statute or statutory regulation, shall be 
guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to the punishment to which a person convicted 
of actual committing that offence would be liable.  
 
Hunt433 says that it is now possible, though perhaps slightly unusual, to charge a person 
with the crime of conspiracy to defeat or obstruct the course of justice rather than attempt to 
defeat or obstruct the course of justice.  For instance in 1929, in R v Smith,434
                                                 
429Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 162.  
 the accused 
was charged with the statutory offence of inciting, instigating, etc, to defeat or obstruct the 
course of justice in contravention of section 15(2)(a) of Act 27 of 1914 as amended by 
 
430Section 15(2)(a) of the Riotous Assemblies and Criminal Law Amendment Act 27 of 1914.  
 
431Section (18)(2)(a) of the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956.  
 
432Act 17 of 1956. 
 
433Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 162.  
 
4341929 AD 377. 
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section 4 of Act 39 of 1926 for conspiring with a certain Mthethwa to bring a false charge 
against a certain Monaghan of unlawfully supplying them with liquor.435 The accused 
(Smith) was charged with the crimes of (1) defeating or obstructing the due course of 
justice or alternatively inciting, instigating, commanding or procuring the commission of 
the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice.436 Allegedly, the accused 
wrongfully and intentionally, falsely and corruptly, with intent to defeat or obstruct the 
course of justice, incited, counselled, instigated, commanded, induced or procured one 
Mthethwa, a police officer to plant a marked ten shilling note under the bed of one 
Monaghan and to bring a bottle of liquor from the house.  Their intention was to make it 
appear as if the said Monaghan sold liquor to Mthethwa in contravention of the liquor 
laws.437 Smith then had the said Monaghan charged with contravening the liquor laws 
which charge Smith knew to be false.438 The accused also fabricated evidence against 
Monaghan while knowing it to be false.  He was found guilty.439 Mthethwa was the only 
witness for the state but in order for the court to convict the accused there should have been 
two witnesses in terms of section 284 of Act 31 of 1917.440 The accused applied to the 
Appellate Division citing irregularity in his conviction based on evidence of a single 
witness.441 The Appellate Division refused the application.442
                                                 
435At 381. 
  
  
436In contravention of 15(2)(b) of Act 27 of 1914 as amended by section 4 of Act 39 of 1936.  
 
437R v Smith supra (n 434) at 378. 
  
438Ibid. 
 
439At 379. 
 
440Ibid.  This section which precluded a conviction for perjury on the evidence of any one witness unless there 
was an addition some other evidence as to the accused’s guilt had no application to a trial upon a charge of 
defeating the course of justice even where such charge involved a charge of perjury as a necessary ingredient. 
 
441In terms section 370 of Act 31 of 1917.  In terms of this section the court at a criminal trial should grant a 
request for a special entry made under section 370 of Act 31 of 1917 unless such request obviously constitutes 
an abuse of the court process. 
 
442S v Smith supra (n 434) at 381.  
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Another case where conspiracy to defeat the course of justice in contravention of section 
15(2)(a) of the Riotous Assemblies and Criminal Law Amendment Act443 was charged, was 
R v Fourie and Another.444 The facts of this case were the following:  One Beyers was 
charged with stealing a box containing a quantity of gold bullion which belonged to the 
Standard Bank of South Africa Limited and which was in the lawful custody of the 
Administration of the South African Railways and Harbours.445 Fourie who was accused 
number one in this case, was investigating the theft case against Beyers.  It is alleged that 
whilst Beyers was out on bail Fourie and Friedman, with intent to defeat the ends of justice, 
conspired with Beyers to dispose of the said gold bullion to the personal advantage of 
themselves and so prevented the due administration of justice in contravention of section 
15(2)(a).446 Alternatively, they were charged with incitement.  Regarding the alternative 
charge it was alleged that the accused wrongfully and unlawfully and corruptly incited or 
instigated or procured the said Beyers to sell, deal in, dispose of, etc, the gold bullion with 
intent to defeat or obstruct the course of justice in contravention of section 15(2)(b).  The 
accused were convicted on the alternative charge of contravening section 15(2)(b).447
 
 
In South Africa there is also legislation which prohibits conduct that defeats or obstructs the 
due administration of justice.  The provisions that prohibit the defeat or obstruction of the 
due administration of justice are found in certain sections of various enactments that were 
not promulgated with legislating against the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of 
justice as their primary objective.  These Acts are the following: 
 
                                                 
443Act 27 of 1914.  
 
4441937 AD 31.  
 
445At 38.  
 
446At 36.  
 
447At 37.  
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a. Sections 30, 31, 36(1) and 49 of the Military Discipline Code.448
b. Sections 36-40 of the Transkeian Penal Code.
 
449
c. Sections 8, 9 and 11 of the Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act.
 
450
 
 
7.6.1    First Schedule of the Defence Act 44 of 1957 
a. Section 30 of the Military Discipline Code (MDC)451
 
 prohibits any act or conduct 
which is intended to deceive, alter, deface, suppress, etc any document which is intended to 
be used for official purposes.  Section 30 provides: 
Any person who 
(d) with intent to deceive, alters, defaces, suppresses or makes away with any 
document     required, made, kept or issued for official purposes. 
 
shall be guilty of an offence … 
 
b. The Code also punishes those who make false accusations or statements against a 
member who is subject to it (the Code).  This means that in order to convict X of 
contravening section 31 he must have made false accusations against a member of the 
Defence Force.  Section 31452
 
 provides: 
Any person who makes any false accusation or statements against or concerning any other person 
subject to this Code, shall be guilty of an offence … 
 
c. Section 36(1)453
 
 provides:  
                                                 
448First Schedule of the Defence Act 44 of 1957.  This Act has been repealed and replaced by the Defence Act 
42 of 2002.  The latter Act retained the First Schedule of its predecessor. 
 
449The Transkeian Penal Code, Act 9 of 1983 (Tk).  
450The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004.   
451The Military Disciple Code is found in the First Schedule of the Defence Act 44 of 1957.  
452Military Discipline Code.  
 
453Military Discipline Code. 
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Any person who– 
 
(b) being present at preliminary investigation, summary trial or board of inquiry after 
being duly summoned or warned to attend as a witness, fails, refuses to be sworn in or 
to affirm; 
 
(c) when giving evidence at a preliminary investigation, summary trial or board of inquiry, 
refuses to answer any questions which in law he could be compelled to answer , or 
refuses or fails to produce any document or thing in his possession or under his control 
which in law he could be compelled to produce; 
 
shall be guilty of an offence. 
 
Like section 139(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code,454 where someone who refuses to 
testify at a preliminary inquiry could be charged with obstructing justice,455
refusing to produce any document or a thing under his or her control.  The actus reus of this 
offence is refusal to answer questions or failure to produce a document or a thing which by 
law he or she is compelled to produce at the preliminary investigation or board of inquiry. 
 the provisions 
of section 36(1) of the Military Discipline Code prohibits the suppression of the truth by a 
witness who refuses to answer questions that by law he or she is compelled to answer or by  
 
d. Section 49456
 
 provides: 
Any person, who with intent to defeat or obstruct the course of justice, assists or harbours any person 
who to his knowledge has committed an offence under this Code, shall be guilty of an offence …  
 
It is submitted that the one who harbours or who assists in harbouring a wanted fugitive so 
that he or she cannot be brought to book has done no less than the one who attempted to 
spirit away a witness so that the witness cannot give testimony in judicial proceedings.  
Both these acts have a tendency to defeat or obstruct the course of justice. 
 
                                                 
454RSC 1985 c C-46.  See the provisions of this section supra in Chapter Five, text at note 13. 
455R v Mercer at 347 supra in Chapter Five under 5.4.2, text at note 106.  
 
456Military Discipline Code. 
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7.6.2   Current legislation in the Transkei territory  
As has been said earlier in this thesis,457 the statutory crime of defeating or obstructing the 
course of justice was founded in the Transkeian Penal Code of 1868,458 which was repealed 
in 1983 and replaced by a new Penal Code,459 which shall now be discussed.  This 
legislation prohibits the fabrication of evidence,460 the removal or intentional destruction of 
possible exhibits461 and the intentional committing an act that defeats the course of 
justice.462
7.6.2.1 Fabrication of evidence 
   
In the old Transkei territory, fabricating evidence in order to mislead any court or judicial 
proceedings was prohibited in terms of Section 36 of the Penal Code.463
Any person who, with intent to mislead any court or person holding any judicial proceedings, 
fabricates or contrives evidence by any means other than perjury and subornation of perjury, or 
knowingly makes use of such fabricated evidence, shall be guilty of an offence.  
 Section 36 
provides– 
 
This section criminalizes, inter alia, fabrication of evidence.  It also punishes anyone who 
knowingly uses fabricated evidence even if he or she is not the one who fabricated it. 
                                                 
457See the discussion of this Penal Code supra in Chapter Two under 2.4.7, text at note 219. 
458The Transkeian Penal Code Act 24 of 1886.  
459The Transkeian Penal Code, 1983 (Act 9 of 1983 (Tk)):  Transkei (SA) Statute Law 1983 (UNISA) 81-82. 
Although the legislation of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (the former “independent” 
homelands) or “TBVC states” did not form part of the South African legislation, this legislation remains valid 
as part of South African law in the area where it previously applied, because in 1994, these states were re-
incorporated into the Republic of South Africa.  See Botha op cit (n 349) 10.  
 
460Section 36. 
461Section 37. 
462Section 40. 
463Act 9 of 1983 (Tk). 
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The elements of this offence are 
 
(a) fabrication of evidence or knowingly making use of fabricated evidence; 
(b) wrongfulness; and 
(c) intention to mislead the court or person holding any judicial proceedings. 
7.6.2.2 Removal or destruction of possible exhibits 
Section 39 of the Penal Code464
Any person who, knowing that any book, document or thing of any kind whatsoever, is or may be 
required in evidence in a judicial proceeding; wilfully removes or destroys it or renders it illegible or 
unidentifiable, with intent thereby to prevent it from being used in evidence, shall be guilty of an 
offence. 
 also makes it an offence to, inter alia, remove or destroy 
possible exhibits which may be required in evidence in judicial proceedings.  Section 39 
provides– 
 
The elements of this offence are 
(a)  removing or destroying documents;   
(b) wrongfulness; and 
(c) intention to prevent that it being used as evidence. 
 
7.6.2.3 Acts with intent to defeat the course of justice  
In addition to the acts which have the tendency to obstruct the course of justice and which 
                                                 
464Act 9 of 1983 (Tk). 
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are prohibited in terms of sections 36 and 39 of the Penal Code, there is a section465
 Any person who– 
 which 
creates a broad crime of defeating the course of justice.  Section 40 provides: 
 
(a) accuses any person falsely of any crime or does anything to obstruct, prevent, pervert 
or defeat the course of justice; or 
(b) in order to obstruct the due course of justice, dissuades by any means, or hinders or 
prevents any person lawfully bound to appear and give evidence as a witness from so 
appearing and giving evidence, or endeavours to do so; or  
(c) obstructs or in any way interferes with or knowingly prevents the execution of any 
legal process, civil or criminal, 
shall be guilty of an offence:  Provided, however, that where the offence has caused the conviction and 
execution of an innocent accused, such person may be sentenced to imprisonment for life. 
 
It is clear that subsection (a) codifies the common law crime of obstructing the course of 
justice by making provision for laying a false charge against an innocent person 
(calumnia).466
 
 On the other had, subsection (b) prohibits any dissuasion or hindrance or 
prevention of witnesses from attending and giving evidence in judicial proceedings.  It also 
prohibits any endeavour to dissuade, hinder or prevent witnesses from attending judicial 
proceedings.  It is submitted that the words “in order to obstruct the course of justice” show 
that there must be an intention to obstruct the due administration of justice. 
7.6.3   Legislation pertaining to the prevention and combating, of corrupt activities 
To some extent, corruption overlaps with the crime of obstructing the course of justice 
where there are two persons involved.  Corruption is a different crime and protects different 
interests, namely, public welfare.  The crime of obstructing the course of justice protects the 
due administration of justice.  Not all conduct, which is charged as corruption will 
                                                 
465Section 40 of Act 9 of 1983 (Tk).  
 
466The common law crime is discussed supra in this Chapter under 7.4.4, text at notes 227, 232 and 244.  
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necessarily obstruct the course of justice and vice versa.  
 
In 2004, Parliament passed legislation467 to prevent and combat corrupt activities.  This Act 
is South Africa’s first comprehensive anti-corruption legislation.  It replaced the Corruption 
Act 94 of 1992.468 It is said that corruption is a major hindrance to sustainable 
development, as it has a disproportionate impact on poor communities and corrodes the 
very fabric of the society.469 Furthermore, corruption impedes economic growth and is 
extremely costly for business.470 Therefore, corruption is a crime against the public 
welfare.471 Snyman472 says that the offence of corruption has two forms: (1) that committed 
by the corruptor (active corruption) and (2) that committed by the corruptee (passive 
corruption).  Each form may be committed in respect of an act of corruption to be 
performed (‘future corruption’) or already performed (‘past corruption’).473
 
 
7.6.3.1 Corrupt activities relating to judicial officers 
Section 8(1) of this Act criminalises certain actions by judicial officers, namely, judges and 
magistrates.  The purpose of this section is to prevent judicial officers from directly or 
indirectly accepting or agreeing to accept any gratification from any other person.  This 
section also prohibits any person from directly or indirectly giving or agreeing or offering 
                                                 
467The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004.  
468O Sibanda “The South African corruption law and bribery of foreign public officials in international 
business transactions:  A comprehensive analysis” (2005) South African Journal of Criminal Justice Vol 18 
No 1 1. 
 
469United Nations Global Compact “Transparency and anti-corruption,”at 
htt://www.unglobalcompact.org/aboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/anti-corruption.html (accessed on 21 May 
2007).  
 
470Ibid. 
471Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 376.  
472Ibid.  
473JRL Milton and MG Cowling South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol III 2ed 1997 D3-3. 
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to give any gratification to a judicial officer.  In terms of section 8(2) the acts which 
constitute the offence of corrupt activities relating to judicial activities in terms of section 
8(1) above include the following: 
 
a. performing or not adequately performing a judicial function; 
b. making decisions affecting life, freedoms, rights, duties, obligations and property of 
persons; 
c. delaying, hindering or preventing the performance of judicial function; 
d. aiding, assisting or favouring any particular person in conducting judicial proceedings 
or judicial functions; 
e. showing any favour or disfavour to any person in the performance of a judicial  
function; or  
f. exerting any improper influence over the decision making of any person, including  
another judicial officer or a member of the prosecuting authority, performing his or 
her official functions.  
 
Section 8 requires that X (the judicial officer) must directly or indirectly have accepted or 
agreed to accept or offered to accept any gratification.  What will happen if Z approaches X 
who is the presiding judicial officer in a trial against Y, on a charge of murder, without any 
offer of any gratification with a request to delay or hinder or prevent the performance of a 
judicial function?  It is submitted that if there was no acceptance or agreement or offer to 
accept any gratification, the state cannot invoke section 8(1) against X.  Therefore, the law 
is silent where X did what he or she did without accepting any gratification or agreement or 
offer to accept any gratification or where X acted of his or her own accord and obstructed 
the course of justice.  In such cases X can be charged with the crime of obstructing or 
defeating the course of justice. 
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7.6.3.2    Corrupt activities relating to members of the prosecuting authority  
Section 9(1) of the Act474 is aimed at preventing members of the prosecuting authority 
from, inter alia, corruptly continuing or discontinuing of criminal proceedings, delaying, 
hindering or preventing the performance of a prosecutorial function and exerting any 
improper influence over the decision-making of any person, including another member of 
the prosecuting authority or a judicial officer, performing his or her official functions.475
 
 
Section 9 provides that  
(1) Any– 
(a) member of the prosecution authority who, directly or indirectly, accepts or agrees or offers 
to  accept any gratification from any other person, whether for the benefit of himself or herself 
or for the benefit of another person; 
 
(b) person who, directly or indirectly, gives or agrees or offers to give any gratification to a 
member of the prosecution authority, whether for the benefit of that member or for the benefit  
 
of another person in order to act, personally or by influencing another person so to act, in a 
manner- 
 
(i) that amounts to the – 
 
(aa) illegal, dishonest, unauthorised, incomplete, or biased; or 
 
(bb) misuse or selling of information or material acquired in the course of the, 
exercise, carrying out or performance of any powers, duties or functions  
arising out of a constitutional, statutory, contractual or any other legal 
obligation; 
 
(iii) designed to achieve an unjustified result; or 
 
(iv) that amounts to any other unauthorised or improper 
inducement to do or not to do anything, 
 
is guilty of an offence of corrupt activities relating to members of the prosecuting authority. 
 
 
Section 9 is silent on the situation where X, who is a member of the prosecuting authority,  
 
                                                 
474The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004.  
475Section 9(2)(a)(i),(b) and (e). 
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without accepting any gratification from anybody, delays or hinders or prevents the 
performance of prosecutorial function.  It is submitted that the state cannot invoke section 
9(1) where there is nobody who directly or indirectly gives or agrees or offers to give any 
gratification and X did what he or she did without a second person being involved.  In such 
cases X can be charged with the crime of obstructing or defeating the course of justice. 
 
7.6.3.3 Corrupt activities relating to witnesses and evidential material during 
certain proceedings 
Firstly, section 11(1)476 makes it an offence for any person to directly or indirectly accept 
any gratification from another person in exchange for testifying in a particular manner or in 
an untruthful manner in a trial, hearing or other judicial proceeding; withholding testimony 
or a record or document, etc, to such judicial proceedings or altering, destroying, mutilating 
or concealing a record or document and absconding from a trial, hearing or proceedings.  
Secondly, section 11(2)477
 
 makes it an offence for any person to directly or indirectly give 
or agree to give any gratification to any other person with the intent to do all the acts 
mentioned in subsection (1) above.   
A close look at section 11 reveals that there must be at least two people involved in the 
commission of this offence, that is, the one who accepts or agrees to accept a gratification 
(the corruptee)478 and the one who gives away or agrees to give away a gratification (the 
corruptor).479
                                                 
476The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004. 
 This section does not address the situation where X, without an agreement or 
 
477The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004. 
 
478Section 11(1).  
479Section 11(2).  
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promise of receiving any gratification from anybody, testifies in a particular manner in a 
trial, hearing or other proceeding or withholds testimony, a record, document, etc, or 
fabricates, destroys, mutilates or conceals a record, document or any other object to be used 
at such trial, hearing or proceedings or absconds from the trial, hearing or proceedings.   
 
7.7 SUMMARY 
The crime of obstructing the course of justice developed from the provisions of the Roman 
and Roman-Dutch lex Cornelia de falsis, the lex Calumnia and the lex Remmia.  It now has 
a wider scope than under Roman and Roman-Dutch law.  In South Africa, this crime is 
sometimes referred to as “defeating the course of justice”, sometimes as “obstructing the 
course of justice,” sometimes as defeating and obstructing the course of justice, sometimes 
as defeating or obstructing the course of justice and sometimes as defeating the ends of 
justice.  There are also situations where the accused is charged with attempting to defeat the 
ends of justice or attempting to defeat or obstruct the course of justice.  It is said the 
charging of this crime as attempt to defeat or obstruct the course of justice alleviates the 
agony, on the prosecution’s part, of proving that justice was in fact defeated or even 
obstructed by the accused’s act or series of acts of the accused.  It is also said that the 
correct designation of the crime in the charge sheet will depend on the nature of the act or 
conduct which the accused alleged committed.  According to this view, a reference to “ends 
of justice” in the description of this crime should be avoided because it unduly restricts the 
ambit of the crime which deals with interference with the course of the administration of 
justice and can be committed even though justice does triumph in the end.  The 
discrepancies in the designation of this crime may cause legal uncertainty because 
prosecutors are not sure whether to charge the accused with defeating or obstructing the 
course of justice.  The accused is placed at the mercy of that specific prosecutor as much 
 392 
will depend on how the charge sheet is drawn up by that specific prosecutor.  This may lead 
in a situation where two accused persons (X1 and X2) who have committed the similar 
offences, for example, dissuading state witnesses not to testify in their respective trials, 
being charged with different offences.  X1, for example, might be charged with defeating 
the course of justice and X2 might be charged with obstructing the course of justice. 
 
In our law the administration of justice means the judicial administration of justice in both 
civil and criminal proceedings, but not in quasi-judicial proceedings.  Our courts have 
refused to extend the scope of the crime to include quasi-judicial proceedings.  The scope 
of this crime has, however, been extended to include any conduct which interferes with 
police investigation of crimes.  Our courts have convicted accused persons of defeating or 
obstructing or attempting to defeat the course of justice for misleading the police in order 
prevent them from detecting that a crime was committed.  This means that the course of 
justice begins to run and may immediately be obstructed, upon the commission of the 
principal crime; and while the police are investigating the crime and even before 
investigation has started.  Although it seems correct and necessary to regard police 
activities as falling within the scope of the concept of the administration of justice, only 
those activities which relate to the investigation of crimes and the collection of evidence 
relating to such crimes come within the ambit of the concept of administration of justice.  
Interference with routine police activities that are not connected with the investigations of 
crimes are regarded as of essentially administrative nature and thus fall outside the ambit of 
the crime of defeating or obstructing the administration of justice. 
 
This thesis could not find any authority in case law which addresses the question as to when 
the administration of justice comes to an end.  Academic opinion varies as to when the 
administration of justice ends.  Firstly, it is said that the judicial administration of justice is 
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completed after the court has pronounced its judgement (including all appeals) and 
anything which delays or obstructs the execution of judgement is not a proper subject 
matter for a criminal charge of defeating or obstructing the course of justice.   
 
Secondly, it is said that the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice may also 
be committed where proceedings have been concluded, for instance, where a person 
contriving the release of X, a convicted prisoner, wilfully and falsely files an affidavit that 
Y and not X committed the crime. 
 
In order to succeed with the prosecution of the crime of obstructing or defeating the course 
of justice the state must prove the following elements: 
 
a. Defeating or obstructing  
b. the course of justice 
c. Unlawfully and 
d. Intentionally. 
 
The conduct element of the common law offence of defeating or obstructing the course of 
justice requires that the accused defeats or obstructs or attempts to defeat or obstruct the 
administration of justice. 
 
The following are examples of acts which amount to “defeating or obstructing the course of 
justice: 
 
a. Interference with witnesses.  One of the ways of interfering with a witness is when 
X requests Y, who is a potential witness, to give false evidence during the trial, but, in order 
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for the accused (X) to be convicted of the crime of attempting to defeat or obstruct the 
course of justice the state must prove that the statement the accused induced the witness to 
give is false and that the accused knows that it is false. 
 
b. A witness demands money for giving or not giving evidence.  Our courts have 
convicted witnesses of attempting to defeat the ends of justice following an attempt by 
them to accept money from the accused persons so that they could leave the country in 
order to avoid giving give testimony against them.  What is clear from both case law and 
academic commentary is that receiving money in order to give or not to give evidence 
constitutes the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice.  The law is silent on 
whether a person who gives money to potential witnesses in order to give or not to give 
evidence commits the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice.  However, this 
may be treated as general interference with witnesses or an attempt to influence witnesses 
which amounts to the common law offence of defeating or obstructing the course of justice.  
 
c. Tampering, altering, fabricating, concealing and destroying evidence.  
Tampering with evidence may take the form of fabricating or destroying or altering or 
concealing documents or exhibits such as goods.  It is said that the most serious 
manifestation of the way in which the crime is committed is the fabrication of evidence, for 
example, where the accused concocted a chain of evidence including false documents, that 
implicate another person as guilty of unlawful activities, he or she commits the crime of 
defeating or obstructing the course of justice. 
 
d. Falsely accusing someone of having committed a crime.  In 1988, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal overruled its previous decision where it had decided that the crime of 
laying false charges against someone else (calumnia) was obsolete in our law.  It accepted 
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that the conduct constitutes an attempt to defeat or obstruct the course of justice and 
therefore is a crime in our law. 
 
e. Interference with police in the execution of their duties.  One of the ways of 
committing this type of offence is to interfere with a speed trap.  Some academic writers are 
of the view that a motorist who warns the oncoming motorists of the presence of a speed 
trap by flashing his or her lights interferes with the due administration of justice.  The court 
on review confirmed the conviction of the accused on a charge of attempting to defeat the 
ends of justice after the accused and the passenger warned other motorists of the presence 
of a speed trap in the vicinity.  It depends on X’s intent.  Warnings of police speed traps 
will only be punished as obstructing or defeating the course of justice or an attempt thereto 
where X’s intent is to enable an offender to escape detection and capture, arrest and 
punishment.  However, where the accused had no reason to believe that the oncoming 
motorist was exceeding the speed limit and no reason to presume that he or she intended to 
do so, he or she did not intend to defeat the course of justice by warning other motorists 
about the presence of a speed trap.  This is also the preferable view amongst academic 
writers.  The police, in operating a speed trap, are engaged in law enforcement that is a 
function distinct and distinguishable from the administration of justice by the courts of law.  
Hampering the police in the performance of their duties ought, generally, to be charged as a 
statutory offence of obstructing the police in the performance of their duties, not as 
defeating of obstructing the administration of justice.   
 
f. Making false statements to the police or someone else.  The act of misleading, or 
attempting to mislead the police by making exculpatory or inculpatory statements could 
amount to defeating or obstructing the course of justice.  This offence is, for instance, 
committed when an investigation is being made into a suspected crime and X persuades Y 
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to make a false statement which tends to show that he (X) is not guilty of the suspected 
crime.  X also commits this offence where he falsely incriminates himself in order shield Y 
from prosecution. 
 
There is academic opinion which says that X does not commit this offence when, in order 
to avoid incriminating himself, he lies to the police.  It is said that lies told to the police by 
X in order to avoid incriminating himself should not be punishable as defeating or 
obstructing the course of justice except in instances where a person incriminates somebody 
else or falsely incriminates himself in order to protect the real offender.  It is said that to 
hold otherwise would be to deny X the benefit of the common law privilege against self-
incrimination.  In the Burger case, however, the Court of Appeal held that if a person has 
reason to believe that he had committed an offence and realises that legal steps may 
possibly be taken against him and that a police investigation will be launched, and he 
intentionally does something with intent to obstruct or prevent such investigation, he is 
guilty of the offence of an attempt to obstruct the course of justice.  In the court’s view, it 
makes no difference if the guilty person, who wants to avoid criminal proceeding against 
himself persuades a friend to give false information to the police, or do it himself.   
 
However, this thesis submits that a mere denial of liability does not amount to an unlawful 
obstruction of justice.  It is submitted that a distinction must be drawn between false 
statements made in order to avoid self-incrimination (for example, a mere denial of 
liability) and false statements made to mislead the police with a view to obstruct the course 
of justice and to prevent an investigation.  In the former case, X’s conduct cannot be 
viewed as an unlawful obstruction of justice because his right against self-incrimination 
should be accorded more weight.  But in the latter case, X’s conduct amounts to punishable 
obstruction of justice. 
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g. Lying to the police that a crime has been committed.  Lying to the police that a 
crime has been committed constitutes the crime of obstructing the course of justice.  The 
crime is not committed by merely wasting the police officials’ time and energy or by 
refusing to answer questions put by the police or to refuse to co-operate with the police in 
obtaining evidence against oneself or another because in most cases, there is no legal duty 
on the individual to assist the police.  However, in the case of a hoax report which may lead 
to the arrest or detention of an innocent person (Y) such conduct may amount to obstruction 
of the course of justice or an attempt thereto. 
 
h. Misleading the police in order to prevent detection of a crime.  Misleading the 
police with intent to prevent the detection of a crime constitutes defeating or obstructing the 
course of justice.  In S v Daniels, the accused was convicted with the crime of attempting to 
defeat or obstruct the course of justice after he had made endeavours to mislead the police 
in order to prevent them from detecting a crime which he had committed.  
 
i. Interfering with the judiciary.  Any attempt by the accused to influence the 
judiciary in any way, for example, by exhorting them not to give any credence to certain 
types of evidence, contrary to their duties amounts to the common law offence of 
attempting to defeat or obstruct the course of justice. 
 
j. Improperly influencing a party to a civil case.  Improperly influencing a party to a 
civil case constitutes the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice.  This crime 
could also be committed in relation to a party to the proceedings who may or may not be a 
witness in civil proceedings. 
 
k. Unlawfully releasing a prisoner.  An unlawful release of a prisoner awaiting trial so 
 398 
that he or she cannot stand trial may amount to the crime of defeating or obstructing the 
course of justice, or an attempt thereto. 
 
Bail application 
In our criminal justice system, X may be refused bail if there is a likelihood that he or she, 
if released on bail, may, inter alia, attempt to influence or intimidate witnesses or conceal 
or destroy evidence.  Section 60(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act empowers the courts not 
to grant bail to X where there is a likelihood that he or she (X), if he or she were released 
on bail will, inter alia, attempt to influence or intimidate witnesses or conceal or destroy 
evidence.  In S v Yanta, the court held that in deciding whether the interests of justice 
permitted the release on bail of an awaiting trial prisoner, the courts must take the broad 
considerations mentioned above into account. 
 
Statutory offences 
Conspiracy or incitement to commit a crime, including the common law crime of defeating 
or obstructing the course of justice is a statutory offence.  It is punishable in terms of 
section 18(2)(a) of the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956.  A statutory crime of 
obstructing the course of justice is found in Act 9 of 1983 (Tk) which is applicable only in 
Transkei.  The First Schedule of the Defence Act 44 of 1957, which is applicable only to 
members of the Defence Force, creates offences reminiscent to the common law offence of 
obstructing the course of justice.  It is clear that there is only one piece of national 
legislation which partly overlaps with conduct which is intended to and has the tendency of 
obstructing the course of justice, that is the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities 
Act 12 of 2004.  Firstly, section 8(1) prevents judicial officers from directly or indirectly 
accepting or agreeing to accept any gratification from any other person in order to   
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a. perform or not adequately perform a judicial function; 
b. make decisions affecting life, freedoms, rights, duties, obligations and property of 
persons; 
c. delay, hinder or prevent the performance of judicial function; 
d. aid, assist or favour any particular person in conducting judicial proceedings or 
judicial functions; 
e. show any favour or disfavour to any person in the performance of a judicial  function; 
or  
f. exert any improper influence over the decision-making of any person, including  
another judicial officer or a member of the prosecuting authority, in the performance 
of his or her official functions.  
 
This section also prohibits any person from directly or indirectly giving or agreeing or 
offering to give any gratification to a judicial officer.  Section 8 requires that X must 
directly or indirectly have accepted or agreed to accept or offered to accept any gratification 
in order to do the above-mentioned conduct.  If there was no acceptance or agreement or 
offer to accept any gratification, the state cannot invoke section 8(1) against X.  This 
statutory crime overlaps with the common law crime of defeating or obstructing the course 
of justice but it requires at least two parties to be involved in its commission. 
 
Secondly, section 9(1) of the Act is aimed at preventing members of the prosecuting 
authority from, inter alia, corruptly continuing or discontinuing with criminal proceedings, 
delaying, hindering or preventing the performance of a prosecutorial function and exerting 
any improper influence over the decision-making of any person, including another member 
of the prosecuting authority or a judicial officer, performing his or her official functions.   
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Again, Section 9 is silent about the situation where X, who is a member of a prosecuting  
authority, without accepting any gratification from anybody or agrees or offers to accept, 
delays or hinders or prevents the performance of prosecutorial function.  The state cannot 
invoke section 9(1) where there is nobody who directly or indirectly gives or agrees or 
offers to give any gratification and X did what he did without a second person involved. 
 
Thirdly, section 11(1) punishes any person who directly or indirectly accepts or agrees or 
offers to accept, any gratification from another person in exchange for testifying in a 
particular manner or in an untruthful manner in a trial, hearing or other proceeding, 
withholding testimony or a record or document, etc, to such judicial proceedings, altering, 
destroying, mutilating or concealing a record or document and absconding from a trial, 
hearing or proceedings.  Section 11(2) makes it an offence for any person to directly or 
indirectly give or agree to give any gratification to any other person with the intent to do all 
the acts mentioned above.  This section does not address the situation where X, without an 
agreement or promise of receiving any gratification from anybody, testifies in a particular 
manner in a trial, hearing or other proceeding or withholds testimony, a record, document, 
etc, or fabricates, destroys, mutilates or conceals a record, document or any other object to 
be used at such trial, hearing or proceeding or absconding from a trial, hearing or 
proceeding.  
 
Lastly, this Act partly addresses matters regarding interference with witnesses but it does 
not address the issue of witness intimidation, which is one of the most common ways of 
obstructing the course of justice. 
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Comparative analysis  
As with the law of two Australian states, Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory, in 
South African law the crime of obstructing the course of justice is punishable in terms of 
the common law.  This differs from jurisdictions like Canada, the United States of America 
and the remaining Australian States which have comprehensive legislation to regulate all 
the manifestations of the crime of obstructing, preventing or perverting the course of 
justice. 
 
Like the English common law, the scope of this crime has been extended in South African 
law to include the investigative stage of the principal crime.  This differs from the 
Australian law where police investigations, as a general rule, do not form part of the course 
of justice and interference with them does not constitute the offence of perverting the 
course of justice. 
 
In South Africa, proceedings of an administrative nature or quasi-judicial nature cannot be 
the subject of a charge of defeating or obstructing the due administration of justice.  This 
differs from the Canadian and the American law.  In the former jurisdiction, a Coroner’s 
enquiry may be the subject of the charge of perverting the course of justice and in the latter 
jurisdiction, investigations by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the United States 
Probation Officer (USPO) may also be the subject of a charge of perverting the course of 
justice.  Also, under the English law, the proceedings in an arbitration form part of the 
administration of justice.  The crime of perverting the course of justice can be committed 
also in relation to these proceedings. 
Unlike Canada, where the concept of “the course of justice” was extended to include post-
trial activities, there are no judicial decisions in South Africa as to when the “administration 
of justice” terminates.   
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As in Australian law, where some states have a statutory crime of perverting the course of 
justice, in South Africa according to some case law and academic opinion, this crime may 
also be committed by omission.  For instance, in S v Gaba, an omission was recognised to 
constitute the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice because there was a 
legal duty on the accused to act positively on the ground of his official capacity.  However, 
other case law and academic opinion maintain that this crime can generally only be 
committed by “positive acts” and not by omission.  According to case law, for example, an 
arrested person’s refusal to allow a blood sample to be taken, inasmuch as it involves a 
mere omission, does not constitute the offence of defeating or obstructing the course of 
justice or an attempt to do so.  Generally, in English, Canadian and American law the crime 
cannot be committed by mere omission.  In these jurisdictions, an omission does not give 
rise to liability unless there is a legal duty to act positively imposed by either common law 
or by statute. 
 
Unlike in other jurisdictions, in South Africa, the crime of an attempt to obstruct or to 
defeat the course of justice is not treated as a substantive offence.  It is treated as an 
inchoate offence.   
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
 
8.1 GENERAL 
South Africa’s past has been described as that of “a deeply divided society characterized by 
strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice” which generated gross violations of human 
rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and a legacy of 
hatred, fear, guilt and revenge.1 The coming into being of the new order in South Africa in 
1994 brought political, legal and socio-economic changes to the country.  The 
establishment of a new legal order was initiated with the adoption of South Africa’s first 
democratic Constitution2 which was, for the first time, the supreme law of the land.  The 
Interim Constitution was established through the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP).  
The process was informed by the reports of a number of technical committees and the final 
draft that came out from the MPNP was adopted by Parliament.3
 
 Therefore, the Interim 
Constitution was the product of negotiation and compromise among parties with competing 
and conflicting interests with regard to conceptions on how the South African future legal 
and social order ought to be. 
The adoption of the Interim Constitution was described as a stepping-stone to negotiating a 
Final Constitution for the Republic of South Africa.4
                                                 
1Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 775 (CC) at 776; E Mureinik “A bridge to where? Introducing the interim Bill of 
Rights” (1994) SAJHR Vol 10 1 31; S Hoctor “The right to freedom of expression and the criminal law – The 
journey thus far” (2005) Obiter Vol 26 3 460-61 and AS Butler “The 1996 Constitutional Bill, its amending 
power, and the Constitutional Principles” (1996) The Human Rights Constitutional Law Journal of Southern 
Africa Vol 1 3 27.   
 One of the principal purposes of the 
  
2The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993.  See N Steytler Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure (1998) 1; John C Mubangizi “The role of the National Human Rights institutions in the promotion 
and protection of human rights in Uganda and South Africa: A comparative evaluation” (2006) Obiter Vol 27 
3 456 and C Rautenbach “A commentary on the application of the Bill of Rights to customary law” (1999) 
Obiter Vol 20 1 114.  
 
3See J Kentridge and D Spitz “Interpretation,” Revision Service 5 (1999) 6 at: 
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centre_publications/constitutionallaw/pdf/11-Interpretations.pdf  (accessed on 12 
August 2008); G Devenish “The Interim Constitution in the making” (1997) THRHR Vol 60 622 and S v 
Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391(CC) at 406-07. 
 
4L Jordaan Aspects of Double Jeopardy, Unpublished LLD Thesis, University of South Africa (1997) 656-57.  
 
 404 
Interim Constitution was to set out the procedures for the drafting and adoption of the Final  
Constitution.5 After the adoption of the 1996 Constitution,6 the Interim Constitution was 
replaced and fell away.7 In order to appease all political parties that were involved in the 
multi-party negotiations, it was agreed that the Final Constitution must include the 
fundamental values and principles contained in the Interim Constitution.8 The 
Constitutional Court was required to certify that all provisions of the text of the new 
Constitution passed by the Constitutional Assembly complied with the constitutional 
principles.9 The certification proceedings were held to determine whether or not the new 
constitutional text adopted by the Constitutional Assembly in 1996 to replace the Interim 
Constitution, was consistent with the 34 constitutional principles by which the 
Constitutional Assembly was bound.10 The court’s task was an unprecedented and 
extraordinary exercise of judicial review.11
 
 
The Constitution of South Africa is the supreme law of the Republic.  Section 2 of the 
Constitution12
 
 provides:  
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct 
                                                 
5In particular, section 71(1)(a) of the Interim Constitution required that the new constitutional text should 
comply with the constitutional principles set out in Schedule 4 of the Interim Constitution.  
 
6The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.  
 
7I Currie and J De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2005) 2.  
  
8M Chaskalson and D Davis “Constitutionalism, the Rule of Law, and the first certification judgement: Ex 
parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly in Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996, 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) (1997) SAJHR Vol 13 No 1 430. 
 
9Section 71(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. See also B de Villiers 
and J Sindane Managing Constitutional Change (1996) 31 and D van Wyk, J Dugard, B de Villiers and D 
Davis “Rights and constitutionalism: The new South African legal order” (1995) TSAR Vol 3 628. 
 
10Premier, Western Cape v President of the Republic of South Africa 1999 (3) SA 657 (CC) at 666F-G and IM 
Rautenbach and EFJ Malherbe ConstitutionalLaw 3ed (1999) 321.  In the first certification, the Constitutional 
Court held that certain provisions of the new constitutional text did not comply with all the constitutional 
principles and accordingly declined to certify the text. 
 
11See Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa supra (n 1) at 775; Currie and De Waal op cit (n 7) 6 and Rautenbach and Malherbe 
op cit (n 10) 31.  
 
12The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
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inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.  
 
The Interim and the Final Constitutions have affected profoundly not only constitutional 
law in South Africa, but every other branch of law as well.13  The coming into being of the 
1996 Constitution also impacted on both common law and statutory crimes. So, for 
example, any law (both common law and legislation) which criminalises any conduct is 
invalid if it is in conflict with certain rights in the Bill of Rights.14
 
 Crimes do not exist in a 
vacuum, they bear relevance to the Constitution and they protect certain core values found 
in the Constitution.  The constitutional relevance of crimes requires legal scholars to 
determine which core values an individual crime seeks to protect. 
Like any other crime, the crime of obstructing the course of justice protects certain core 
values found in the Constitution.  This chapter discusses the crime of obstructing or 
defeating the course of justice from a constitutional perspective.  Firstly, it looks at the core 
values guaranteed in the Constitution that are relevant to the administration of justice in 
general.  Secondly, it looks at the crime of obstructing the course of justice in particular.  It 
discusses the core values that this crime strives to protect.  It considers the doctrines of 
constitutional supremacy and separation of powers and the effect that these doctrines have 
on the administration of justice.  Lastly, this chapter investigates whether any or some 
rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited in order, inter alia, to protect the due 
administration of justice.  If this question is answered in the affirmative, it is considered 
whether such limitation would be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. 
 
                                                 
13M Dendy “In the light of the Constitution –1: The supremacy of the Constitution: (2009) De Rebus, 
(January/February) 60. 
 
14See National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others 1998 (6) 
BCLR 729 (CC).  This is a South African Constitutional Court case decided on October 9, 1998 that resulted 
in a landmark decision regarding sodomy laws.  Basing itself on South Africa's 1996 post-apartheid 
Constitution — which was the first Constitution ever to explicitly ban discrimination based on sexual 
orientation — the court unanimously overturned as unconstitutional the law banning sexual activities between 
consenting male adults. 
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8.2 CORE VALUES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL DISPENSATION 
8.2.1    Constitutional supremacy 
Before the coming into being of the 1993 Constitution,15 South Africa had never had any 
legislative instrument even vaguely reminiscent of a supreme Constitution with a Bill of 
Rights.  South African constitutional law had been premised upon the British concept of 
parliamentary supremacy or parliamentary sovereignty.16 According to this doctrine, 
Parliament can make or unmake any law, and that no person or body17 is recognized by law 
as having a right to override or supersede parliamentary legislation.18 The consequence of 
this is that the judiciary has an inferior status to the democratically elected Parliament and 
also to the executive.19 Sometimes the word “sovereignty” is used in a political rather than 
in a strictly legal sense.20 Dicey21
 
 observes: 
But the word “sovereignty” is sometimes employed in a political rather than in a strictly legal sense.  
That body is “politically” sovereign or supreme in a state the will of which is ultimately obeyed by the 
citizens of the state. In this sense of the word the electors of Great Britain may be said to be, together 
with the Crown and the Lords, or perhaps, in strict accuracy, independently of the King and the Peers, 
the body in which sovereign power is vested … But this is a political, not a legal fact … The political22
 
 
sense of the word “sovereign” is, it is true, fully as important as the legal sense or more so.  But the 
two significations, though intimately connected together, are essentially different … 
Parliamentary supremacy was the fundamental principle of South African law.  It is said 
                                                 
15The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 
  
16LM du Plessis and JR de Ville “Bill of Rights interpretation in the South African context (1): Diagnostic 
observations” (1993) Stell LR Vol 1 63; W le R de Vos “The impact of the new Constitution upon civil 
procedural law” (1995) Stell LR Vol 6 135 and PD Glavovic “Human rights and environmental law: the case 
for a conservation Bill of Rights” (1988) CILSA Vol 21 65-66. 
 
17J Dugard (ed) Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978) 28 and GE Devenish “The doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty and the proposed new Constitution” (1979) THRHR Vol 42 86.  
 
18Z Motala “Independence of the judiciary, prospects and limitations of judicial review in terms of the United 
States model in the new South African order: towards an alternative judicial structure” (1991) CILSA Vol 24 
290-91; CR Munro Studies in Constitutional Law 2ed (1999) 131; I Currie et al The New Constitutional and 
Administrative Law 1ed (2001) 13 and I Mahomed “The impact of a Bill of Rights on law and practice in 
South Africa” (1993) De Rebus 460. 
 
19DM Davis “Administrative justice in a democratic South Africa” (1993) Administrative Law Reform 26 and 
HWR Wade and CF Forsyth Administrative Law 7ed (1994) 29. 
  
20AV Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Constitution 10ed (1959) 73-74.  
 
21Ibid. 
  
22G Bindman South Africa and the Rule of Law (1988) 7. 
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that as long ago as in the 1890s a constitutional crisis in the South African Republic 
prompted President Paul Kruger to denounce judicial review on the ground that the testing 
right is a principle of the devil.  To him judicial intrusion on Parliament’s sovereignty was 
“ungodly.”23 The period between 1910 and 1961, when South Africa became a Republic, 
led to the expansion of the powers of Parliament.  As a result, civil liberty and the rule of 
law were sacrificed on the altar of parliamentary supremacy to the idol of apartheid.  All 
previous South African Constitutions restricted the Supreme Court’s competency to decide 
on the validity or invalidity of acts of Parliament and section 34(2) read with section 34(3) 
of the 1983 Constitution24 confirmed that.  According to Dugard,25 in England, 
parliamentary supremacy was controlled by political tradition, convention and the rule of 
law, whereas in South Africa it was taken to its logical and brutal conclusion at the expense 
of human rights.  When the Interim Constitution came into force in 1994 it marked a 
turning point for South Africa.  The new Constitution did away with the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty26 and replaced it with a system where the Constitution became 
the supreme law of the country and any law or conduct inconsistent with it was invalid.27 
As a result, the courts have a conclusive veto28
                                                 
23S Ellmann (ed) In a Time of Trouble: Law and Liberty in South Africa’s State of Emergency (1992) 12. 
 over legislation or the common law because 
they have powers to pronounce on the validity or invalidity of any legislation or the 
common law.  The Interim Constitution was a transitional Constitution.  There is academic 
opinion that the 1996 Constitution represents a less dramatic development of our legal 
 
24Act 110 of 1983.  The aim of this Constitution was chiefly to accommodate the political aspirations of 
Coloureds and Indians by including them in a Parliament consisting of three Houses, the tri-cameral 
Parliament.  The House of Assembly was for Whites, the House of Representatives was for Coloured people 
and the House of Delegates was for Indian people.  See D Marais South Africa: Constitutional Development: 
A Multidisciplinary Approach 2ed (1993) 255 and Bindman op cit (n 22) 6. 
  
25Dugard op cit (n 17) 36. 
 
26KE Klare “Legal culture and Transformative constitutionalism” (1998) SAJHR Vol 14 147.  According to 
this doctrine, Parliament could make any law it wished and no person or institution, including the courts, 
could challenge any Act of Parliament.   
 
27Pius Langa ‘A delicate balance: The place of the judiciary in the constitutional democracy’ (2006) SAJHR 
Vol 22 14 and Currie and de Waal op cit (n 7) 5.  
28PW Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada 3ed (1992) 802. 
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system than the Interim Constitution, which created a new legal grundnorm.29 According to 
this view, the 1996 Constitution represented more the development of the Interim 
Constitution.30 There is another view, which says that the coming into being of the 1996 
Constitution led to a new constitutionalism31 which placed new core values at a centre 
stage.  These core values are32 human dignity and the achievement of equality, the 
protection of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism, a democratic 
system of governance and the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law.33 
Wessels34 says that these constitutional values represent the source from which our human 
rights dispensation was derived and they give guidance when conflicting rights are 
balanced.  According to Motshekga,35 the principle of constitutional supremacy is 
reinforced by an independent and impartial judiciary which has the power and jurisdiction 
to safeguard and enforce the Constitution and all fundamental rights.  It is submitted that in 
the South African constitutional context the phrase “constitutional supremacy”, unlike the 
Diceyan doctrine of parliamentary supremacy,36 is used in a legal rather than in a political 
sense.  Our Constitution is the supreme law of the land and any law or conduct inconsistent 
with it is invalid.  It is a legal instrument, not a political document.  It is capable of giving 
rise to individual rights capable of enforcement in a court of law.37
 
 
                                                 
29See D Davis “The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993, Act 108 of 1996” (1997) SAJHR Vol 
13 No 1 1. 
  
30Ibid. 
  
31Constitutionalism is the idea that government should derive its powers from a written or unwritten 
constitution and that its powers should be limited to those set out in the constitution.  See Currie and De Waal 
op. cit. (n 7) 8 and H Barnett Constitutional and Administrative Law 5ed (2004) 5. 
  
32Section 1 (a)-(d) of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
. 
33Section 1(a)-(c) of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.  
 
34L Wessels My Rights! Your Rights? Let’s Talk! 1ed (2007) 25. 
  
35MS Motshekga Concepts of law and justice and the Rule of Law in the African context. Unpublished LLD 
thesis. University of South Africa (1994) 507. 
  
36Cf Dicey op cit (n 20) 73-74. 
 
37S v Zuma and Another 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) at para 14.  See: 
http://www.saflii.org.za/za/cases/ZACC/1995/1.html (accessed on 13 August 2008).  
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8.2.2   The rule of law  
Since the Norman Conquest, the political institutions of England were characterised by two 
features:  The undisputed supremacy of the central government and the rule or supremacy 
of law.38 According to Mathews,39 the rule of law is frequently used to denote the existence 
of public order in a given society.  In this sense it means rule backed by established 
authority.  The doctrine of the rule of law was popularised by Dicey.  According to Dicey,40
 
 
the doctrine of the rule of law is based on the following principles: 
a. The principle of legality, which states that no person may be deprived of rights 
 and freedoms through the arbitrary exercise of wide discretionary powers by the 
 executive.  
b. The principle of equality, which states that no person is above the law and every 
 person is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts. 
c. The rights of individuals are effectively protected by the action and decisions of the 
courts rather than by guarantees contained in a constitution. 
 
According to Yardley,41 the Diceyan concept of equality before the law is flawed because 
there are situations where people are not equal before the law; for example, foreign 
sovereigns and diplomats enjoy special immunity from criminal prosecution or civil action 
and judges cannot be held civilly liable for anything said or done in the course of their 
office. He agrees that it is impossible to iron out all inequalities.  According to 
Motshekga,42
                                                                                                                                                     
  
 the weakness of the Diceyan concept of the rule of law was that the 
38Dicey op cit (n 20) 183-84. 
 
39AS Mathews Law, Order and Liberty in South Africa, Unpublished LLD Thesis, University of Natal, (1970) 
3.  
   
40Dicey op cit (n 20) 187-195 and 202-203.  See also G Wilson Cases and Materials on Constitutional and 
Administrative Law 2ed (1976) 557-58. 
 
41D Yardley Introduction to Constitutional and Administrative Law 8ed (1995) 102-103. 
  
42Motshekga op cit (n 35) 528-29.  
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individual was allowed the enjoyment of his or her civil liberties by the mercy of the 
sovereign parliament.  Motshekga propagates a dynamic concept of the rule of law.  
Motshekga’s43
 
 dynamic concept of the rule of law, unlike the Diceyan concept of the rule 
of law, is not derived from the culture and traditions of any particular country.  It derives 
from the principle of humanity [ubuntu] which provides that the legal values of freedom 
and equality and the corollaries of justice and right to democratic governance are inherent 
in the worth and dignity of the human personality. 
The rule of law is one of the central values on which the new constitutional order in the 
Republic of South Africa is founded.44 It is also one of the core values relevant to the 
discussion of the crime of obstructing or defeating the course of justice.  Section 1 of the 
Constitution45
 
 provides: 
(1) The Republic of the South Africa is one sovereign democratic state founded on one of the 
following values: 
 
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and advancement of human rights and 
freedoms. 
 
(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism. 
 
(c) Supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections, and a multi-party 
system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness. 
 
                                                 
43Motshekga op cit (n 35) 529.  
 
44IM Rautenbach and EFJ Malherbe Constitutional Law 5ed (2008) 10.  
  
45The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.  
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Section 39(1) of the Constitution46 provides that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a 
court, tribunal or forum, must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.  Obstruction of the due 
administration of justice is quintessentially against the South African democratic system of 
government.  Such conduct subverts the very judicial process on which the rule of law so 
vitally depends.47
 
  
According to Feldman,48
 
 once legal rules have been made and promulgated, the doctrine of 
the rule of law means that it is the courts’ function to ensure, inter alia, that people are able 
to exercise their freedoms and that the boundaries between the public and private spheres 
are not overstepped especially by the state.  It is submitted that the rule of law depends, 
inter alia, on the smooth running of the judicial process without any interference by any 
person or organ of state.  Any conduct by X that subverts the judicial process undermines 
one of the core values of our Constitution, namely, the rule of law.  The following conduct 
subverts the judicial process and therefore has a direct bearing on the rule of law: 
intimidation of witnesses or judicial officers, destruction of documents to be used in a 
judicial proceeding, etc.  It is submitted that by punishing any conduct that interferes with a 
judicial process or proceeding, such as intimidation of witnesses, alteration of such 
documents, etc., the crime of obstructing the course of justice protects and upholds the rule 
of law. 
 
 
8.2.3   The doctrine of separation of powers  
The doctrine of separation of powers (trias politica), together with the rule of law and the 
                                                 
46The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.  See infra the discussion of the provisions of 
section 39(1) under 8.5, text at note 117. 
  
47Cooper op cit Chapter Six (n 13) 621. 
  
48D Feldman (ed) Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (1993) 33. 
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value of constitutional supremacy, run like a thread throughout the South African 
Constitution.  The doctrine of separation of powers requires that the functions of 
government be classified into legislative, executive and judicial legs and that separate 
branches of government perform each separate function.49 The powers of various branches 
of government are set out in chapters four to eight of the Constitution.50  It is said that the 
purpose of separating the functions of government in this manner is to prevent excessive 
concentration of power in a single person or body.51 According to Chemerinsky,52 the 
division of powers among these branches was designed to create a system of checks and 
balances and to lessen the possibility of tyrannical rule.  This doctrine is employed to 
ensure that the new system of government contains within it checks and balances to uphold 
the core values of the Constitution.53 However, there is no universal model of separation of 
powers and there is no separation that is absolute because the relationship between the 
different branches of government and the power or influence that one branch of government 
has over the other differs from one country to another.54 The principle of separation of 
powers is based on the idea of the rule of law.55
 
 This leads us to the principle of judicial  
 
 
 
                                                 
49J De Waal, I Currie and G Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook 4ed (2001) 20 and F Venter “Requirements 
for a new constitutional text: The imperatives of the constitutional principles” (1995) SALJ Vol 112 No 1 39; 
Yardley op cit (n 41) 61; C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (ed) (2007) 22-23 and K Malan “The 
Unity of powers and the independence of the South African judiciary” (2005) De Jure Vol 1 102.  
 
50The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
  
51De Waal, Currie and Erasmus (n 49) 20 and Barnett op cit (n 31) 97.  
 
52E Chemerinsky Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 2ed (2002) 1.  See also Yardley op. cit. (n 38) 
61 and JH Garvey and TA Aleinikoff (eds) Modern Constitutional Theory: A Reader (1989) 178.  
 
53Langa op cit (n 27) 4. 
 
54Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa supra (n 1) 810. 
  
55P De Vos “A bridge too far? History as context in the interpretation of the South African Constitution” 
(2001) SAJHR Vol 17 1 26. 
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independence. 
 
8.2.4   Independence of the courts 
The judicial authority of the Republic of South Africa is vested in the courts56 which are 
independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law which they must apply 
impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice.57 Section 165 of the Constitution58
(1) The judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the courts. 
 
provides: 
 
(2) The courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they must 
apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice. 
 
(3) No person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of the courts. 
 
(4) Organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect the courts to 
ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of courts. 
 
(5) An order or decision issued by a court binds all persons and organs of state to which it applies. 
 
The existence and operation of an independent judiciary dispensing justice without fear or 
favour and free from political pressure or influence constitutes an important element of the 
rule of law.59 Judicial independence simply means the right and the duty of judges to 
perform the function of judicial adjudication through the application of their own integrity 
and the law, without any actual or perceived, direct or indirect interference from or 
dependence on any other person or institution.60
 
 It is said that the principle of an 
independent judiciary goes to the very heart of sustainable democracy based on the rule of  
 
                                                 
56Section 165(1) of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
 
57Section 165(2).  See also MA Fouche Legal principles of contracts and commercial law 6ed (2007) 15-16 
and C Theophilopoulos et al Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure (ed) 2006 7. 
 
58The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.  
 
59HG Mwakyembe Tanzania’s Eighth Constitutional Amendment and its Implications on Constitutionalism, 
Democracy and the Union Question (ed) (1995) 131. 
  
60I Mahomed “The role of the Judiciary in a constitutional state” (1998) SALJ Vol 115 112.  
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law.61 No person or organ of state62 may interfere with the functioning of the courts.63 This 
is interpreted to mean the judicial functioning which takes place during judicial 
proceedings, as opposed to the administrative functioning of the courts.  Section 165(3) of 
the Constitution created a constitutional imperative that courts should function free from 
interference from any person or organ of state.  An example of interference that is 
prohibited by section 165(3) is an attempt by X to influence the judiciary by, for example, 
exhorting them not to give any credence to certain types of evidence, contrary to their 
duties.  This kind of conduct amounts to the common law offence of attempt to defeat or 
obstruct the course of justice.64 The rule against interference with the functioning of the 
courts guarantees one of the founding values of our Constitution, the rule of law, and 
elevates the common law crime of obstructing the course of justice by interfering with the 
judiciary, to a constitutional imperative.  Court orders or decisions bind all persons and 
organs of state to which they apply.65 Without compliance with court orders by the state 
and private persons, the administration of justice would fall into disrepute in the eyes of the 
public.66
 
  
The Constitution accords the judicial authority of the Republic of South Africa to the 
                                                 
61Ibid.  See also  N Arendse “The bar, the bench and judicial independence” (2006) Advocate, April 3; and B 
Spilg “Judicial independence    impending constitutional crisis” (2006) Advocate, April 8.  
  
62In terms of section 239 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 an organ of state means: 
 
(a) any department of state or administration in the national, provincial or local sphere of government; 
or 
 
(b) any other functionary or institution- 
 
(i) exercising a power or performing a function in terms of the Constitution or a 
provincial constitution; or  
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation, 
but does not include a court or a judicial officer … 
 
63Section 165(3).  See C Albertyn “Judicial independence and the Constitution Fourteenth Amendment Bill” 
(2006) SAJHR Vol 22 No 1 131.  
 
64Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 61 and Snyman op cit Chapter Two (n 151) 338-39. 
 
65Section 165(5). 
 
66GE Devenish The South African Constitution (2005) 328. 
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courts.67 Section 165(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides, inter 
alia, that courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law.  This 
independence of the courts is two-fold – it consists in personal independence and functional 
independence.  Personal independence of the judiciary means that the appointment, terms 
of office and conditions of service of judicial officers are not controlled arbitrarily by other 
government bodies.68 This deals mainly with the question of security of tenure.69 
Functional independence of the courts means that in the exercise of their powers courts are 
subject only to the law.70 According to Rautenbach and Malherbe,71 functional 
independence protects the objectivity of judicial bodies and prevents interference with 
judicial functions.  This may be interpreted to mean that procedures followed during 
judicial proceedings and findings of the courts may not be subject to the directives of any 
other government body.  It is also said that the legislature, executive, private persons and 
pressure groups may also not influence the courts.72 The offences of contempt of court and 
interference with the due administration of justice protect the courts against such 
interference.73
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67DH van Zyl “Justice and the new constitutional dispensation in South Africa” (1998) De Jure Vol 31 51; S 
Jagwanth “The constitutional roles and responsibilities of lower courts” (2002) SAJHR Vol 18 No 1 202; 
Devenish op cit (n 66) 327 and Rautenbach and Malherbe op cit (n 10) 244. 
 
68Rautenbach and Malherbe op cit (n 10) 246.  
 
69B Spilg “Judicial independence  a dummy’s guide” (2005) Advocate, August 18 and Mwakyebwe op cit 
(n 59) 131.  It is said that with every single decision a judge creates friends and enemies.  Where the “created” 
enemy is powerful and rich (e.g. the Executive) and where the judiciary enjoys no security of tenure, the 
judge concerned may be summarily dismissed at the pleasure of the Executive.  
 
70Rautenbach and Malherbe op cit (n 10) 249.  
 
71Ibid.  
 
72Devenish op cit (n 66) 344.  
 
73Ibid.  See also J Burchell and J Milton Principles of Criminal Law 1ed (1991) 627. 
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8.3 POWERS OF COURTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS 
South African courts, as constitutional adjudicators, play a critical role in the law reform 
sphere.74  The courts perform a policymaking function in the process of developing the 
common law and adjusting it to ever-changing needs of society.75 Section 172 of the 
Constitution76 empowers South African courts, when deciding a constitutional matter, to 
declare any law or conduct which is inconsistent with the Constitution invalid.  Section 172 
of the Constitution77
 
 provides: 
(1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court- 
 
(a) must declare that any law  or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is 
invalid to the extent of its inconsistency; and 
 
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including−  
 
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and 
 
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any 
conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect.  
 
(2) (a) The Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court, or a court of similar status may 
make an order  concerning the constitutional validity of an Act of Parliament, a 
provincial Act any conduct of the President, but an order of constitutional invalidity has 
no force unless it is confirmed by the Constitutional Court. 
 
(b) A court which makes an order of constitutional invalidity may grant a temporary 
interdict or other temporary relief to a party, or may adjourn the proceedings, pending a 
decision of a Constitutional Court on the validity of that Act or conduct. 
 
(c) National legislation must provide for the referral of an order of constitutional 
invalidity to the Constitutional Court. 
 
(d) Any person or organ of state with a sufficient interest may appeal, or apply, 
directly to the Constitutional Court to confirm or vary an order of constitutional 
invalidity by a court in terms of this subsection. 
 
The 1996 Constitution did away with the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, which 
prevented the courts from declaring an Act of Parliament invalid, and replaced it with 
constitutional supremacy.  In terms of the Constitution, the courts have powers to enquire 
                                                 
74MM Corbett “Aspects of the role of policy in the evolution of our common law” (1987) SALJ Vol 104 54 
   
75Ibid.  
 
76The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
  
77The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
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into the validity of any Act of Parliament and any conduct of the President, but an order of 
constitutional invalidity has to be confirmed by the Constitutional Court in order to have 
any force.  In this regard, the Constitutional Court, in Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle 
Accidents Fund,78
 
 held: 
When a constitutional matter is one which turns on the direct application of the Constitution 
and which does not involve the development of the common law, considerations of costs 
and time may make it desirable that the appeal be brought directly to this Court. But when 
the constitutional matter involves the development of the common law, the position is 
different. The Supreme Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to develop the common law in all 
matters including constitutional matters. Because of the breadth of its jurisdiction and its 
expertise in the common law, its views as to whether the common law should or should not 
be developed in a ‘constitutional matter’ are of particular importance. Assuming, as 
Mr Omar contends, that this Court’s jurisdiction to develop the common law in 
constitutional matters is no different to that of the Supreme Court of Appeal, it is a 
jurisdiction which ought not ordinarily to be exercised without the matter having first been 
dealt with by the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
 
 
Section 173 of the Constitution79 read with section 39(2)80 empowers the courts to develop 
the common law appropriately where it is deficient in promoting the section 39(2) 
objectives when interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects 
of the Bill of Rights.  It may be argued that our courts have a secondary lawmaking 
function which is enshrined in the Constitution.81
 
 Section 173 of the Constitution vested 
our courts with the constitutional power to be the custodians of our common law, including 
the common law crime of obstructing the course of justice.  Section 173 provides: 
The Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts have the inherent power to 
protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the common law, taking into account the 
interests of justice. 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
781998 (10) BCLR 1207 (CC) at para 33.  See also Fourie and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and 
Another 2003 (5) 301 (CC) at para 12 and Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions and Another 2007 (5) SA 
30 (CC) at para 17.  The latter case is discussed infra under 8.7, text at note 183. 
 
79The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
  
80The provisions of section 39(2) are discussed infra under 8.5, text at note 117. 
   
81The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.  
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The Constitutional Court in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another82 
held83 that in exercising their powers to develop the common law, courts should be mindful 
of the fact that the major role player for law reform should be the legislature and not the 
judiciary.  It is submitted that judge-made law emanates from the Constitution because the 
Constitution delegated some legislative function to the judiciary.84 This happens when the 
court lays down new law in a case before it.  The facts of this case are as follows:  
Carmichelle was brutally assaulted by a certain Coetzee.  Coetzee had previously been 
convicted for housebreaking and indecent assault.  In the previous year, Coetzee was 
serving a suspended sentence of imprisonment.  At the time of Carmichelle’s assault, 
Coetzee was facing a charge of rape.85 It is alleged that during his bail application the 
prosecution did not oppose Coetzee’s bail, and he was released on bail.  Only a few days 
later he attacked the applicant, Mrs Carmichele, in her home, seriously wounding her.  She 
brought a delictual action against the State for injuries she had sustained as a result of the 
attack.86 Her case was that members of the police as well as public prosecutors involved in 
the rape case owed her a legal duty to act in order to prevent Coetzee from causing her 
harm and that they failed to comply with that duty.87The High Court held that there was no 
evidence to support the existence of the said duty and that the police and the prosecutors 
had acted wrongfully.88
for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court.
 The Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal and she 
applied  
89
                                                 
822001 (4) SA 938 (CC). 
 
  
83At 954D. 
 
84Section 173 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 empowers Constitutional Court, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts to develop the common law.  In terms of section 39(2) when 
developing the common law, the courts must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.  
 
85Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another supra (n 82) at 939G. 
 
86At 940B-C. 
  
87At 940C-D. 
  
88At 940D-E.  
 
89At 940D-E.  
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It was argued on her behalf that the police and the prosecution were among the primary 
agencies of the State responsible for the discharge of its constitutional duty to protect the 
public in general and women in particular against violent crime.  Counsel for the applicant 
relied in particular on the constitutional obligation of the courts to develop the common law 
in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution.90 The legal question that confronted the 
Constitutional Court was whether the common law of delict should be developed to afford 
Carmichele a right to claim damages against the State if the police or the prosecutor were 
negligent, or whether this should be left to the High Court or the Supreme Court of Appeal 
to determine.91 The court held that under section 39(2) of the Constitution, concepts such as 
policy decisions and value judgments which reflect the wishes and the perceptions of the 
people and society’s notions of what justice demands might well have to be replaced or 
supplemented and enriched by the appropriate norms of the objective value system 
embodied in the Constitution.92 The court held93 that the investigating officer had a clear 
duty to bring to the prosecutor’s attention any factors known to him relevant to the exercise 
by the magistrate of his discretion to grant Coetzee bail.  Instead, the investigating officer 
recommended that Coetzee should be released on warning in the clear knowledge that the 
prosecutor would act on such recommendation.  The court further held94 that there is no 
reason why the prosecutor should not be held liable for the consequences of a negligent 
failure to bring necessary information known by him to be relevant to the magistrate’s 
exercise of his discretion to grant or refuse bail.  The court further held95
                                                 
90At 940F-G.  The provisions of section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 are 
discussed infra under 8.5, text at note 117. 
 that if the 
prosecutor’s negligence results in the release of an accused on bail, and the accused then 
 
91At 969I. 
 
92At 962D-E. 
  
93965B-C. 
  
94At 968E. 
  
95At 968E.  
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proceeds to commit other crimes, such prosecutor may be held liable for the damages 
suffered by the complainant.  The Constitutional Court upheld the appeal and set aside the 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Court.96
  
 
The obligation of courts to develop the common law in the context of the section 39(2) 
objectives is not purely discretionary.  Where the common law is deficient in promoting the 
section 39(2) objectives, courts are under a general obligation to develop it appropriately.97
 
 
In this case the common law of delict was developed to include situations where a police 
officer and the prosecutor, as agents of the State, failed to comply with their legal duty to 
protect members of the society.  They failed to oppose bail application by the suspect, 
which failure resulted in the release of the suspect by the magistrate.   
8.4 THE BILL OF RIGHTS  
The declaration of fundamental rights of citizens dates from the later part of the eighteenth 
century when the American and French revolutions took place.98 Chapter two of the South 
African Constitution contains the Bill of Rights.  The Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of 
democracy in South Africa.  It enshrines the rights of all people in South Africa and affirms 
the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.99
  
 
The Bill of Rights was aimed at safeguarding human rights, ending centuries of state 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
96At 971E-F. 
  
97At 955F-G.  
 
98The American Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the Bill of Rights in 1791 provided, among other 
things, for the preservation of such fundamental rights as freedom of religion, speech, etc.  In 1789, France 
followed suit and came up with French Declaration of Rights of Man.  See Yardley op. cit. (n 41) 104-05. 
 
99Section 7(1) of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.  See also G Carpenter “South 
Africa and the human rights experience since 1994” (2004) Codicillus Vol 45 1 2 and K Keddy “The equality 
clause in the South African Bill of Rights and accessible credit for disadvantaged communities” (2002) TSAR 
Vol 4 676.  
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sponsored abuse.100 An amended Bill of Rights forms part of the new Constitution,101 
which was adopted by the Constitutional Assembly in May 1996 and certified by the 
Constitutional Court in December 1996.102 In S v Makwanyane and Another,103 Chaskalson 
cited with approval Justice Jackson in West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette104 
and held:105
 
 
The purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political 
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of the majorities and officials and to establish them as 
legal principles to be applied by the courts.  One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a 
free press, freedom of worship and assembly and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to 
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections. 
 
According to Kentridge and Spitz,106 Chapter Two of the Constitution is directed to the 
relationship between government and private persons.  It secures to all persons a zone of 
autonomy into which neither the State nor any other person may trespass.  It also gives 
private persons certain rights which they can claim against the State.107 The Bill of Rights 
is the cornerstone of democracy in South Africa.  The purpose of the Bill of Rights is “the 
unremitting protection of individual rights and liberties.”108 Section 7 of the Constitution109
provides: 
  
(1) This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa.  It enshrines the rights of all 
people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom. 
                                                 
100Currie and De Waal op cit (n 7) 2. 
 
101The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
  
102Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Amended Text of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC).  See also South African Law 
Commission The Application of the Bill of Rights to Criminal Procedure, Criminal Law, the Law of Evidence 
and Sentencing, Discussion Paper 90, Project 101 (2000) 1; South African Law Commission The Application 
of the Bill of Rights to Criminal Procedure, Criminal Law, the Law of Evidence and Sentencing: Report, 
Project 101 (2001) and Jordaan op cit (n 4) 657.  
 
103S v Makwanyane and Another supra (n 3) at 432.  
 
104319 US 624 (1943) at 638.  
 
105S v Makwanyane and Another supra (n 3) at 432. 
 
106Kentridge and Spitz op cit (n 3) 11-11. 
  
107Ibid. 
 
108Ibid. 
 
109The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.  
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(2) The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. 
 
(3)  The rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the limitations contained or referred to in section 36, or 
elsewhere in the Bill. 
 
Of significance to the discussion of the due administration of justice are the due process 
rights of arrested, detained and accused persons.110 These rights are said to be part of the 
system of intrinsic values that must inevitably reshape the ‘contours of a new landscape to 
which the administration of justice and the fight against crime must adapt.’  The concept 
and practise of a fair trial has a wide jurisprudential implication and is intended to ensure 
that justice is done to both the accused and to the interests of the community.  Any 
unjustified infringement of any of the rights listed in section 35 (rights of arrested, detained 
and accused persons) of the Constitution has the same effect as a fatal irregularity which 
impairs the criminal proceedings as a whole.111
  
 
The Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary 
and all organs of State.112 The scope and content of the rights in the Bill of Rights are 
subject to constitutional interpretation in order to seek and discover the values underlying 
its provisions.113 Most of the rights in the Bill of Rights are not absolute; they may be 
limited in terms of the limitations clause.114
 
 For instance, society’s wider interest in  
 
combating crime may necessitate the limitation of these rights.115
                                                 
110In particular the rights guaranteed in section 35(3)(h) and (j) and section 35(5).   
 This leads us to the 
 
111Devenish op cit (n 66) 177.  
 
112Section 8 of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.  See also AG Nienaber “The 
comprehensibility of South Africa’s Bill of Rights: An empirical study” (2001) De Jure Vol 34 1 115.  
 
113F Snyckers Constitutional Law of South Africa (1998) 27-28. 
 
114D Davis, H Cheadle, and N Haysom Fundamental Rights in the Constitution: Commentary and Cases: a 
commentary on chapter 3 of Fundamental Rights of the 1993 Constitution and chapter 2 of the 1996 
Constitution (1997) 304; Devenish op cit (n 66) 179; de Vos op cit (n 16) 142 and Mureinik op cit (n 1) 33. 
  
115PM Bekker et al Criminal Procedure 8ed (2007) 90. 
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interpretation and limitation of the rights in the Bill of Rights.   
 
8.5 INTERPRETATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS  
The Constitution of the United States of America is one of the oldest constitutions in the 
world, but as it is a living legal instrument, courts in the United States of America are still 
involved in its interpretation.  Constitutional interpretation is a dynamic process which can 
never be finished since circumstances, perceptions and values change.116 Looking at the 
United States’ experience it is clear that South African courts will be involved in 
constitutional interpretation for many years to come.  Section 39 of the Constitution deals 
specifically with the interpretation of the Bill of Rights.  Section 39117
 
 provides:  
(1) when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum- 
 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom; 
 
(b) must consider international law; and  
 
(c) may consider foreign law. 
 
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, 
every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights. 
 
(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are  
recognized or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that 
they are consistent with the Bill. 
 
Section 39(1) is an exhortation to the courts to seek to discover the values underlying the 
Bill of Rights in interpreting its provisions.  It guides South African courts to the correct 
jurisprudential approach to the interpretation of the Constitution, in general, and the Bill of 
Rights in particular. South African courts are indeed enjoined by section 39 of the 
Constitution to interpret the Bill of Rights so as "to promote the values which underlie an 
open and democratic society based on freedom and equality,"118
                                                 
116C Botha Statutory Interpretation: An introduction for students 4ed (2005) 124.  
 and, where applicable, to 
have regard to relevant public international law.  Section 39 also permits our courts to have 
 
117The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
118See S v Zuma and Another supra (n 37) at 7 para 17. 
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regard to comparable foreign case law. 
 
The Constitutional Court has laid down guidelines as to how the Constitution and the Bill 
of Rights in particular should be interpreted.  These are textual, purposive, generous and 
contextual interpretations.119
 
 
8.5.1    Textual interpretation 
According to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, the text of the Constitution 
plays an important role in determining the meaning of a provision of the Bill of Rights.120  
For instance, in the Zuma decision, Kentridge, AJ (as he was then) held:121
 
 
 While we must always be conscious of the values underlying the Constitution, it is nonetheless our 
task to interpret a written instrument.  I am well aware of the fallacy of supposing that general 
language must have a single "objective" meaning.  Nor is it easy to avoid the influence of one's 
personal intellectual and moral preconceptions.  But it cannot be too strongly stressed that the 
Constitution does not mean whatever we might wish it to mean.  We must heed Lord Wilberforce's 
reminder that even a constitution is a legal instrument, the language of which must be respected.  If 
the language used by the lawgiver is ignored in favour of a general resort to "values" the result is not 
interpretation but divination … [I] would say that a constitution embodying fundamental rights 
should as far as its language permits be given a broad construction.   
 
Because the Constitution is abstract and open-ended it cannot be interpreted by looking at 
the literal meaning of the Constitution’s provision alone.  This means that constitutional 
interpretation involves more than the determination of the literal meaning of particular 
provisions.  When interpreting the Constitution the proper interpretation of the provision 
may entail looking beyond the literal meaning. 122
 
 
8.5.2   Purposive interpretation 
Purposive interpretation entails identifying the core values enshrined in the Constitution 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
119Currie and De Waal op. cit. (n 7) 147-55 and Rautenbach and Malherbe op cit (n 10) 40-47. 
 
120Currie and de Waal op cit. (n 7) 147 and Botha op cit (n 116) 122.  
 
121S v Zuma and Others supra (n 37) at para 17-18.  
 
122Currie and De Waal op cit (n 7) 147-48 and Botha op cit (n 116) 122. 
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and preferring the interpretation of a provision that best supports and protects the core 
values that underpin the fundamental rights in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom.123 This is done by analysing the purpose of the right 
with regard to the interests it is meant to protect.  In 1985, the Supreme Court of Canada in 
R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd,124 with reference to the Canadian Charter of Rights, held:125
 The meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter was to be ascertained by an analysis of 
the purpose of such a guarantee;  it was to be understood, in other words, in the light of the interests 
it was meant to protect.  In my view this analysis is to be undertaken, and the purpose of the right or 
freedom in question is to be sought by reference to the character and larger objects of the Charter 
itself, to the language chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom, to the historical origins of the 
concept enshrined, and where applicable, to the meaning and purpose of the other specific rights and 
freedoms with which it is associated within the text of the Charter.  The interpretation should be… a 
generous rather than legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of a guarantee and the securing for 
individuals the full benefit of the Charter's protection. 
 
 
The Constitutional Court has cited with approval this decision in a number of cases126 when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights.  It is said that purposive interpretation tells us that once the 
purpose of the right in the Bill of Rights has been identified we will be able to determine 
the scope of the right.127
 
 
 
8.5.3   Generous interpretation 
Generous interpretation is interpretation in favour of the rights in the Bill of Rights and 
against the restriction of those rights.  It entails giving a wider meaning to the language in 
which the rights have been drafted.128
                                                                                                                                                     
 
 In the Zuma case the Constitutional Court expressed 
itself in favour of a generous interpretation of the Bill of Rights.  Kentridge AJ, cited with 
123Currie and De Waal op cit (n 7) 147; Botha op cit (n 195) 122 and J Klaaren “Structures of government in 
the 1996 South African Constitution: Putting democracy back into human rights (1997) SAJHR Vol 13 1 18-
19. 
  
124(1985) 1 SCR 295 at http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1985rcs1-295/1985rcs1-295.pdf (accessed on 15 
August 2008).   
 
125At para 116-17.  
 
126See S v Zuma and Others supra (n 37) at 8 and S v Makwanyane supra (n 3) at 403. 
  
127Currie and De Waal op cit (n 7) 149.  
 
128Currie and De Waal op cit (n 7) 150. 
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approval the much-quoted passage from the judgment of Lord Wilberforce in the Privy 
Council in Minister of Home Affairs (Bermuda) v Fisher129 and held:130
[ ] a generous interpretation ... suitable to give to individuals the full measure of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms referred to.  This is in no way to say that there are no 
rules of law which should apply to the interpretation of a constitution. A constitution is 
a legal instrument giving rise, amongst other things, to individual rights capable of 
enforcement in a court of law.  Respect must be paid to the language which has been 
used and to the traditions and the usages which have given meaning to that language.  It 
is quite consistent with this, and with the recognition that rules of interpretation may 
apply, to take as a point of departure for the process of interpretation a recognition of 
the character and origin of the instrument, and to be guided by the principle of giving 
full recognition and effect to those fundamental rights and freedoms with a statement of 
which the constitution commences. 
  
 
Again, in the Mhlungu131 decision, the Constitutional Court followed the international 
culture of constitutional jurisprudence and expressed itself in favour of a generous 
interpretation.  Mahomed J, held:132
 
  
In proceedings which might affect their lives and liberties, large numbers of South African citizens 
would, on purely fortuitous grounds, be unable to assert the expanding human rights guaranteed by 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution, including the fundamental right to a fair trial protected by section 
25(3). Such a result would be inconsistent with the international culture of constitutional 
jurisprudence which has developed to give to constitutional interpretation a purposive and generous 
focus … 
 
The generous interpretation was also followed in the Makwanyane decision.  Chaskalson P 
cited the Zuma decision and said that the approach followed in the Zuma decision should be 
adopted in the interpretation of the fundamental rights because, whilst paying due regard to 
the language that has been used, it is “ generous and purposive and gives expression to the 
underlying values of the Constitution.”133
 
 
8.5.4    Contextual interpretation 
The context in which the rights in the Bill of Rights must be read is the historical and 
political setting of the Constitution.  The provisions of the Constitution must be read in 
                                                                                                                                                     
   
129[1980] AC 319 (PC) at 328-29.   
  
130S v Zuma and Others supra (n 37) at para 14.  
 
131S v Mhlungu and  Others 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC).   
 
132At  para 15. 
133S v Makwanyane and Another supra (n 3) 203D. 
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context in order to ascertain their purpose.  South Africa’s political history plays a crucial 
role in the interpretation of the Constitution.134 In 2001, in Investigating Directorate: 
Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd:  In re Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit,135 the Constitutional Court, per Langa DP (as he was then) 
held:136
 
 
All law-making authority must be exercised in accordance with the Constitution.  The Constitution is 
located in a history which involves a transition from a society based on division, injustice and 
exclusion from the democratic process to one which respects the dignity of all citizens, and includes all 
in the process of governance.  As such, the process of interpreting the Constitution must recognise the 
context in which we find ourselves and the Constitution’s goal of a society based on democratic 
values, social justice and fundamental human rights.  This spirit of transition and transformation 
characterises the constitutional enterprise as a whole. 
 
In S v Makwanyane, the Constitutional Court expressed its support of contextual 
interpretation.  For example, in dealing with the question of whether the imposition of the 
death sentence could be regarded as constitutional, the court treated the right to life, the 
right to equality and the right dignity as together giving meaning to the prohibition of cruel, 
inhuman and degrading punishment in section 11(2) of the Interim Constitution.137 In S v 
Mhlungu, the Constitutional Court also expressed the importance of the text of the 
Constitution during interpretation.  The court, per Mahomed J, held:138
 
 
[S]uch an alternative construction would have to be based not only on the literal meaning of the 
words "as if this Constitution had not been passed" in isolation but, in its proper context.  The 
relevant context would be section 241(8)139
                                                                                                                                                     
  
 itself, section 241 as a whole and the larger context of 
134GE Devenish “The interpretation of the justiciable rights in South Africa’s interim Constitution” (1995) De 
Jure Vol 28 266; Currie and De Waal op cit (n 7) 153-54 and Botha op cit (n 116) 122-23.  
 
1352001 (1) SA 545 (CC).   
 
136At para 21.  
 
137Jordaan op cit (n 4) 665. 
  
138S v Mhlungu and Another supra (n 131) at para 8. 
  
 139Section 241(8) of the Interim Constitution read as follows: 
 
All proceedings which immediately before the commencement of this Constitution were 
pending before any court of law, including any tribunal or reviewing authority established 
by or under law, exercising jurisdiction in accordance with the law then in force, shall be 
dealt with as if this Constitution had not been passed:  Provided that if an appeal in such 
proceedings is noted or review proceedings with regard thereto are instituted after such 
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the Constitution regarded as a holistic and integrated document with critical and important 
objectives.  
 
Interpretation involves two enquiries.  First, the meaning or scope of a right must be 
determined, and then it must be determined whether the challenged law or conduct violates 
that right.140 In Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order141 the court held that the Constitution 
must be interpreted so as "to give clear expression to the values it seeks to nurture for a 
future South Africa."142 It has been said above143
 
 that most of the rights in the Bill of Rights 
are not absolute; they are subject to limitation in terms of the limitation clause. 
8.6 LIMITATION OF RIGHTS IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
It is said that constitutional rights and freedoms are not absolute.144 They may be limited 
only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom.  They have boundaries set by, inter alia, important social concerns such as 
preventing conduct that hinders or threatens to hinder the due administration of justice.145 
Section 36(1) of the Constitution sets out specific criteria for the limitation of fundamental 
rights in the Bill of Rights.  No law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights 
except as provided in section 36(1) of the Constitution.146
                                                                                                                                                     
commencement shall be brought before the court having jurisdiction under this 
Constitution. 
 Section 36(1) of the 
 
140Currie and De Waal op cit (n 7) 145.  
 
1411994 (3) SA 625 (E).  This case arose from a criminal trial before Hugo J in the Natal Provincial Division.  
In court it was heard together with the case of S v Mhlungu supra (n 131) which also arose from a criminal 
trial in the Natal Provincial Division.  Each of them came to this Court by way of a referral by the judge 
presiding over the trial.  In each case the judge referred to this Court for a decision on the question of  whether 
section 217(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 was inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993.   
 
142Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order supra (n 141) at 80-81.  
 
143See supra under 8.4, text at note 114. 
 
144See Devenish op cit (n 66) 179 and De Vos op cit (n 16) 142.  
145S v Singo 2002 (4) SA 858 (CC) at http://constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/567.pdf (accessed on 31 
March 2008) at 24 and Currie and De Waal op cit (n 7) 180. 
 
146Section 36(2) of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.  
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Constitution147
 
 provides: 
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including- 
 
(a) the nature of the right; 
 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
 
In this chapter, section 36(1)(b), which deals with the nature of the purpose of the 
limitation, is discussed.  It is said that a limiting measure must serve a purpose that all 
reasonable South Africans would agree to be very important.148 The importance of the 
purpose of the limitation is said to ask the society to determine whether the objective or 
purpose of the limitations serves the values of openness, democracy, human dignity, 
freedom, equality and other values enshrined in the Constitution.149 This is based on the 
proportionality test set out by Chaskalson P in S v Makwanyane.150 In this case the 
Constitutional Court held151 that the limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is 
reasonable and necessary in a democratic society involves the weighing up of competing 
values and an assessment based on proportionality.  The Constitutional Court held in S v 
Singo,152 that protecting the administration of justice at its broadest is a legitimate purpose 
of limiting the rights in the Bill of Rights.  In Shabalala v Attorney-General (Transvaal)153
                                                 
147The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.  
 
 
148Currie and De Wall op cit (n 7) 180. 
 
149S Woolman “Out of order? Out of balance?  The limitation clause of the Final Constitution” (1997) SAJHR 
Vol 13 No 1 110. 
 
150S v Makwanyane supra (n 3).  
 
151At 436B-G.  
 
152S v Singo supra (n 145) at 25.  See also Currie and De Waal op cit (n 7) 180. 
 
1531996 (1) SA 725 (CC).  See http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/2701.pdf (accessed on 31 
March 2008).  See also Currie and de Waal op cit (n 7) 180. 
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the Constitutional Court found that prevention of intimidation of witnesses is one of the 
legitimate purposes for the limitation of rights in the Bill of Rights. 
 
Two Constitutional Court decisions in which the protection of the administration of justice 
was held to be a legitimate purpose for limiting rights in the Bill of Rights are discussed 
here.  The first is Shabalala v Attorney-General (Transvaal).  Firstly, it is important to note 
that this case was decided in terms of the Interim Constitution.154 The facts of this case 
were as follows:  Shabalala and five others were charged with murder.  Before evidence 
was led, the accused applied for copies of relevant police dockets, including witnesses’ 
statements and lists of exhibits in the possession of the State.  The application of the 
accused rested on the submission that section 23155 read with section 25(3) of the 
Constitution, entitled them to access to such information as of right.  The then Attorney-
General of the Transvaal and the Commissioner of the South African Police opposed the 
application.156 The court a quo, per Cloete J, refused the application on the ground that the 
court was unable to conclude that the accused would not be given a fair trial if they did not 
have access to the police docket.157 Notwithstanding these conclusions, the court was of the 
view that the Constitutional Court, on a number of constitutional questions, should consider 
the ruling raised by the applications made on behalf of the accused.  The matter was 
referred158
 
 to the Constitutional Court for decision.   
The crucial issue that needed to be determined by the Constitutional Court was whether the 
“blanket docket privilege” from the pre-constitutional era could survive in a dispensation 
                                                 
154The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1993. 
  
155Section 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 provided: 
 
Every person shall have the right of access to all information held by the state or any of its organs at 
any level of government in so far as such information is required for the exercise or protection of any 
of his or her rights. 
 
156Shabalala v Attorney-General (Transvaal) supra (n 153) 1-2. 
 
157At 2-3.  
 
158In terms of section 102(8) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 
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with guaranteed fundamental rights.  Was the rule constitutional?  The Constitutional 
Court, per Mahomed DP, observed that the basic test in this matter must be whether the 
right to a fair trial in terms of section 25(3) included the right to have access to a police 
docket or the relevant part thereof.159 The court further held that there was overwhelming 
balance in favour of the accused person’s right to disclosure when there is no risk that such 
disclosure might lead to the disclosure of the identity of informers or State secrets or to 
intimidation of witnesses or obstruction of justice.160 It was held that in such circumstances 
any refusal to disclose the docket to the accused would appear to be unreasonable, 
unjustifiable in an open and democratic society.161 The court further held162
 
 that: 
(1) in the situation where the statements of witnesses made in circumstances where 
there was a reasonable risk that their disclosure might constitute a breach of the 
interests sought to be protected such as State secrets, methods of police 
investigations, the identity of the informers, etc., and  
 
(2) where the statements of witnesses made in the circumstances where their 
disclosure would constitute a reasonable risk that such disclosure might lead to the 
intimidation of witnesses or otherwise hinder the administration of justice  
to afford access to such statements to the accused may indeed impede the proper ends 
of justice and lead to the intimidation of witnesses.  
 
Mahomed DP held163
                                                                                                                                                     
 
 that the State may resist the accused’s claim for access to any 
document in the police docket on the ground that: 
159Shabalala v Attorney-General (Transvaal) supra (n 153) at 26. 
  
160At 39. 
  
161Ibid.  
 
162At 40.  See also K Malan Fundamental Rights: Themes and Trends (1996) E12-5.  
163Shabalala v Attorney-General (Transvaal) supra (n 153) at 60. 
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(a) such access is not justified for the purpose of enabling the accused properly to 
exercise his or her right to a fair trial, or 
(b) it has a reason to believe that there is a reasonable risk that access to the relevant 
document would lead to the disclosure of the identity of an informer or state secrets, 
or 
(c) there was a reasonable risk that such disclosure might lead to the intimidation of 
witnesses or otherwise prejudice the proper ends of justice.  
 
In S v Singo,164 the facts were as follows:  In 1996, Singo was arrested on charges of 
common assault and malicious damage to property.  He was released and warned to appear 
in court in January 1997 in terms of the provisions of section 72(1)(a) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act.165 He failed to appear.  He was arrested and dealt with in terms of section 
72(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  Section 72(4)166
 
 provides: 
The court may, if satisfied that an accused referred to in subsection (2)(a) or a person referred to in 
subsection (2)(b), was duly warned in terms of paragraph (a) or, as the case may be, paragraph (b) of 
subsection (1), and that such accused or such person has failed to comply with such warning or to 
comply with a condition imposed, issue a warrant for his arrest, and may, when he is brought before 
the court, in a summary manner enquire into his failure and, unless such accused or such person 
satisfies the court that his failure was not due to fault on his part, sentence him to a fine not exceeding 
                                                 
164S v Singo supra (n 145).   
 
165The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.  Section 72(1) provides: 
 
If an accused is in custody in respect of any offence and a police official or a court may in respect of 
such offence release the accused on bail under section 59 or 60, as the case may be, such police official 
or such court, as the case may be, may, in lieu of bail and if the offence is not, in the case of such 
police official, an offence referred to in Part II or Part III of Schedule 2- 
 
(a) release the accused from custody and warn him to appear before a specified court at a specified 
time on a specified date in connection with such offence or, as the case may be, to remain at the 
proceedings relating to the offence in question, and the said court may, at the time of such release 
or at any time thereafter, impose any condition referred to in section 62 in connection with such 
release.  
 
(b) in case of an accused under the age of eighteen years who is released under paragraph (a), place 
the accused in the care of the person in whose custody he is, and warn such a person to bring the 
accused or cause the accused to be brought before a specified court at a specified time on a 
specified date and to have the accused remain in attendance at the proceedings relating to the 
offence in question and, if a condition has been imposed in terms of paragraph (a), to see to it that 
the accused complies with that condition. 
  
166The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.  
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R300 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three months.  
 
He told the court that the reason for his failure to comply with the section 72(1) warning 
was that he had settled the dispute with the complainant; that they had reconciled and that 
they had agreed that both would appear in court in order to have the charges withdrawn.  
He further told the court that owing to a misunderstanding on his part, he went to work in 
Namibia.  The court rejected his explanation and convicted him summarily.167
He successfully appealed to the Venda High Court.  The court upheld his appeal and set 
aside the conviction and sentence.
 
168 It relied heavily upon the 2001 Constitutional Court’s 
judgement in S v Mamabolo (ETV) and Others Intervening169 in which the court had to 
consider, inter alia, the constitutional validity of a summary procedure in the context of 
contempt of court proceedings and advanced, inter alia, the following reasons for its 
judgement.170 First, section 72(4) contains an impermissible reverse onus which violates the 
right to be presumed innocent while the summary procedure envisaged in the section is 
inconsistent with a right to a fair trial guaranteed in terms of section 35(3)(a), (b), (h), (i) 
and (j) of the Constitution.  The ruling of the High Court was referred to the Constitutional 
Court, as the latter makes the final decision as to whether an Act of Parliament, a Provincial 
Act or conduct of the President is constitutional, and must confirm any order of invalidity 
made by the Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court, or a court of similar status, before the 
order has any force.171
 
  
The Constitutional Court was faced with the following questions:172
 
 
(a) whether the summary procedure envisaged in section 72(4) limits the accused’s 
                                                 
167S v Singo supra (n 145) at 6.  
 
168Ibid.  
 
1692001 (3) SA 409 (CC).  
170S v Singo supra (n 145) at 6-7.  
 
171In terms of section 167(5) of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
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right to a fair trial, more particularly, whether the phrase “unless such accused or such 
person satisfies the court that his failure was not due to fault on his part” limits the 
right to be presumed innocent and the right to remain silent; 
 
(b) if the right to a fair trial is limited, whether such limitation is justifiable in terms 
of the limitation clause (section 36(1)) of the Constitution; and 
 
(c) if any of the limitations imposed by section 72(4) are not justifiable, to decide 
upon what would be the appropriate relief.  
 
The court, per Ngcobo J, observed that the Mamabolo decision was distinguishable from 
the present case in that it was concerned with allegedly contemptuous conduct that occurred 
outside the court and after the termination of the relevant court proceedings.173 The court 
held:174
 
 
It did not deal with the kind of conduct which disrupts the orderly progress of judicial proceedings and  
which usually requires swift judicial intervention.  By contrast we are here dealing precisely with such 
conduct, conduct which requires swift intervention in order to permit the administration of justice to 
continue unhindered.  
 
 
The court found that during section 72(4) proceedings the accused enjoys the right to be 
informed of the details of the charge against him or her.  Therefore, the summary procedure 
does not limit the accused’s right to a fair trial.175
 
  
The court also held that section 72(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act limits the right to be 
presumed innocent and to remain silent.176
                                                                                                                                                     
172S v Singo supra (n 145) at 7-8.  
 The question was whether the limitation was 
173At 14.  
 
174At 14-15. 
 
175At 16. 
 
176At 24. 
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justifiable.  The court observed177 that the importance of effectively prosecuting conduct 
that obstructs the administration of justice cannot be gainsaid.  Failure to appear in court 
manifestly hinders the administration of justice and in order to ensure the proper 
administration of justice, such conduct must be dealt with swiftly and effectively.  The 
court held that “the incursion into the right to silence is justifiable”178 because section 72(4) 
pursues a pressing social concern.  It is aimed at preventing conduct that obstructs or 
threatens to obstruct the administration of justice.179
 
 
From the perspective of the crime of obstructing or defeating the course of justice the 
importance of this case lies in the fact that the court stressed the importance of the proper 
administration of justice in determining whether the limitation of the right is justifiable.  
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited in order to prevent the obstruction of the 
course of justice.  Therefore, the prevention of the obstruction of the due administration of 
justice is a constitutional imperative.  In other words, prevention of the commission of the 
crime of obstructing or defeating the course or the ends of justice can be a valid purpose 
finding justification for the limitation of fundamental rights 
 
8.7 SHOULD THE CRIME OF OBSTRUCTING THE COURSE OF JUSTICE BE 
EXTENDED BY THE COURTS? 
It may be argued that since the courts are vested with powers to develop the common 
law,180
                                                                                                                                                     
  
 they may extend the common law crime of obstructing the course of justice where 
the crime is inadequate to punish all conduct which has a tendency to interfere with the 
course of justice.  However, Constitutional Court jurisprudence acknowledges that when 
exercising their powers to develop the common law, courts should be mindful of the fact 
177At 24-25. 
  
178At 26.  
 
179At 28. 
180In terms of section 39(2) read with section 173 of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 
1996. 
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that the major role player for law reform should be the legislature and not the judiciary.181 It 
is submitted that judge-made law emanates from the Constitution because the Constitution 
delegated some legislative function to the judiciary.  This happens when the court lays 
down new law in a case before it.  It is said that such a rule is an exercise of legislative 
power.182 The case in point here is Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions and 
Another.183 This case dealt with the constitutional validity of the common law definition of 
rape to the extent that it excluded non-consensual anal penetration and it was gender 
specific.  The facts of this case were the following:  The accused, Masiya, was charged with 
the rape of a nine-year old girl.  Evidence established that the girl was penetrated anally.184 
Both the State and defence agreed that if the accused were to be found guilty he should be 
convicted of indecent assault.185 The court a quo, on its own accord, considered whether the 
common law needed to be developed to include anal penetration in the crime of rape.  The 
court a quo found that the definition of rape should be developed in order to promote 
constitutional objectives.186 The accused was convicted of rape in terms of the extended 
definition and was committed to the High Court for sentencing.187  The primary questions 
to be considered by the Constitutional Court were:188
 
 
(a) whether the previous definition of rape was inconsistent with the Constitution 
and whether the definition of rape needed to be developed; and 
(b) whether such development should apply retrospectively.  
                                                                                                                                                     
  
181See Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another supra (n 82) at 954.  
 
182AE van Blerk Jurisprudence:  An Introduction 1ed (1998) 33. 
 
183Masiya v Director Public Prosecutions and Another supra (n 78). 
184At 36C. 
  
185At 36D. 
 
186At 36D-37D. 
  
187At 38A.  
 
188At 42B-C. 
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With regard to the first question, it was argued that the definition perpetuates gender 
inequality and promotes discrimination.  The state further contended that the 
definition perpetuates leniency in sentencing.  The court found that the development 
of the common law is a power that has always vested in our courts and that this 
power is exercised in an incremental fashion as the circumstances of each case may 
require.189 The court also emphasised the fact that it is the legislature that has the 
major responsibility for law reform.190 The court also warned that the courts must be 
astute to avoid the appropriation of the legislature’s role in law reform when 
developing the common law.191 The court, per Nkabinde J, held:192
 
 
The inclusion of penetration of the anus of a female by a penis in the definition will increase the extent 
to which the traditionally vulnerable and disadvantaged group will be protected by and benefit from 
the law.  Adopting this approach would therefore harmonise the common law with the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights.  
The court held193 that the prevalence of sexual violence in our society is deeply troubling.  
Therefore, the extension of the definition of rape to include non-consensual anal penetration 
will not only yield advantages to the victim of rape, but will also express the abhorrence 
with which our society regards these pervasive but outrageous acts.  Nkabinde J, indicated 
that while the court was aware of the fact that the 2003 Bill (which led to the promulgation 
of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act)194
                                                 
189At 47C.  
 was before 
Parliament, it could not delay, defer or refuse to deal with an extension of the definition of 
rape when the facts before it demanded such an extension and when it was clearly in the 
 
190At 47D.  
 
191Ibid. 
  
192At 50C. 
  
193At 51H. 
  
194Act 32 of 1997.  This Act, inter alia, repealed the common law offence of rape and replaced it with a new 
expanded statutory offence of rape, applicable to all forms of sexual penetration without consent, irrespective 
of gender.   
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public interest to do so.  The court further held195
   
 that any further delay in or suspension of 
the extension of the definition of rape would constitute an injustice upon survivors of non-
consensual anal penetration such as the nine-year-old complainant in this case.  That result 
should not be countenanced. 
On the legality issue, the court held that if the definition of rape were to be developed 
retrospectively it would offend the constitutional principle of legality.196 The Constitutional 
Court deviated from its previous decision where in 1996,197 Kentridge AJ, held:198
 
 
In our Courts a judgment which brings about a radical alteration in the common law as 
previously understood proceeds upon the legal fiction that the new rule has not been made 
by the Court but merely ‘found’, as if it had always been inherent in the law.  Nor do our 
Courts distinguish between cases which have arisen before, and those which arise after, the 
new rule has been announced.  For this reason it is sometimes said that ‘Judge-made law’ is 
retrospective in its operation.  In all this our Courts have followed the practice of the 
English Courts … [I]t may nonetheless be said that there is no rule of positive law which 
would forbid our Supreme Court from departing from that practice. 
 
The court further held199
 
 that the principle of legality must not prevent the courts from 
developing the common law because that would undermine the principles of our 
Constitution which require the courts to ensure that the common law is infused with the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution. 
The extension of the scope of the common law crime of rape by the Constitutional Court in 
Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions and Another,200
                                                                                                                                                     
  
 to include, in addition to penile 
195Masiya v Director Public Prosecutions and Another supra (n 78) at 52A. 
196At 53F. 
 
197See Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at: 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1996/10.rtf (accessed on 08 August 2008). 
 
198At para 65.  
 
199Masiya v Director Public Prosecutions and Another supra (n 78) at 53F-G. 
  
200Masiya v Director Public Prosecutions and Another supra (n 78).  
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non-consensual penetration of the complainant’s vagina, such penetration of her anus, has 
been received with unease in academic circles, especially by Professor Snyman.201
 
  
Criticism of the Masiya decision is two-fold.  Firstly, it is argued that the Constitutional 
Court overstepped its judicial function and violated the principle of legality when it 
extended the scope of rape to include anal penetration.  In doing so the court usurped the 
function of the legislature.  Secondly, it is argued that the traditional definition of rape has a 
rational basis and does not discriminate unjustifiably against women, and therefore did not 
need extension. 
Section 35(3)(l) of the Constitution202 provides that every person has a right not to be 
convicted for an act or omission that was not an offence under either national or 
international law at the time it was committed or omitted.  Regarding the principle of 
legality, Snyman writes:203
 
  
This is part of the principle of legality in criminal law.  This principle implies, inter alia, that courts 
may not create crimes.  The general principle is iudicis est ius dicere sed non dare: the function of a 
judge is not to create new law, but to interpret existing law.  Otherwise a court infringes upon the task 
of the legislature, and in so doing violates the principle that the legislative and judicial functions of the 
state must be separated.  
 
According to Snyman,204
                                                 
201CR Snyman “Extending the scope of rape: A dangerous precedent” 2007 SALJ 677-78 and CR Snyman 
Criminal Law 5ed (2008) 46-47.  
 ‘developing’ in section 39(2) of the Constitution does not include 
any power to extend the scope of the existing crimes to encompass situations not covered 
by the existing definition.  He argues that the principle of legality is not limited to a 
prohibition upon the courts against creating new crimes, but extends further to include a 
prohibition against extending the legal definition or scope of existing crimes to include 
 
202The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
  
203Snyman op cit (n 201) 678. 
  
204Ibid. 
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situations which are not covered by the existing definition.205 He further argues that to 
extend the definition of the crime by analogy leads to legal uncertainty not only in the field 
of sexual offences but also in the field of other common law offences.206
 
 
This thesis respectfully agrees with Snyman’s arguments because overzealous judicial law-
making encroaches upon the legislature’s function and infringes the principle of legality 
which states that the courts’ function is to interpret, not to make the law.   
 
In 2008, Froneman J, in S v Mshumpa and Another 207 agreed with Snyman.  In this case, 
the vexing legal question was whether to shoot an unborn child with the intent of killing the 
child constitutes a separate crime of murder, besides the offence aimed at the mother 
carrying the unborn child.208 The court had to decide whether or not it may extend the 
ambit of the common law crime of murder to include the situation where X shoots the 
woman in the abdomen with intent to kill her unborn child.  A summary of this case is as 
follows:209 Best (accused number 2) was involved in a love triangle with Ms Shelver and 
Ms Jacoby.  Ms Shelver was 38 weeks pregnant.  Best approached Tukani for assistance to 
get rid of Shelver’s unborn child.  Tukani involved Mr Mshumpa (accused number 1) in the 
plot.  It was agreed that in order for the plot to look like a real robbery, Best would himself 
be shot in the shoulder during the so-called robbery.  In February 2006, Mshumpa executed 
the plan in the manner already described above.  The accused (both Mshumpa and Best) 
were indicted, inter alia, with the murder of the unborn child in the womb of its mother and 
attempting to defeat or obstruct the course of justice.210
                                                 
205Snyman op cit (n 201) 678-79 and Snyman op cit (n 201) 47-48. 
 The question was whether the court 
  
206Snyman op cit (n 201) 686.  
2072008 (1) SACR 126 (E) at http://www.legalbrief.co.za/filemgmt_data/files/Baby%20murder%202.pdf, 
(accessed on 10 September 2008). 
    
208At 2. 
  
209At 3. 
 
210Ibid. 
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should follow the Masiya211 decision where the common law crime of rape was extended to 
include penile penetration of the anus, and extend the definition of murder to include the 
killing of an unborn child in its mother’s womb.212 The court, per Froneman J, refused to 
prospectively declare that the definition of murder be extended to include such instances.  It 
held:213
 
  
[W]hether I should make a prospective declaration that the definition of murder should be extended to 
include the killing of an unborn child.  I think not … The appropriate development in respect of 
appropriately punishing third parties who intentionally harm or kill unborn babies may thus in my 
judgment be done within the ambit of existing crimes of assault against the pregnant mother … I am 
not saying that there is no merit in making the killing of an unborn child a crime, either as part of the 
crime of murder or as a separate offence, only that in my view the Legislature is, as major engine for 
law reform, … better suited to effect that radical kind of reform than courts.      
  
The doctrine of separation of powers requires that the functions of government be classified 
into legislative, executive and judicial legs and that the separate branches of government 
perform separate functions.214 This prevents excessive concentration of power in any single 
leg of government, including the judiciary. It is respectfully submitted that giving the 
judiciary excessive powers to extend the definition of crimes, will be dangerous in an open 
and democratic society like ours.  In terms of section 44 of the Constitution,215 the 
legislative authority of the Republic of South Africa is vested in a democratically elected 
Parliament.  Therefore, it is submitted that any extension of the ambit of the crime of 
obstructing or defeating the course of justice is primarily Parliament’s constitutional 
responsibility.  The legislature should lead the way in initiating law reform in this regard.  
This thesis relies on the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court where it held:216
 
  
                                                                                                                                                     
  
211Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions and Another supra (n 78).  
 
212S v Mshumpa and Another supra (n 207) at 28.  
213At 28-29. 
  
214See Currie and De Waal op cit (n 49) 20; Venter op cit (n 49) 39 and Yardley op cit (n 41) 61.   
 
215The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
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In a democratic society the role of the legislature as a body reflecting the dominant opinion should be 
acknowledged.  It is important that we bear in mind that there are functions that are properly the 
concern of the courts and others that are properly the concern of the legislature.  At times these 
functions may overlap.  But the terrains are in the main separate, and should be kept separate. 
 
 
In a constitutional democracy such as ours, the legislature and not the courts has the major 
responsibility for law reform and the delicate balance between the courts’ functions and 
powers on one hand and those of the legislature on the other should be recognised and 
respected.217 The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court218
 
 provides that courts must be 
careful to avoid the appropriation of the legislature’s role in law reform when developing 
the common law.  It is submitted therefore, that if there exists a need to extend the common 
law definition of the crime of obstruction of the course of justice, such reform should 
preferably be undertaken by the legislature. 
8.8 CAN THE ACCUSED CHALLENGE THE AMBIT OF THE CRIME ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS? 
What has to be established is whether the accused can challenge the ambit of the common 
law offence of obstructing or defeating the course of justice, because it is unconstitutionally 
vague and in violation of the principle of legality especially the principle which requires 
that crimes must be formulated clearly (ius certum principle).  This means that crimes must 
not be formulated vaguely or unclearly or widely.219 In S v Friedman,220 the accused 
challenged the constitutionality of the common law offence of fraud insofar as the courts 
have held that the prejudice does not have to be financial or proprietary, it may be potential 
and does not have to be suffered by the representee.221
                                                                                                                                                     
216See Ferreira v Levin No and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell No and Others 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) 
at 259, para 183 at: http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1995/13.rtf (accessed on 08 August 2008). 
 The facts of this case were the 
217See Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another supra (n 197) at 48 para 61. 
  
218See Masiya v Director of Public Prosecution and Another supra (n 78) at 21-22. 
  
219Snyman op cit (n 201) 36-37. 
 
2201996 (1) SACR 181 (W).   
 
221At 183e. 
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following:  The accused, Friedman, was one of six persons originally charged with fraud 
involving the smuggling of stolen, unwrought gold.222 Allegedly, the accused stole 
unwrought gold and platinum and fraudulently smuggled them to the United Kingdom and 
Switzerland as ‘scrap silver’ and/ or ‘scrap gold.’223
 
 The accused challenged the common 
law definition of ‘fraud’ and, in particular, the wide and vague concept of “potential 
prejudice,” arguing that this concept is not a just definition of the offence.   
He argued that the crime would punish the dishonesty of the misrepresentation without 
having sufficient regard to the effects of such misrepresentation.224 It was further argued on 
behalf of the accused that the crime punished an individual without weighing the actual 
consequences of an individual’s actions.  In the absence of actual prejudice which has a 
tangible form, like proprietary or some other species of definite harm, common law fraud 
amounts to an invasion of individual liberty and an infringement of his right to a fair trial as 
required by section 25(3) of the Interim Constitution (now section 35(3)).  The defence 
counsel argued that the proper approaches to the boundaries of the crime of fraud are those 
to be found at civil law where an actionable misrepresentation requires some species of 
loss.225
 
 He emphasised the causation element in civil law.  It was submitted on behalf of the 
accused: 
(1) that actual prejudice and not merely potential prejudice be proved, 
(2) that the prejudice be patrimonial, and 
(3) that the prejudice had to have been suffered by the representee and not by third 
parties.226
 
 
                                                 
222At 182c. 
223At 183i-j. 
  
224At 190e. 
  
225At 190h-i. 
 
226At 182g-h. 
 444 
It was argued that presently the crime amounted to an invasion of individual liberty and an 
infringement of a substantive concept of a fair trial as required by section 25(3) of the 
Interim Constitution227
 
 (now section 35(3).  
The court conceded that the present definition of fraud is wide, but that does not make it 
difficult and impossible to ascertain the type of conduct which falls within it.228 With 
regard to vagueness, the court held that the test for vagueness is the following:229
 
 
(1) is the law so vague that it does not qualify as a limit prescribed by the law?  This 
means whether the law is so obscure as to be incapable of interpretation with any 
degree of precision using ordinary tools, and 
(2) is it so imprecise that it is not a reasonable limit? 
 
In dismissing the application to quash the indictment the court held:230
 
 
I do not find the breadth of the common law definition of fraud repugnant to the provisions of the 
Constitution to which counsel has referred.  I find nothing objectionable in the approach which 
punishes fraud not because of the actual harm it causes, but because of the possibility of harm or 
prejudice inherent in the misrepresentation … I am unaware of any groundswell of opinion in the 
courts, among academic writers or the public at large, for reform of the definition of fraud because of 
perceived unfairness as to the manner in which the law as presently defined operates.     
 
With regard to the defence counsel’s argument that the proper approaches to the boundaries 
of the crime of fraud are those to be found at civil law where an actionable 
misrepresentation requires some species of loss,231
                                                                                                                                                     
 
 the court held that there is nothing 
inconsistent between the approach and the requirements of civil law.  The court further held 
227The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 
 
228S v Friedman supra (n 220) at 194b. 
 
229At 194d-e. 
  
230At 194h-95d. 
 
231See supra note 225. 
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that redress at civil law is, and should be, confined to persons who have actually been 
prejudiced, whereas it is not the function of the criminal law to satisfy individuals who have 
been wronged but to punish people who have transgressed defined norms.   
 
In United States v Cueto,232
 
 the accused challenged the constitutionality of the omnibus 
clause of section 1503 of the United States Code as being wide as applied in the indictment.  
The court ruled that the omnibus clause of section 1503 of the Code was intended to ensure 
that criminals could not circumvent the statute’s purpose by devising novel and creative 
schemes that would interfere with the course of justice but would nevertheless fall outside 
the ambit of section 1503 prohibition. 
Following these two judicial authorities it may be argued that any constitutional challenge 
by the accused of the scope of the common law crime of obstructing or defeating the course 
of justice would not succeed because: 
 
(1) the crime of obstructing or defeating the course of justice is not repugnant to the  
provisions of the Constitution, and 
 
(2) this crime is intended to ensure that criminals could not circumvent the law by 
devising novel and creative schemes that would interfere with the course of justice 
but would nevertheless fall outside the ambit of the current definition of this crime. 
 
8.9 SUMMARY 
Before the coming into being of the 1993 Constitution in 1994, South Africa had never had 
any legislative instrument even vaguely reminiscent of a supreme Constitution with a Bill 
of Rights and our constitutional law had been premised upon the British concept of 
parliamentary supremacy or parliamentary sovereignty.  When the Constitution of 1993 
                                                 
232United States v Cueto is discussed supra in Chapter Six under 6.3.1.4.3, text at note 167-175. 
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came into force in 1994 it marked the beginning of a new legal order in South Africa.  The  
Constitution did away with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and replaced it with a 
system where the Constitution became the supreme law of the country and any law or 
conduct inconsistent with it was invalid. 
 
(1) The core values of the Constitution.  The advent of the 1996 Constitution has 
impacted on most common law and statutory crimes.  Like any other crime, the crime of 
obstructing the course of justice protects certain core values which are found in the 
Constitution.  The coming into being of the 1996 Constitution placed new core societal 
values at the centre stage.  These core values are human dignity; the achievement of 
equality, the protection of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism, a 
democratic system of governance and supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law.  
The principle of constitutional supremacy is reinforced by an independent and impartial 
judiciary which has the power and jurisdiction to safeguard and enforce the Constitution 
and all fundamental rights.  Unlike parliamentary supremacy, constitutional supremacy is 
used in a legal rather than in a political sense.  Our Constitution is the supreme law of the 
land and any law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid.  It is a legal instrument, not a 
political document. 
 
(2) The Rule of law.  The doctrine of the rule of law is based, inter alia, on the principle 
of equality, which states that no person is above the law and that every person is subject to 
the jurisdiction of the courts.  The rule of law is one of the values on which the Republic of  
South Africa is founded.  It is among the core values enshrined in our Constitution that are 
relevant to the crime of obstructing or defeating the course of justice.  Obstruction of the 
due administration of justice is quintessentially against the South African democratic 
system of government.  This crime subverts the very judicial process on which the rule of 
law so vitally depends.  The rule of law depends, inter alia, on the judicial process which 
must run smoothly without interference from any person or organ of state.  By punishing 
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any conduct (such as intimidation of witnesses, alteration of documents, etc.) that interferes 
with a judicial process or proceeding, the crime of obstructing the course of justice protects 
one of the constitutionally enshrined core values, the rule of law. 
 
(3) The doctrine of separation of powers.  The doctrine of separation of powers, 
together with the rule of law and constitutional supremacy, runs like a thread throughout the 
South African Constitution.  The purpose of separating the functions of government is to 
prevent excessive concentration of power in a single person or body.   
 
(4) Independence of the courts.  The existence and operation of an independent 
judiciary dispensing justice without fear or favour and free from political pressure or 
influence constitutes an important element of the rule of law.  The principle of an 
independent judiciary goes to the very heart of sustainable democracy based on the rule of 
law.  Independence of the courts means that in the exercise of their powers courts are 
subject only to the Constitution and the law.  Functional independence protects the 
objectivity of judicial bodies and prevents interference with judicial functions.  Courts are 
protected from interference with the due administration of justice by, inter alia, the 
offences of contempt of court and obstruction of the due administration of justice. 
 
(5) Powers of the courts in constitutional matters.  The position of South African 
courts as constitutional adjudicators represents the high-water mark of judicial power in the 
sphere of law reform.  Section 173 of the Constitution read with section 39(2) of the 
Constitution empowers the courts to develop the common law appropriately where it is 
deficient in promoting the section 39(2) objectives.  It may be argued that our courts have a 
secondary lawmaking function which is enshrined in the Constitution.  Section 173 of the 
Constitution vested our courts with the constitutional powers to be the custodians of our 
common law.  In terms of section 173 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court, 
Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts have inherent powers to protect and regulate 
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their own process, and to develop the common law, taking into account the interests of 
justice.  According to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, in exercising their 
powers to develop the common law, the courts should be mindful of the fact that the major 
role player for law reform should be the legislature and not the judiciary.    
 
(6) The Bill of Rights.  The Bill of Rights is aimed at safeguarding human rights and 
bringing centuries of state sponsored abuse to an end.  The Bill of Rights forms part of the 
new Constitution, which was adopted by the Constitutional Assembly in May 1996 and 
certified by the Constitutional Court in December 1996.  This Bill of Rights is a 
cornerstone of democracy in South Africa.  It enshrines the rights of all people in our 
country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.  The 
state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.  The rights in 
the Bill of Rights are subject to limitation in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.   
 
Of significance to the discussion of the due administration of justice are the due process 
rights of arrested, detained and accused persons.  These rights are said to be part of the 
system of intrinsic values that must inevitably reshape the contours of a new landscape to 
which the administration of justice and the fight against crime must adapt.  Section 39 of 
the Constitution deals specifically with the interpretation of the Bill of Rights.  When 
interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every 
court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.  
The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are 
recognized or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that 
they are consistent with the Bill of Rights.  Section 39(1) is an exhortation to the courts to 
seek to discover the values underlying the Bill of Rights in interpreting its provisions.  It 
guides South African courts to the correct jurisprudential approach to the interpretation of 
the Constitution, in general, and the Bill of Rights in particular.  South African courts are 
indeed enjoined by section 39 of the Constitution to interpret the Bill of Rights so as to 
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promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and 
equality, and, where applicable, to have regard to relevant public international law.  Section 
39 also permits our courts to have regard to comparable foreign case law.  The 
Constitutional Court has laid down guidelines as to how the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights in particular should be interpreted.  These are textual, purposive, generous and 
contextual interpretations.  Constitutional rights and freedoms are not absolute.  They have 
boundaries set by, inter alia, important social concerns such as preventing conduct that 
hinders or threatens to hinder the due administration of justice.  They may be limited only 
in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom.  Any limiting measure must serve a purpose that all reasonable South Africans 
would agree to be very important.  The Constitutional Court held that protecting the 
administration of justice at its broadest is a legitimate purpose for limiting the rights in the 
Bill of Rights, including the right to a fair trial.  The State may resist the accused’s claim 
for access to any document in the police docket on the ground that there is a reasonable risk 
that such disclosure might lead to the intimidation of witnesses or otherwise prejudice the 
proper ends of justice.  The importance of effectively prosecuting conduct that obstructs the 
administration of justice cannot be gainsaid.  Conduct such as failure to appear in court 
manifestly hinders the administration of justice and in order to ensure the proper 
administration of justice, such conduct must be dealt with swiftly and effectively.  The 
incursion into the accused’s fundamental right to silence is justifiable if it pursues a 
pressing social concern such as preventing conduct that obstructs or threatens to obstruct 
the administration of justice.  Prevention of the commission of the crime of obstructing or 
defeating the course or the ends of justice can be used as a yardstick when determining the 
purpose of the limitation of fundamental rights.  If the purpose of the limitation of the right 
in the Bill of Right is to prevent the accused from obstructing the course of justice such 
limitation is justifiable. 
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(7) Should the crime of obstructing the course of justice be extended by the courts?  
In terms of section 44 of the Constitution, the legislative authority of the Republic of South 
Africa is vested in a democratically elected Parliament.  Constitutional Court jurisprudence 
confirms that in a democratic society the role of the legislature as a body reflecting the 
dominant opinion should be acknowledged.  Such jurisprudence further emphasises that it 
is important that we bear in mind that there are functions that are properly the concern of 
the courts and others that are properly the concern of the legislature.  According the 
Constitutional Court, at times these functions may overlap, but their territories are in the 
main separate, and should be kept separate.  Therefore, any extension of the ambit of the 
crime of obstructing or defeating the course of justice is mainly Parliament’s constitutional 
responsibility.  The legislature should lead the way in initiating law reform and legislate 
this crime. 
 
(8) Can the accused challenge the ambit of the crime on constitutional grounds?  It 
is submitted that constitutional challenge by the accused of the scope of common law crime 
of obstructing or defeating the course of justice would not succeed because the crime of 
obstructing or defeating the course of justice as presently defined is not repugnant to the 
provisions of the Constitution.  The current definition of the crime is intended to ensure that 
criminals do not circumvent the law by devising novel and creative schemes that would 
interfere with the course of justice, but would nevertheless fall outside the ambit of the 
current definition of this crime. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
9.1 GENERAL 
The study undertaken in this thesis demonstrates that any conduct aimed at the 
obstruction of the due administration of justice threatens core constitutional values.  
These values are: 
 
(1) constitutional supremacy, 
(2) the rule of law, 
(3) the doctrine of separation of powers, and 
(4) the independence of the courts. 
 
The question arises of whether the common law offence, as developed in South Africa’s 
pre-constitutional dispensation, targets all the types of conduct that may be undertaken to 
defeat or obstruct the due administration of justice and so jeopardise these core values.   
 
This comparative legal study reveals that various manifestations of conduct which have 
the effect of obstructing the due administration of justice have been criminalised in 
foreign jurisdictions in terms of comprehensive legislation. 
 
The conclusion of this thesis is that legislation needs to be introduced in South Africa 
which targets all forms of conduct which may defeat or obstruct the proper administration 
of justice.  It is submitted that such legislation is necessary to ensure the optimal 
protection of the relevant constitutional values.  Moreover, it is important to replace the 
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common law offence with clearly formulated statutory offences that will provide clear 
guidelines to our courts, and ensure legal certainty, legality and consistency in the 
prosecution of the offence. 
 
In this closing chapter, detailed proposals are made for law reforms which include draft 
legislation.  The proposal and draft legislation are preceded by a brief discussion of the 
relevant constitutional imperatives.   
 
9.2 CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVES 
It has been said above that, before 1994, South African constitutional law was based on 
the concept of parliamentary supremacy, whereby the Parliament of the day reigned 
supreme and the courts had no powers to review Acts of Parliament.1 Generally speaking, 
judicial officers were required merely to be positivist functionaries, who applied the law 
without any concern or consideration for basic principles of justice or human rights.2 
Cases where the state was involved, for instance, and more especially cases which 
touched on security legislation, almost inevitably resulted in pro-executive decisions.  As 
a result, the South African judicial system lost credibility and legitimacy.3 This changed 
in 1994 with the coming into being of the Interim Constitution of 1993,4
                                                 
1See supra Chapter Eight (n 1).  See also Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA; In re: Ex parte 
Application of the President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at para 40. 
 and later, the 
  
2S Mothupi “Transformation of the judicial system: The debate continues” Codicillus (2006) Vol 47 No 2 
6.  
 
3Ibid.  
 
4The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 
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Final Constitution5 in 1996.  The new Constitution is the supreme law of the land.6 The 
advent of the Constitution has had a dramatic impact on crimes in general, and on the 
crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice in particular.  It introduced 
constitutionalism which places the core constitutional values at centre stage.  These core 
values are said to represent the source from which the human rights dispensation is 
derived, and they give guidance when conflicting rights must be balanced.7
 
 The core 
values which the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice strives to protect, 
and which are discussed in this thesis, are (1) constitutional supremacy, (2) the rule of 
law, (3) the doctrine of separation of powers, and (4) the independence of the courts.  
This study has demonstrated that the values of constitutional supremacy and separation of 
powers underpin this crime.  This study has also demonstrated that some of the rights in 
the Bill of Rights may have to be limited in order to protect the due administration of 
justice. 
a. The rule of law.  In a constitutional democracy like ours, the courts play an 
important role.  It is argued that any conduct which is aimed at emasculating the courts of 
their authority subverts one of the fundamental values of our Constitution, namely, the 
rule of law.  Intimidating judicial officers is one of example of conduct which 
undermines the authority of the courts.  The existence and operation of an independent 
judiciary that dispenses justice without fear, favour or prejudice is an element of the rule 
                                                 
5The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
  
6Section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
  
7See Wessels op cit Chapter Eight (n 34) 52.  
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of law.8
 
 Therefore, punishing such conduct as defeating or obstructing the course of 
justice demonstrates what an important role this crime plays in protecting the 
constitutional imperatives, in general, and the rule of law, in particular. 
b. The doctrine of separation of powers.  This doctrine refers to the division of 
government responsibility into distinct branches in order to limit any one branch from 
exercising the core functions of another.  The aim is to prevent the concentration of 
power in a single branch and provide for checks and balances.9 It is argued that too much 
concentration of power in any one branch of government, including the judiciary, is a 
threat to our democracy, because the most powerful branch may end up usurping the core 
functions of the other branches.  A powerful executive, for example, may undermine both 
the legislature and the judiciary by implementing policies which are opposed to the 
legislation passed by Parliament and policies declared as unconstitutional by the courts.  
Unwarranted interference by the judiciary may occur when the courts turn down pieces of 
legislation passed by Parliament, and when the decisions of the courts make laws beyond 
what is required to give full effect to the Bill of Rights.  By so doing, the courts may 
unreasonably usurp the constitutionally mandated powers of the legislature and involve 
themselves in policy-making, and that amounts to a breach of the doctrine of separation 
of powers.10
 
 
                                                 
8See Mahomed op cit Chapter Eight (n 60) 111.  
 
9See at www.ncs/.org/programs/legismgt/SeparationPowers.htm (accessed on 21 December 2008). 
  
10See SA Dersso “The role of courts in the development of the common law under section 39(2): Masiya v 
Director of Public Prosecutions Pretoria (The State) and Another,” at 
www.saifac.org.za/docs/2007/Masiya%20Case%20note.pdf (accessed on 21 December 2008). 
 456 
It has been argued above that the doctrine of the separation of powers, trias politica, 
together with the rule of law and constitutional supremacy, run like a thread throughout 
the South African Constitution.11 This thesis further argues that this doctrine reinforces 
judicial independence in that no organ of state, including the legislature and the 
executive, may interfere with the functioning of the courts.  It is said that any jeopardy to 
the independence of the judiciary also affects the doctrine of the separation of powers and 
that the Constitution is devalued when judicial independence is undermined.12
 
 
c. Independence of the courts.  The independence of the judiciary is generally 
regarded as being an essential component of the democratic government.  This is spelled 
out in our Constitution which gives effect to internationally accepted principles and 
which have been applied in judgments of the Constitutional Court.13 In emphasising the 
importance of judicial independence, Chaskalson says:14
Historically, the generally accepted core of the principle of judicial independence has the complete 
liberty of individual judges to hear and decide the cases that come before them:  no outsider - be it 
government, pressure group, individual or even another judge - should interfere in fact, or attempt to 
interfere, with the way in which a judge conducts his or her case and makes his or her decision.  
This core continues to be central to the principle of judicial independence. 
 
 
 
                                                 
11See supra Chapter Eight, under 8.2.3. 
   
12See South African Institute of Race Relations “Constitution devalued when judicial independence is 
undermined,” at www.sairr.org.za/press-official/institute-opinion/Constitution-devalued-when-judicial-
independence-isundermined-html, accessed on 21 December 2008. 
  
13A Chaskalson “Comments made at the Gordon Institute for Business Science Forum on the independence 
of the judiciary” Legal Resource Centre (LRC) (20 August 2008) 1, at 
www.lrc.co.za/Articles/Articles_Detail.asp?art_ID=462 (accessed on 18 December 2008). 
 
14Chaskalson op cit (n 30) 2. 
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Actions by the executive that may be seen to make it seem that justice was not done are 
not actions which guarantee the independence of the courts.15 Section 165 of the 
Constitution provides that the judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the courts.16 
In order for the courts to use this authority impartially, as required by the Constitution, 
they must be independent from any kind of influence.  The independence of South 
African courts is guaranteed by the Constitution which is in line with various 
international instruments.17
                                                 
15I Farlam “Some aspects of judicial independence” Centre for Constitutional Rights: The FW De Klerk 
Foundation (31 October 2008) 1, at 
 They are independent and are subject only to the Constitution 
and the law.  Courts must operate free from any interference or influence from any 
person, including other judges or organs of state.  It is submitted that any improper 
interference with the functioning of the courts jeopardises the due administration of 
justice and may lead to the collapse of the rule of law.  Currently, such conduct is 
punishable in terms of the common law crime of defeating or obstructing the course of 
justice.  Again, by punishing conduct which is intended to defeat or obstruct the course of 
justice by interfering with the functioning of the courts, the common law crime of 
obstruction of justice is being elevated to a constitutional imperative. 
www.cfcr.org.za/?p=337 (accessed on 18 December 2008). 
  
16See the provisions of section 165 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 supra 
Chapter Eight (n 58). 
  
17This is in line with article 26 of the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights (The Banjul Charter) 
of 1986.  This article provides: 
 
States parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to guarantee the independence of the courts 
and shall allow the establishment and improvement of appropriate national institutions entrusted 
with the promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the present Charter. 
 
This article also imposes a strong obligation on the State.  The whole notion of human rights will become 
useless in a society where the judiciary is not independent.  Independence of the judiciary draws one’s 
attention to the principle of the separation of powers that should exist between the three main organs of 
government: the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. In order for these organs of state to function 
properly, they should be independent of each other.  The State, and particularly the executive, is a potential 
violator of human rights and seldom wants or agrees to be held responsible for its acts. Therefore, only an 
independent judiciary can curb administrative excesses. 
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d. Limitation of rights.  This study has also demonstrated that certain fundamental 
rights may need to be limited in order to protect the due administration of justice.18 X 
may be refused bail, for example, if there is a possibility that he may, inter alia, attempt 
to influence or interfere with witnesses or conceal evidence.19 This conduct at most 
defeats or obstructs the course of justice.  The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court 
also demonstrates that the protection of the due administration of justice is a legitimate 
purpose for limiting the rights in the Bill of Rights.  In the Singo20 case, the court held 
that protecting the administration of justice is a legitimate reason for limiting the rights in 
the Bill of Rights.  Also, in the Shabalala21 case, the Constitutional Court found that the 
prevention of intimidation of witnesses is one of the legitimate purposes for the limitation 
of the rights in the Bill of Rights.  In the Mamabolo22 case, the court observed that the 
importance of effectively prosecuting conduct that obstructs the due administration of 
justice cannot be gainsaid.  Failure to appear in court manifestly hinders the 
administration of justice and in order to ensure the proper administration of justice, such 
conduct must be dealt with swiftly and effectively.  The court held that “the incursion 
into the right to silence is justifiable”23
 
 in order to protect the due administration of 
justice. 
                                                 
18In terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
  
19See supra Chapter Seven under 7.5, text at notes 415 and 417. 
  
20See S v Singo supra Chapter Eight (n 152) at 25. 
 
21See Shabalala v Attorney-General (Transvaal) supra Chapter Eight (n 153) at 60. 
    
22See S v Mamabolo (ETV) and Others Intervening supra Chapter Eight (n 169) at 24-25. 
 
23At 26.  
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9.3 SUGGESTED REFORM OF THE COMMON LAW CRIME OF 
OBSTRUCTING OR DEFEATING THE COURSE OF JUSTICE 
9.3.1 The beginning and the termination of the “course of justice” 
As it has been argued in this thesis, law reform is mainly the domain of the legislature, 
especially if the ambit of the crime is extended.24
  
 Therefore, Parliament should take the 
initiative and introduce legislation which criminalizes the various ways in which the 
offence of obstruction of justice can be committed.  In the paragraphs that follow, various 
proposals are made for such law reforms. 
A comparative study undertaken in this thesis demonstrates that in most jurisdictions the 
course of justice is said to begin to run and may be prevented or perverted or obstructed 
or defeated before judicial proceedings are pending, while they are pending25 or during 
judicial proceedings.26 This crime may be committed after the perpetration of the 
principal crime, but before investigations into the crime have begun.  In other 
jurisdictions the scope of justice has been extended to include police investigations.27 
This trend is also followed in the United States of America.  In United States v Novak,28 
the court held that there was nothing in section 150329
                                                 
24See supra Chapter Eight under 8.3 and 8.7. 
 requiring a pending judicial 
 
25Under English law, see supra Chapter Three under 3.2, text at note 22.  
 
26See the Canadian law supra in Chapter Four under 4.2, text at note 705.  
 
27Under English law the matter is discussed in Chapter Two supra under 2.3, text at notes 252 and 261.  In 
South African law the matter is discussed supra in Chapter Seven under 7.2, text at note 77. 
 
28See the discussion of United States v Novak supra Chapter Six under 6.2, text at note 43. 
 
2918 United States Code.  
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proceeding.  In R v Wijesinha,30 the Supreme Court of Canada held that the phrase 
“course of justice” would include an investigation which could lead to legal proceedings 
being taken against a person. The Australian courts, on the other hand, have ruled that at 
common law the course of justice does not begin until the jurisdiction of a court or a 
competent judicial authority is invoked.31 Therefore, as a general rule, police 
investigations do not form part of the course of justice in Australia.32
 
 This thesis argues 
that the prevalence of the crime of obstructing the course of justice is a menace to our 
criminal justice system and to the rule of law.  Therefore, the scope of the crime should 
include interference with police investigations and conduct committed as soon as the 
principal crime has been committed, but even before it has been detected.  Clear 
legislation to this effect will bring an end to the uncertainty as to this particular aspect of 
the crime. 
It has been said above that no authority could be found in our case law where the court 
decided when “the course of justice” terminates for the purpose of this offence.  
However, there are two academic opinions as to when the administration of justice ends.  
Hunt33
                                                 
30See R v Wijesinha at 418e-h supra Chapter Five under 5.2.1, text at note 29. 
 says that the judicial administration of justice is completed after the court has 
pronounced its judgment and anything which delays or obstructs the execution of 
judgment is not proper subject matter for a criminal charge of defeating or obstructing the 
 
31See The Queen v Rogerson at 283 supra Chapter Four under 4.2 text at note 6 and James v Robinson at 
606 supra Chapter Four under 4.2, text at note 6. 
 
32See supra Chapter Four under 4.2, text at note 7. 
 
33Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 149. 
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course of justice.  However, Lansdown, Hoal and Lansdown34
 
 argue that the crime of 
defeating or obstructing the course of justice may be committed after proceedings have 
been concluded, for example, where a person contrives to effect the release of convicted 
prisoner, X, by wilfully, and falsely, filing an affidavit that states that Y and not X 
committed the crime.  
This thesis agrees with Hunt.  It is further submitted that in criminal proceedings, the 
course of justice terminates immediately after the court which finally deals with the 
matter has passed its judgment and, in cases where the accused is found guilty, after the 
sentence has been passed.  It is submitted that in civil proceedings the course of justice 
terminates when the court has made its findings with regard to the liability of the 
respondent or defendant and, if the plaintiff or applicant prevails, after the court has made 
an order, unless either of the parties launches an appeal. 
 
9.3.2 In which circumstances should an omission be punishable? 
As a general rule, in South Africa, an omission is punishable only if there is a legal duty 
upon somebody to act positively.35
                                                 
34Cf Lansdown, Hoal and Lansdown op cit Chapter Seven under 7.2, text at note 100.  
 If the legal duty is not created expressly in the 
legislation, the rule is that there is a legal duty on X to act positively if the legal 
 
35Snyman op cit Chapter Seven (n 1) 59 and HB Malcomess The Possibility of a General Omissions Clause 
for South African Criminal Law, Unpublished Dissertation for LLB, University of Stellenbosch, (2008) 5.  
For example, section 34 of Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 imposes a duty 
on certain persons to report corrupt activities; section 12 of the Protection of Constitutional Democracy 
Against Terrorist and Related Matters Act 33 of 2004 imposes a duty on a person who has reason to suspect 
that another person intends to commit, or has committed, a ‘terrorist’ offence or is aware of the presence at 
any place of a person who is so suspected of intending to commit or having committed such offence to 
report the suspicion to the police and, section 29 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 
imposes a duty on a person who carries on a business or who is employed by a business to report suspicious 
or unusual transactions regarding the proceeds of unlawful activities. 
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convictions of the community demand that there be such a duty,36 but at common law 
there is no general duty to act positively.37 Burchell points out that Parliament should not 
simply overturn the emphasis of the common law on individual autonomy by imposing 
legal duties to act positively “in a wholesale or piecemeal way so that the common law 
rule of no liability is completely undermined.”38 He points out that a general criminal 
liability, for example, for failure to inform the police of the commission or suspected 
commission of an offence would overturn the fundamental emphasis on individual 
autonomy in the common law, and would result in certain fundamental rights being 
infringed and established fault criteria being compromised.39 According to Snyman,40 a 
legal duty to act may sometimes arise by virtue of the fact that a person is an incumbent 
of a certain office, such as lawyers, medical practitioners, police officers, etc. In S v 
Gaba,41 for example, the court held that X, a policeman, was under a duty to disclose the 
identity of a person who was being questioned by fellow investigation officers and who 
specifically asked X to identify the person.  Police officers are also under a legal duty to 
prevent a person in their charge from being assaulted.42
                                                 
36See Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A) 597A-B; S v Gaba supra Chapter Seven (n 8) at 
751 and Snyman op cit Chapter Seven (n 1) 59. 
 It is submitted that a police 
officer’s failure to report a crime which he or she has seen being committed constitutes 
  
37J Burchell “A saga of snitches and whistleblowers: The boundaries of criminal liability for breach of 
statutorily imposed duties especially in the context of organised crime” (2008) Essays in honour of CR 
Snyman (ed by JJ Jourbet)  25.  
 
38Burchell op cit (n 37) 25-26. 
  
39Burchell op cit (n 37) 28. 
  
40Snyman op cit Chapter Seven (n 1) 60.  See also Burchell op cit Chapter One (n 1) 194. 
 
41See S v Gaba supra Chapter Seven under (n 8) at 751.  This matter is discussed under 7.1, text at note 18. 
  
42See Minister van Polisie v Ewels supra (n 36). 
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the crime of obstruction of justice if he or she intended to help the criminal to evade 
justice.43
  
 However, that should not be extended to an ordinary person, because that will 
violate an individual’s autonomy. 
A legal duty to act positively may also arise where a protective or a special relationship 
exists between the parties.  A person who occupies a protective or special relationship 
towards another may be under a legal duty to take steps to protect that person from 
harm.44 In 2001, in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another,45 the 
Constitutional Court held that the police owe a duty, derived from the Constitution, to 
protect the public, in general, and women and the vulnerable in particular.  The court held 
that the state may be delictually liable for damages for failure by the police to bring to the 
prosecutor’s attention any factors known to a police officer to be relevant to assist the 
magistrate to exercise his discretion, and failure by a prosecutor to bring necessary 
information known to him to be relevant to assist the magistrate to exercise his discretion 
whether or not to grant bail to the accused, where the magistrate released X, who was 
charged with rape, on his own recognisance instead of keeping X in custody where he 
could do no further harm.46
  
 
                                                 
43See also Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter One (n 1) 194.  
 
44Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter One (n 1) 191 and Snyman op cit Chapter Seven (n 1) 60. 
  
45This case is discussed in detail supra Chapter Eight under 8.3, text at note 82.  See also Burchell and 
Milton op cit Chapter One (n 1) 196-97. 
  
46See supra Chapter Eight under 8.3, text at notes 93, 94 and 95. 
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However, Burchell47
 
 says that there is a vast difference between imposing responsibilities 
on the State and individuals to protect persons, especially the weak and vulnerable, from 
violence and exploitation (or even to foster the protection of socio-economic rights) and 
imposing duties on the citizens of the State to assume the role of the State by reporting on 
the suspected and sometimes vaguely defined criminal activities of their fellow citizens 
on pain of criminal sanction.  He is of the view that a community of coerced informers 
will only serve to turn citizens against one another and impose additional strains on 
already overcrowded prisons by a process of over-criminalisation, without solving the 
underlying problem of poor detection of criminal activity. 
In English law, there is both academic and judicial authority to suggest that the common 
law offence of perverting the course of justice cannot be committed by mere omission.48 
In jurisdictions like Australia and South Africa,49
                                                 
47See Burchell op cit (n 37) 29. 
 failure to act positively (omission) may 
sometimes constitute the crime of perverting the course of justice if the court finds that 
there was a legal duty to act positively in the specific case.  In Australia, the statutory 
crime of perverting or attempting to pervert the course of justice may be committed by 
both positive acts and omissions.  For instance, in New South Wales and in Victoria, 
failure to report to the police that a serious indictable offence has been committed by 
another person constitutes a statutory crime of perverting the course of justice in certain 
   
48See supra Chapter Three supra under 3.1, text at notes 4 and 8.  
 
49See S v Gaba at 746 supra Chapter Seven under 7.1, text at note 8.  See also Snyman’s views op cit 
Chapter Seven (n 106).  
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circumstances.  Section 319 of the New South Wales Crimes Act50 punishes both an act 
and an omission intended to pervert the course of justice.  Section 105 of the Tasmanian 
Criminal Code51 also punishes any person who commits an act or omits to do something 
with intent to pervert the course of justice. In Hatty v Pilkinton,52
  
 for instance, the full 
bench of the Federal Court of Australia upheld the conviction of a lawyer who did 
nothing to correct the impression created when his client appeared in court under a false 
name. 
In South Africa, there are different opinions, both academically and in the case law, as to 
whether the crime of obstructing the course of justice may be committed by omission.  
Snyman confirms that the crime may be committed by either a positive act or an 
omission.53 There is case law to support Snyman’s view in S v Gaba54 and Minister van 
Polisie v Ewels,55
                                                 
50Crimes Act of 1900 (NSW).  The provisions of section 319 are discussed supra Chapter Four (n 143). 
 for instance, where it was observed that an omission might lead to a 
conviction of attempt to defeat or obstruct the course of justice if there was a legal duty to 
act positively, for instance where X acted in his official capacity.  It has been 
demonstrated above that other academic writers prefer to use the words “act” to define 
this crime, meaning that it can generally only be committed through a positive act and not 
 
51Criminal Code Act 69 of 1924 (Tas).  The provisions of section 105 are discussed supra Chapter Four (n 
314).  
 
52Hatty v Pilkinton at 158 supra Chapter Four under 4.3.1.4, text at note 78. 
 
53Snyman op cit Chapter Seven (n 1) 340. 
  
54See S v Gaba supra Chapter Seven (n 8) at 746. 
  
55See Minister van Polisie supra (n 36). 
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through a mere omission.56 This view has been followed in a number of cases, for 
example, this definition led to a decision in S v Oberbacher57 that a “positive act by the 
accused” is necessary before the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice 
can be committed.  In both S v Binta58 and S v Kiti,59
 
 the Oberbacher decision was relied 
upon and the court, on appeal, set aside the convictions of the accused charged with 
defeating the course of justice for refusing to allow samples of blood to be taken from 
them after having been arrested for drunk driving.  This thesis agrees with Snyman and 
the Gaba decision in that this crime may be committed by omission if the legal 
convictions of the society so require. 
It is submitted that the legal convictions of the community require that a person arrested 
for drunk driving should also be held liable for the crime of obstruction of justice if he or 
she refuses to submit to a blood test.  Driving while under the influence of liquor is one 
of the biggest threats to road safety in South Africa.  Statistics from the Department of 
Transport indicates that 50% of the deaths on our roads involved drivers with a blood 
alcohol level of above 0,05 per 100 milliliters.60
                                                 
56Cf Hunt op cit Chapter Two (n 7) 143 and Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 939. 
 Therefore, in order to address the legal 
uncertainty as to whether the provisions of section 37(2)(a) placed a legal duty upon X 
not to refuse to allow his or her blood sample to be taken and of whether or not a mere 
refusal to allow a blood sample to be taken constitutes a crime, Parliament introduced 
 
57S v Oberbacher supra Chapter Seven (n 108) at 818E- 819G. 
 
58This case is discussed supra Chapter Seven under 7.3.1, text at note 121. 
 
59S v Kiti is discussed in detail supra Chapter Seven under 7.3.1, text at note 135.  
 
60See Arrive Alive, at http://www.arrivealive.co.za/pages.aspx?I=1259 (accessed on 13 December 2008).  
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legislation which prevents such refusal.61
 
 It is submitted that police investigation into the 
deaths and injuries caused in road accidents embraces examination of, inter alia, the 
sobriety of the drivers concerned and the roadworthiness of their vehicles.  Such 
examination may disclose the commission of the offence of driving a vehicle, or 
occupying the driver’s seat of a motor vehicle with the engine running, while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor or of a drug having a narcotic effect.  Refusal to allow the 
taking of a blood sample may lead to X’s acquittal in the suspected offence of drunk 
driving.  Public justice requires not only that evidence be made available before a court 
and that evidence should not be concealed, but that every crime, including drunk driving, 
should be properly prosecuted.  Therefore, whoever refuses to allow his or her blood to 
be taken suppresses evidence and should be found guilty of the offence of defeating or 
obstructing the course of justice. 
As to whether or not compelling X to give a blood sample constitutes a violation of the 
right not be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence in terms of section 35(3)(j) of 
the Constitution,62 it is submitted that yes, it does violate that right.  Nevertheless, it is 
further submitted that such violation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.  The provisions of 
section 65(9) of the NRTA63
                                                 
61Section 65(9) of the National Road Traffic Act 93 of 1996 as amended.  The provisions of this section are 
discussed supra Chapter Seven under 7.3.1, text at note 142. 
 which prohibit the refusal to allow a blood sample to be 
 
62The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.  
 
63The provisions of this section are discussed supra Chapter Seven under 7.3.1, text at note 142. 
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taken, and of section 37(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act64
 
 which permits the taking 
of a blood sample, serve the public interest of preventing driving while under the 
influence of alcohol which, according to statistics, is the cause of 50% of road accidents 
and fatalities on our roads.  It is submitted that the public’s interest in the safety and 
security of the person should be accorded more weight in this case than the right of an 
accused against self-incrimination.   
It is submitted that such legal duty arises also where X occupies a certain office, whether 
public or private, where legislation imposes a duty upon X to act positively.  It is 
submitted that failure to prosecute such an omission may allow a guilty accused to escape 
conviction and that would scandalize our criminal justice system.  
 
In conclusion it is suggested that omission be punishable as obstruction of justice in the 
following circumstances: 
(1) Where there is a legal duty to act positively because X is an incumbent of 
a certain public or private office. 
(2) Where there is a legal duty to act positively because X stands in a 
protective relationship towards somebody else. 
(3) Where a statute places a duty upon X to act positively. 
The courts may find also, in other cases, that a legal duty exists.  However, it is submitted 
that no general liability for omission for the offence of obstructing the due administration 
of justice is needed in our law.  However, there are situations where failure to act 
positively should be punishable depending on the legal convictions of the society. 
                                                 
64Act 51 of 1977.  The provisions of this section are discussed supra under 7.3.1, text at note 120. 
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9.3.3 Quasi-judicial proceedings 
In South Africa, conduct intended to obstruct the course of justice, but which occurs in 
the context of quasi-judicial proceedings is not covered by the common law crime of 
obstructing or defeating the course of justice.  As a result, the core constitutional values 
this crime strives to protect do not receive full protection.  In administrative matters 
different bodies known as boards, commissions or tribunals have quasi-judicial 
jurisdiction.  Disputes are referred to them before they may be referred to courts. The 
comparative and historical study undertaken in this thesis demonstrates that any 
interference with either evidence or a witness during such quasi-judicial proceedings may 
have far-reaching consequences for the due administration of justice, especially if the 
decision of that quasi-judicial body is taken to court either on review or appeal.  In the 
foreign jurisdictions considered in this study, the crime of perverting or attempting to 
pervert or obstruct the course of justice may be committed in respect of quasi-judicial 
proceedings.  In R v Vreones,65 the English court convicted the accused of the crime of 
attempting to pervert the course of justice for altering evidence to be used in an imminent 
arbitration process.  In this case the court found that to manufacture false evidence for 
purposes of misleading a tribunal is a punishable offence of attempting to pervert the 
course of justice.66
 
  
In Canadian law, the crime of perverting the course of justice may be committed in 
“judicial proceedings.”  In terms of section 118(d) and (e) of the Canadian Criminal 
                                                 
65See a detailed discussion of The Queen v Vreones supra Chapter Two (n 116). 
  
66At 366-67.  
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Code,67 “judicial proceedings” include proceedings before an arbitrator or umpire, or a 
tribunal by which a legal right or legal liability may be established.  For example, in R v 
Wijesinha,68
 
 it was held that the scope of the “course of justice” includes the disciplinary 
proceedings of the Law Society. The court noted that most quasi-judicial or 
administrative tribunals commence with an investigation and such an investigation is an 
essential step in a quasi-judicial proceeding which may result in a criminal prosecution.  
Therefore, anyone who perverts the course of that investigation commits the crime of 
perverting the course of justice. 
In Western Australia, threats of any kind made to prevent or hinder people who are 
summoned to give evidence before a Royal Commission constitute the statutory crime of 
“perverting the course of justice.”69
 
 
Likewise, in the United States of America, there is authority for the proposition that the 
accused may be convicted of obstruction of justice for interfering with the following 
quasi-judicial proceedings: (1) investigation by the United States Probation Officer 
(USPO),70 (2) investigation by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),71
                                                 
67The Criminal Code of 1985.  See the provisions of section 118 of the Code supra Chapter Five under 5.2, 
text at note 14. 
 and (3) proceedings 
  
68See a detailed discussion of R v Wijesinha supra Chapter Five (n 46). 
 
69It is punishable in terms of section 128 of the Criminal Code Act 28 of 1913 (WA).  
 
70See United States v Novak supra in Chapter Six (n 43).  
 
71See United States v Ladum supra in Chapter Six (n 89).  
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involving the insurance business whose activities commence before any insurance 
regulatory official or agency.72
  
 
On the strength of the wealth of authorities mentioned above it is submitted that the ambit 
of the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice should be extended to 
include interference in respect of quasi-judicial proceedings where a legal right or legal 
liability may be established.  The ambit of this crime should be extended to include 
interference with, inter alia, the following quasi-judicial proceedings: 
 
(1) a disciplinary enquiry conducted by the South African Medical and Dental 
Council,  
 
(2) Boards of Inquiry in terms of section 101 of the Defence Act,73
 
 
(3) Commissions of Inquiry,74 proceedings of the National Assembly75
                                                 
72Section 1515(a)(1) of 18 United States Code.  
 and the  
 
73The Defence Act 42 of 2002.  Section 101(1) provides: 
 
The Minister, the Secretary for Defence, or the Chief of the Defence Force may, at any time or 
place, convene a board of inquiry to inquire into any matter concerning the Department, any 
employee thereof or any member of the Defence Force or any auxiliary service, any public 
property or the property or affairs of any institution or regimental or sports funds of the said Force, 
and to report thereon to make a recommendation. 
 
74Appointed in terms of section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.   
 
75In terms of section 56 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.  This section provides: 
  
The National Assembly or any of its committees may– 
 
(a) summon any person to appear before it to give evidence on oath or affirmation, or to 
produce documents.  
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National Council of Provinces,76 proceedings of provincial legislatures77 and 
proceedings of the National Consumer Tribunal.78
 
 
In all these proceedings, although they are quasi-judicial or administrative in nature, 
rights and liabilities are established.  Normally, outcomes of such proceedings are 
referred to courts by anyone who was the subject of the proceedings and who was not 
happy with the outcome. Moreover, criminal prosecution may follow such proceedings.  
It is submitted that the due course of law is obstructed where, for example, during a 
disciplinary enquiry conducted by the South African Medical and Dental Council, X, 
persuades Y, who is a witness to such proceedings, to manufacture false evidence in such 
proceedings in order to exonerate X.  If Y obeys X and on the strength of Y’s false 
evidence, X is exonerated of the alleged misconduct, there is no doubt that the due 
administration of justice has been defeated or obstructed.  It is submitted that if X and Y 
knew that the outcome of the current disciplinary proceedings may lead to court 
proceedings, and if the act or conduct was carried out with the intention to obstruct the 
                                                 
76In terms of section 69 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.  This section provides: 
  
The National Council of Provinces may– 
 
(a) summon any person to appear before it to give evidence on oath or affirmation, or to 
produce documents.  
 
77In terms of section 115 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.  This section 
provides: 
  
A provincial legislature or any of its committees may– 
 
(a) summon any person to appear before it to give evidence on oath or affirmation, or to 
produce documents.  
 
78Established in terms the National Credit Act 34 of 2005.  In terms of section 152(1) of the Act, an order 
of the tribunal may be served, executed and enforced as if it were an order of the High Court.  Its decisions 
are binding, inter alia, on a magistrate’s court.  
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proper administration of justice, X and Y would have committed the crime of conspiracy 
to defeat or obstruct the course of justice or of the attempt to defeat or obstruct the course 
of justice.  The underlying idea is that X should be prevented from misleading any 
tribunal with the intention of obstructing or defeating the proper administration of justice.   
 
9.3.4 Should wasteful employment of the police be punishable? 
A comparative study has demonstrated that in English, Australian and South African law, 
X does not commit the crime of obstructing or defeating the course of justice by merely 
making statements to the police falsely averring that a crime has been committed when 
no specific person is implicated.  In these jurisdictions the crime cannot be committed by 
the mere waste of police time and energy where there is no innocent individual who is 
placed in jeopardy of investigation, arrest and prosecution.79 Neither is an accused person 
guilty of an offence for refusing to admit to the police whether he or she is guilty of any 
suspected crime.80
 
 
From the above discussion it is clear that if X makes a telephone call to the police 
alleging that he has been hijacked and the police go out to investigate these allegations, X 
does not commit the offence of defeating or obstructing or attempting to defeat or 
obstruct the course of justice by merely wasting police time and energy.  However, this 
thesis argues that if the police, on the strength of X’s false allegations, go out, cordon off 
                                                 
79See Murphy op cit Chapter Three (n 67) 581; The Queen v Todd at 326 supra Chapter Four (n 19); 
Boister op cit Chapter Seven (n 64) 205; Burchell and Milton op cit Chapter Two (n 148) 942 and S v 
Bazzard at 307d supra Chapter Seven (n 25). 
 
80Williams op cit Chapter Two (n 90) 417.  In view of the right against self-incrimination in South African 
Constitution, a mere denial of guilty does not constitute unlawful obstruction of justice. 
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the area and search a few suspected houses, then innocent individuals are placed in 
jeopardy of investigation.  Therefore, X commits the crime of attempting to defeat or 
obstruct the course of justice although he or she, in his or her call, did not identify the 
individuals he claimed hijacked him.  X must at least have dolus eventualis − he or she 
must foresee the possibility that his or her conduct would place innocent individuals at 
risk of investigation and possible prosecution and he or she must have reconciled him− or 
herself to that possibility. 
  
Under Canadian law, wasting police time and energy and any diversion that 
unnecessarily takes police time and effort, is considered to impede or retard the course 
which the operation of justice would normally take, and amounts to a statutory crime of 
obstruction of justice for purposes of section 139(2) of the Code.81 This offence is 
committed by, inter alia, wilfully making a false report to the police tending to show that 
an offence has been committed.82 Under English law, the common law misdemeanour of 
wasteful employment of the police has been codified.  That conduct is now punishable in 
terms of section 5(2) of the Criminal Law Act.83
 
 It is submitted that in South Africa, too, 
we need law reform in this regard.  At present, such conduct is not punishable in South 
Africa, so it is submitted that such conduct be made punishable as a separate crime.  
 
                                                 
81Canadian Criminal Code RSC 1985 c-C46.  See the provisions of section 139(2) supra Chapter Five (n 
13).  See also Mewett and Manning op cit Chapter Five (n 11) 665. 
 
82Rodrigues op cit Chapter Five (n 11) 4-113. 
83Criminal Law Act of 1967.  See the provisions of section 5 of this Act supra Chapter Three (n 182).  
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9.3.5 Interfering with a witness 
A comparative study has revealed that in England and Australia, X does not commit any 
offence if he or she merely persuades a witness not to give false evidence or to persuade 
the witness to tell the truth, or honestly approaches a witness who has made a false or 
mistaken statement and by reasoned arguments supported by material facts, tries to 
dissuade him or her from giving perjured or erroneous testimony.84 However, if X uses 
improper means, such as threats or bribery, or even an otherwise lawful act like 
threatening to sue the witness for damages if he or she does not tell the truth, amounts to 
the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice because X is interfering with a 
witness.85 This conduct may also amount to attempted extortion.86 Threatening or bribing 
someone to tell the truth poses a potential obstruction of the due administration of justice 
because the witness does not give evidence voluntarily as he or she has been induced. 
The crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice also occurs if a witness is 
offered something in order to induce him or her to alter or withdraw his or her statement 
made with a view to the provision of evidence in support of criminal proceedings.87
  
 
9.3.6 Intimidating the accused to plead guilty to a crime 
Improperly persuading an accused person to plead guilty to a crime does not only 
interfere with the accused’s constitutional right to be presumed innocent, to remain silent 
                                                 
84Murphy op cit Chapter Three (n 66) 773 and R v Kotch supra Chapter Five (n 165). 
  
85R v Toney at 370A supra Chapter Three (n 86); Card op cit Chapter Three (n 1) 538 and Murphy op cit 
Chapter Three (n 67) 580-81. 
 
86The crime of extortion is committed when a person unlawfully and intentionally obtains some advantage, 
which may be of either a patrimonial or a non-patrimonial nature, from another by subjecting the latter to 
pressure which induces him or her to hand over the advantage. 
   
87R v Panayiotou at 115G-H supra Chapter Three (n 77). 
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and not to testify during the proceedings,88 but it also constitutes the offence of 
attempting to defeat or obstruct the course of justice.  For example, prosecutor X commits 
the offence of attempting to defeat or obstruct the course of justice when he or she, by 
improper means (e.g. through threats or intimidation), persuades the accused, Y, to plead 
guilty to an alleged offence that Y has allegedly committed, even if X believes that Y is 
guilty of the offence with which he or she is charged.  A plea made as a result of 
intimidation or threats has not been made freely and voluntarily, and any court that acts 
on that plea is misled and its proceedings have been rendered abortive.89 It is argued that 
this conduct undermines the due and proper administration of justice by the courts.  It 
cannot be said that intimidating the accused to plead guilty to a crime does not prejudice 
the accused, but X does not commit this offence if he uses lawful means (like the plea 
bargaining process)90
 
 to persuade Y to plead guilty. Likewise, an attorney does not 
commit this offence if he merely advises his or her client to plead guilty to the crime he 
or she is charged with. 
9.3.7 Obtaining bail by improper means 
It is submitted that as bail proceedings form a significant part of the machinery of our 
criminal justice system, the process that governs bail application and release on bail must 
not be interfered with lightly.  To obtain bail by improper means may constitute the crime 
of defeating or obstructing the course of justice.  The accused, X1, X2 and X3, commit 
                                                 
88Section 35(1)(a) read with subsection (3)(h) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.  
 
89See Meisseer v The Queen at 143 supra Chapter Four (n 65).  
 
90Plea bargaining refers to the tendering of a plea of guilty on the basis that there would be some agreed 
advantage for the accused, for example, that there would be a reduction in sentence, or a withdrawal of 
other charges.  
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the crime of conspiracy to defeat or obstruct the course of justice if, during X1’s bail 
application, they agree to lie to the court in order to secure X1’s release on bail.  In R v 
Baba,91 for example, the accused, X1 and X2, falsely presented X1 to the court as a co-
tenant of a house in order to provide security92
 
 which may enable X1 to be released on 
bail, and their conduct constituted obstruction of justice.  In these circumstances the court 
is misled by the accused’s conduct and, based on the misrepresentation, the court releases 
X1 on bail.  This thesis argues that such misrepresentation jeopardises the proper 
administration of justice because had there not been such misleading evidence, X1 would 
not have been released on bail. 
It is submitted that the constitutional core values protected by this crime are the rule of 
law and the independence of the courts.  The rule of law means, among other things, 
equality before the law.  It is argued that the concept of equality before the law also 
connotes that those who qualify to be released on bail should be released and those who 
do not should not be released.  Therefore, obtaining bail by improper means violates this 
concept.  In the above example, X interferes with the functioning of the courts.  Judicial 
independence simply means the right and the duty of the courts to perform the function of 
judicial adjudication through the application of their own integrity and the law, without 
any actual or perceived, direct or indirect interference from or dependence on any other 
                                                 
91See R v Baba supra Chapter Four under 4.3.1.3, text at note 72.   
 
92In terms of section 60(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.  This section provides that: 
  
The court may, on good cause shown, permit an accused to furnish a guarantee, with or without 
sureties, that he will pay and forfeit to the state the sum of money determined under subsection 
(1), or increased or reduced under section 63(1), in circumstances under which such sum, if it had 
been deposited, would be forfeited to the state. 
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person or institution.93 It is said that the principle of an independent judiciary goes to the 
very heart of sustainable democracy based on the rule of law.94
  
 Therefore, it is submitted 
that, in order to give full effect to the due administration of justice, particularly during the 
pre-trial stages of our criminal justice system, South Africa needs law reform which will 
punish any conduct intended to obtain bail by improper means as defeating or obstructing 
or attempting to defeat or obstruct the course of justice. 
9.3.8 Persuading a victim not to prosecute his or her assailant or persuading a 
person not to report an incident to the authorities 
Under Canadian law, persuading a victim not to prosecute his or her assailant or 
persuading a person not to report an incident to the authorities constitutes the crime of 
perverting the course of justice. 95 In R v Whalen,96
                                                 
93See Mahomed op cit Chapter Eight (n 60) 111.  
 for example, the court observed that 
an attempt to dissuade a person from reporting an incident to the authorities might 
constitute a way in which the offence of obstruction of justice could be committed.  The 
court further observed that it was irrelevant that neither formal police investigations nor 
judicial proceedings had been instituted.  In this case the accused were facing two 
charges of obstructing justice for: (1) dissuading or attempting to dissuade persons by 
threats or other corrupt means from giving evidence in judicial proceedings, and (2) 
dissuading or attempting to dissuade persons by threats or other corrupt means from 
reporting to the police incidents which they knew, or ought to have known, needed to be 
 
94Ibid. 
 
95Rodrigues op cit Chapter Five (n 11) 4-115 and Mewett and Manning op cit Chapter Five (n 18) 491.  
 
96See R v Whalen supra Chapter Five under 5.3.2, text at note 87.  
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dealt with by a court of law.97
 
  
The writer agrees with the R v Whalen98
 
 decision where the court said it was persuaded 
that in a society where the individual has the right to conduct his or her affairs 
independently of his or her neighbour, within the confines of the law, and someone 
attempts to dissuade him or her (through improper means) from reporting an incident, it 
may constitute an obstruction of justice. 
It has been argued above that, in South Africa, the course of justice begins and may be 
defeated or obstructed when the principal crime is committed and the police are 
investigating it, or even before the police have commenced with their investigation.99
 
 
Therefore, X defeats or obstructs the due administration of justice where he or she 
improperly persuades Y not to report a crime to the relevant authorities, like the police.  
X commits the same offence where he or she improperly persuades Y not to institute 
private prosecution proceedings against Y’s assailant where the state has refused to 
prosecute. 
It is submitted that the constitutional core value protected by this crime is the rule of law 
which requires that the administration of justice should run smoothly and unhindered.  
This can only be achieved if, among other things, crimes are reported, investigated, 
prosecuted, and the guilty are convicted and the innocent are acquitted.  The above 
                                                 
97At 218. 
98At 220.  
99See supra Chapter Seven under 7.2, text at note 78. 
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conduct encourages lawlessness which may erode one of the most important core values 
of our Constitution – the rule of law. 
  
9.3.9   Pleading guilty to a crime committed by another person 
This thesis has not found any precedent in our case law to the effect that X commits the 
crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice where, in judicial proceedings, he 
or she pleads guilty to a crime committed by Y in order to protect the latter from 
prosecution and subsequently from being sentenced if found guilty.  Academic writers 
have not addressed this matter either.  In England and Canada this type of conduct 
constitutes the crime of perverting the course of justice.100 This conduct is performed, in 
most cases, because either X feels pity for Y or the latter has promised him or her money.  
This conduct seriously offends the principle of public justice because the proceedings in 
court are conducted on a false basis.  As a result, the factually guilty Y will escape 
conviction and the innocent X will be judged falsely.101 It is submitted that if X is 
convicted and sentenced, X’s conduct also subverts the purpose of punishment.  It is 
further submitted that in terms of the retribution theory of punishment, the balance of the 
scales of justice can be restored only if the real offender, Y, is punished.  Also, the real 
offender, Y, cannot be deterred102
                                                 
100See R v Devito and Devito supra Chapter Three (n 52) and R v Doz supra Chapter Five (n 97).  
 from the commission of further crimes if the wrong 
person is being punished.  That state of affairs jeopardises the due administration of 
justice.  It is also submitted that where there is a prior agreement between X and Y that 
 
101See Hannah op cit Chapter Three (n 133) 759. 
  
102The idea of individual deterrence is to teach the individual person convicted of a crime a lesson, which 
will deter him or her from committing crimes in the future.  Generally speaking, the community is deterred 
from committing such acts by the threat of possible punishment. 
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the former will plead guilty to the crime committed by the latter in order to protect him or 
her from prosecution, they must both be charged with conspiracy to defeat or obstruct the 
course of justice. 
 
The writer argues that such a crime protects some core values of our Constitution namely, 
the rule of law and the independence of courts.  Pleading guilty to a crime committed by 
another person interferes with the proper functioning of the courts.  Therefore, it 
obstructs the due administration of justice by the courts.  It also jeopardises the rule of 
law by undermining the authority of the courts.  It is submitted that, in order to protect 
the rule of law and the independence of the courts by preventing people from pleading 
guilty to offences committed by others through pity or by receiving money to do so, 
South Africa can learn from jurisdictions such as Canada and England and reform the law 
and make the above conduct punishable. 
 
9.3.10 Picketing or parading or demonstrating with intent to impede the due 
administration of justice 
The historical and comparative study undertaken in this thesis has demonstrated that 
conduct which was punished as the common law crime of embracery, which means 
tampering with a juror or jury, is codified in other jurisdictions.  In the United States, for 
instance, there is legislation that prevents picketing, parading, or demonstrating near a 
court building or a building or residence occupied or used by a judge if such conduct is 
done with the intention of interfering with, obstructing or impeding, the due 
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administration of justice.103
 
 
In developing countries like South Africa, mass scale demonstrations, protests, marches, 
strikes and boycotts have played a powerful role in bringing about political and socio-
economic changes.  In South Africa, peaceful and unarmed assemblies, demonstrations 
and picketing are permissible in terms of the Constitution. 104
 
 Section 17 of the 
Constitution provides: 
Everyone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket a right and to 
present petitions.   
 
However, such assemblies, demonstrations and picketing must be done within the 
confines of the law – they must be peaceful and unarmed to qualify for constitutional 
protection.  Violence or intimidation on the picket line will result in forfeiture of such 
protection and expose the perpetrators to criminal liability.105
                                                 
103See section 1507 18 United States Code supra Chapter Six (n 198). 
 It is argued that there is a 
fine line between the constitutional right of people to assemble, demonstrate, picket and 
present petitions peacefully and unarmed and such conduct as may be intended to 
undermine the authority of the courts.  If, for example, a group of people hold a peaceful 
and unarmed demonstration outside the court while the proceedings are in progress, and 
they are carrying placards with written messages intended to intimidate a judge not to 
come to an independent decision and to intimidate witnesses not to testify, the group 
crosses the line of their constitutional right to assemble, demonstrate, picket and present 
  
104The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.  
 
105D du Toit et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 5ed (2006) 232. 
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petitions peacefully and unarmed and enters the domain of the crime of defeating or 
obstructing the course of justice.  This conduct has the natural and probable effect of 
obstructing the due administration of justice. 
 
Protection of the courts is a constitutional imperative.  Therefore, how can the courts be 
protected against picketing or parading or demonstrating with intent to disrupt or 
improperly influence judicial officers and witnesses?  Section 165(4) of the Constitution 
instructs organs of State to come up with legislation and other measures to assist and 
protect the courts and to ensure their independence.106
 
 Therefore, it is submitted that law 
reform is necessary in order to make it a crime for anyone who, with intent of interfering 
with, obstructing or defeating, preventing or delaying the due administration of justice or 
with the intent of influencing the court or any witness, pickets or parades or demonstrates 
outside the court. What should be criminalized is not picketing or parading or 
demonstrating outside the court, per se, but doing it with the intention of undermining the 
authority of the courts, and therefore, the due administration of justice.   
This thesis has argued, above,107
                                                 
106The provisions of section 165 are discussed in detail supra Chapter Eight (n 58). 
 that crimes do not exist in a vacuum, they bear 
relevance to the Constitution and that they protect certain core values found in the 
Constitution.  It is submitted that the crime of defeating or obstructing the course of 
justice by picketing or parading or using amplifiers with intent to disrupt or influence 
judicial officers, court officials or witnesses; will protect two of the most important core 
values of our Constitution − the rule of law and judicial independence.  The rule of law 
  
107See supra Chapter Eight under 8.1.  
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denotes the existence of public order which is backed by the authority of the courts in a 
given society.108 It is argued that the conduct mentioned above, if done with intent to 
disrupt or influence judicial officers, erodes the judicial authority which is vested in the 
courts in violation of section 165(3) of the Constitution.109
 
 In order to protect these two 
core values of our Constitution - the rule of law and the independence of the courts−law 
reform is needed to punish those who defeat or obstruct or attempt to defeat or obstruct 
the course of justice by means of the conduct enumerated above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
108See Mathews op cit Chapter Eight under 8.2.2, text at note 39.  
 
109The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.  See the provisions of section 165 supra 
Chapter Eight (n 58).  
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9.4 DRAFT BILL 
 
CRIMINAL LAW:  (DEFEATING OR OBSTRUCTING THE COURSE OF 
JUSTICE AND RELATED MATTERS) BILL 
______________ 
_________ 
_____________ 
 
PROPOSED BILL 
 
The aim of the proposed Bill is to give effect to the full protection of the due 
administration of justice and the core values found in our Constitution — namely, the 
supremacy of the Constitution, the rule of law, the doctrine of separation of powers and 
the independence of the courts.  The Bill proposes that – 
• all aspects of the law relating to defeating or obstructing the due course of 
justice be reviewed in order to bring all aspects of the law relating to 
defeating or obstructing the due course of justice into a single statute; 
• the common law offence of defeating or obstructing the due course of 
justice be repealed and replaced with a new statutory offence of defeating 
or obstructing the due course of justice applicable to all conduct which 
defeats or obstructs or attempts to defeat or obstruct the due course of 
justice; and 
• to provide for matters connected therein. 
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PREAMBLE 
WHEREAS conduct which defeats or obstructs or attempts to defeat or obstruct the due 
administration of justice is of grave concern in a constitutional state as it jeopardises the 
proper functioning of the criminal justice system of the country; 
WHEREAS the common law offence does not deal adequately and effectively with such 
conduct and some aspects relating to or associated with the commission of the offence of 
defeating or obstructing the course of justice; 
WHEREAS the due administration of justice is crucial for the protection of the 
Constitution by an independent judiciary; 
WHEREAS section 165 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 
vests the judicial authority of the Republic in the courts and provides, inter alia, for the 
independence of the courts and instructs organs of state, through legislative and other 
measures, to assist and protect the courts to ensure their independence; 
WHEREAS the courts are subject only to the Constitution and the law which they must 
apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice; 
AND WHEREAS section 44 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 
vests the legislative authority of the Republic in Parliament; 
BE IT THEREFORE ENACTED by the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, as 
follows:— 
 
 
 
 
 
 487 
INDEX 
CHAPTER ONE 
DEFINITIONS AND OBJECTS 
Definitions and interpretation of the Act  
(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise indicates– 
(a) “Board of inquiry” means any board of inquiry constituted in terms of any 
legislation to inquire into any issue in any state department; 
 
(b) “Commission of inquiry” means a public inquiry appointed by the President of 
the Republic in terms of the Constitution and any other law to inquire into an 
issue as determined by the President;  
 
(c) “Constitution” means the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of  
1996; 
(d) “Course of justice” means the administration of justice in judicial and official 
proceedings, and  
(i) commences immediately when the principal offence is committed 
whether or not investigation into it has begun (in criminal cases) or 
immediately when the cause of action arises whether or not a 
summons has been served (in civil proceedings), 
(ii) terminates when the court or tribunal which finally adjudicates the 
matter has passed judgement and if the accused is convicted after it 
has imposed a sentence. 
(e) “Court” means— 
(i) the Constitutional Court; 
(ii) the Supreme Court of Appeal; 
(iii) the High Courts; 
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(iv) the Labour Appeal Court; 
(v) the Labour Court; 
(vi) the Magistrates’ Courts; and 
(vii) any other court established in terms of an Act of Parliament.  
(f) “Judicial proceeding” means proceedings– 
(i) in or under the authority of the court; 
 
(ii) before a court, judge, justice, or coroner; 
 
(iii) before an arbitrator or umpire, or a person or body of persons 
authorised by law to make an inquiry and take evidence therein under oath 
where a legal right or legal liability may be determined; or  
(iv) before a tribunal by which a legal right or legal liability may be 
established; 
 
whether or not the proceeding is invalid for want of jurisdiction or for any other 
reason. 
 
(g) “Judicial officer” means a judge, a magistrate and includes a judge of the 
Court of Military Judges and the Court of a Senior Military Judge; 
 
(h) “Justice of the Peace” means a person authorized to take down statements 
under oath and confessions; 
 
(i) “Law” means the law of the Republic; 
 
(j) “Officers of the court” means defence lawyers, prosecutors, interpreters, and 
transcribers; 
 
(k) “Official proceedings” means proceedings before tribunals whose jurisdiction 
extends to the enforcement or adjustment of rights and liabilities in accordance 
with the Constitution and the law and whose procedure is judicial in character and 
includes investigations conducted by – the National Assembly, the National 
Council of Provinces and the Municipal Council, or a committee of the National 
Assembly or the National Council of Provinces or the Municipal Council thereof, 
that is authorised by the law to summon any person (both legal and juristic) to 
appear before it to give evidence under oath or affirmation or to produce 
documents; 
 
(l) “Person/s” means both legal and juristic person/s; 
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(m) “Police” means members of the South African Police Services, members of 
the Metro Police of different Municipalities and any police service established in 
terms of any law; 
 
(n) “President” means the President of the Republic;  
 
(o) “Republic” means the Republic of South Africa; and 
 
(p) “This Act” includes any regulations that may be promulgated in terms of this 
Act. 
 
Objects 
 
2. The objects of this Act are to give comprehensive and extensive protection to the 
proper administration of justice and the protection of core constitutional values related to 
the proper administration of justice by– 
 
(a) Enacting all matters relating to defeating or obstructing the course of justice in 
a single statute; 
 
(b) repealing the common law offence of defeating or obstructing the course of 
justice and replacing it with a new and extended statutory offence of defeating or 
obstructing the course of justice; and 
 
(c) bringing certainty to the prosecution of this crime.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Picketing and parading 
 
3. Any person who – 
 
(1) with the intent of interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the due 
administration of justice, or with the intent of influencing any judge, 
assessor, witness, or officer of the court, in the discharge of his or her 
duty, pickets or parades in or near a building housing a court of the 
Republic of South Africa or in or near a building or residence occupied or 
used by such judge, assessor, witness, or such officer, or with such intent 
uses any sound-truck or similar device or resorts to any other 
demonstration in or near any such building or residence, 
 
is guilty of an offence … 
  
Interference with judicial officers, assessors, witnesses and legal practitioners 
 
4. Any person who– 
 
(1) unlawfully causes or procures, or threatens or attempts to cause or procure 
any injury or detriment with the intention of inducing a person who is or 
may be – 
 
(a) a judicial officer or other officer of the court at judicial proceedings 
(whether proceedings that are in progress or proceedings that are to be 
or may be instituted at a later time); or 
 
(b) involved in such proceedings as a witness, assessor or legal 
practitioner, to act or not to act in a way that might influence the 
outcome of the proceedings,  
 
(2) unlawfully interferes or attempts to interfere with a judicial officer or other 
officer of the court at judicial proceedings in a manner not mentioned in 
subsection (1),  
 
to act or not to act in a way that might influence the outcome of the proceedings 
 
is guilty of an offence …  
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Concealing offences 
 
5. Any person who – 
(1) where any other person has committed an offence (either at common law 
or at statutory law), or knowing or believing him or her to be guilty of the 
offence, and that he or she has information which might be of material 
assistance in securing the prosecution or conviction of an offender for it, 
unlawfully does any act with intent to impede his or her apprehension or 
prosecution;  
 
(2) asks, receives, or obtains, or agrees to receive or obtain, any property or 
benefit of any kind for himself or herself or any other person, upon any 
agreement or understanding that he will conceal any offence;  
 
(3) offers, gives or agrees to offer or give, any property or benefit of any kind, 
to any person mentioned in ss (1), for the benefit of that person or any 
other person, upon any agreement or understanding that he will conceal 
any offence,  
 
is guilty of an offence… 
 
Attempts to obstruct or to defeat the course of justice or the due administration of 
the law 
 
6. Any person who – 
(1) attempts to obstruct or to defeat the course of justice or the due 
administration of the law in a manner not otherwise dealt with in the 
preceding provisions of this Act, 
is guilty of an offence … 
 
Fabricating evidence 
 
7. Any person who – 
 
(1) with intent to mislead any person involved in any judicial or official 
proceedings, 
 
(a) fabricates evidence by any means other than perjury or counselling or 
procuring the commission of perjury; or 
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(b)  knowingly makes use of such fabricated evidence; 
 
is guilty of an offence … 
 
Deceiving witnesses 
 
8. Any person who – 
 
(1) practices any fraud, deceit, or knowingly makes or exhibits any false 
statement, representation, token, or writing, to any person called or to be 
called as a witness in any judicial, or official proceeding, with intent to 
affect the testimony of such person as a witness,  
 
is guilty of an offence…  
 
 
Obstruction of justice administered by commissions of inquiry, boards of inquiry, 
inquiry by the National Assembly, National Council of Provinces, Municipal 
Council, etc. 
 
9. Any person who – 
 
(1)  threatens or in any way punishes, damnifies or injures or attempts to do 
the above, to any other person for having given or being about to give 
evidence in future in official proceedings by – 
  
(a)  a commission of inquiry; 
 
(b) a board of inquiry; 
 
(c) an investigation by National Assembly; 
 
(d) an investigation by the National Council of Provinces; 
 
(e) an investigation by the Municipal Council  
 
is guilty  of an offence… 
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Witness giving contradictory evidence 
 
10. Any person who – 
 
(1) being a witness in a judicial or in official proceeding, gives evidence with 
respect to any matter of fact or knowledge and who subsequently, in a 
judicial or official proceeding or tribunal, unlawfully and intentionally 
gives evidence that is contrary to his previous evidence, 
 
is guilty of an offence … 
 
Conspiracy to a bring false accusation 
 
11. Any person who – 
(1) conspires with another person to bring false charges against an innocent 
person while knowing that the person is innocent  
is a guilty of an offence… 
 
Conspiracy to defeat justice 
 
12. Any person who – 
(1) conspires with another person with intent to defeat or obstruct the course 
of justice, 
is guilty of an offence… 
 
Interference with evidence 
 
13. Anyone who – 
 
(1) unlawfully and intentionally destroys, mutilates or conceals, or fabricates 
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a record, document or other object or attempts to do so, with intent to 
impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in judicial or official 
proceedings, or; 
 
(2) with intent to mislead during judicial or official proceeding, unlawfully 
uses or attempts to use a record mentioned in ss (1), 
 
is guilty of an offence… 
 
Refusal to give or allow the taking of a blood sample 
 
14. Anyone who− 
(1) with intent to defeat or obstruct the course of justice, unlawfully and 
intentionally refuses to allow any medical officer of any prison or a district 
surgeon or, if requested thereto by any police official, any registered 
medical practitioner or registered nurse to take his blood sample as 
required by the provisions of section 37(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 
51 of 1977, 
is guilty of an offence… 
 
Persuading another person to plead guilty to a crime 
 
15 Any person who – 
(1) in order to protect the main perpetrator of the crime, improperly persuades 
another person to plead guilty to a crime, 
 
is guilty of an offence … 
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Obtaining bail with improper means 
 
16 Any person who – 
(1) with intent to defeat or obstruct the course of justice, improperly attempts 
to obtain bail for himself or herself or any other person 
is guilty of an offence … 
 
Persuading a victim not to report an incident to the relevant authorities or not to 
prosecute his or her assailant 
 
17. Any person who – 
(1) with intent to defeat or obstruct the course of justice, improperly persuades 
any victim of crime or any other person, 
(a) not to report the incident to the relevant authorities, or; 
(b) not to prosecute his or her assailant, 
is guilty of an offence … 
 
Pleading guilty to a crime committed by another person 
 
18. Any person who – 
(1) with intent to protect a person, pleads guilty to an offence committed by 
another person, or 
(2) with intent to protect another person, persuades another person to plead 
guilty to an offence committed by that person 
is guilty of an offence … 
 
Defeating or obstructing the due administration of justice 
 
19. Any person who – 
(1) performs an act whereby he unlawfully and intentionally obstructs or 
defeats the due administration of justice, or 
(2) omits to perform an act in circumstances in which there is a legal duty 
upon him to perform a positive act, whereby he unlawfully and 
intentionally obstructs or defeats the due administration of justice 
 
is guilty of an offence … 
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Wasting police time 
 
20. Any person who – 
(1) with intent to mislead, causes the police to enter on or continue an 
investigation by 
(a) making a false statement that accuses some other person of having 
committed an offence;  
 
(b) doing anything that is intended to cause some other person to be 
suspected of having committed an offence that he or she has not 
committed, or to divert suspicion from himself or herself; 
 
(c) reporting that an offence has been committed when it has not been 
committed; or 
 
(d)  reporting or in any other way making it known or causing it to be made 
known that he or she or some other person has died when he or she or 
that other person has not died,  
 
is guilty of an offence… 
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